

THE
PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC
DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE

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IN TWO VOLUMES.

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To

My Mother.

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CHARACTER AND CONDITIONS OF INDUCTION.

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Division

CHARACTER AND CONDITIONS OF INDUCTION.

CHAPTER XV.

• CHARACTER OF INDUCTION.

§ 1. **Transition to Induction.** We have seen that in actual life Induction and Deduction run into each other—Induction proving the material validity of abstract truths established by Deduction, and Deduction also supplementing and verifying inductive generalizations and showing their harmony. In passing from facts to laws, we employ the inductive method ; while, in applying these laws to new cases, we make use of the deductive method. We have seen also that, in syllogistic reasoning, at least one of the premises must be universal, which, if not a fundamental truth, must have been reached by induction. Thus, if we are not satisfied with the mere formal truth secured by deduction, we are inevitably led to inquire into the correctness of the data and thus into the inductive validity of the universal premise. If our end is truth in the full sense of the term—and not this or that form of truth—then we can never be satisfied with an examination of this or that type of reasoning, but we must inquire into the grounds of all reasoning contributing to a

Induction and Deduction supplement each other in conclusively establishing a truth.

Truth in the full sense can be attained when Deduction is aided by Induction.

Induction
inquires into
the (material)
truth of
universal
propositions
entering into
deductive
reasoning.

Character-
istics of
Induction

(1) Induction
establishes a
proposition
instead of a
notion.

In a complex
Notion, a
connection of
elementary
ideas is
assumed,
while in an
Induction, it
has to be
proved.

(2) In
Induction the

complex result. Hence the transition from Deduction to Induction is as natural and necessary as the passage from Induction to Deduction. Indeed they are but different aspects of the inferential activity. And, since we have discussed Deduction first, for its comparative simplicity, we must now pass on to the consideration of Induction, which supplies universal propositions, serving as premises of deductive reasoning.

§ 2. **Marks of Induction.** An Inductive Inference implies that we arrive at a universal proposition in harmony with facts, by observing a number of individual instances. It is a universal real proposition based on observation and established in conformity with the uniformity of Nature. Three points we should note in this connection :—

(1) What is established by Induction is a proposition as distinguished from a notion. A notion often involves but a single idea or quality, while an inductive proposition expresses a connection between two notions or terms. Sometimes, no doubt, a notion may be complex, involving a plurality of ideas or qualities, *e.g.*, 'man', 'matter', 'book'; and in such notions the ideas or qualities are evidently found connected. But there is a difference even between such a complex notion and an Induction. In a complex notion the connection is tacitly assumed, whereas in Induction the connection is open to question and has thus to be proved. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 1.)

(2) The conclusion in Induction is always more general than the data or premises: we observe

only a few cases, while the inference covers all similar cases. The essence of Induction lies, as indicated by Mill and Bain, in the leap or hazard involved in passing from the known to the unknown. If in any case there is no such leap, we cannot call it Induction proper. If, for example, on observing individually that every student of this class prepares his lesson, I conclude that all the students of the class prepare their lesson, it cannot be called Induction in the proper sense of the term. The conclusion here does not state more than what is given in the premises: the conclusion is but an epitome or summary of the instances observed. This form of Induction is described by Mill and Bain as Improper Induction. A true induction indicates that we pass from 'some' to 'all'—from the cases which are present before us to all similar cases, embracing the past, the present, and the future, the near and the distant, the familiar and the unfamiliar. Thus, when we conclude that 'all material bodies have weight' from 'some' known instances of the weight of such bodies, we argue inductively in the proper sense of the term.

conclusion is more general than the data.

(3) Induction must ultimately be based on observation. We have seen that formal truth or self-consistency is the end of Deduction, while material truth or conformity to fact is the end of Induction. A generalization not in harmony with fact is to be rejected as an extravagant hypothesis.

(3) Induction aims at material truth, and so it is based on observation.

§ 3. **Postulates of Induction.** We have seen in Chapter I, § 10, that Logic presupposes

Besides the general postulates of Logic

mentioned in
Chap. I, § 10,
Induction
assumes the
coherent and
systematic
character of
the world
with the
necessary
implications
of the Prin-
ciples of
Causation,
Uniformity
and Sufficient
Reason.

certain data without which there would be neither materials nor principles to proceed with. These ultimate data are, as we have said, (1) the mind or the subject, (2) the thing known or the object and (3) the relation between the subject and the object. In addition to these assumptions there are certain others in all Inductive inferences. We have seen that Induction aims at establishing universal real proposition from the particular facts of experience. It thus tries to discover the laws of nature which express general connections between several phenomena which would otherwise seem detached. It, therefore, assumes that there are fixed and definite relations in nature, that the world is not a chaos but a cosmos where every event has a sufficient reason or cause for its happening. This assumption is expressed in the principles of Sufficient Reason, Causation and Uniformity of Nature which are regarded as the ground of Induction. We have seen that all these principles are but expressions of Consistency or Identity. (*Vide* Chap. II, §§ 7-9). Law of Uniformity, for example, as found in Nature is really Identity in another form and Law of Causation as understood in science is based on the same principle. Similarly, the Principle of Sufficient Reason aiming to show necessary and identical connection between effects and causes or conclusions and data is but Identity differently expressed. Hence, the most general principle which lies at the root of all Inductions is the Principle of Identity.

§ 4. Perfect and Imperfect Induction.

A distinction has been drawn between Perfect and Imperfect Induction. An Induction is said to be *perfect* when a universal proposition is established after an examination of *all* the instances coming within its sweep. When, for example, we say that all the students of this class have prepared their lesson well after examining every one of them, then the induction is said to be perfect, because there is perfect assurance about the conclusion : when we have observed every case coming within the 'all', the universal conclusion cannot but be true. Hence, Aristotle regards Perfect Induction as 'formally valid' induction. An induction, on the other hand, is said to be *imperfect* when the universal conclusion is reached after a survey of only some of the instances, as when we say all the students of this class have prepared their lesson from a random examination of many of them. In an imperfect induction there can never be perfect assurance owing to the more or less precarious extension to all cases of what has been observed in but a few or many. Thus, what is called imperfect induction really illustrates induction proper—the leap from the known to the unknown, the passage from 'some' to 'all' ; while what is called perfect induction is scarcely an induction,—it is induction improperly so called, because it is a mere summation of known facts. Hence, Mill denies Perfect Induction the status of Induction at all.

Perfect Induction is based on an observation of all the instances coming within its range ;

while *Imperfect Induction*, on an observation of some of the instances,

Imperfect induction is really induction proper.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the terms perfect and imperfect induction have

The distinction between

Perfect and
Imperfect
Induction is,
however, not
uniformly
drawn by all
writers.

Fowler.

not been used uniformly by all writers. The above distinction was drawn by the scholastic logicians. Some modern writers, however, have used 'perfect induction' even in the sense of scientific induction or *induction proper*, while others have used it to cover all instances where there is room for certainty as distinguished from those where there is room only for probability. Fowler, for example, writes, "It sometimes happens that though we may be unable to establish a fact of causation between two particular phenomena, we may be able to show that some one phenomenon stands in a causal relation to some one or other of a definite number of other phenomena. Thus, supposing a vegetable to be transplanted to a distant part of the world, we may be able to assure ourselves, by excluding other causes of difference, that any new qualities which it may assume are due either to difference of climate or to difference of soil, or to both of these causes conjointly, though our knowledge may not enable us to assign amongst these alternatives the particular cause or combination of causes to which the effect is due. Now ought such an Inference to be classified as a perfect or an imperfect Induction? If we content ourselves with stating the alternatives, the inference should be regarded, so far as it goes, as a Perfect Induction; for within the limits stated the conclusion may be considered absolutely certain. But, if, on any grounds, we suppose one of these alternatives to be more probable than the others, and we state this as our

conclusion, the inference is, of course, only a probable one, and should rank as an Imperfect Induction. The same remarks will apply to those cases in which there is any uncertainty as to the nature of the fact of causation. If the inference be, say, that the two phenomena either are one cause and the other effect, or stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect, though we may be unable to determine which of the two is cause and which is effect, or are joint effects of the same cause (adding any other alternatives which the particular case may require), the inference is, so far as it goes, a Perfect Induction. But, if one or some only of these alternatives be selected, on any grounds short of absolute or moral certainty, to the exclusion of the others, the inference is only probable, and must be regarded as merely an Imperfect Induction." (*Inductive Logic*, pp. 222-223).

§ 5. Processes Simulating Induction.

Under this head come all those cases where we apparently generalize a law from the observation of a few instances, without really doing so. The following cases may be considered in this connection :—

(1) What has been described above as perfect induction is not really an induction, in as much as there is no advance in knowledge in such a case. Suppose we argue thus : The Calcutta University, the Patna University, the Dacca University, the Bombay University, the Madras University, the Allahabad University, the Punjab University, the Lucknow University, the Benares Hindu University, the Delhi University, and the Mysore University

(1) Perfect induction, being but a summary of the instances observed, is not truly an induction.

aim at the due education of Indian students ; but, these Universities are all the Indian Universities : therefore, all the Indian Universities aim at the due education of Indian students. Here the conclusion merely sums up what is said in the premises, without giving us any new information. It is but a compendious form of the original statements and not properly an induction.

The same remark applies to some forms of mathematical reasoning.

An analogous case is found in some forms of mathematical reasoning. When, for example, observing that a straight line meets the circle, the ellipse, the parabola, and the hyperbola only in two points, we conclude that the same thing is true of all conic sections, we cannot be said to reason inductively, since the conclusion only states briefly what is said separately in the premises.

(2) The proofs of Euclid, though apparently inductive are not really so, since they are but deductions from definitions, axioms, and postulates.

(2) The proofs of Euclid are sometimes regarded as Inductive : a certain truth is proved by reference to a particular diagram ; and subsequently it is generalized and believed to be true in every similar case. The angles at the base of an isosceles triangle, for example, are proved to be equal with regard to a particular diagram drawn on paper or board ; and what is found to be true in the particular case is next generalized with regard to all similar cases, *vis.*, all isosceles triangles. Mill calls such a process of mathematical reasoning '*Induction by Parity of Reasoning*' on account of the similarity (parity) of the character of reasoning in all such arguments. He, however, puts it aside as an 'apparent induction.' The argument apparently has the semblance of Induction, in as much as we proceed from the

particular to the general. When we closely examine the character of proof in such cases, we find that it is essentially Deductive. The proof is couched in general language and is applicable to this, that, or any other diagram. The diagram is meant merely to illustrate the proof which is essentially general and deductive in character. The proof really establishes a conclusion from definitions, axioms, postulates, and the truths established in the previous propositions. In such proofs, as Mill says, "the characteristic quality of Induction is wanting, since the truth obtained, though really general, is not believed on the evidence of particular instances." Thus, we see that Euclid's proofs are not Inductive but Deductive.*

(3) When on the observation of certain positions of a planet its orbit is discovered, the inference is taken by some to be essentially Inductive. When, for example, noticing the successive positions of Mars, we infer that it moves in an ellipse, it is contended that we proceed from the known to the unknown, from the particular to the general; and this is an important character of Inductive Inference. But we should remember that here we seemingly proceed from the particular to the general, while really we proceed from the general to the particular. If one be not familiar with the properties of an ellipse, then he can never possibly surmise

(3) The determination of the orbit of a planet from some of its positions is really a deductive inference, as it follows from a knowledge of the properties of a curve.

* When, however, a geometrical truth is established by a careful observation of several particular instances, the process is to be viewed as inductive and not deductive, as when we generalize that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal after measuring and comparing such angles in many cases. It then illustrates Induction by Simple Enumeration. (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 2.)

that the orbit of Mars is elliptic by observing some of its positions. In discovering the orbit, what we really do is to deduce the character of the orbit in the particular case from our general knowledge of the properties of the corresponding curve. The argument is thus really Deductive and not Inductive.* (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 5, Colligation of Facts).

§ 6. The Inductive Syllogism. Two ineffectual attempts have been made to reduce Induction to the Syllogism. Let us consider them separately.

(1) Aristotle tries to reduce an inductive inference into a syllogism of the third figure ;

(1) Aristotle tries to resolve an Induction into a Syllogism of the third figure thus :—

'Henry, Smith, Thomas, and others are mortal' ;

'Henry, Smith, Thomas, and others are all men' :

Therefore, 'All men are mortal'.

This syllogistic form is described by Aristotle as "proving the major term of the middle by means of the minor." Here the minor, middle, and major

* Dr. Venn observes on this point : "The only facts which the example supposes Kepler to have had before him were a finite number of observed positions, and these he had somehow to fill in. Now, as every mathematician knows, given any number of points we can conceive as many curves as we please each of which shall fulfil the condition of passing through all these points. The true path therefore was in no way given to observation in the sense that it only required to be recognized and named : it had on the contrary to be selected or guessed from amongst the infinite number of possible curves. If it were worth going into further detail it might easily be shown that 'induction' in both senses was involved. Not only was the constructive or originaive element demanded in a high degree (thus constituting the process an induction in Whewell's sense), but there was also that of generalization (thus constituting it induction in Mill's sense). What Kepler did was, from a finite number of observed positions to frame a rule for inferring all the intermediate unobserved positions, as well as those at any past or future time." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 354.)

terms are to be understood in denotation. The predicate of the conclusion ('mortal') is of the widest extent and may thus be said to be the major term. The subject of the conclusion—'men'—is of medium extent and may thus be said to be the middle term. The term which is subject in each premise is of the least extent and may thus be said to be the minor term. Hence in the syllogism the major is proved of the middle by means of the minor.

But the attempt of Aristotle may be taken as futile. When, for example, we take 'Henry, Smith, Thomas, and others are all men,' do we examine every human being? If so, the argument is not at all Inductive, for the general conclusion is then merely an epitome of the instances observed. We have seen that the essence of Induction lies in the leap from the known to the unknown which is possible only on the discovery of a general law. If there is no such leap here, there is no Inductive Inference; and so Induction is not reduced to Deduction (Syllogism). If, again, the given minor premise involves a leap from the known to the unknown, it can be effected only by a truly Inductive method and not by means of Deduction.

but the attempt is futile.

Again the Inductive Syllogism of Aristotle may be said, strictly speaking, to violate the rules of the syllogism. If we consider the syllogism, given above, we find that the copula 'are' in the minor premise means 'make up' or 'constitute'. The syllogism, accordingly, implies that each of the persons in the major premise is 'mortal' (the

major term), while the persons in the minor premise collectively constitute the class 'men' (minor term). Thus, the middle term 'Henry, Smith, Thomas and others' is used collectively in the minor premise and distributively in the major. Therefore, the conclusion 'All men are mortal' is *deductively* invalid as the syllogism involves the fallacy technically known as *the fallacy of composition*.

(2) The attempts of Aldrich and Whately to resolve induction into a syllogism are likewise unsuccessful.

(2) Aldrich and Whately try to resolve an Induction into the Syllogism thus :—'The men whom I have observed and the men whom I have not observed are mortal.' But 'All men are the men whom I have observed and the men whom I have not observed.' Therefore, 'All men are mortal.'

It is argued here that a universal conclusion may thus be arrived at by the syllogistic process. But the question at issue is—What is the ground of the major premise? We might have observed some men to be mortal; but what right have we to assume, without the help of Induction, that the men whom we have not observed are also mortal? The unobserved instances can be included in the scope of a proposition only when we take for granted the truth of the Inductive process.

An inductive argument may, however, be reduced to the syllogistic form with the uniformity of nature as major and

An inductive argument may, however, be reduced to the syllogistic form with the Uniformity of Nature as the major premise and the facts observed as the minor. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 1.) Thus, 'John is mortal, Smith is mortal, Brown is mortal, Henry is mortal, therefore all men are

mortal,' may be reduced to the syllogistic form thus :—

the facts
observed as
minor
premise.

What is true of several members of a species under certain conditions is true of all the members under the same conditions ;

Mortality is true of the several members John, Smith, Brown, and Henry of the species man under certain conditions, *i.e.*, when human nature is present in them :

Therefore, mortality is true of all members of the species man under the same conditions ; *i.e.*, all men are mortal.

§ 7. Relation of Induction to Deduction. We have seen that, in every valid syllogism, at least one of the premises must be universal. The function of the syllogism thus appears to be to interpret a universal proposition by reference to a particular case. When a universal proposition is thus assumed as a premise, it may be regarded as the outcome of prior induction. The way, then, in which we usually argue is first to arrive at a universal proposition by Induction and then to apply such a proposition to a definite or particular case. This explanation implies that Induction usually precedes Deduction. And, no doubt, as a matter of fact, universal propositions are mostly established by the application of the Inductive Canons or Methods ; only a few fundamental principles are assumed as axiomatic in Logic. But, if the question is raised as to the relative priority of Induction or Deduction, the question is not quite

Inductive
generaliza-
tions form
the premises
of syllogisms,
which
interpret them
by reference
to particular
cases.

Conflicting
views of the
relative
priority of
Induction or
Deduction.

easy to answer. In fact, different views have been held on this point :—

(1) Some (e.g., Mill) hold that Induction precedes Deduction ;

(1) Some (e.g., Mill) maintain that Induction must always precede Deduction. We first arrive at universal propositions by Induction ; and next we apply these propositions to particular cases by the Deductive method.

(2) while others (e.g., Jevons) contend that Deduction underlies Induction.

(2) Others (e.g., Jevons) contend that Deduction precedes Induction. The supporters of this view hold that the universal proposition is first suggested to the mind by imaginative insight as a hypothesis ; and, when this hypothesis is verified, it is regarded as an Inductive Generalization. Verification (*i.e.*, deduction of facts from a universal proposition or supposition) thus precedes Induction. To arrive at an Inductive Generalization, we must proceed, according to this view, thus :—
(1) Observation, (2) Analysis, (3) Elimination, (4) Hypothesis, (5) Verification (Deduction), (6) Induction.

The latter view seems to be plausible.

If we are to choose between these two views, the latter view seems to be plausible, so that in theory Deduction may be said to precede Induction. When from the observation of a few cases we pass to a general truth we can do so only by imaginatively connecting all such cases together and bringing them under a comprehensive formula applicable to them all. We never observe the general truth floating in the air, as it were. We merely guess it at the outset ; and it is only after verification that we accept it as a law governing facts. Thus, deduction, in the form of verification

seems to precede the inductive enunciation of a law or general truth. But we should remember that this deductive procedure is generally implicit and vague. In all difficult cases, we apparently employ first the inductive canons to arrive at correct generalizations, which subsequently become the starting points of further deductive applications and exemplifications. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 1).

§ 8. Induction as an Inverse Process.

Induction is sometimes described as an inverse process of deduction, as finding out from a few concrete cases a law or general truth from which such cases may be deduced. Instead of proceeding, as in the syllogism, directly from a general truth to a case illustrating it, we have in induction first to surmise such a truth from the observation of instances and then to deduce them from it for its verification before accepting it as a reliable generalization. A syllogism, as we have seen, may be likened to a hypothetical proposition, in which we proceed from the antecedent to the consequent, and not *vice versa*. In induction, on the contrary, we first pass from the consequent to the antecedent and then back again from the antecedent to the consequent in order to be sure that the supposed antecedent is really a ground adequate to account for the consequent. To explain some facts we are led to frame some hypothesis about a cause which is believed to be adequate to account for them; and, to be sure that this hypothesis is correct, we put it to test and see whether the result agrees with the facts to be explained. If this be the case, the

Induction is viewed as an inverse process of deduction, since a correct generalization can be reached only by the deductive verification of a previously suggested hypothesis.

hypothesis is taken to be an inductive generalization. Thus, if deduction is a straight and forward movement, induction may be viewed as a circuitous movement in which we move first backwards to reach a general truth by way of conjecture or hypothesis and then move forwards to verify it and so to establish it as a well-grounded generalization. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 9.) There seems to be a good deal of truth in this view of induction, which is advocated by Jevons, Sigwart, Bosanquet, and others in opposition to what is taught by Bacon, Mill, and Bain. Jevons, accordingly, observes—“It is the inversion of deduction which constitutes induction”. (*Principles of Science*, p. 12.)

It may, however, be mentioned here that Deduction and Induction are finally but two aspects of a fundamental inferential process which aims at systematizing or rationalizing experience. As rational creatures we can never be satisfied with detached facts ; we ever try to weave them together in a connected system by means of laws. Thus, an attempt at systematization may proceed either from the side of facts or from the side of laws : we may start with facts and try to discover the thread or law connecting them ; or we may start with laws and aim at their exemplifications. In the former case, no doubt, we have first to suppose a law and verify it by deduction of facts, before accepting it as a correct generalization. But our aim in both the cases is the same, *vis.*, to organize experience.

§ 9. Induction or Deduction as a Converse Process. Of the two processes of in-

ference, Induction and Deduction, one is sometimes said to be the converse of the other. Such a description, however, is only partially true. In Induction we pass from the particulars to the universal, from the less general to the more general, while in Deduction we pass from the universal to the particular, from the more general to the less general. But besides this contrast, there is another important point of difference between them which renders them quite distinct. In the former we aim at material truth and so examine carefully the validity of the data by an appeal to observation and experiment, while in the latter we aim only at formal truth and so accept the data as they are supplied to us. If in the one case by careful observation, variation of circumstances and elimination of accidental features we try to determine the material factors which are causally connected justifying generalizations in conformity with facts, in the other case we take for granted the premises furnished by the different branches of knowledge on their authority and only draw a conclusion which follows necessarily from the data according to the fundamental principles of consistency. Thus, the view that the one process is merely the converse of the other is only superficially true.

To describe induction or deduction as a converse process is only partially true.

§ 10. Importance of Induction. Induction, as we have seen, enables us to generalize a truth from the observation of some individual instances. Such a generalization is important in many ways :—

(1) We thus discover the laws of nature and bring together several phenomena which would

(1) Induction reveals the laws of

Nature,
thereby
unifying
phenomena.

(2) It is an aid
to memory.

(3) It is a
guide to
future inquiry.

(4) It finally
establishes
the inner
unity and
harmony of
the universe.

(5) It is
practically
useful as
indicating
future issues.

otherwise seem detached. Bacon conclusively proved the importance of Induction for scientific inquiry.

(2) We can thus remember the several instances far more easily than otherwise we may be able to do. It is not practicable for us to remember the numerous individual instances, illustrating a law, one by one. If, however, a law is established by Induction, we can remember, as it were, in a nutshell all that is involved in the law.

(3) The law or universal proposition serves as a formula or guide for future investigations. Subsequently the law may be applied to new concrete cases yielding a conclusion not suspected before.

(4) When, by careful and continued inductive research, we trace the several laws of Nature to a few ultimate laws, closely connected with one another, we discover the inner unity of the universe and understand its true character as a harmonious whole. The law of Conservation of Energy as the highest inductive generalization reveals the fundamental unity and close correspondence of the different departments of Nature.

(5) Induction is of great practical value, as it enables us to interpret the unknown by reference to the known and thus to secure results which may be of great moment to us. Without general laws to guide us, we cannot employ even deduction to determine an issue in a concrete case.

§ 11. Exercises.

1. Indicate the relation of Induction to Deduction, determining their place in scientific investigation,

2. Distinguish between perfect and imperfect induction. Which of them illustrates the true form of inductive inquiry?

3. Explain the characteristics of Induction, illustrating your remarks by examples. 'Induction by Parity of Reasoning is improperly called Induction'. Why?

4. Distinguish Induction proper from processes simulating Induction. Are the proofs of Euclid inductive generalizations? If not, when can geometrical truths be so regarded?

5. Explain and examine the view of Aristotle that "Induction is proving the major term of the middle by means of the minor".

6. Is it possible to reduce Inductive Reasoning to the Syllogism? Explain and examine the views of Aldrich and Whately.

7. Induction is sometimes described as the inverse process of Deduction. How?

8. Point out the importance of Inductive Reasoning. Who is the founder of Inductive Logic?

9. "Induction is the process of establishing general propositions, and deduction is the interpreting of them". Explain and illustrate this. Is the theory of reasoning here implied admitted by all logicians? If not, what other theory has been held?

10. You draw an isosceles triangle on a board, and prove that its two basal angles are equal, and then draw the conclusion that all isosceles triangles have their basal angles equal: explain the logical character of this conclusion.

11. Have the inductive and deductive processes of reasoning anything in common? What is common to them? In what do they differ?

CHAPTER XVI.

THE INDUCTIVE PROCESS.

§ 1. **Complexity of Phenomena.** We have seen that Logic has nothing to do with an inquiry into the real character of things (which comes within the province of Metaphysics); it is concerned only with facts or phenomena as they are presented to our mind. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.) Most of the facts so presented are, however, of a complex nature; so that they must be broken up or analysed into their constituent elements, before we can arrive at a universal proposition. Given any object, say, 'man' or 'metal', we can form universal propositions about it in various ways by dwelling on its different features. We may, for example, say 'men are mortal,' 'men are imperfect,' 'men are intelligent,' 'men are social beings,' 'men are created,' and so on. Similarly, we can say that 'metals are heavy,' 'metals are elements,' 'metals are extended,' 'metals are material bodies,' and so forth. All these general statements imply that we select some one feature from among many, which becomes the ground of inference in any case. Inference, as we have seen, is always based on similarity (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 1); and this is prominently illustrated in Induction. To generalize is to select a common feature, which is viewed apart from other factors going with it. And,

As the phenomena which we have to observe are more or less complex, inductive generalizations always involve analysis and abstraction.

considering the complexity of most of the facts of experience, we may form, with regard to any object or event, numerous universal propositions by reference to its different aspects or relations.

Though, however, theoretically we may form innumerable universal propositions with regard to any case, yet all of them are not practically useful. That 'metals are material bodies,' that 'men are not horses,' that 'umbrellas are extended' are general propositions, no doubt; but they are of no practical utility. Thus verbal propositions, as merely unfolding the meanings of the subject, are practically useless; and so they are excluded from Induction proper. Induction, as we have seen, is a real proposition, based on observation and applicable to all facts of a kindred nature. But all real propositions are not equally important or useful always. That 'gold is malleable,' that 'it is ductile,' that 'it is found in the Transvaal' are all real propositions; but they are not equally useful in every case. That 'quinine cures ague' and that 'quinine is bitter' are both universal propositions; but they are not equally important always. Hence the business of true induction is to employ special means for discovering deep-seated relations or connections of things and phenomena for definite purposes.

§ 2 The Inductive Problem. We know that an Induction is a universal real proposition based on observation and in harmony with the Uniformity of Nature. In every case of induction we generalize a relation between two notions or facts. Now, the possible relationships which are

The aim of induction is to establish useful real propositions by reference to fundamental or deep-seated connections.

Induction aims at establishing universal real propositions. Universal propositions express any one of three relations :

(1) co-existence, (2) succession, and (3) equality or inequality.

generalized are ultimately resolvable into three, namely,—(1) Co-existence, (2) Succession, and (3) Equality or Inequality. All possible generalizations must involve a reference to some one of these three forms of relation.

(1) Bare co-existence does not justify the inductive leap from the known to the unknown.

(1) With regard to the relation of Co-existence, whether in time or space, it may be mentioned that there is no ground for proceeding from the known to the unknown, which is the essence of all Induction. We may, for example, observe two things or qualities together, but if we cannot trace the relation of co-existence to causation, we can never generalize the connection from the observation of a few instances. Hence is it that Bain remarks, "There is a blankness of resources in regard to the proper laws of Co-existence; their Logic is speedily exhausted." (*Induction*, p. 10.)

(2) Succession is either (a) variable or (b) invariable. (a) Variable succession can never be a ground of generalization. (b) Invariable succession, involving causation, is the ground of true Induction.

(2) A relation of Succession may be either variable or invariable. (a) Variable succession can evidently never constitute the ground of Inductive generalization: what varies from instance to instance can never possibly be generalized or pronounced as uniform. (b) Invariable succession is especially illustrated in Causation: the cause of an event is its immediate, unconditional, and invariable antecedent. The cause invariably precedes the effect. If, in certain instances of invariable succession, we discover the causal connection, then evidently we can generalize the relation, relying on it. The Inductive Problem is thus practically restricted to the discovery of the causal connection of facts or phenomena.

(3) It may be mentioned here that the relation of Equality or Inequality, which constitutes the proper subject-matter of mathematics, follows in most cases from mathematical axioms. Hence such a generalization illustrates rather the Deductive Method. If, however, it be contended with the empiricists (like Mill, Bain, and others) that the mathematical axioms are themselves the outcome of generalization from experience, then such generalizations must necessarily be as much uncertain as generalizations resting on co-existence. By observing the relation of equality or inequality in some cases, we are not quite justified in generalizing such a relation, when we are not aware of a causal connection. Thus, the Inductive Problem, as mentioned above, is confined to the establishment of the causal connection alone.

Though the Inductive Problem is thus limited to the establishment of causal connection among phenomena, yet we find that it may be presented in two different forms : (a) either a cause may be given, and we try to find out its effect ; or (b) the effect may be given, and we try to discover its cause.

(a) In the first form of inductive inquiry we may by direct observation or experiment find out the effect which follows from the given cause and thus generalize the relation between them. Of course, it should be remembered that, in dangerous cases, it would not be wise to have recourse to experiment. In such cases, we should mainly depend on observation ; and, in complex instances, we may have recourse to the Deductive Method,

(3) A relation of equality or inequality is either a deduction from axioms or is precarious like relations of co-existence.

The inductive problem is thus restricted to the discernment of the causal relation.

The inductive problem wears two forms :

(a) an inquiry from cause to effect, or (b) an inquiry from effect to cause.

(a) In the first form, we may often find out the effect by experiment.

by calculating the consequences which are likely to follow from the given causes.

(b) In the second form, we suppose a cause and then see by the employment of the experimental methods whether the effect follows from it.

In solving an inductive problem we thus always proceed from cause (given or supposed) to effect.

(b) In the second form of inductive inquiry, it is not possible for us to go backwards and thus to find out the cause which actually gave rise to the effect. As Mr. Read puts it, "The past cause can never be recovered either by Nature or by Magic". In such cases we are driven to suppose a cause which might have produced the effect. The supposition or hypothesis, as it is called in Logic, is next tested by the Inductive Canons with a view to verification. Thus, though the Inductive Problem may be presented in either of two forms, yet its solution must always be in one direction, from cause—real or supposed—to effect.

§ 3. History of the Inductive Problem.

We have seen in the last section that Induction aims at arriving at a universal proposition which extends beyond the range of our particular experience and is more than a mere probability. It enquires how from one or more cases we come to a law which holds good in all cases of the same kind. When we look back for its history we find Aristotle describing it as a process of ascending from the particulars to the universal. He says that we establish a universal proposition by reference to all the particular instances illustrating it. According to him to show that an Induction is formally valid all the instances under it must be cited. This he considers possible with the help of a syllogism, commonly known as Inductive Syllogism, *e.g.*,

Aristotle.

The cow, the buffalo, the sheep, etc., ruminates,
 The cow, the buffalo, the sheep, etc., are horned
 animals,

∴ All horned animals ruminates (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 6). This kind of inference, called by Aristotle Induction, is usually known as Perfect Induction and is really deductive rather than inductive.

The Scholastic and Mediæval Logicians used Induction to mean a summation of particular instances, *e.g.*, concluding a certain class of things to possess a certain quality after finding it in all the members of the class. Such an inference was called by the Scholastics Perfect Induction as distinguished from what they called Imperfect Induction where a universal conclusion is drawn on an observation of some like instances. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 4). Thus, according to them the essence of Induction consists in the enumeration of instances. Now, the so-called Perfect Induction cannot properly be called an Inference which implies a progress from the known to the unknown as in it the conclusion is merely a re-assertion of the premises, a short-hand registration, as it were, of observed facts. The so-called Imperfect Induction also is uncertain due to its exposure to the risk of a contradictory instance. Moreover, these inductions cannot yield universal propositions which imply necessary or causal relation. Hence the opposition of Bacon and Mill to such kinds of Induction.

Bacon said that Induction cannot be entirely a process of enumeration which "is a puerile thing

Scholastics.

Bacon.

exposed to the danger from a contradictory instance." The object of Induction is the attainment of the knowledge of causes which is the basis of all true generalizations. The methods of such Induction are to be found in his celebrated work the *Novum Organon* where he describes the acquisition of all knowledge as the process of "interpreting nature." Thus, in order to understand Nature, we should observe her ways of action. We should observe the facts as they appear with a mind free from all "Idola" or prepossessions and collect a large number of instances from which general laws might gradually be gathered. (*Vide* foot-note to § 1, Ch. XXXI). His Method thus aims at strict fidelity to facts by allowing facts to speak for themselves. The salient features of his inductive method, sometimes called Baconian Method, are : (1) collection of a large number of instances of the phenomenon under investigation ; (2) exclusion from them by comparison of all elements that do not accompany the phenomenon ; and (3) detection, as a result of the elimination of the non-essential, of the "form" or cause of which the phenomenon is the effect. Thus we see that we owe to Francis Bacon the rudiments of the Method of Scientific Induction, subsequently elaborated by J. S. Mill, though, however, more than three centuries earlier Roger Bacon indicated the importance of experiment in scientific investigation.

We have seen that with Bacon observation of Nature (facts) was the sole ground of Induction.

But mere observation is not sufficient to give us a knowledge of causal relation for the attainment of which we should exclude the inert factors and select the potent. This led Mill to formulate the general Methods of Induction which are but methods of elimination deducible from the Law of Causation. (*Vide* Chapter XVIII, § 1.) Again, with Bacon Induction aims at rather *discovering* causal connections than proving them. But Mill defines Induction as "the process of *discovering* and *proving* general propositions." The main steps in his inductive procedure are : (1) observation of facts, (2) analysis of a complex phenomenon into antecedent and consequent, (3) exclusion of the circumstances which are not invariably present with the phenomenon under investigation with the help of the methods of elimination, (4) establishing causal connection between the antecedent and consequent uniformly related by way of sequence, and (5) verifying or proving this causal connection by a reference to actual facts.

Before leaving this section we may have a brief reference to the contributions of W. Whewell to Inductive doctrine. According to Whewell the whole process of establishing general propositions is Induction. As against Mill's empiricism that our knowledge is entirely made up of sense-impressions he indicates the importance of thought which renders knowledge possible by unifying the discrete sense-impressions with the help of 'Ideas' or concepts. Particular facts of experience by themselves cannot give us knowledge : they are

exposed to the danger from a contradictory instance." The object of Induction is the attainment of the knowledge of causes which is the basis of all true generalizations. The methods of such Induction are to be found in his celebrated work the *Novum Organon* where he describes the acquisition of all knowledge as the process of "interpreting nature." Thus, in order to understand Nature, we should observe her ways of action. We should observe the facts as they appear with a mind free from all "Idola" or prepossessions and collect a large number of instances from which general laws might gradually be gathered. (*Vide* foot-note to § 1, Ch. XXXI). His Method thus aims at strict fidelity to facts by allowing facts to speak for themselves. The salient features of his inductive method, sometimes called Baconian Method, are : (1) collection of a large number of instances of the phenomenon under investigation ; (2) exclusion from them by comparison of all elements that do not accompany the phenomenon ; and (3) detection, as a result of the elimination of the non-essential, of the "form" or cause of which the phenomenon is the effect. Thus we see that we owe to Francis Bacon the rudiments of the Method of Scientific Induction, subsequently elaborated by J. S. Mill, though, however, more than three centuries earlier Roger Bacon indicated the importance of experiment in scientific investigation.

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to be bound together or unified by appropriate concepts or ideas. This process of unification of particulars he terms *Colligation* which according to him is the essence of Induction. Thus he describes Induction as "the *process* of a true Colligation of Facts by means of an exact and appropriate conception." And he says "The grand problem of Science is to superinduce Ideas or Conceptions upon Facts. The business of the discoverer after familiarising with facts, is to compare them with conception after conception, in the view of finding out after a longer or shorter process of trial and rejection, what conception is exactly 'appropriate' to the facts under his consideration. When the investigator has at length by a happy guess, hit upon the appropriate conception, he is said to 'Colligate' the facts, to 'bind them into a unity'." According to Whewell, therefore, Induction is a method rather of *discovery* than proof, as it aims at discovering the concepts which would bind together particular facts of experience.

✓ § 4. **Conditions of Induction.** The conditions of Inductive Inquiry are (I) partly subjective and (II) partly objective. We may briefly indicate the conditions thus :—

I. Subjective conditions :

(I) The **subjective conditions** include the following :—

(1) Patience and perseverance,

(1) Patience and perseverance in research. Observation or Experiment is seldom successful in only a few cases. There may be distracting circumstances or disturbing agencies which may baffle inquiry, unless it is steadily pursued in a

definite direction with care and patience. The lives of scientists often illustrate how by perseverance they finally succeeded in their investigations, though they had on many occasions been disappointed before.

(2) Inductive inquiry must always be carried on in an impartial and unprejudiced way. As Bacon has shown, the mind must be freed from the Idola before it can reflect like a mirror the correct state of things. (*Vide* Chap. XXXI, § 1, foot-note.) We often imagine that certain qualities or relations are present in a certain case because we are anxious to find them there. Pope observes—

(2) Absence of bias or prejudice.

“Trace science, then, with modesty thy guide ;
First strip off all her equipage of pride :
Deduct what is but vanity or dress,
Or learning’s luxury, or idleness”.

(3) Inductive inquiry requires further the power of close application and high abstraction, so essential to the generalizing process. Without reflective analysis and imaginative insight, inductive inquiry often becomes unavailing. “It is not”, says Venn, “simple generalization, in the sense of mere extension, which we have to perform, but generalization through a judicious use of exclusions resting on observation and experiment”. (*Empirical Logic*, p. 352.) Hence the importance of hypothesis which as a tentative conception guides the selection of instances in an inductive inquiry and determines the line of observation and experiment. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 9.)

(3) Concentration, abstraction, and well-

imagination.

(4) Belief in Causality and Uniformity.

(4) Belief in Causality and Uniformity without which there can be no extension from some cases to all. Whether actually there is a ground for such belief or not, we need not consider here; but without the belief we can never take a step from the known to the unknown.

II. Objective conditions :

(1) Separation of elements.

(II) The **objective conditions** of Induction may be indicated thus :—

(1) We have seen that the facts or phenomena observed are generally of a complex character. In order, therefore, to discover the cause or the effect of any event, we must isolate it from its natural concomitants which go to disguise it or modify its character. In determining, for example, the effect of a medicine, we should exclude all those consequences which are known to follow from climate, habit, diet, or individual constitution in any case. Similarly, in investigating the cause of a malady, physical or mental, we should separate all those circumstances which, though accompanying it, are also found without it. Thus, in inquiring into the cause of plague or of insanity, we overlook the character of weather or of diet which may vary without affecting the disease. If, as a matter of fact, we find plague to be ordinarily connected with locality, and insanity with marriage between near consanguineous relations, then we separate these circumstances as probable causes and concentrate our investigations on them. We find, accordingly, Analysis* playing a prominent part in all

* Analysis, it should be remembered, wears two distinct forms, known as (1) logical or psychological and (2) physical or chemical.

inductive inquiries. We must at the outset resolve or analyse a complex fact or phenomenon into its constituent factors before we can expect to discover its true cause or effect.

(2) These remarks also make it clear that Elimination, or exclusion of the non-essential factors, is also an important step in the inductive inquiry. If, in the above illustration, we fail to leave out the effects of climate, habit, diet, personal constitution, or weather, then we cannot satisfactorily determine the true effect of medicine in any case or the proper cause of plague or insanity. "We know", says Bain, "from the law of Causation that in the changes going on in the world, the present situation is the result of the previous situation; and if that previous situation were reproduced so would

(2) Elimination

(1) *Logical analysis* is the ideal separation of elements which cannot actually be isolated, as when we analyse a ball into its constituent qualities (roundness, hardness, weight, etc.). This form of analysis is effected by the successive direction of attention to one feature at a time and the withdrawal of attention from the other features for the time being, thus exhaustively considering all the constituent elements or features. If, instead of considering all these elements or features, we only dwell on some, overlooking the rest, then what we call 'abstraction' is illustrated. Thus, when, in the case of a ball, we take into account simply the weight or form, ignoring the other qualities, we may be said to exercise abstraction. Abstraction may therefore, be called incomplete or imperfect analysis, and analysis, thorough-going abstraction. Logical analysis should be distinguished from physical. (2) *Physical analysis* implies the actual separation of elements or parts, as in what we call chemical analysis. It is illustrated in inductive inquiry when we really separate a supposed cause or effect from its attendant circumstances in order to determine its proper logical value. If, for example, we separate an article of diet from the other articles of food, with which it is usually taken, in order to estimate its effect on health, we have recourse to this form of analysis. Both these forms of analysis are illustrated in inductive investigations: the logical or psychological form, usually known as *resolution*, is included in the subjective conditions, while the physical or chemical, underlying *elimination* in the objective. Synthesis in every case tests the correctness and adequacy of prior analysis. (*Vide* Chap. XXVIII, § 2.)

the present. But this is not all ; for we may be able to show that if a *certain part* of the previous situation were reproduced, the present would follow ; we can put aside all otiose or inert accompaniments and reduce the antecedent circumstances to those really operative. This is the process of *Inductive Elimination, required alike in special and in general inquiries as to cause and effect.*" (*Logic*, II, pp. 41-42.) We should remember that Elimination always presupposes analysis : "without analysis, as shown in the preceding paragraph, we can never eliminate and so we cannot correctly generalize. All the inductive methods, underlying the generalizing process, involve, therefore, analysis and elimination in a more or less prominent form.

The Inductive
Methods
always
involve
analysis and
elimination,

which require
variation of
circumstances.

We must remember in this connection that, in order successfully to employ analysis and elimination for inductive generalizations, we must *vary the circumstances*, so that the phenomena connected by way of causation may be singled out and the accidental accompaniments, rejected. As in nature several factors usually go together, which it is impracticable to study apart by complete isolation, it is often difficult to distinguish the true cause or effect from its accidental accompaniments. We are, however, enabled to distinguish them by **the method of varying the circumstances** which brings successively before our view different combinations, the varying factors of which we reject as accidental and the constant factor or factors we select as essential—thus taking a step towards generalization. If, for example, we never

find the antecedent A alone nor the consequent a alone, but we always find them mixed up with other antecedents and consequents, then we may succeed in discovering a causal connection between A and a when they remain constant in the midst of variations of the other antecedents and consequents, *e.g.*, when ABC are followed by adf , ADE by abc , and AFG by ade . (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 2 and § 4.) Hence we see the importance of observation and experiment as the means of supplying a varied combination of antecedents and consequents, so that the inert or accidental factors may easily be excluded and the potent or material factors, found out. This is what is described by Bacon as 'varying the circumstances.' The Principle of Elimination can, therefore, successfully work when it is aided by adequate observation and experiment. This is well illustrated in the following account of an inquiry into the cause of Endemic Goitre given by Minto in his *Logic* :—

Observation
and
experiment
are aids to
elimination.

"Instances of the disease have been collected from the medical observations of all countries over many years. Why is it endemic in some localities and not in others? We proceed on the assumption that the cause, whatever it is, must be some circumstance common to all localities where it is endemic. If any such circumstance is obvious at once, we may conclude on the mere principle of repeated coincidence that there is causal connection between it and the disease, and continue our inquiry into the nature of the connexion. But if no such circumstance is obvious, then in the

An illustration.

course of our search for it we eliminate, as fortuitous, conditions that are present in some cases but absent in others. One of the earliest theories was that endemic goitre was connected with the altitude and configuration of the ground, some notorious centres of it being deeply cleft mountain valleys, with little air and wind and damp marshy soil. But wider observation found it in many valleys neither narrower nor deeper than others that were exempt, and also in wide exposed valleys such as the Aar. Was it due to the geological formation? This also had to be abandoned, for the disease is often incident within very narrow limits, occurring in some villages and sparing others though the geological formation is absolutely the same. Was it due to the character of the drinking-water? Especially to the presence of lime or magnesia? This theory was held strongly, and certain springs characterised as goitre-springs. But the springs in some goitre centres show not a trace of magnesia. The comparative immunity of coast regions suggested that it might be owing to a deficiency of iodine in the drinking-water and the air, and many instances were adduced in favour of this. But further inquiries made out the presence of iodine in considerable quantities, in the air, the water, and the vegetation of districts where goitre was widely prevalent; while in Cuba it is said that not a trace of iodine is discoverable either in the air or the water, and yet it is quite free from goitre. After a huge multiplication of instances, resulting in the

elimination of every local condition that had been suggested as a possible cause, Hirsch came to the conclusion that the true cause must be a morbid poison, and that endemic goitre has to be reckoned among the infectious diseases." (Pp. 319—320.)

(3) Verification, or confirmation of the surmise (previously formed by analysis and abstraction) by an appeal to facts, is also an essential condition of every inductive generalization. "Were all our processes absolutely trustworthy such a stage as this would not be required ; but being what they are it would be rash to omit this safeguard." (Venn, *Empirical Logic*, p. 352.) If a hypothesis is thus proved to be false, then we are driven to frame a new one by fresh analysis and abstraction, until facts bear out our supposition. When a hypothesis is verified, or established beyond doubt as consistent with facts, it is regarded as a law.

(3) Verifica-
tion.

§ 5. **The Inductive Procedure.** The preceding remarks must have made it clear that in order to generalize a proposition we must have certain facts. Facts, as we have seen, supply materials for generalization.

The inductive
procedure
involves—

(1) The first step, therefore, in the Inductive process is a patient, careful, and thorough examination of facts presented to the mind. Such observation, moreover, should not be capricious, but must be well-regulated ; we are to observe the relevant facts, withdrawing our attention from those that are irrelevant.

(1) a careful
study of
relevant facts

(2) The second step in the Inductive process consists in the definition or clear and accurate

(2) a clear
definition
them,

tion of Facts.
Colligation is
a subjective
synthesis of
facts by a
suitable
notion or
hypothesis.

synthesis or mental union of facts or materials supplied to the mind, by an exact and appropriate conception. Thus, he uses it to mean "the act of bringing a number of facts actually observed under a general description," as, for example, by gradually going round a new country and noting its surroundings we call its shape to be round or circular. According to Dr. Whewell, whenever we arrive at a general proposition on the observation of several individual instances, we really bring together all instances of a particular class under a suitable conception or hypothesis. It is the hypothesis or notion which enables us to 'colligate' or 'bind together' (Latin *colligare*,—*con*, together, and *ligare*, to bind), as it were, all the facts to which the hypothesis or notion is applicable. The notion or hypothesis is supplied by the mind ; and it is, so to speak, the tie or bond uniting the materials constituting the subject-matter of the generalization. A notion may thus be viewed as a string which fastens together facts in a coherent whole of experience governed by law.

Colligation is
not neces-
sarily an
Induction.

Colligation of facts, however, is not the same as Induction. As Mill observes, "Induction is colligation," but "colligation is not necessarily Induction." In every Inductive generalization we, no doubt, 'colligate' or bring together facts of a certain kind ; but it can never be said that whenever we bring together facts by an appropriate general conception, we also form an induction. In description, definition, or classification, for example, we 'colligate' facts by a general notion ; but no

connection is proved, as is required in Induction. We have already read the difference between a notion and a general proposition. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 2.) Even when a general notion is a complex idea, involving the co-presence of several elements, it is distinct from Induction. For, in Induction the co-presence or connection is to be *proved* by laborious research (namely, by the application of the Inductive Canons), while in a notion the co-presence or connection is *assumed*. As Mill points out, Whewell confounds Induction with mere Description. A description, by simply delineating the features of a class, brings together its members and thus 'colligates' them; but a description never proves a connection nor explains it. The essence of Induction lies in this proof or explanation. Similarly, when we connect together the places of a planet by reference to its orbit, we colligate them; but, as shown above (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 5), there is scarcely any Induction in such a process.

In induction a connection is proved, which is assumed in a notion, colligating facts.

Dr. Whewell confounds Induction with Description.

§ 7. Scientific and Unscientific Induction. Induction, as we have seen, is the inference of a universal real proposition from the observation of some individual instances, in accordance with the Uniformity of Nature. But such generalizations may be reached either (1) by simple observation or (2) by laborious research. (1) The one form is illustrated in all popular generalizations which merely rest on uniform or uncontradicted experience, without an attempt to verify whether there is any real ground for such inference or not. Thus,

(1) Unscientific Induction is illustrated in popular generalizations resting on mere un-

contradicted
experience.

It is known
as Induction
by Simple
Enumeration

which, as
Bacon points
out, is more
or less
precarious.

(1) Scientific
Induction
establishes a
generalization
by proving
causal

a child that has seen only black dogs may take all dogs to be black ; a foreigner, coming across only dishonest natives of a particular land, may take all the natives to be so ; the rustics of Northern Europe, having no information of the rest of the world, may think that all men are white, as some negroes are led to believe that all men are black. Men, similarly, believe that all crows are black, though albinos of the species are not altogether uncommon ; and swans are ordinarily taken to be white, though black swans are found in Australia. Our common belief in some laws of Nature (*e.g.*, that men are mortal) rests on this kind of induction. It is known as *Induction by Simple Enumeration**. As it is based merely on our faith in the Uniformity of Nature without the discovery of any causal connection, it is usually probable or uncertain. And so Bacon condemns it as "a childish thing, precarious in its conclusions and exposed to risk from a contradictory instance". The value of this form of induction we shall examine afterwards. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 2 and Chap. XXII, § 1.)

(2) The other form of Induction is employed in all scientific investigations ; and so it is called Scientific Induction. In it we try to place a general truth on a secure foundation by discovering some

* Induction by *Simple Enumeration* should be distinguished from Induction by *Complete Enumeration* (or *Perfect Induction*) in which all individual instances coming within a general proposition have been observed ; but the latter, as we have seen, is not properly an induction at all. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 3.) Thus, 'All the kings who ruled in France in the eighteenth century were named Louis' may be taken as an example of Induction by Complete Enumeration.

ground uniting the facts or phenomena which constitute the subject-matter of the generalization. We shall see in the next chapter that the only secure ground of inductive generalization is found in the causal connection between phenomena, the absence of which can at most create a presumption in favour of a conjunction. Hence all the Inductive Methods, which are used for scientific generalizations, are given to deciphering such a connection. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII.) The guesses and crude beliefs of Simple Enumeration, when tested and verified by the Inductive Methods, become well-established inductions. "Such a surmise," says Fowler, "may afterwards be proved by the aid of one or other of five methods to be correct, and, in that case, it is taken out of the category of inductions *per simplicem enumerationem*, and becomes an instance of a scientific induction." (*Inductive Logic*, p. 215.)

connection
by means of
the experi-
mental
methods.

Induction by
Simple Enu-
meration,
when verified
by the
Inductive
Methods,
becomes
Scientific
Induction.

§ 8. Complete and Incomplete Induction. An induction may be said to be complete when we arrive at a general proposition from the observation of particular instances. It implies, as we have seen, a leap from the known to the unknown and involves a reference to causal connection. It is a universal statement which is not merely a summation of particulars. "A complete induction", says Bain, "is a generalization that shall express what is conjoined everywhere, and at all times, superseding for ever the labour of fresh observation". (*Induction*, p. 2.) This complete induction, however, may be either methodical and

Complete
Induction is
Induction
proper in
which we
pass from
some to all.

systematic, or immethodical and unsystematic. The former illustrates scientific induction, while the latter only induction by simple enumeration.

Incomplete Induction is used ambiguously.

(a) It sometimes means induction in which the causal connection is not definitely established owing to the imperfect fulfilment of the experimental methods.

(b) It means also induction which operates subconsciously in determining inferences in particular cases, without developing a universal proposition.

The term 'Incomplete Induction' has been used in at least two distinct senses. (a) Some understand by it that form of induction in which we are dimly aware of a causal connection between the phenomena under investigation, but we cannot definitely establish it owing to the imperfect application of the Inductive Methods. Thus, incomplete inductions, according to Fowler, are "the results of an imperfect fulfilment of one or other of the Inductive methods". [*Inductive Logic*, p. 234.] (b) Others hold that 'incomplete induction' implies that the universal proposition is not developed out of particular instances, but it operates subconsciously in the mind in determining inferences in other particular cases. When, for example, we reason from particulars to particular, we find this form of induction involved. If, after finding, say, ten mangoes of a basket to be sweet, I expect that the eleventh and twelfth mangoes are also sweet, then, according to this view, 'incomplete induction' is illustrated. My inference with regard to the eleventh or twelfth mango cannot be true unless the universal proposition 'all mangoes of the basket are sweet' be true. But this universal proposition is not explicitly formulated; it operates only implicitly in the mind to justify a conclusion in a particular case. We shall see in Chapter XXII that analogical inference is of this character. When we draw such an inference, we are generally not

aware of any causal link ; for to be conscious of such a link is to take a step towards generalization or complete induction. If we know, for example, that A is the cause of B, then surely we are led to generalize that wherever A is, there B also is present.

§ 9. Exercises.

1. Indicate the character of Inductive Inquiry and the different forms it may assume.

2. Determine the conditions of inductive research. What do you understand by Elimination and Varying the Circumstances ? Is Elimination the essence of Induction ?

3. Analyse the Inductive Process, illustrating the steps by examples.

4. What do you understand by Colligation of Facts ? How does it differ from Induction ?

5. Distinguish between (1) Scientific and Unscientific Induction, (2) Induction by Simple Enumeration and Induction by Complete Enumeration.

6. What do you understand by Analysis and Abstraction ? Are they connected in any way with Inductive Investigation ?

7. Distinguish between (1) Elimination and Resolution and (2) Complete and Incomplete Induction.

8. 'The method of Induction consists throughout in the framing of hypotheses to explain the phenomena given in experience, and the verification of those hypotheses by constant appeal to facts.'—Explain the above. How far does it agree with Mill's theory of the nature of Induction ?

9. Consider whether there is any theoretical ground for the distinction, in respect to proof, between propositions of sequence and propositions of co-existence, and whether there is any practical utility in the distinction.

10. Clearly explain what is meant by the Method of Varying the circumstances and show how it helps inductive investigation. Is the Method connected in any way with Elimination ?

CHAPTER XVII.

THE GROUNDS OF INDUCTION.

Inference
always
involves both
matter and
thought.

The matter is
assumed in
Deduction,

while it is
examined in
Induction.

1. The For-
mal Ground
of Induction

§ 1. **Formal and Material Grounds.** We have seen that every form of inference—nay, every product of thought—involves two elements, *vis.*, form and matter. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 8, foot-note, and Chap. II, § 1.) There are principles or ways according to which we reason and also materials about which we reason. We have further read that in the case of deductive inference, which is concerned only with formal truth, the materials or data are accepted in logic without independent investigation. In syllogism, for example, we have only to see whether any conclusion necessarily follows or not from the premises according to the fundamental laws of thought, and we have nothing to do with the material truth or falsity of the premises. In inductive reasoning, however, it is otherwise. We know that induction is concerned with material, and not merely with formal, truth. Hence, in all inductive inquiries, we must satisfy ourselves as to the actual truth of the data or premises. We also know that in induction we always proceed from particular instances to a general truth or universal proposition. The grounds of Induction, accordingly, are (I) partly formal and (II) partly material.

(I) The Formal Ground of Induction includes (1) the Law of Uniformity of Nature and (2) the Law

of Causation. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 7 and § 8.) We have seen that the invariable tendency of the mind is to generalize, to unify—even when there is imperfect similarity. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 7 and *The Elements of Morals*, Chap. XX, § 5.) Our hasty and incorrect generalizations prove but the irresistible tendency of the mind to think in this way. In order, however, that there may be a secure ground for a generalization, we must discover a causal link justifying the extension to other like cases of what is observed only in a few. The assumptions underlying all inductive generalizations are (*a*) that all the individuals of a class are characterized by the same nature or essence, so that what is fundamentally true of some can naturally be expected of all, and (*b*) that the manifestation or behaviour of a thing is always causally connected with its essential nature. Hence the Principle of Similarity and that of Ground and Consequent are regarded by realistic writers as constituting the very basis of every inductive inquiry. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 6 and Chap. II, § 4 and § 9.) The Principle of Similarity implies, as we have seen, Identity of Essence, and the Principle of Ground and Consequent implies a Causal Connection; and these are the essential formal conditions of all inductive research. They are the fundamental principles on which every form of inductive reasoning ultimately rests.

Includes
(1) the Law
of Uniformity
of Nature
and (2) the
Law of
Causation.

which are
interpreted
by realistic
writers as
(*a*) the
Principle
of Similarity
and
(*b*) the
Principle of
Ground and
Consequent.

(II) The Material Ground of Induction includes Observation and Experiment, which supply materials for generalization. Whenever we generalize, there must be some subject-matter; and this evi-

II. The
Material
Ground
includes
Observation
and
Experiment

dently is furnished by Observation and Experiment. They are the sources whence the materials of all inductive reasoning are derived. Let us consider these Grounds of Induction separately.

The Law of Uniformity explains the invariable tendency of the mind to generalize,

§ 2. **Law of Uniformity of Nature.** We have already explained this law in chapter II, § 7. We need only mention here that mere uniformity without causation does not afford a justification for extending to unknown cases what has been observed in some, however much we may naturally be disposed to do so. Such a justification is found in the causal link between the phenomena under investigation. We might have noticed uniformity of certain relations in the past ; but we can never with confidence extend it to the future if no causal connection is known to subsist between the related objects or features. In fact, uniformity by itself scarcely means anything : uniformity is uniformity in behaviour, nature, or action, which involves an appeal to the way in which a cause operates. Thus, the Law of Uniformity alone can never be regarded as the ultimate ground of induction ; it must be taken in connection with Causation that we may be allowed to infer a universal real proposition from the observation of a few instances.

which is found to be legitimate when supported by Causation.

Causation implies that an effect is produced by

§ 3. **Law of Causation.** The law of causation strictly speaking implies that an event is produced by a cause. As Kanada says, कारणभावात् कार्यभावः, i.e., 'from existence of the cause is existence of the effect.' (*Vaisheshika Aphorisms*, IV, i, 3. Gough's Edition, p. 133.) That the same cause always

gives rise to the same effect is not implied in causation, though it is justified by experience and supported by the Uniformity of Nature. Uniformity is thus no essential part of causality, which may operate though there may be continual surprises owing to its capricious operation. But, without uniformity, there would be no coherent experience and no room for expectation. (*Vide The Elements of Morals*, Chap. XX, § 5.) We find, accordingly, that as a matter of fact causality operates uniformly in nature, affording room for expectation and prediction. Thus, *Causation, as modified by Uniformity, constitutes the true formal ground of Induction.* And Causation, when so modified, includes, as we have seen, the Principle of Similarity and the Principle of Ground and Consequent. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 4, § 9 and § 11.)

Causation as modified by Uniformity constitutes the true formal ground of Induction.

We should remember here that the causal law assumes a mechanical or external relation between the different parts of the universe. As we are but spectators of the world, we witness various phenomena in conjunction with others; and our rational constitution leads us to construe them as a connected whole by discovering links which bind them together. Where we fail to detect a connection, we treat the relation as accidental, though really nothing is accidental in this well-ordered universe. (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 2). Only an indwelling Spirit that pervades it through and through can read aright the connections of its diverse phenomena. As we have to survey it from outside we are constrained to infer connections by signs fur-

The law of causation as understood in science assumes a mechanical relation between the different parts of the world.

nished by experience. Thus, though as a matter of fact the effect is but the cause transformed, yet the limitations of our intelligence and the consequent imperfection of our knowledge lead us to view them as separate and then to construe them as antecedent and consequent bound together by inviolable necessity. (*Vide* § 6.)

In Logic, we are concerned, not with the question of the ultimate character of causation, nor with the way in which we come to know it, but with its marks or characteristics by which it can be recognised.

In Logic, we inquire into the character of the causal relation with a view to determine its characteristics or fundamental features. The logical aspect of this inquiry should not be confounded with the metaphysical or psychological. The metaphysical aspect of the problem implies an inquiry into the real character of the causal relation : Whether, for example, by cause we are to understand a thing, a force, or a phenomenon ; and whether the causal connection is real or fictitious. Such a question comes within the province of Metaphysics and falls outside the scope of Logic proper. To determine, again, the way in which we arrive at a knowledge of the causal relation is a psychological question, which should not be confounded with the logical inquiry. In Logic, without raising a question as to the real character of cause or the source of our knowledge of it, we merely try to ascertain the characteristics or marks by which the causal relation can be distinguished from other relations. The question here is what are the tests or features by which we can distinguish a cause from an accidental circumstance. Let us inquire into this logical aspect of the question a little carefully.

§ 4. **Scientific View of Causation.** For the purpose of logical or scientific inquiry we consider the causal connection as existing between two facts, one of which is the *consequent* and the other is the *antecedent*.

Scientific
view of
Causation.

(A) When we analyse the *qualitative aspect* of the causal relation we find the following features :—

(A)
*Qualitative
aspect :*
Causation
implies

(1) The causal connection, as just now remarked, always involves a relation between two factors, one of which is regarded as the consequent (effect) and the other as the antecedent (cause).

(1) a relation
of succession
between two
factors, of
which

(2) The consequent is always regarded as an event in time, that is, a change or phenomenon to be accounted for.

(2) the
consequent is
regarded as
the effect and

(3) The cause, which explains the phenomenon or effect, precedes it. Thus, the causal relation is a case of succession, the antecedent being the cause and the consequent, the effect.*

(3) the
antecedent as
the cause.

(4) But mere succession does not constitute the causal relation. Succession may be either variable or invariable. Variable succession never inspires in us a belief in causal connection. Clouds, for example, may precede or succeed sunrise ; and so we never regard the one as the cause or effect of the other. It is the invariable succession which is taken to be the mark of causation, so that we regard the cause as the invariable antecedent and the effect as the invariable consequent. Thus, the

(4) Causation
is invariable
succession.

The cause is
thus the
invariable,

* It is immaterial in Logic to discuss the question whether the cause and the effect may be simultaneous. Even if they be so, we do not as a rule apprehend simultaneously what may simultaneously happen. Thus, even simultaneous events may seem to us as successive.

stroke of a sword is taken to be the cause of the flow of blood; and the administration of poison, the cause of death.

(5) unconditional,

(5) But this invariable relation alone does not constitute causality. Had it been so, then night might be regarded as the cause of day, or day of night, since the one invariably precedes the other. Thus, the cause is not merely the invariable antecedent, but also the unconditional antecedent. By 'unconditional' is meant that, without any other condition, the antecedent, which is regarded as the cause, is able to lead or give rise to the effect. Thus, the sun is taken to be the cause of light, as the presence of the one is invariably and unconditionally followed by the other.

and (6)
immediate
antecedent.

(6) Cause, moreover, is not a remote antecedent, but the proximate or immediate antecedent which, without any other condition, brings about the effect. The cause, for example, in the above illustrations, is the stroke of a sword, the administration of poison, or the presence of the sun, which immediately precedes the effect.

If we take the above marks or features into our consideration, then we may define a cause as the immediate, unconditional, and invariable antecedent which produces the effect.

(B) Quantitative aspect :

(B) The *quantitative aspect* of the causal relation is illustrated in the fact that there is perfect equivalence between the cause and the effect in every case. Every effect is due to the expenditure of some energy. What we regard as the effect is the energy transformed; and what we regard as the

The effect is
but the cause
transformed,
and hence
they are

cause is the energy prior to such transformation. When, for example, an individual takes food and feels refreshed, the feeling of refreshment is regarded as the effect, which is due to the nourishment supplied by the food. The quantitative equivalence involved in the causal relation is due to conservation of energy. The doctrine of conservation of energy implies that—

equivalent in energy.

The doctrine of conservation of energy

(1) The total amount of energy in the universe remains constant, and no part of it can be destroyed ;

(2) One form of energy may be transformed into another (for example, the molar into the molecular, the physical into the chemical, the chemical into the vital) ;

(3) In the process of change, work is done and an effect produced ; but no energy is lost.*

The doctrine of conservation of energy has been established conclusively by the modern sciences ; and it may be proved in detail with regard to any and every subject-matter. We may illustrate the law here by an example or two. When, for example, a cannon ball strikes a wall, which is not visibly affected in any way by such impact, we may be led to think that the energy of the moving ball is altogether lost ; and the law of conservation of energy seems to be disproved by such an instance. But, if we examine the case a little carefully, we find that an effect is really produced in the form of

is supported by the sciences.

Illustrations.

*Kanada says, न द्रव्यं कार्यं कारणञ्च वधति, i.e., 'a substance is not destroyed either by its effect or by its cause.' (*Vaisheshika Aphorisms* 1, 1, 12. Gough's Edition, p. 13.)

heat. That part of the wall against which the ball strikes becomes very hot ; and the degree of heat is proportioned to the violence of impact. We know, however, that heat is but a form of motion : it involves movement of molecules, though not movement of a mass. Thus, the case in question illustrates but the transformation of molar movement into molecular movement ; and, as we have said, there is perfect equivalence in respect of quantity between the energy of the cause and the intensity of the effect. Another illustration will make the position still more clear. When, for example, we throw a ball upwards and it rests on the roof of a building, apparently the moving energy of the ball is lost. But we really find that here kinetic energy is transformed into the potential form. Matter may be found either in motion or in position. Matter in position, though seemingly quiet, is really a store-house of energy, which may be perceived on the fulfilment of certain conditions. If, for example, the roof of the building be removed, the ball will again fall to the ground with the same energy with which it moved upwards (the resistance of the air being excluded). As Bain observes, a mountain tarn, though visibly quiet, is really a source of vast energy, which may be revealed if one of its banks give way. Thus, the cause and the effect are but different aspects of a definite amount of the same energy : what we call the 'cause' is but the effect concealed ; and the 'effect' likewise is but the cause revealed. It may be mentioned here that the doctrine of Conserva-

tion of Energy lends support to the view that cause must be the unconditional antecedent of a given phenomenon, called its effect, as the theory implies that the effect is but the cause transformed, in which case there can be nothing intermediate between the two.

The difference between Kinetic and Potential Energy, or between matter in motion and matter in position, brings out the difference between what are called 'Agent' and 'Patient'. The terms 'Agent' and 'Patient' are entirely relative. What seems to be purely passive is really the seat of energy which may not be manifested at the time. As Mill observes, when the administration of poison proves injurious to life, the poison is ordinarily taken to be the 'Agent' and the human system, the 'Patient.' But this human system must be susceptible to the influence of the poison ; otherwise it can never exercise an injurious influence on the human organism. Thus, what seems to be a passive collocation or arrangement of materials or circumstances is not really devoid of energy altogether ; it illustrates but potential energy under definite conditions.

Often, for the production of an effect, a combination of circumstances or conditions is essential, some of which may be in the form of moving energy and some in the form of collocation. The lunar eclipse, for example, is produced by a collocation of the sun, the earth, and the moon, causing an interception of the solar rays. The movement of a boat down a stream is caused both by energy

Distinction between Kinetic and Potential Energy, between Agent and Patient, is entirely relative.

The cause or the effect may be either a moving energy, or a collocation, or a combination of them.

Illustrations. and collocation. Sometimes, by ellipsis, a collocation may simply be referred to as a cause. When, for example, a hydraulic press is employed in compressing bales of jute, the press is regarded as the cause, though the real moving power is found in the moving or running stream. Similarly, an effect may sometimes be represented as a collocation. When, for example, masons construct a building, the effect is illustrated, not in the form of moving energy, but in the form of a collocation, namely, a definite arrangement of materials known as a building. These illustrations bring out the importance of collocation, whether found in the cause or in the effect.

A cause is an assemblage of 'conditions'.

Meaning of a 'condition.'

An illustration.

§ 5. **Causes and Conditions.** From the preceding remarks it is apparent that a cause or an effect is often a complex fact, involving several elements. A cause, like an effect, may be an assemblage of several factors, each of which is called 'a condition'. As Kanada says, 'Causality results also from conjunction': 'संयोगात्' (*Vaisheshika Aphorisms*, x, ii, 2. Gough's Edition, p. 305.) A 'condition' may briefly be defined as that which exercises some influence on the effect: the influence may be in the form of either production, prevention, or modification. Anything which helps, destroys, or retards an effect may be viewed as a *condition*. And all the conditions taken together constitute a cause. Mill thus explains the meaning of 'condition':—When, for example, an individual takes mercury and goes out in cold weather and catches cold and gets fever, the cause of the

cold and fever is to be found, not merely in taking mercury, nor merely in exposure, but in both the circumstances taken together, namely, in exposure while under the influence of mercury. Each of these two circumstances is called a 'condition', and both the conditions taken together constitute the cause. It may be mentioned in this connection that conditions may be either positive or negative. A *positive* condition is that which helps or promotes the effect and so it cannot be left out without baffling the effect; while a *negative* condition is that which tends to thwart or frustrate the effect and so it cannot be introduced without defeating the effect. When, for example, a man falls to the ground through a slip of his feet, the positive condition is illustrated in the slipping of the feet, without which the effect would not have been produced. But a negative condition is illustrated in the absence of a support which might have prevented him from falling to the ground. The positive and negative conditions taken together constitute the real cause. When a condition is taken by itself, it is regarded as but a tendency. A *tendency* may thus be defined as the ability of a condition, when taken by itself, to produce an effect. And the mutual relation of the several tendencies is said to be one of *reciprocity*.

Positive and negative conditions.

Meanings of 'tendency' and

'reciprocity.'

The relation of cause and effect in complex cases is illustrated, as Mill points out, in two prominent forms :—

Causation in complex cases assumes two forms :

(1) One form is described by Mill as the Homogeneous Intermixture of Effects. In this

(1) Homogeneous intermixture

of effects, and case, the several conditions as well as the effect are homogeneous. This is illustrated in mechanics. When, for example, two forces act on a body, the line of motion is indicated by the direction of the resultant. Here all the factors are commensurable.

(2) hetero-
pathic
intermixture
of effects.

(2) The other form is illustrated in the Heteropathic Intermixture of Effects. Here the cause and the effect are not homogeneous, as is illustrated in chemical combination. The chemical compound in any case does not resemble the elements which give rise to it.

*Causation
interpreted
from three
stand-points :*

Whatever may be the form of causal relation, whether Homogeneous or Heteropathic, the causal inquiry must involve an examination of the antecedent circumstances prior to the effect. And though, adequately to explain a fact, it is necessary that all the conditions essential to its production must be mentioned, yet it is not always convenient to enumerate them all. Hence we find the causal conception generally interpreted from three stand-points, namely :— 1) The ordinary stand-point, (2) the scientific stand-point, and (3) the stand-point of conservation of energy. Let us consider them one by one.

(1) The
popular or
practical
stand-point.

(1) Though a cause is really a combination of several conditions, positive and negative, yet in ordinary life it is not convenient nor necessary to enumerate them all. Some of the conditions may be too well-known to require an explicit statement. When, for example, an individual falls to the ground, if we mention as its cause the force of

gravity as well as the slipping of his feet, the explanation would seem at once to be superfluous and pedantic. The force of gravity is a familiar fact known to all ; and hence only reference is made to that circumstance or condition which may not be known at the time, *vis.*, the slipping of the feet. Thus, from the popular or practical stand-point, we often mention only one or two prominent conditions, instead of all, to account for the effect. Hence, we are often led to wonder at the disproportion between some conditions viewed as cause and the greatness of an effect.

“What great events from trivial causes spring !”

We may notice in this connection the distinction often drawn, in the ordinary affairs of life, between what are known as Proximate and Remote Causes. By **Proximate, Immediate, or Direct Cause** is understood in common discourse the ‘condition’ which immediately precedes an effect, as answering questions well with regard to success at an examination, the contact of a spark with gunpowder in the case of explosion, or infection inducing illness in a certain case. It is evident, however, that none of these without other ‘conditions’—such as good preparation, inflammable and expansive quality, or predisposition to a disease—can produce the effect in question. The ‘conditions,’ therefore, which precede the so-called proximate causes and which indirectly determine the effect are called **Remote, Mediate, or Predisposing Causes**. Sometimes the remote cause is popularly called simply ‘the conditions,’ while the proximate

Distinction
between
Proximate
and Remote
Causes.

or exciting cause only 'an occasion.' These terms, however, are entirely relative. For example, in the case of harvest, good rain may be viewed as a proximate cause and sowing as a remote cause; or good rain may be regarded as a remote cause and the industry of the husbandman following it as a proximate cause producing the effect. Thus, the Proximate and Remote Causes are really the direct and indirect 'conditions' which bring about an event. Similarly, Aristotle's enumeration of four causes is really an analysis of the different 'conditions' which conspire to produce an effect.*

(2) The
scientific
stand-point.

(2) From the scientific stand-point, however, it is essential that all the conditions entering into a cause must be explicitly stated to account for an effect. However insignificant or familiar a condition may be, it needs a mention in science in order to an adequate explanation of the phenomenon under investigation. When, for example, we say that 'the last straw breaks the back of the camel', we do not really mean that the last straw alone does so, though it serves no doubt to bring about the effect in the last instance. A proper or

* The four kinds of causes essential to the production of a thing are called by Aristotle formal, material, efficient, and final. The *formal cause* is the scheme or design by which an effect is produced; the *material cause* is the stuff or substance of which a thing is made; the *efficient cause* is the force or agency by which a result is achieved; and the *final cause* is the end or purpose for which it is produced. Thus, in the case of a building, its plan of construction is the formal; brick, mortar, &c., the material; the masons, the efficient; and the building constructed, the final cause. Aristotle, ultimately resolves these four causes into two—material and formal, the latter as operant design being also the efficient and final cause at the same time.

scientific explanation must enumerate all the conditions, such as (1) the weight of the load from the very beginning, (2) the capacity of the camel to bear the burden, (3) the limit of this capacity, (4) the action of gravity, and (5) the added weight of the straw which brings the weight beyond the capacity of the camel. The scientific view is thus comprehensive in character.

(3) From the stand-point of conservation of energy we should not only enumerate all the conditions essential to the production of an effect, but must also point out the quantitative equivalence of the cause and the effect. The doctrine of conservation of energy teaches us that what we regard as an effect is but the cause transformed. So, we must prove this transformation by indicating their quantitative equivalence. We should remember in this connection that the cause or the effect in any particular case may be illustrated in the form of either a moving power or a collocation.

(3) The stand-point of conservation of energy.

§ 6. **Plurality of Causes.*** The doctrine of plurality of causes implies that one and the same effect may be produced by different causes : it is not necessarily always produced by the same cause. Light, for example, may be produced now by the sun, now by the moon, and now by fire. "It is not true," says Mill, "that one effect must be connected with only one cause, or assemblage of con-

Plurality of causes implies that the same effect may be produced by different

Mill.

* 'Plurality of Causes' should be distinguished from the 'Composition of Causes.' The former holds that the same effect may be produced by different causes, while the latter means a number of factors or conditions each contributing to the production of a certain effect.

ditions ; that each phenomenon can be produced only in one way. There are often several independent modes in which the same phenomenon could have originated. One fact may be the consequent in several invariable sequences ; it may follow, with equal uniformity, any one of several antecedents or collections of antecedents. Many causes may produce motion : many causes may produce some kinds of sensation : many causes may produce death. A given effect may really be produced by a certain cause, and yet be perfectly capable of being produced without it." (*Logic*, I, p. 468.) Thus, one and the same effect, it is urged, may be due to any one of several causes. This is what is called by Professor Fowler, the 'vicariousness of causes.'

Fowler.

The doctrine is untenable.

Illustrations.

Though the doctrine of plurality of causes is generally accepted, yet its validity may be questioned. The doctrine is really based on a confusion of the different kinds of effect and an oversight of their differences. The light produced by the sun is not of the same character as that produced by the moon ; nor is the light of the moon of the same kind as that of the fire. Thus, if we take into account the specific character of the effect in any case, it can be due to only one cause, say the sun, the moon, or the fire. The silver light of the moon is never attributed to the sun, nor is the golden brilliance of the solar ray attributed to the moon. Similarly, though death, generally viewed, may be regarded as the outcome of any one of several causes, yet specifically considered it can be

due to only one cause. Thus, death from plague is not of the same character as death from fever or poisoning, or from a disease of the lungs or the bowels. Nay, deaths due to different *kinds* of fever (such as black fever, yellow fever, malarious fever), poisoning (such as arsenic, hydrocyanic acid, opium), lung complaints (such as consumption, pneumonia, bronchitis), or bowel complaints (such as cholera, dysentery, and diarrhœa) are not quite of the same character. "Had we been equally exhaustive," observes Venn, "in our enumeration of the constituent elements in the aggregate effect as we were in those of the cause, no such plurality would have been possible. The inclusion of every fresh element among the consequents excludes some of the alternative possibilities of causation, and the inclusion of all would rigidly confine us to one only." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 62.)

The doctrine of 'plurality of causes' as held by Mill is inconsistent with his own view of treating cause as the invariable and unconditional antecedent of a phenomenon. For, the idea of invariable and unconditional sequence carries with it the necessary implication of such a sequence being independent of any other thing, *i.e.*, the implication of a particular set of conditions being able to produce a particular effect or a certain effect being due to none but a particular agency.

In fact, the doctrine of plurality of causes is due to our different estimates of the cause and the effect. (1) If we take the cause as generically or vaguely as we take the effect, then we may say that the

The doctrine is based on a confusion: it owes its plausibility to a difference

in the
estimate of
the cause
and the
effect.

Venn's
testimony.

same effect is always due to the same cause. Death, for example, is due in every case to the failure of the vital functions. (2) If, again, we be as much precise in our estimate of the effect as we are in our estimate of the cause, then, also, as shown above, the same effect is always produced by the same cause. "We say, for instance," writes Venn, "that death may be brought about in a variety of different ways, and we call all these ways 'causes,' and thence deduce the doctrine of plurality of causes. It may be produced by suicide, in any particular case ; by disease, and that of various different kinds ; by murder ; and so forth. But all these alternative suppositions are only rendered possible, because the 'death' is a single element in the sense above described, that is, it has been abstracted from a number of other characterizing circumstances. Had we introduced these other elements or characterizing circumstances, only one of these causes would have been left possible. The condition of the organs would have precluded such and such a form of disease ; the position of the body and the nature of the wounds would have precluded the alternative of suicide ; and so on with each alternative in turn. So clearly is all this recognized whenever it becomes important to take it into consideration, that the whole procedure in a trial for murder, or in any coroner's court, rests upon the assumption that if we are particular enough in our assignment of the effect there is no possibility left open for any plurality of causes." (*Ibid.*) So far, therefore, as the real constitution

of the world is concerned, there is no justification for the doctrine of plurality of causes, advocated with so much force by Mill and Bain. (*Vide* Bain's *Logic*, II, p. 77.) Generalization of the cause or specialization of the effect brings out that this doctrine is really due to confusion.

It may, however, be said in favour of this doctrine that it is in accordance with the common and popular estimates of causes and effects, with which primarily the logical inquiry is concerned. The perfect equivalence of the cause and the effect and the ultimate unity of the universe are known only to the Supreme Mind, to whom, as we have seen, all inferences are superfluous. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 4 and Chap. IX, §. 2.) If, however, all things are not clear to our finite intelligence, we are constrained to have recourse to inference in order to render intelligible what otherwise is obscure and perplexing to us. Hence, when an effect is produced, we try to discover its cause ; and an imperfect estimate of it is evidently more satisfactory than a wrong estimate or total ignorance. It is nearer truth, for example, to attribute a burning sensation, in the case of being scorched, to fire than to air or water ; and it is surely some relief to be able to discover a cause than merely to gape and be perplexed at a consequence. Hence the inductive canons are intended to exclude wrong conclusions regarding causes or effects ; but their end is not to establish that perfect equivalence between cause and effect, which is the consummation of all knowledge and

The doctrine, however, is consistent with the common view of causation, which ordinarily underlies an inductive inquiry into causes.

Knowledge of the perfect equivalence between cause and effect would render inductive investigation superfluous.

consonant only with omniscience. In fact, there would be little room for the employment of inductive canons when a knowledge of exact equivalence between cause and effect is reached. Inductive investigation, like every other form of inference, is consistent only with the stage of finite and imperfect intelligence. Perfect knowledge would give rise to intuition all round. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 4 and *Elements of Morals*, Chap. XII, § 3.)

Causes and effects are usually found in complex aggregates; and the inductive problem is to connect a cause with its own effect.

§ 7. Conjunction of Causes and Intermixture of Effects. Owing to the unity, continuity, and complexity of Nature, we seldom find a cause or an effect alone: as a matter of fact, several causes and effects often go together and render it more or less difficult to determine the relation of cause and effect between two phenomena. Even such a simple experience as the sound of a gun or the smell of a flower is usually accompanied by other experiences caused, if not by the same object, at least by other objects affecting other senses. Thus, a flash of light, taste of a lemon, or contact of a gentle breeze may co-exist with such experiences of sound and smell. And, however easy it may seem in our childhood or youth to distinguish the causal connections in such complex cases, the baby has to disentangle the threads by natural intelligence aided by variation of experience, before attributing an effect to its proper cause. We have also seen how what seems to be a single cause is really an aggregate of conditions, determining an effect by their co-pres-

ence ; and these conditions in their turn are determined by others, either proximate or remote. Hence we see that the web of our experience is really a very complex fabric, the parts of which are often mixed together and can be distinguished only with great difficulty.

The causes or effects which thus go together may either (i) remain distinct or (ii) amalgamate in a complex whole. The rules or canons of induction are specially applicable to the former case (i), their function being to discover causal connections between certain antecedents and consequents by the elimination of others. When (ii) causes or effects unite in a complex whole, the effect may be either (a) *homogeneous* with the conspiring causes or (b) *different* in kind from them. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 5.) In both the cases we have *intermixture of effects*, the result being in the one case (a) compound, while in the other (b) heteropathic. (a) A *compound effect*, produced by *composition of causes*, is illustrated when two or more forces acting together give rise to a resultant (*e.g.*, when two locomotives double the speed of a train, or when an object pulled in two different directions moves along the diagonal).^{*} This is also known as 'homogeneous intermixture of effects', as in it the

Concurrent causes or effects may either (i) remain distinct or (ii) blend in an indistinguishable mass, giving rise to homogeneous or heteropathic intermixture of effects. The inductive method is practically limited to the former case (i), while the deductive is usually applicable to the latter (ii).

^{*} *The composition of causes* may be distinguished from the *conditions of a cause* by the fact that in the former (*e.g.*, in the case of a tug-of-war or a river fed by two tributaries) the constituent factors would separately produce effects of the same kind, though quantitatively greater or less than the compound effect, while in the latter (*e.g.*, in the case of the explosion of gun-powder) the constituent factors will separately produce no effect of the kind which is the outcome of their joint operation.

compound or total effect is of the *same kind* as its *individual causes*. As it is not easily amenable to inductive canons, it generally requires the employment of the Deductive Method for a discovery of the true causes ; and the more numerous the factors which bring about an effect, the greater the difficulty of using the inductive method, owing to the comparatively small share of each cause in producing the effect, and hence the greater the necessity of applying the Deductive Method. (*Vide* Chap. XX.) (b) A *heteropathic effect*, produced by a *combination of causes*, is illustrated when an unlike result is produced by co-operant causes, such as we find in the production of water by a chemical combination of oxygen and hydrogen. The application of the inductive canons is possible in this case, though the employment of the deductive method is more efficacious here also. The deductive method proceeds by supposing the different causes from which the complex effect is synthetically deduced by reference to the laws of their operation ; and this is a more practicable course in the case of the intermixture of effects (specially when it is homogeneous with the causes) than the employment of the inductive canons, which can scarcely work by elimination here, since the different parts of the effect inextricably blend in a homogeneous whole.

Effects may sometimes be present in the form of tendency or tension.

It may be mentioned in this connection that sometimes different effects may be so opposed that they are apparently destroyed, as in the case of a bent bow or an evenly balanced tug-of-war. Really, however, the effects in such cases are not extin-

guished but held in reserve in the form of tendency or tension, as is evident from the manifestation of an effect when the string is cut in the one case or a member is withdrawn from either side in the other. Neutralization should not be construed as annihilation.

§ 8. **Mutuality of Cause and Effect.** We have seen that no sharp demarcation line can be drawn between causes and effects, they being but different aspects of one and the same energy. (*Vide* § 4.) The application of a spark to gunpowder, for example, is the cause of its explosion ; but this explosion again is the cause of the sensation of sound, which in its turn may be the cause of starting or of vigilance. Thus, we can never say that anything is absolutely a cause or an effect. What may be a cause with regard to one may be an effect with regard to another. Not only so, we find that often causes and effects re-act on each other. Industry, for example, promotes thrift, and thrift in its turn encourages industry ; sympathy secures co-operation, and co-operation again fosters sympathy. Owing to the continuity and activity of all natural processes, such action and re-action are illustrated in all the departments of nature and mind.

Sir G. C. Lewis well illustrates this reciprocity in the case of political causation. "It happens sometimes," he writes, "that when a relation of causation is established between two facts, it is hard to decide which, in the given case, is the cause and which the effect, because they act and

[†]Cause and effect are entirely relative, they being but different aspects of the same energy.)

The course of Nature is continuous, in which an event may be viewed as an effect in relation to a prior phenomenon, while as a cause in reference to a posterior.

Cause and effect often re-act on each other.

Testimony of Sir G. C. Lewis.

Illustrations. re-act upon each other, each phenomenon being in turn cause and effect. Thus, habits of industry may produce wealth ; while the acquisition of wealth may promote industry : again, habits of study may sharpen the understanding, and the increased acuteness of the understanding may afterwards increase the appetite for study. So an excess of population may, by impoverishing the labouring classes, be the cause of their living in bad dwellings ; and, again, bad dwellings, by deteriorating the moral habits of the poor, may stimulate population. The general intelligence and good sense of a people may promote its good government, and the goodness of the government may, in its turn, increase the intelligence of the people, and contribute to the formation of sound opinions among them. Drunkenness is in general the consequence of a low degree of intelligence, as may be observed both among savages and in civilized countries. But, in return, a habit of drunkenness prevents the cultivation of the intellect, and strengthens the cause out of which it grows. As Plato remarks, education improves nature, and nature facilitates education. National character, again, is both effect and cause : it re-acts on the circumstances from which it arises. The national peculiarities of a people, its race, physical structure, climate, territory, etc., form originally a certain character, which tends to create certain institutions, political and domestic, in harmony with that character. These institutions strengthen, perpetuate, and reproduce the character out of which

they grow, and so on in succession, each new effect becoming, in its turn, a new cause. Thus, a brave, energetic, restless nation, exposed to attack from neighbours, organizes military institutions : these institutions promote and maintain a warlike spirit : this warlike spirit, again, assists the development of the military organization, and it is further promoted by territorial conquests and success in war, which may be its result—each successive effect thus adding to the cause out of which it sprung". (*On Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, Vol. I, p. 375.)

§ 9. Observation and Experiment.

Observation and Experiment constitute, as we have seen, the material grounds of induction ; for every inductive generalization materials must be presented to the mind, which constitute the subject-matter of such a generalization. But merely the presentation of materials is not adequate ; there must also be an observing mind. And, in order to arrive at a correct generalization, we must observe with care, attention, and patience. Mere random perception of events or objects can never be conducive to inductive inquiry. If we notice any and every object which comes before the mind, then there will be no system and no possibility of sound generalization. Hence simple perception, or knowledge of objects or phenomena as presented to the mind, is not favourable to inductive research. In order to it, we must regulate our perception in the required direction : we should know what we are about, withdrawing our attention

Observation and Experiment supply materials for inductive generalizations.

Observation
is regulated
perception.

from what is irrelevant and directing our attention to what is connected with our inquiry. Thus, observation should be distinguished from mere perception : we may describe *observation* as *regulated perception*. And it is this regulated perception or observation which is of special importance in inductive inquiry.

In a wide
sense
Observation
includes
Experiment.

Observation
and Experi-
ment differ
in procedure.

According to some, *e.g.*, Stock, "Observation is passive experience" and "Experiment is active experience" on the ground that in the former the mind is passive, as it merely receives impressions about the phenomena under investigation, whereas it is active in the latter. But such a distinction is based on an erroneous theory of knowledge, *vis.*, mental passivity. In fact mental activity is involved in both in the form of interpretation of sense-impressions. We must construe observation, however, in a broad sense, so as to include experiment. Indeed, observation and experiment are not distinct in kind. They are but forms of regulated and prolonged perception, conducted with great care and attention and having some definite end in view. In both the cases, facts are presented to the mind and the mind takes notice of such facts. Though, however, the mind cognizes facts in both the cases, yet there is a difference in the procedure by which facts are brought before the mind. As Bain puts it, "Observation is *finding* a fact, Experiment is *making* one" : in the one case, we merely notice a fact which in the course of nature comes before the mind ; while, in the other, we so mould the circumstances as to give rise

to the fact or phenomenon which we wish to observe. In observation it is not always possible for us to simplify the conditions and have a control over them. But in experiment we attempt the production of a similar phenomenon under conditions which are simpler and variable at our will.* Electricity, for example, in the form of lightning is observed in the case of atmospheric discharge when it happens ; but it may be produced at pleasure in the laboratory by experiment, *i.e.*, by an arrangement of circumstances brought about by voluntary agency. Bacon likened Experiment to cross-examination of witnesses, since by means of it we so interrogate Nature as to elicit definite answers from her. Thus, Observation and Experiment are the channels of information which supply materials for inductive generalizations.

Though Observation and Experiment are thus essentially the same, yet the difference in procedure in the two cases brings out an important difference in their relative advantages. (1) The advantages of Experiment over Observation are :—

(1) In the case of Experiment we can multiply the instances as often as we like, while in the case of Observation we must depend upon the bounty of Nature for a suitable opportunity.

(2) In the case of Experiment we can produce an effect or phenomenon under definite and known

Relative advantages of Observation and Experiment :
(1) The advantages of Experiment.

* Sometimes we find in nature certain conditions happening by themselves without our agency and offering an opportunity for the special study of a phenomenon. These are called by some *Natural Experiments*, *e.g.*, a lunar eclipse which is so favourable to proving the round shape of the earth.

circumstances, while in the case of Observation there may be innumerable unknown and unsuspected agencies which modify the phenomenon under observation.

(3) In the case of Experiment we may vary the circumstances as we like, while in the case of *Observation* we must depend entirely on the special combination which Nature may be pleased to present before us.

(4) In the case of Experiment we can observe with greater care, while in the case of Observation we are taken by surprise, as it were, and thus have not an opportunity to observe with the same degree of caution and precision.

In the case of Experiment we can not only adjust our attention to the circumstances bringing about an effect, but we can also observe with a better care the issue or result. Attention, in the case of Experiment, is pre-adjusted; and hence it enables us to notice with greater care what otherwise might have been overlooked or but cursorily examined. "To experiment," says Fowler "is, not only to observe, but also to place the phenomenon under peculiarly favourable circumstances, as a preliminary to observation." (*Inductive Logic*, p. 34.)

Illustrations.

The truth of the above remarks is illustrated in the following examples mentioned by Minto in his *Logic*:—

"The air-pump was invented shortly before the foundation of the Royal Society, and its members made many experiments with this new means of

isolating an agent and thus discovering its potentialities. For example, live animals were put into the receiver, and the air exhausted, with the result that they quickly died. The absence of the air being the sole difference, it was thus proved to be indispensable to life. But air is a composite agent, and when means were contrived of separating its components, the effects of oxygen alone and of carbonic acid alone were experimentally determined.

"A good example of the difficulty of excluding agencies other than those we are observing, of making sure that none such intrude, is found in the experiments that have been made in connexion with spontaneous generation. The question to be decided is whether life ever comes into existence without the antecedent presence of living germs. And the method of determining this is to exclude all germs rigorously from a compound of inorganic matter, and observe whether life ever appears. If we could make sure in any one case that no germs were antecedently present, we should have proved that in that case at least life was spontaneously generated.

"The difficulty here arises from the subtlety of the agent under observation. The notion that maggots are spontaneously generated in putrid meat, was comparatively easy to explode. It was found that when flies were excluded by fine wire-gauze, the maggots did not appear. But in the case of microscopic organisms proof is not so easy. The germs are invisible, and it is difficult to make

certain of their exclusion. A French experimenter, Pouchet, thought he had obtained indubitable cases of spontaneous generation. He took infusions of vegetable matter, boiled them to a pitch sufficient to destroy all germs of life, and hermetically sealed up the liquid in glass flasks. After an interval, micro-organisms appeared. Doubts as to the conclusion that they had been spontaneously generated turned upon two questions : whether all germs in the liquid had been destroyed by the preliminary boiling, and whether germs could have found access in the course of the interval before life appeared. At a certain stage in Pouchet's process he had occasion to dip the mouths of the flasks in mercury. It occurred to Pasteur in repeating the experiments that germs might have found their way in from the atmospheric dust on the surface of this mercury. That this was so was rendered probable by his finding that when he carefully cleansed the surface of the mercury no life appeared afterwards in his flasks." (Pp. 314-315).

(II) The
advantages of
Observation.

Though Experiment possesses certain advantages over Observation, yet it can scarcely be denied that Observation also possesses certain advantages over Experiment. (II) The advantages of Observation over Experiment are :—

(1) There are facts or phenomena which are beyond our control, as well as agencies too dangerous to be experimented upon. We cannot, for example, have recourse to experiment with regard to heavenly bodies, which are altogether beyond

our control, and it will be too dangerous to have recourse to experiments involving serious injury to or destruction of individuals or society. In such cases we must be content with the observation of facts or phenomena as presented to us.

(2) In the case of Observation we may direct our attention from the effect to the cause or from the cause to the effect. Noticing instances of invariable sequence, we may observe the effect as well as the cause. But, in the case of Experiment, we proceed from the cause to the effect : the cause being given or surmised, we try by experiment to find out its effect. We can make the cause produce its effect ; but we can never make the effect bring back or reproduce its cause. All that we can do in the latter case is to suppose a cause by reference to past experience and then to make it produce its effect. Experiment thus leads us from cause—real or supposed—to effect, while Observation in either direction.

It is clear from the preceding account that, of the inductive sciences, those which can employ both observation and experiment are generally more certain and advanced than those which rest on observation alone. If we can actively manipulate materials so as to produce certain results at our will, we have means of verification under our control ; and thus we can often establish truths more conclusively under such circumstances than when we are left merely at the mercy of Nature. This is clearly brought out by the fact that while the physical sciences made but little progress in

Experimental sciences are more progressive than those resting on observation alone.

ancient and mediæval times owing to the total neglect of experiment by the Greek and mediæval scholars, these very sciences have made rapid strides in modern times owing to the extensive use of experiments in them now-a-days. And thus these sciences are ranked as prominent among the experimental sciences as distinguished from those in which, from the very nature of the subject-matter, we are constrained to have recourse to observation alone (*e.g.*, geology and astronomy).

Observation and Experiment are often vitiated by inference.

Before closing this section we must guard against an error which often vitiates our observation and experiment. We not infrequently mix up what is actually presented with what is but imagined or supposed. Thus, on seeing a cord we think it to be a snake or on noticing a sudden flash of light we take it to be lightning. In such cases perception is confounded with inference, leading to a wrong reading of facts and so to false surmises and incorrect conclusions. (*Vide* Chap. XXX, § 8). We should, therefore, be very careful in our observations and experiments, so as to take them at their proper worth and not to import into them what is suggested from without, in order that our inferences from them may be valid.

Observation, Explanation, and Classification are interconnected.

§ 10. Observation and Explanation.
We should remember in this connection that Observation is not an aimless act but is employed for some end in view. We *observe* a natural phenomenon (say, an eclipse of the sun or the moon) or have recourse to an experiment in the laboratory as illustrating some truth or law. Observations are

actually controlled or regulated by some guiding idea involved in a theory or an effort at explanation ; and the facts observed in their turn furnish materials to confirm or refute the theory or hypothesis. Observation and Explanation are thus inter-connected : we never observe in a random way ; and the materials which we gather under the spell of explanation in their turn contribute to it. Moreover, observation (including experiment) is a mental act involving comparison and leading to the discovery of relations of similarity and difference ; and whenever we bring a phenomenon under one class as distinct from another, we mean that it is governed by certain fixed relations and laws which 'explain' its character and behaviour. We, accordingly, find* that Observation, Explanation and Classification usually go hand in hand. (*Vide* Chap. XXVI, § 2.)

§ 11. Ground of Causation. Opinions differ with regard to the ultimate basis of the Law of Causation. We know that, in order to arrive at an inductive generalization, we must employ certain tests or, as they are called, Inductive Canons. These Inductive Canons in their turn presuppose the Law of Causation, for, without our faith in such a law, the Canons by themselves can never warrant inference from the known to the unknown. Now the question is, What is the ground of this Law of Causation itself, which is taken to be the basis of the Inductive Canons ? Two different answers have been given to this question :—

Different views of the origin of our belief in Causation.

- (1) The Law of Causation is taken by some (1) The

Intuitional View.

(*vis.*, by intuitional writers) as inherent in our mental constitution. Our mind has been moulded, as it were, according to this law. Thus, whenever an event takes place in Nature, we are led by this natural law of our understanding to think that it must have a cause. Such a tendency is at once universal and necessary, and the causal principle is self-evident in character.

(2) *The Empirical View.*

(2) It is urged by the supporters of the empirical school that the Law of Causation, like other laws, is but a generalization from experience. We have observed that every event has a cause ; and consequently we infer that the causal law is universal in character. But this position is inconsistent and untenable. As Mansel observes, it is a 'paralogism' to hold that 'the ground of all Induction is itself an Induction'. We have seen that all inductive generalizations ultimately rest on the assumption of the causal principle ; and if this principle itself be a generalization from experience, then we move in a never-ending circle.

The empirical view moves in a circle.

It is urged by empiricists that Universal Agreement, which is the basis of Causation, is not the same as the Experimental Method of Agreement.

Mill and Bain, no doubt, defend the empirical position by holding that the ground of the Law of Causation is not exactly the same as the ground of an inductive generalization. The Law of Causation is due to Universal Agreement throughout nature : it is this uncontradicted experience which induces belief in the universal character of the causal principle. And this Universal Agreement should not be confounded with the Method of Agreement as an Inductive Canon, which proceeds by elimination and varying the circumstances. No

elimination or variation of circumstances is implied in the Universal Agreement which, according to the supporters of this view, is the final basis of all ultimate laws.

But, it may be replied that experience alone can never be an adequate ground for establishing the Law of Causation. If we appeal to experience, we find that we know the causes of but few events or phenomena, while we are ignorant of causes in innumerable instances. Thus, if experience be the guide, then we should rather be led to hold that events are uncaused than caused. Moreover, experience can scarcely beget such a necessary and universal conviction as we find attending the causal principle. It thus appears that the law of Causation, which is taken to be the formal ground of every inductive inference, is an *a priori* axiom of the understanding.

§ 12. Relation of Causation to Uniformity of Nature. It is generally believed that the Law of Causation alone is the formal ground of Induction. This is the prevailing opinion ; and there is some justification for it when the cause is construed as the invariable antecedent of an effect or phenomenon. But this invariable sequence is connected rather with the Law of Uniformity of Nature than with the Law of Causation itself. The Law of Causation, strictly speaking, may be taken to imply that every event or change must have a ground or cause. But though every event is thus believed by us to be caused, yet it does not necessarily follow that the same cause

Causation, however, is not proved by Universal Agreement.

Experience fails to account for the necessity and universality involved in the causal relation.

Causation is ordinarily regarded as the formal ground of induction ; but, properly speaking, Causation and Uniformity of Nature constitute together such a ground.

should always produce the same effect. The latter statement implies not merely that an effect must have a cause, but also that Nature is uniform in her procedure, yielding the same result under the same circumstances. Thus, both the Law of Causation and the Law of Uniformity of Nature seem to be the indispensable formal grounds of inductive generalizations.

(a) Without Causality, mere Uniformity can never justify an inductive leap.

(a) Without the Law of Causality we may generalize, but we cannot arrive at Induction in the proper sense of the term : relying on the Law of Uniformity of Nature we may generalize relations not known to be due to causal connection. In such cases it would be precarious to proceed from the known to the unknown, in the absence of a known tie or connection* between phenomena ; and such instances may at most amount to Immethodical Induction or Induction by Simple Enumeration.

(b) Without Uniformity, mere Causation can never justify a generalization.

(b) Without the Law of Uniformity of Nature we can never generalize at all, even though we believe in the Law of Causation : effects may be caused ; but if the same cause be not always followed by the same effect, then evidently there can be no valid ground for generalization or proceeding from the known to the unknown. If, for example, fire now burns and now quenches thirst, and the ground is now solid and now liquid, or, say, rice is now nutritious and now poisonous, then evidently we can never arrive at a correct general proposition.

Mill and Bain take Causation as

Mill and Bain and many other logicians do not include the Law of Uniformity of Nature as a

distinct condition in the formal ground of Induction, because according to them the Law of Causation implies the Law of Uniformity of Nature. The Law of Causation, it is said, is but an instance of the Uniformity of Nature, namely, uniformity with regard to sequence. Hence is it that Mill and Bain contend that, in every inductive generalization, the ultimate major premise must be the Law of Uniformity of Nature, which is taken to be the ground of Causation itself. But, as we have seen, Causation is essentially distinct from Uniformity of Nature. Hence, Causation by itself can never be taken as the formal ground of induction; but *Causation as modified by the Law of Uniformity*.

but an aspect of Uniformity but this is not true.

We may mention here the views of some empiricists (*e.g.*, Mill and Bain) who regard the Law of Uniformity of Nature as but a generalization from experience. Thus, according to them by observing several instances of burning of fire and floating of timber in water we believe that fire and timber will similarly behave in future under similar conditions. This belief, then, in the Uniformity of Nature is derived from the uniform experience of the past. But it may be said, as against this view, that such an attempt of explaining the Law of Uniformity as an empirical generalization is hardly tenable, as such a generalization presupposes Uniformity of Nature. If we did not believe, for instance, that fire would burn and timber would float as they did in the past, we could not have inferred their uniform behaviour in the future on the strength of our previous experience about

The empirical view holding Uniformity as but generalization from experience is also untenable.

them. Thus, the empirical account of the origin of our belief in the Uniformity of Nature is a paralogism, as Mansel says, because it views the belief in Uniformity as a result of generalization and yet presupposes this belief in every generalization.

§ 13. Exercises.

1. What are the grounds of Induction? Distinguish between Formal and Material Grounds. Explain and examine the remark—"The Principle of Causation is the formal ground of Induction."

2. Indicate the character and marks of the Law of Causation and the Law of Uniformity of Nature.

3. How is the Principle of Uniformity of Nature related to the Law of Causation in its scientific aspect? Distinguish between the scientific and the popular view of Causation.

4. Explain the meanings of Energy and Conservation of Energy; and show the bearing of the Theory of Conservation on the nature of Causation.

5. Distinguish between (a) Causes and Conditions and (b) Proximate and Remote Causes. Elucidate—"The cause is the sum total of the conditions, positive and negative, taken together."

A man is crossing the river in a small boat; a sudden squall of wind comes on; the boat founders, and the man is drowned: what do you consider to be the cause and the conditions of his death?

A balloonist, unable to make a successful parachute descent, falls headlong and dies. Determine clearly the cause and conditions of his death.

6. What do you understand by Plurality of Causes? Is the doctrine strictly tenable?

7. Distinguish between (1) joint and complex effects and (2) homogeneous intermixture and heteropathic intermixture of effects. Are the effects in the case of an evenly balanced tug-of-war destroyed?

8. What do you understand by the Mutuality of Cause and Effect? Illustrate your remarks by examples.

9. Distinguish between Observation and Experiment, and indicate their relative advantages in inductive investigation. Elucidate—"Observations and experiments are the material grounds of Induction."

10. Show by a careful estimate of Observation and Experiment that the difference between them is 'not of kind but of degree.' What sciences depend mainly on Observation and why? What sciences depend mainly on Experiment and why? Do Observation and Experiment alone justify an inductive generalization?

11. What is the ultimate ground of our belief in Causation? Discuss the different views on the subject.

12. Distinguish between the Conditions of a Cause and the Composition of Causes. Examine in detail the statement that a cause is the *immediate, invariable, and unconditional antecedent* of an effect.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE EXPERIMENTAL METHODS.

§ 1. Experimental Methods as Deductions from Causation. We have seen that the difference between scientific and unscientific induction lies in the systematic employment of certain logical tests or methods which secure a degree of certainty in the one case, not attainable in the other. Thus, the Experimental Methods, or Canons of Induction, as they have been called, serve the same purpose in Induction as do the rules of the syllogism in deductive reasoning. And, as the syllogistic rules are mere deductions from the principles of consistency, so the Experimental Methods are really deductions from the Law of Causation as it is construed in science, *i.e.*, as modified by the Law of Uniformity of Nature. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 4 and § 12.)

As the syllogistic rules are deductions from the principles of consistency, so the inductive canons are deductions from the law of causation as conceived in science.

Our aim in every inductive inquiry is to generalize a relation from the observation of several individual instances. And there is a legitimate ground of such generalization when we detect causal connection between the phenomena about which we wish to generalize. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 2.) To detect the causal connection is, however, not always an easy task, as most phenomena presented to us are of a complex character. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 1.) Hence the necessity of elimination or exclusion of those circumstances which,

The Inductive Canons aim at discovering the causal connection by

though accompanying the phenomena under investigation, are not vitally connected with them. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 4.) The different Inductive Canons or Methods thus aim at excluding such accidental circumstances and discovering the factors that are really connected by causation. "The gist of all the Methods," observes Dr. Venn, "by which we are enabled to isolate the cause, and to determine over what limits it may safely be inferred, is one of analysis and exclusion." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 352.) And herein lies the great merit of Mill's System as distinguished from the Baconian Method. Bacon simply pointed out the necessity of observation that we may not be misled by our fancies but arrive at correct generalizations in harmony with facts. We should remember, however, that mere observation of facts is but a precarious guide without the employment of systematic procedure to explain them by the rejection of the inert factors and the selection of those that are potent. While Bacon was content with emphasizing the necessity of a mere careful study of Nature (facts), Mill aimed at an exact formulation of general Methods of Induction which might be equally applicable to the material and moral sciences. The conditions of proof being the same in all cases, he tried to formulate Rules or Canons to satisfy them. As observation is not the sole ground of Induction, we must, according to him, methodically generalize, *i.e.*, we should try to explain facts by reference to laws gathered by well-regulated inductive investigation.

variation of
circumstances
and
elimination.

Dr. Venn.

*Features of
Causation
from which
the Canons
follow :*

The several Inductive Canons or Methods, which we shall study in this chapter, follow directly from the Law of Causation. We have read that the Law of Causation, as conceived in Logic, implies that the cause is the invariable, unconditional, and immediate antecedent of what follows (*viz.*, the effect). An explanation of causal relation, therefore, depends on two sets of conditions : (1) that a certain cause always produces a certain effect or that whenever X (cause) is Y (effect) is, or whenever Y is, X is ; and (2) that a certain effect does not happen in the absence of a particular cause, or that whenever X is not, Y is not. The former, that is (1), is usually called a *Positive Instance*, while the latter, that is (2), a *Negative Instance*. Negative Instances, however, should be distinguished from *Exceptions*. Exceptions disprove causal relation, while Negative Instances prove it. We can now deduce the following traits or features which necessarily follow from the nature of a cause and which enable us to decipher the causal relation in any case by the extrusion of accidental circumstances :—

(i) An antecedent which can be excluded without prejudice to the effect is no part of the cause.

(2) No variable or accidental circumstance is the cause or part of the cause of a phenomenon.* Thus, when the relation between an antecedent and a consequent is a variable one, *i.e.*, when the one exists without the other, the relation can

* This is evidently the contrapositive of the definition of 'cause.' It may be proved thus :—A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an event : therefore, no cause is a variable or accidental antecedent of an event (*obverse*) : hence, no variable or accidental antecedent of an event is its cause (*contrapositive*).

never be a causal one. We, accordingly, conclude that whatever antecedent can be left out, without prejudice to the effect or whatever antecedent can be present, without the effect being present, can not be its cause or part of its cause. If, therefore, there be circumstances or antecedent phenomena which may be removed without affecting the effect in the least, then these plainly have nothing to do with the cause. If, for example, my lecture is not affected in any way by the absence of the register or the table before me, then evidently these are not causally connected with it. From this it also follows that if the introduction of a phenomenon does not influence an effect in the least, then such a phenomenon cannot be regarded as its cause or part of its cause. If, for instance, my lecture is not at all affected by the entrance of a bearer into the room, then there can be no causal connection between the two phenomena. The very fact that the effect existed when the phenomenon was absent serves as a case of natural elimination, bringing out the non-existence of causal nexus between the two. We shall see that this trait of causation is prominently illustrated in the *Canon or Method of Agreement*. (*Vide* § 4.)

(This is the basis of the Canon of Agreement.)

(ii) The invariable and unconditional antecedent of a phenomenon is its cause.* From this it is clear that whatever antecedent cannot be left out, without prejudice to the effect, must be its cause

(ii) An antecedent which cannot be excluded without

* This is the simple converse of the definition of 'cause.' A definition, we know, as the explanation of a term, admits of *simple conversion*. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 2.)

affecting the
effect is a
part of the
cause.

or part of its cause. The relation between cause and effect being an inseparable one, we naturally conclude that what cannot possibly be separated from an effect, without impairing or annihilating it, is its cause or a necessary part of its cause. If, for example, light can never be removed without obscuring my vision, then I am led to infer that light is the cause or a necessary condition of vision. We should, however, remember here that the unconditional character of the causal relation is essential to justify an inference that what necessarily precedes is the cause of what necessarily follows, as otherwise the necessary connection may be due to some remote cause of which the antecedent and the consequent are but co-effects (*e.g.*, the succession of day and night). " Thus, in order to be sure that an invariable antecedent is the cause, we must satisfy ourselves that nothing else goes with it (either in an overt or in a covert form) which might account for the effect. If the removal of a certain antecedent in any case involves also the removal of another potent factor associated with it, then we cannot rightly infer that the antecedent is the cause of the consequent, even if the consequent disappears with the disappearance of the antecedent, for the absence of both may be due to the removal of the unsuspected potent factor. Hence, *other circumstances remaining unaltered*, if we find that an antecedent cannot be excluded without the exclusion of a consequent, then we may take the one to be the cause or a necessary condition of the other. This trait of causation underlies,

as we shall see, the employment of the *Canon* or *Method of Difference*.

(Canon of Difference.)

(iii) The effect being but the cause transformed, there is equivalence between them, which is emphasized in the quantitative aspect of causation. Thus, any increase or decrease of the one is invariably followed by a corresponding increase or decrease of the other. If, for example, one horse draws a carriage at the rate of 3 miles an hour, two horses of the same strength would draw it at the rate of 6 miles an hour. When, therefore, an antecedent and a consequent vary in numerical concomitance, either directly or inversely, we conclude that they are causally connected. This trait of causation underlies the *Canon* or *Method of Concomitant Variations*. When, accordingly, we find that the rise or fall of an antecedent, which cannot altogether be eliminated, is accompanied by the rise or fall of a certain consequent, we naturally conclude that the antecedent and the consequent thus varying in numerical concomitance are causally connected.

(iii) Antecedents and consequents varying in numerical correspondence are causally connected.

(This is the basis of the Canon of Concomitant Variations.)

As the Joint Method (called also by Mill 'The Indirect Method of Difference,' by Bain 'The Method of Double Agreement,' and by Fowler 'The Double Method of Agreement') and the Method of Residues presuppose, as we shall see, the other Methods or Canons, all these Canons or Methods are thus seen to be ultimately based on the Law of Causation. Thus, Induction really aims at drawing a universal conclusion consistently with the data furnished by experience and the light

As the Canon of the Joint Method and that of Residues presuppose the other Canons, all the Canons are found to depend on Causation

Testimonies
of Read

supplied by the Law of Causation. "In fact," says Mr. Read, "Inductive Logic may be considered as having a purely formal character. It consists, first, in a statement of the Law of Cause and Effect ; secondly, in certain immediate inferences from this Law, expanded into the Canons ; thirdly, in the syllogistic application of the Canons to special propositions of causation by means of minor premises, showing that certain instances satisfy the Canons." (*Logic*, p. 225.) Bain, likewise, observes that the several Inductive Methods are really Deductive, as they follow directly from the Law of Causation ; they are called Inductive only "by courtesy."

and Bain.

Induction
aims at
discovering
a causal
connection
and thereby
establishing
a universal
proposition.

§ 2. **Enumeration and Analysis of Instances.** From the preceding remarks it is clear that the aim of Induction is to arrive at a universal proposition by establishing causal connection between two facts or phenomena. Induction thus presupposes that the world is a system or cosmos and not merely a disconnected aggregate of things or a chaos. We believe that all things have definite natures of their own by reason of which they behave in certain uniform ways towards one another. This evidently implies that all things of the world constitute an interconnected whole, so that a change in one gives rise to a change in another ; and this reciprocity is governed by law, which defines what we call the nature of a thing. The end of Induction, then, is to discover this nature or law governing a relation in any case. We thus say 'Heat expands bodies'

'Man is mortal,' 'Matter gravitates,' *etc.* (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 3 and Chap. XXIII, § 2.)

As, however, the nature or law is embodied in things, we must study them with care in order to discover it aright. Hence the necessity of observation and experiment, which bring before our mind appropriate instances calculated to reveal the inner law of their nature. The instances or facts being, however, generally complex, we must have recourse to analysis and elimination in order to exclude the accidental adjuncts and thereby to discover the essential nature underlying them. Mere multiplication of instances, therefore, does not mean much, unless we use the instances as means of discovering their inner nature revealing laws of connection. Perfect Induction* or Induction by Complete or Simple Enumeration, therefore, falls short of the requirements of true Induction. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 7 and Chap. XXII, § 1). Enumeration is but preparatory to Analysis. All that Enumeration of Instances can do is to create a presumption in favour of or against the presence of a law, according as they are uniform or conflicting in character; and, in the case of preponderance of evidence, we generally rely on statistics to determine a law, which is disguised by the influence of hostile elements. (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 3 and § 4). Usually, however, Induction by Simple Enumeration is the starting-point of Scientific Induction: several similar instances first suggest a law connecting them; and then we try to verify it by further observation, analysis, and comparison.

Instances are observed with a view to discover the causal connection.

Enumeration of instances is thus an aid to induction.

Adequate analysis of even a single case may justify an inductive generalization.

A true induction may appropriately be expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition.

Logic as a science of proof tests hypotheses about causation.

From this we can easily see that, for the purpose of true inductive generalization, adequate analysis and examination of even a single case may at times suffice ; such, for example, as we gather from the dissection of an animal or the chemical analysis of a compound, unhampered by distracting circumstances. (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 6.) A true inductive generalization, due to the nature or necessary connection of things, may appropriately be expressed in the form of a hypothetical proposition implying a relation of dependence between an antecedent and a consequent. Thus, 'All men are mortal' may be expressed as 'If humanity is, mortality is.' (*Vide* Chap. VII, § 5.)

§ 3. Inductive Methods as Weapons of Elimination. We have already read that Proof, and not Discovery, is the end of Logic. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 11.) Logic does not teach us how to discover the causal connection in any particular instance. Such a discovery must be suggested to our mind by imaginative insight. We must first frame some hypothesis to explain the phenomenon under investigation, before a discovery can be made of its appropriate cause.

A hypothesis, as a guiding conception, enables us to select appropriate instances by reference to which we can test its validity. As the instances, however, are more or less complex in character, we have to analyse them and eliminate the accidental features before we are able to find out the material factors which are likely to throw light on the hypothesis. The Rules by which we test these in-

stances, with a view to the exclusion of the inert accompaniments and the selection of potent factors, are known as the Inductive Canons or Methods. These Canons or Inductive tests are five in number, *vis.*, (I) the Canon of the Method of Agreement, (II) the Canon of the Joint Method, (III) the Canon of the Method of Difference, (IV) the Canon of the Method of Concomitant Variations and (V) the Canon of the Method of Residues. These Canons are chiefly applicable to cases where the causes and effects remain distinct, instead of blending in a homogeneous whole, when, as we have said, the deductive method is specially applicable. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 7.)

Five tests or Canons.

The Canons are specially useful when the causes and effects remain distinct.

The Inductive Methods have at times been described as Weapons of Elimination ; but this description is only partially true. No doubt, we try, by the employment of the Canons or Methods, to exclude the accidental circumstances, which obscure the potent factors and thus stand in the way of the discovery of the causal connection. But we should remember that the function of the Inductive Methods is not mere negative exclusion but also positive selection : if they are employed for the elimination of inert adjuncts, it is only because such elimination clears the ground and so renders prominent the factors which are related as cause and effect. Thus, the aim of the Inductive Methods is always positive discovery, though this is attained by negative exclusion : the irrelevant are thrust out in order that the relevant may be seen. To single out the essential factors which are

The Inductive Methods employ elimination with a view to discovery.

really operative, the Inductive Methods have recourse to the elimination or rejection of what are variable and inert.

Thus, each Inductive Method has both a positive and a negative function, following immediately from the traits of causation explained above.

From the above remarks it is clear that each of the Inductive Methods or Canons has both a positive and a negative aspect ; and these two aspects readily follow from the first two traits or features of causation indicated in section before the last. The first trait has the negative function of elimination ; while the second, the positive function of finding out the causal relation. The Method of Concomitant Variations follows evidently from the third trait or feature. With these preliminary remarks let us now proceed to explain the five Inductive Canons one by one.

Enunciation of the Canon.

§ 4. (1) The Canon of Agreement. *If two or more instances of a phenomenon under investigation have only one other circumstance (antecedent or consequent) in common, that circumstance is the cause or the effect of the phenomenon, or connected with it by causation.*

This Canon implies that when we find a phenomenon *uniformly* preceded or followed by another in two or more cases, then we are led to conclude that this other phenomenon is the cause or the effect, according as it precedes or follows the phenomenon under investigation, or the two phenomena are co-effects of some other cause, so that the one can never be found without the other. Whether we are right or wrong in our supposition can, of course, only be proved by more extended

observation or by the employment of the other Canons. As explained in Chap. XVI, § 4, elimination by variation of circumstances is prominently illustrated in this Method.

If, for example, *A B C* be followed by *a b c*, *A D E* by *a f g*, and *A R S* by *a m n*, then we naturally suspect that the common factor in the antecedents (*viz.*, *A*) is the cause or a necessary part of the cause of the common factor in the consequents (*viz.*, *a*). To take a concrete example : if an individual repeatedly suffers from rheumatic pains when the weather is cloudy, then he naturally suspects that the cloudy weather is the cause or a necessary condition of his rheumatism.

Illustrations.

The Canon of Agreement is essentially a Canon of the Method of Observation. We observe numerous instances of correspondence between antecedents and consequents, from which we naturally conclude that there is some causal connection between the common factors present in them. We find, for example, a remarkable coincidence between the scarlet colour and the absence of fragrance. The following account in this connection is instructive :—"Among all the colours that blooms assume, none are less associated with fragrance than scarlet. We cannot at present recollect a bright scarlet blossom that is sweet-scented—yet no other colour among flowers is more admired and sought after. Scarlet prevails among *Balsamina*, *Euphorbia*, *Pelargonium*, *Poppy*, *Salvia*, *Bouvardia*, and *Verbena*, yet none of the scarlets are of sweet perfumes. Some of the light-coloured

This Canon is employed in Observation.

Illustrations.

Balsams and Verbenas are sweet-scented, but none of the scarlets are. The common Sage, with blue blooms, is odoriferous both in flower and foliage ; but the scarlet-Salvias are devoid of smell. None of the sweet-scented-leaved Pelargoniums have scarlet blooms, and none of the scarlet bloomers have sweet scent of leaves nor of blooms. Some of the white-margined Poppies have pleasant odours ; but the British scarlets are not sweet-scented. The British white-blooming Hawthorn is of the most delightful fragrance ; the scarlet-flowering has no smell. Some of the Honeysuckles are sweetly perfumed, but the Scarlet Trumpet is scentless." (Elder, *American Gardener's Monthly*.)

*Defects of
the Canon*

(1) To
generalize
correctly, we
must observe
a large
number of
instances.

The Canon of Agreement has certain defects or disadvantages which may be indicated thus :—

(1) The number of instances observed must be large enough to justify a generalization. If we observe a correspondence between an antecedent and a consequent in but a few cases, we cannot reasonably conclude therefrom that the two are causally connected. If, for example, we find a visitor at 4 P.M. on two or three successive occasions, we cannot hastily conclude therefrom that there is any connection between that hour and his visit. The coincidence may be purely accidental. In order to justify an inference that there is a causal connection between them, a more extended observation must be made ; and if we really find that in numerous instances the individual pays visit only at 4 P. M., then we may be justified in supposing that there is a causal connection between that hour and

his visit, *i.e.*, in supposing that the individual finds that hour to be the most convenient for his visit.

(2) The Canon fails in the case of Plurality of Causes. If one and the same effect can be produced by different causes on different occasions, then the Canon of Agreement can never warrant us in inferring that a variable factor in the antecedent is not a cause. In the above symbolical example *B* may be the cause of *a* in the first case, *D* in the 2nd, and *R* in the 3rd. Thus, on the assumption of the doctrine of plurality of causes, we cannot conclude that *B*, *D*, or *R* is not the cause of *a*, because it is not uniformly preceded by any one of them. When, for example, a conjuror produces wonderful results by different tricks on different occasions, taking care to use his wand in each case, then the inference that his wand, and not the tricks, is the cause of the results is evidently not valid, though it is so suggested to the spectators. Likewise, a doctor may administer castor oil with rose syrup to a patient, mercury with rose syrup to another, and croton-oil with rose syrup to a third person, and the common result in all these cases is loose evacuation. From this evidently we are not justified in inferring that rose syrup is a laxative, though such an inference may be suggested to a layman. This defect is remedied, as we shall see, by the employment of the Joint Method or even by the Method of Difference.

(2) The Canon fails in the case of Plurality of Causes.

(3) The Method of Agreement being mainly a method of observation is subject to the limitations of observation. Its conclusion, therefore, cannot be

(3) It is not competent to distinguish Causation

from
Co-existence.

more than a mere probability or a tentative certainty unless it is verified by the negative instances. In fact this method fails to *prove* (but only suggests) causal connection between the constant factors in the antecedents and consequents. All that the Canon of Agreement shows is that the one (the constant antecedent) goes with the other (the constant consequent); but these two factors may be related simply by co-existence and not by causation, in which case an inductive generalization would be highly precarious. Or, the common antecedent and the common consequent may be the co-effects of some other cause, as in the case of day and night. 'It was a general belief at St. Kilda,' says Dr. Paris, 'that the arrival of a ship gave all the inhabitants *colds*. Dr. John Campbe'l took a great deal of pains to ascertain the fact, and to explain it as the effect of effluvia arising from human bodies; the simple truth, however, was, that the situation of St. Kilda renders a north-east wind indispensably necessary before a stranger can land—the wind, not the stranger, occasioned the epidemic.' (*Pharmacologia*, p. 89.) We see, then, that the Canon of Agreement, though often employed by common people, is not competent to prove a causal connection, which lies at the root of all valid inductive generalizations.

§ 5. (II) The Canon of the Joint Method of Agreement in Presence and in Absence.

Enunciation
of the Canon.

If (i) two or more instances in which a phenomenon occurs have only one other circumstance (consequent or antecedent) in common, while (ii) two or more

instances in which it does not occur have nothing else in common save the absence of that circumstance ; the circumstance in which alone the two sets of instances differ throughout (being present in the first set and absent in the second) is the effect or the cause of the phenomenon, or causally connected with it.

<i>Agreement in Presence.</i>	<i>Agreement in Absence.</i>	<i>Illustration.</i>
ABC	BCD	
abc,	bcd,	
ADE	DEF	
ade,	rst,	
AKL	KLM	
akl.	klp.	

This Canon implies the double application of the Method of Agreement, *vis.*, Agreement in Presence and Agreement in Absence. It implies that whatever is present in several observed instances with the presence of a phenomenon, and is absent in several observed instances with its absence, is causally connected with the phenomenon. It is, accordingly, applied where there are two sets of instances differing only in one antecedent and one consequent, which are uniformly present in the instances of one set and uniformly absent from the instances of the other. When this is the case, we naturally suspect that the antecedent and the consequent which are present in the positive instances and absent from the negative ones are related either as cause and effect or by some bond of causation which chains them together. Thus, in the symbolical example given above, we find in the first set of instances *A* to be common to all

Enunciation
of the Canon.

§ 6. (III) The Canon of Difference. *If an instance in which a phenomenon occurs and an instance in which it does not occur, have every other circumstance in common save one, that one (whether consequent or antecedent) occurring only in the former; the circumstance in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable condition of the phenomenon.*

What this Canon implies is that when we have a pair of clearly defined instances of succession, agreeing in all respects except an antecedent and a consequent, which are present in one case but absent in the other, then we are led to think that the antecedent and the consequent are causally connected. When the presence of an agent, therefore, is followed by the appearance, and its absence by the disappearance, of a certain event (other conditions remaining the same), then it is generally thought that there is a causal connection between the agent and the event. Thus,

Illustrations.

ABC	BC
abc.	bc.

Here we notice in the first case that ABC are followed by abc , while in the second case we find that BC are followed by bc . In the second case we find that A is absent from the antecedent, and a is absent from the consequent. Hence, we naturally conclude that A is the cause of a ; for the two are uniformly present in the first, and they are uniformly absent from the second case. This Canon of Difference has thus its force even when it is employed as a method of observation.

It is
principally

its chief merit lies in its being employed as an instrument of experiment. When, having observed that A is followed by a , we suspect that they are causally connected, and then we have recourse to experiment to verify our suspicion, the full force of this method is clearly illustrated. We remove, for example, A and we find that a also disappears ; and this is a conclusive proof that A is the cause of a . We find, for example, that when we strike a bell placed in the receiver of an air-pump full of air, sound is produced ; but as soon as the air is pumped out, there is no more any sound. We are, accordingly, led to think that sound is produced by the vibration of air. But, in order that this conclusive evidence may be forthcoming, the positive and negative instances should agree in all respects except one (*vis.*, the presence in the one case, and the absence in the other, of the supposed cause and the effect) ; otherwise the absence of the effect in the second case may be due to some other change. Hence, it is remarked that the Canon of Difference is peculiarly efficacious in establishing inductive generalizations, though it is often very difficult fully to satisfy the requirements of this Canon. When, for example, an individual suffers from ill-health in a particular place, and suspects that its climate is injurious to him, he may migrate to some other place and may be completely cured. From this he may infer that the climate of the first place was the real cause of his illness. But, such an inference is precarious, when other changes are simultaneously introduced,

employed in experiments, and is often very conclusive.

The requirements of this Canon are stringent.

such as those in diet and habits. It may thus be altogether erroneous to attribute his illness to climate, when it might have been due to previous diet or habits. (*Vide* Chap. XXX, § 6.)

This Method operates either by subtraction or by addition.

It may be mentioned here that the Method of Difference may operate either by subtraction or by addition. Thus, the withdrawal of an antecedent and the immediate disappearance of a consequent may as much rouse the suspicion of a causal connection between them, as the introduction of an antecedent and the immediate appearance of a consequent. Thus, when the sun is suddenly obscured by a cloud we infer not merely that the sun is the cause of light, but also that the cloud is the cause of darkness. Hence elimination or addition may reveal a causal link, provided the other circumstances remain the same. (*Vide* § 4.)

It is generally employed in practice.

We have said that all men are born logicians, more or less. There is a natural tendency even in children to exercise their intelligence aright for the attainment of truth. Thus, the canon of Difference, as the most cogent Experimental Method, is often employed even by children and rustics to determine a relation of causation. When a child, for example, finds that on shutting the eyes there is no visual experience, while on opening them there is, it naturally infers that the eyes are the organ of vision. Similarly, a cultivator attributes bad harvest to drought when he finds that, other circumstances being equal, there is good harvest when there is rain, while the absence of rain is attended by the failure of crop. If instances be

multiplied, and inference drawn from several cases of agreement in presence and absence, then the ground of inference is not the Method of Difference, but the Joint Method, as explained above. It may also be mentioned that the Method of Difference is not frustrated by Plurality of Causes. If, with the removal of a particular antecedent, a particular consequent also disappears, it proves that they are causally connected, whatever other causes might possibly exist.

From the above account we may easily gather the important points of difference between the Joint Method and the Method of Difference : (1) The Joint Method is generally employed in those sciences or spheres of inquiry where we have to depend on observation ; but the Method of Difference is pre-eminently experimental. The former is thus not so conclusive as the latter. (2) The Joint Method requires a large number of instances, both positive and negative ; but only two instances, one positive and the other negative, are sufficient for the Method of Difference. Thus, the former is comparatively laborious, while the latter rather easy when possible. (3) In the Method of Difference we prove our point directly by comparing the positive with the negative instance. But in the Joint Method the result is first obtained from the positive instances and then it is confirmed by the negative ones. Hence the Joint Method has sometimes been called the 'Indirect Method of Difference.'

Difference
between the
Joint Method
and the
Method of
Difference.

§ 7. (IV). The Canon of Concomitant

Enunciation
of the Canon.

Variations. *Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon (consequent or antecedent) varies in some particular manner is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.*

Exact correspondence in changes suggests causal connection.

As variations are changes in time, when any correspondence is repeatedly noticed between them, we naturally attribute it to causal connection and not to mere chance. Of course, extended observation and careful study are necessary before we are justified in arriving at such a conclusion; and the more definite and exact the correspondence, the surer the conclusion. "The illustrations of this law," as Jevons observes, "are infinitely numerous. Thus Mr. Joule of Manchester, conclusively proved that friction is a cause of heat by expending exact quantities of force by rubbing one substance against another, and showed that the heat produced was exactly greater or less in proportion as the force was greater or less. We can apply the method to many cases which had previously been treated by the simple method of difference; thus instead of striking a bell in a complete vacuum, we can strike it with a very little air in the receiver of the air-pump, and we then hear a very faint sound, which increases or decreases every time we increase or decrease the density of the air. This experiment conclusively satisfies any person that air is the cause of the transmission of sound." (*Elementary Lessons in Logic*, pp. 249-250.)

This Method of Concomitant Variations is applicable to those cases in which the Method of Difference *cannot* properly be employed: *vis.*, the cases in which the supposed potent factors are what are called 'Permanent Causes', *i.e.*, causes of such a kind that their *total* elimination from the phenomena under investigation is not possible. Heat, cohesion, gravity, for example, are factors which cannot altogether be excluded from material bodies. Hence, in studying phenomena connected with these attributes, we are to apply this Canon. When we observe variations in intensity with regard to, say, 'heat' and also variations with regard to, say, 'volume,' we naturally infer a correspondence between 'heat' and 'volume' or 'density.' It is surmised that the brain is the organ of the mind, and this suspicion is based on this Canon. We notice the difference in weight or size of the brain in the case of different species or individuals, and we also notice variation in the degree of mental power. And, as we find differences in weight or size varying with degrees of mental power, we naturally surmise that the two are causally connected.

It is applied to cases where total elimination is not possible.

Illustrations.

These illustrations bring out the efficacy of this Canon in suggesting a hypothesis. Of course, all the Canons are methods of proof and not of discovery. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 13.) But, it should be remembered that concomitant variations materially help discovery when the phenomena under investigation are arranged in a graduated scale. "I have shown," observes Professor Ferri,

This Canon is an aid to discovery.

"that in France there is a manifest correspondence of increase and decrease between the number of homicides, assaults, and malicious wounding, and the more or less abundant vintage, especially in the year of extraordinary variations, whether of failure of the vintage (1853-5, 1859, 1867, 1873, 1878-80), attended by a remarkable diminution of crime (assaults and wounding), or of abundant vintages (1850, 1856-8, 1862-3, 1865, 1868, 1874-5), attended by an increase of crime." (*Criminal Sociology*, Eng. Trans., p. 117.) And he further illustrates how these crimes "in their oscillations from month to month display a characteristic increase during the vintage periods, from June to December, notwithstanding the constant diminution of other offences." (P. 77.)

This Canon may be viewed as a modification of Agreement or of Difference, according as other changes accompany or not the changes examined.

This Canon may be regarded as a modification of the Canon of Agreement or of the Canon of Difference, according as the changes under investigation are accompanied or not by other changes. Thus, if we find $A\ B\ C$ followed by $l\ m\ n$, (2 A) $B'C'$ followed by (2 l) $m'n'$, (3 A) $B''C''$ followed by (3 l) $m''n''$, then we have to single out the connection between A and l in the midst of other variable factors (such as BC , $B'C'$, $B''C''$, $m\ n$, $m'n'$, $m''n''$), as in the case of the Method of Agreement. If, however, the attendant circumstances do not vary, but remain constant [such as ABC followed by lmn , (2 A) BC followed by (2 l) mn , (3 A) BC followed by (3 l) mn], then the connection between A and l stands out distinctly, owing to the absence of other concomitant changes, as in the case of the

Method of Difference. In the former case, of course, the conclusion is not so certain as in the latter, since the correspondence in the variations of A and I may then be due, not to a direct causal connection between them, but to other causes, such as B or C associated with A and varying with it, or something else, owing to whose influence all these factors vary.

It should also be noticed in this connection that the Method of Concomitant Variations is applicable to cases where there are variations in quantity. Qualitative variations are measurable by the other Canons. Quantitative variations may be illustrated either in a direct or in an inverse form. For example, if a train travels 20 miles an hour when drawn by one locomotive, 40 miles an hour when drawn by two, and 60 miles an hour when drawn by three, we readily see the causal connection between motion and steam power. Similarly, if the intensity of a current of water becomes $\frac{1}{2}$ when only one barrier is erected, $\frac{1}{4}$ when two are set up, and $\frac{1}{8}$ when three are employed, we easily discover the connection between a barrier and check on a water-current. Thus, correspondence in the variation of two phenomena, either in a direct or in an inverse form, naturally inspires in us a belief in their causal connection.


The Canon of Concomitant Variations is employed to bring out a causal connection prominently by what are known as the Graphic Method and the Method of Gradations. *The Graphic Method**

It is applicable to quantitative variations, manifested either in a direct or in an inverse form, qualitative variations being measured by the other Canons.


* The Graphic Method is often used in statistical inquiries, as it shows at a glance the fluctuations which we want to notice. The

The Graphic
Method and

is the pictorial representation of the factors which vary together and which are suspected to be connected by way of causation. The Graphic Method may be illustrated by the following diagrams representing the correspondence between, say, the degree of heat and the quantity of volume, or say the prevalence of a disease (*e.g.*, plague) and change of season :—



The following diagram represents also graphically correspondence between the variation in temperature and the lapse of time in the course of the typhus fever :—



abscissa or horizontal line shows variation in an agent or condition, called the *variable*, while the ordinates or perpendiculars indicate variations in the connected phenomenon, called the *variant*. See the diagrams on the next page.

The Method of Gradations or what is called *the Serial Method* consists in arranging in a series, or in a graduated scale, several objects illustrating variations in some fundamental attribute. For example, we may arrange human brains of different sizes or weights and notice corresponding variations in mental powers, or we may arrange the different modern languages in a series according to the degree of complexity and we may also notice corresponding variations in culture, and thus detect a causal connection between the two (*vis.*, the size or weight of the human brain and the degree of mental power in the one case, and the richness of language and the degree of mental culture in the other).* [*Vide* Chap XXVI, § 2] If we supplement such an inquiry by an examination of the brains and the mental powers of other animals or the study of languages in the different periods of history among different nations, then such a procedure is described as the *Comparative Method*.

the Method of Gradations or the Serial Method are based on this Canon.

The Comparative Method.

* Dr. Bosanquet writes—"I remember that a great many years ago I hardly believed in the stone-age tools being really tools made by men. I had only seen a few bad specimens, one or two of which I still think were just accidentally broken flints which an old country clergyman took for stone-age tools. This was to me then a mere guess, *vis.*, that the cutting shape proved the flints to have been made by men. And obviously, if I had seen hundreds of specimens no better than these, I should have treated it as a mere guess all the same. But I happened to go to Salisbury, and there I saw the famous Blackmore Museum, where there are not only hundreds of specimens, but specimens arranged in series from the most beautiful knives and arrow-heads to the rudest. There one's eye caught the common look of them at once, the better specimens helping one to interpret the worse, and the guess was almost turned into a demonstration, because one's eyes were opened to the sort of handwork which these things exhibit, and to the way in which they are chipped and flaked." (*Essentials of Logic*, pp. 143-144.)

The application of this Method becomes difficult when the correspondence is found to be irregular.

The employment of this Method is sometimes rendered difficult owing to irregularities in the correspondence of certain variations. In the case of Weber's law, for example, we notice that beyond certain limits the exact correspondence between the quantity of the stimulus and the intensity of the resulting sensation does not hold good; and we similarly find that water contracts as temperature falls till the freezing point is reached, after which it begins to expand. And the result of this method cannot be regarded as absolutely conclusive even in the case where two variations are found to have a definite numerical ratio between them, for they may both be but co-effects of a certain agent instead of being mutually related as cause and effect. In such cases, we must have recourse to wider observation and other methods to be sure of connection, suggested by this method.

Enunciation of the Canon.

§ 8. (V) **The Canon of Residues.** *Subduct from any phenomenon such part as previous inductions have shown to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedents.*

It is applicable to complex cases.

Illustrations.

This canon implies that when any part of a complex phenomenon is known to be due to certain causes, the remaining or residual portion is due to some other cause besides the known. It is applicable to complex cases in which an aggregate of several conditions or causes gives rise to an aggregate of several effects. If, for example, we observe *ABC* invariably and uncondi-

tionally followed by abc , and we know from previous inductions that B is the cause of b and C is the cause of c , then we can safely conclude that the residual or remaining antecedent A is the cause of the residual or remaining consequent a . Here the situation is a complex one, so that we cannot altogether separate A from its natural concomitants B and C , nor a from b and c . But, by subtraction, we infer that the remaining antecedent is the cause of the remaining consequent. Hence the Canon or Method is known as the Canon or Method of *Residues*.

This Canon rests evidently on the assumption that a cause must be adequate to the effect; so that when a part of a complex effect remains unaccounted for, we are led to attribute it to a cause other than the known causes of the other parts. If, then, we find some invariable antecedent associated with these causes, we naturally suspect it to be the cause of the residual phenomenon, as in the symbolical illustration given above. If, however, no such antecedent is presented to us, we are driven to hunt for it by analogies and past experiences, in order satisfactorily to explain the remaining effect. We thus see that the Method of Residues may be applied in two distinct, though allied, ways. Let us consider them separately.

(1) This method is applied to find out the agency of each of the several causes which combine to produce a complex effect, as indicated in the symbolical example given above. The enunciation of the Canon as given above from Mill, serves this

This Canon rests on the assumption that the cause must be adequate to the effect.

Two prominent forms of the Method :

(1) To connect a residual consequent with a residual antecedent or antecedents.

Illustrations. purpose. When, for example, I smell a nosegay consisting of three kinds of flowers, the smells of two of which are known to me, then by this method I can refer the third smell to the third kind of flower. Similarly, if I weigh a bag with its contents, I can determine the weight of the contents by this method, when the weight of the bag is known to me. This method is also employed by Mill to infer the possible existence of *a priori* factors. He tries to explain our knowledge by reference to experience; and he mentions that if he failed thus to account for all the constituents of knowledge, then the residual factors might be explained by reference to *a priori* origin, the mind being the only other alternative source of knowledge. "The original elements," he writes, "can only come to light as residual phenomena, by a previous study of the modes of generation of the mental facts which are confessedly not original." (*Examination*, p. 179.)

(2) To discover the cause of a residual phenomenon.

(2) A more important application of the Method, however, is to discover an unknown cause of a residual phenomenon not explained by the given causes. Many examples cited by Mill and his followers illustrate this application, though it does not readily follow from the enunciation as given by them. To justify this use a distinct rule is needed, which may be enunciated thus:—*When any part of a complex phenomenon is still unexplained by the causes which have been assigned, a further cause for this remainder must be sought.* This form of the Canon is illustrated in the *discovery*

Enunciation of a Canon for this purpose.

of Neptune. It was noticed by astronomers that Uranus deviated a little from its calculated path. This residual phenomenon, *vis.*, the deviation, was accounted for by the hypothesis of an unknown body to whose influence the deviation was supposed to be due. The telescope was directed to the suspected part of the heavens with the result that Neptune was discovered as the cause of this deviation. Similarly, the *discovery of argon* was due to this method. It was found that nitrogen as found in the atmosphere was slightly heavier than nitrogen obtained from chemical sources. The cause of this difference in weight was supposed to be due to the presence of some other gas in the atmosphere, which was subsequently discovered to be argon.

The above are the two chief applications of this method, though, no doubt, there is a third possibility of trying to discover the effect of a residual cause or antecedent. When, for example, we know *ABC* to be the antecedents, and also *a* to be the effect of *A*, and *b*, the effect of *B*, then we may be on the look out for the effect of *C*. Such a problem may, however, be solved easily by experiment, where possible, or by a study of other instances or combinations in which *C* is present.

This method is, thus, valuable rather as a source of hypotheses than as an instrument of proving or testing them. Hence it may be said to be a method rather of *discovery* than proof. In fact it has been found particularly useful, as we have seen, in the discoveries of physical sciences.

Illustrations.

A third form of the Method is to discover the effect of a residual cause.

Experiment easily settles such a question.

This Method is valuable more as a source of hypotheses than as an instrument of proof.

Difference between this Method and the Method of Difference.

It is clear that this method very closely resembles the Method of Difference. But there is also a distinction between the two methods. In the Method of Difference the negative instance is obtained by direct experience, *i.e.*, by observation and experiment, whereas in the Method of Residues it is got by deduction from our prior knowledge of causal connections. Thus, unlike the Method of Difference, this method is based upon a previous knowledge of the laws of operation of different causes and a deductive computation of their total effect.

This method is especially suitable for quantitative investigations.

This method is sometimes called Deductive, as distinguished from the other Inductive Methods, but such a description is scarcely accurate, since all the canons are deductions from causation and all of them deduce conclusions from hypotheses, which they try to verify by an appeal to observation and experiment.

Like the method of concomitant variations, this method is specially concerned with quantitative investigations, its aim being to offer a complete and precise explanation of a fact. It is sometimes called a Deductive Method, as its procedure is prominently deductive. It first deduces the known consequences of known causes according to the known laws of their operation, and then, to complete the explanation, tries to deduce the known consequence of an unknown cause or, at times, the unknown consequence of a known cause, supposed to operate according to certain laws. Herein does it differ from the other Experimental Methods which proceed mainly by observation and experiment. But, inspite of this difference, we are not justified in calling this method Deductive, as distinguished from the other Inductive Methods, on the following grounds:—(1) The formation of hypothesis and deduction of consequences from it with a view to its verification are essential to all the

Methods. (2) Verification by an appeal to observation and experiment is necessary in all the Methods to set at rest any doubt about the correctness of our conclusion. (3) In a certain sense, all the Canons or Methods may be said to be deductive, for all of them follow immediately from the law of causation. In fact, the inductive canons, as we have seen, may be regarded as immediate inferences from the law of causation; and the application of these canons to particular cases to arrive at universal propositions may therefore be regarded as syllogistic inferences. (*Vide* § 1.)

It may be mentioned in this connection that, as our knowledge progresses and the sciences become more and more deductive (*Vide* Chap. I, § 12), there is greater room for the application of this Canon. "It is by this process," says Sir John Herschel, "that science, in its present advanced state, is chiefly promoted. Most of the phenomena which nature presents are very complicated; and when the effects of all known causes are estimated with exactness, and subducted, the residual facts are constantly appearing in the form of phenomena altogether new, and leading to the most important conclusions." (*Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy*, § 158.)

As our knowledge advances and sciences become more deductive, there is greater room for the application of this Canon.

§ 9. Characteristics and Uses of the Canons or Methods. It is clear from the above account that all the Inductive Methods are like fire purging away the dross of appendages and bringing out the golden link of causal connection, which binds the phenomena under investigation, in its

purity. Having explained in the above sections the different Methods one by one, let us now briefly indicate their characteristics and uses.

The method of Agreement.
It is a method of observation.

It fails to distinguish causation from co-existence.

It is frustrated by plurality of causes.

It is generally employed to establish empirical and scientific generalizations.

It is applicable to phenomena beyond our control and to those which are too dangerous to be experimented upon.

The Joint Method. The

The Method of Agreement. It is pre-eminently a method of observation in which we notice the phenomena under investigation as they are presented to us in the natural course of events. Besides the active regulation of attention to watch with care the phenomena observed, there is no active regulation of the phenomena themselves, such as we find in experiment. There is, thus, the difficulty of discovering whether the connected phenomena are related by way of causation or co-existence, for the most cogent test of causal connection (*vis.*, that, with the disappearance of the cause, the effect also disappears) cannot be applied to phenomena over which we have no control. We have also seen that the Method fails in the case of Plurality of Causes. (*Vide* § 4.) In spite of these disadvantages, this method is most commonly used both by the ignorant and the learned in arriving at empirical and scientific generalizations. There are phenomena, such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, movements of heavenly bodies, epidemics which can never be produced by experiment; and in such cases we must necessarily employ this Method. We have recourse to this method also when an agency is too dangerous to be experimented upon, as when we wish to determine the effects of misrule or of some violent poison.

The Joint Method. It is more conclusive than the Method of Agreement, for the positive and

negative instances taken together produce a strong presumption in favour of a causal connection between the phenomena under investigation. As the positive instances agree only in the presence of the phenomena in question and the negative instances, in their absence, there is a strong probability of a causal link, specially when sequence is proved. We have seen that when the negative instances are exhaustive and eliminate all possible causes, the supposition of a plurality of causes is excluded. (*Vide* § 6.)

The Method of Difference. It is pre-eminently a method of experiment and is most cogent in proving the causal connection. The requirements of this method are, no doubt, very stringent ; but, when they are satisfied, the proof is most conclusive. If the positive and the negative instance differ in nothing else than in the phenomena under investigation, then there is no doubt about their being connected by way of causation. "Agreement and Difference," says Bain, "can be easily compared as to their respective advantages and disadvantages. Agreement needs a large number of instances, but their character is not restricted. Any instance that omits a single antecedent contributes to the result ; the repetition of the same instance is of use only as giving means of selection. Difference requires only one instance ; but that one is peculiar, and rarely to be found." (*Logic*, II, p. 60.)

The Method of Concomitant Variations. It is applicable, as explained above, to those cases where

positive and negative instances together afford a more conclusive proof than either of them taken separately.

It is not vitiated by plurality of causes.

The Method of Difference.

It is chiefly used in experiments and is very efficacious in proving causation.

Its requirements are stringent. Relative advantages and disadvantages of Agreement and Difference.

The Method of Concomitant Varia-

tions. It is applicable to phenomena which cannot be altogether eliminated.

Concomitance may be illustrated either in a direct or in an inverse form.

This method often helps discovery.

the phenomena under investigation cannot be altogether eliminated. If, therefore, we observe that they rise or fall together in intensity, we are led to think that they are connected by causation. When living in a hot climate, we find that the rise of temperature is accompanied by depression of spirits, and that the greater the rise the greater the depression, then we naturally suspect that they are causally connected. To determine whether the phenomena thus varying together are related as cause and effect or as the co-effects of some other cause (as in the case of the rise of a river and the velocity of its current, both of which may be determined by rainfall), we should ascertain whether there is invariable succession or mere co-variation. Concomitance, we should remember, is illustrated either (*a*) in a direct or (*b*) in an inverse form. For example, (*a*) the greater the fuel, the greater the combustion; the greater the perseverance, the greater the likelihood of success; or (*b*) the higher the altitude, the less the rise of water in the common pump or of mercury in the barometer; the better the moral culture, the less the number of crimes. Both the forms are instructive in suggesting and proving causal connections. We should also remember that this method often helps discovery, specially when concomitance is illustrated in an extreme form. "Very often," observes Bain, "we are not alive to a connexion of cause and effect till an unusual manifestation of the one is accompanied with an unusual manifestation of the other. We may be using some hurtful

article of food for a length of time unknowingly ; the discovery is made by an accidental increase of quantity occurring with an aggravation of some painful sensation. This is one form of the efficacy of an Extreme Case ; an efficacy felt both in science and in rhetoric." (*Ibid.*, p. 64.)

The Method of Residues. It is applicable, as shown above, to complex cases in which we are partially aware of causal connections. It presupposes, not merely a knowledge of the laws governing certain elements of the complex instance under investigation, but also the power of readily applying them to these elements, so that the law relating to the residual factor may correctly be suggested to the mind. This method thus involves abstraction and analysis in a prominent degree and requires also a rigid use of synthesis to preclude the possibility of alternative hypotheses relating to other factors which might be supposed to exist. This method, accordingly, is employed when some progress is made in inductive investigations and when a branch of study tends to become more and more deductive. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 12.)

§ 10. Unity of the Methods. The several Inductive Methods, explained above, are not equally fundamental ; they are but different applications of agreement and difference, which, as we have seen, underlie all inference. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 1.) Hence, Mill regards Agreement and Difference as the two fundamental Methods or Canons which lie at the root of all inductive inquiries. The Joint Method, Concomitant Variations, and Residues are

The Method of Residues.
It is applicable to complex cases.

It involves abstraction, analysis, and synthesis in a prominent form. It is employed when some progress is made in inductive investigations.

The different Methods ultimately rest on Agreement and Difference, which are regarded by Mill as fundamental.

Agreement
and Differ-
ence are also
implicated in
each other.

Mr. Read
holds that
Difference is
the funda-
mental
method :

but though
Difference is
essential to
elimination,

yet from mere
Difference we

not at all applicable, if certain factors or aspects do not vary, while others remain constant. In the case of Concomitant Variations, for example, though the factors which are supposed to be causally connected cannot altogether be eliminated, yet they vary in regard to their intensities : there is thus qualitative agreement with quantitative difference. And Agreement and Difference are really implicated in each other : in the case of Agreement, we find also room for Difference, so far as the variable factors are concerned ; and, in the case of Difference also, room for Agreement, so far as the uniformity of sequence and the attendant circumstances are concerned. Mr. Read is inclined to hold that there is really one method at bottom, *vis.*, that of Difference. "In final analysis", he observes, "they are all reducible to one, namely, Difference ; for the cogency of the method of Agreement (as distinguished from a simple enumeration of instances agreeing in the coincidence of a supposed cause and its effect) depends upon the omission, in one instance after another, of all other circumstances ; which omission is a point of difference." (*Logic*, p. 225.) It is, no doubt, true that there must be difference in identity in order to reveal the efficient, as distinguished from the inert, factors in any case : we cannot infer a general relation by Agreement, if the several instances do not vary in respect of antecedents and consequents which are found to be accidental. But it is scarcely correct to hold that Difference, and not Agreement, is the fundamental Method.

From mere Difference we can never infer anything. (*Vide* Chap. IX, § 1.) Difference merely brings out prominently the fundamental agreement in the several instances, as the background in painting gives prominence to a figure. Agreement and Difference ultimately rest on the fundamental intellectual functions of assimilation and discrimination, which underlie all mental processes whether logical or not ; and thus the two methods are very closely connected. But if we be disposed to trace them to a single principle, then Agreement, Identity, or Consistency would seem to lie at the root of all inference or truth. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 11.)

cannot infer anything.

Difference only reveals the fundamental Agreement.

Agreement, Identity, or Consistency lies at the root of all inference.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the different Methods or Canons may all be applied to a case to determine a causal connection : some of the Methods may fail, some may be partially successful, while the rest may confirm the suspicion excited by the other Methods. Causal connection can scarcely be conclusively established by one Method alone. Even the Method of Difference, supposed to be so very convincing, leaves room for doubt, whether there may not be other influences owing to which both the antecedent and the consequent appear and disappear together. This doubt can only be removed by the employment of the other Methods. The imperfections of the different Methods are, to a great extent, neutralized when all of them are directed to one and the same inquiry : what is left doubtful by one Method may then be settled by another. When

All the Inductive Methods may be applied to a case to establish a law or causal connection.

all of them are focussed on the same investigation, they generally yield sufficient light to dispel all darkness and thus to reveal the causal connection which may subsist between certain factors forming the subject-matter of inquiry. The truth of these remarks will be clear from the following section.

Concrete examples :

§ 11. **Examples of the Methods.** Having now studied the different Inductive Methods or Canons, by which we must test the validity of every inductive generalization, let us next try to apply our theoretical knowledge to some concrete cases to prove the uses of these Methods or Canons.

(i) An inquiry into the cause of 'Dew'. It involves the following steps :

(I) The phenomenon of 'Dew' is ordinarily taken as illustrating more or less perfectly the several conditions of inductive inquiry, as indicated in Chapter XVI, § 5.

(i) Careful observation of the phenomenon to be explained (*viz.*, what is known as dew).

(i) *Observation.* The first step necessary for the discovery of the cause of 'dew' is to observe carefully the phenomenon which we try to explain and to mark it out from other analogous phenomena. We observe the formation of 'dew' in the form of moisture ; and we distinguish this from other similar phenomena like 'fog', 'mist,' or 'rain' by the fact that 'dew' is the spontaneous deposition of moisture on a surface when there is no visible wetness in the atmosphere.

(ii) Its definition

(ii) *Definition.* This leads to the definition of 'dew', which conveys a precise knowledge of the phenomenon under investigation.

and (iii) analysis.

(iii) *Analysis.* The phenomenon to be explained being an effect, we cannot possibly have

recourse to experiment. So we must observe with care the phenomenon and its concomitant circumstances, with a view to frame some hypothesis about its cause. The concomitant circumstance, which at once attracts our notice, is the nightfall, involving coldness and darkness. This may be regarded as an analysis of the situation essential to the formation of a hypothesis.

(iv). *Framing Hypotheses.* When by analysis we find that darkness and coldness are generally the uniform conditions of the production of 'dew,' we naturally suspect one or both of these factors to be the cause of 'dew.' Thus, we form hypotheses to account for the phenomenon.

(iv) Starting hypotheses.

(v) *Exclusion of Rival Hypotheses.* But the hypothesis in favour of darkness is excluded by the fact that 'dew' is sometimes deposited before nightfall and also by the fact that 'dew' is not formed every night. Thus, we are driven to the only alternative that coldness is perhaps the cause of 'dew.'

(v) Exclusion of rival hypotheses by elimination

(vi) *Application of the Inductive Methods or Canons.* Let us test this hypothesis by applying the several Inductive Methods or Canons.

(vi) Application of the Inductive Methods :

(1) When we apply the *Method of Agreement*, we find that the object on which 'dew' is deposited is colder than the surrounding atmosphere. If we test it by using the thermometer, we also find that the temperature of a dewed object is less than that of its surrounding atmosphere. This illustrates Agreement in Presence : whenever a surface is dewed, it is colder than the air around it. But,

(1) Agreement ;

Agreement in Absence is not always illustrated : there may be cases of surface coldness without any deposition of 'dew.'

(2) Joint
Method,

(2) The *Joint Method* (which is but a combination of Agreement in Presence and Agreement in Absence) thus fails to discover the cause in this case.

(3) Difference;

(3) Let us now apply the *Method of Difference*. We observe in the same night that some objects are dewed while others are not ; and we find also that the one class of objects is colder than the other. From this we naturally suspect that coldness is perhaps the cause of the deposition of 'dew.' But such a suspicion is unwarrantable, for the objects which differ in temperature (*e.g.*, a blade of grass and a piece of metal) also differ in many other respects. And thus an uncertainty is left as to which of the varying circumstances is really the cause of 'dew.'

(4) Concomi-
tant Varia-
tions in
respect of

(4) Let us now see whether the *Method of Concomitant Variations* is applicable. And we find that the method is illustrated in three ways here :—

(a) material,

(a) When we take into account the *character of the material*, we find that all objects are not equally dewed. If, for example, we expose wood, metal, glass, cloth, *etc.*, in the same night, we find that they are dewed in different degrees ; some are dewed more and some, less. And we find that the degree of the deposition of dew depends inversely on the conducting power of the object dewed ; good conductors are less dewed and bad conductors are more dewed ; and the quantity of 'dew'

depends on the degree of the badness of conducting power.

(b) If we compare objects by reference to their *surfaces*, we find that rough and black surfaces are better dewed than smooth and white ones. And it is known that rough and black surfaces are good radiators of heat. So, we conclude that the quantity of 'dew' varies directly with the radiating power of a substance. (b) surface,

(c) If we compare objects by reference to their *texture*, we find that compact bodies are less dewed than loose ones. And we know that compact bodies are good conductors of heat and loose bodies are bad conductors. This fact may be connected with (a). And, if we take all these facts into consideration, we find that the degree of deposition of 'dew' depends always on the coldness of the surface. In the case of bad conductors, and so in the case of loose bodies, the surface becomes cool sooner, because the inner heat is not quickly transferred to the surface owing to the defect of conducting power. Thus, the Method of Concomitant Variations shows that the deposition of 'dew' is always connected with the coldness of the surface. But here another difficulty presents itself affording an opportunity for the application of the remaining canon. and (c) texture ;

(5) We find that the deposition of 'dew' does not always depend on either the absolute or the relative coldness of a surface. Though the difference between the atmospheric temperature and the temperature of a body be the same in two different (5) Residues.

Dalton's
Theory of
Aqueous
Vapour.

nights, yet we find that 'dew' may be deposited in one night while not in the other. This evidently indicates that mere surface cooling is not the only condition of the deposition of 'dew'; there must be some other residual phenomenon which also determines such deposition. This residual phenomenon was easily suggested by the speculation of Dalton, who had propounded his theory of Aqueous Vapour or the Atmosphere of Steam, indicating the quantity of vapour which might be sustained in air. It had been proved by him that the quantity of aqueous vapour sustained in air varies with its temperature. The maximum quantity of vapour which may be supported in air at a temperature of 80° is said to be equivalent to one inch of mercury; and an amount equal to half an inch is supported at a temperature of 59° . Though the maximum quantity of vapour sustained in the atmosphere is thus determined by its temperature, yet we find that the air is not always saturated up to the extreme limit. In such cases, though there may be a fall in the temperature of the air owing to its contact with a cool surface, yet there may not be the conversion of vapour into water (*i.e.*, the deposition of 'dew'), as the lowered temperature may still be able to sustain the comparatively less quantity of vapour. When, however, the temperature falls below the saturation point, then—and then alone—there is the formation of 'dew.' Thus, the deposition of 'dew' on a body would depend not merely on the coldness of its surface but also on the quantity of vapour contained in the surrounding atmosphere.

We see, then, that the several Inductive Methods have proved a connection between 'dew' on the one hand and surface cooling and atmospheric humidity on the other. That this connection is of a causal character is proved by two circumstances :—

Causal connection is proved by

(1) Atmospheric humidity and coldness of surface are known to precede and the deposition of dew is known to follow.

(1) sequence

(2) Moreover, the quantitative aspect of the causal connection shows that there is equivalence in the transfer of energy. We know that water is converted into vapour by the application of heat ; and it follows that the withdrawal of the heat leads to the reconversion of vapour into water. Hence we conclude that the humidity of the atmosphere and the coldness of surface are the conditions or cause of the deposition of 'dew,' which is the effect.

and (2) the transfer of energy.

(II) The following example taken by Mr. Ryland from the *Pall Mall Gazette* of the 15th October, 1883, may also be mentioned in this connection as illustrating the Inductive Methods :—

(II) An inquiry into the cause of an epidemic of typhoid fever.

"In August, 1883, an epidemic of typhoid fever occurred in Camden Town. The medical officer, Mr. Shirley Murphy, prepared a plan of the district, on which he marked all the houses which had been attacked. His scientific knowledge at once suggested to him a number of hypotheses as to the origin of the attack. Putting them briefly, they were (1) the Regent's Canal ; (2) the water supply ; (3) the sanitary arrangements

The steps involved in it are—

(1) Observation of cases.

(2) Framing of hypotheses.

(3) Exclusion
of rival
hypotheses
by elimina-
tion.

(4) Employ-
ment of the
Inductive
Methods :

(a) the
Joint
Method

(b) the
Method of
Residues ;

(c) the
Method of
Agreement.

in the houses ; (4) the milk supply. The use of his plan, and inquiry at the houses, showed that the first three hypotheses were invalid. The houses attacked were not usually near the canal. Two water companies supplied the district, and houses supplied by both companies were attacked with impartiality. Sanitary defects existed both in attacked houses, and in those which escaped the disease ; while the sanitary arrangements in some of the attacked houses were perfect. So far the positive and negative Methods of Agreement (Joint Method) had been applied as a means of testing the hypotheses arrived at,—not, be it noticed, to suggest the hypotheses, which were largely due to deductive reasoning from general laws of hygiene.

“The fourth hypothesis remained. By the application of the Method of Residues, the case in favour of the fourth hypothesis was not *proved* (as Mill suggests) but perceptibly strengthened. Now, by a direct use of the Method of Agreement, “it was discovered that out of 431 persons attacked, 368 were definitely known to obtain their milk from one particular milkman, Mr. X., while the remaining 63 might well have indirectly obtained it from him also...Out of all the houses attacked, 78 per cent. received their milk from Mr. X.” This use of the Method of Agreement was, however, probably twofold. After the first score or so of cases a strong suspicion was probably aroused in Mr. Murphy's mind that Mr. X.'s milk was the true *causa sine qua non* ; while the

subsequent cases were, it would appear, rather used by way of test, or verification, of the hypothesis so formed. Whether this was so, the report gives no information.

"Mr. Murphy now definitely verified his hypothesis by examining the shop and premises of Mr. X, and the farms from which Mr. X. obtained the milk. He succeeded in proving that one of these farms, near St. Albans, was infected with typhoid, and thus finally showed the adequacy and truth of his hypothesis. As the older logicians would have said, he proved that the typhoid fever infection in Mr. X.'s milk was a *vera causa*." (*Logic*, pp. 218-220)

(III) The determination of the value of vaccination as a prophylactic against small-pox well illustrates the application of the Inductive Methods. Dr. Jenner, who discovered the efficacy of vaccination as a protection against the distemper, was first led to inquire into the matter by a prevalent belief in Gloucestershire that persons contracting cow-pox in dairy farms enjoyed immunity from small-pox.* And his interest was specially roused by the casual remark of a young country woman, who came to him for surgical advice, that she could not possibly take the disease as she had had cow-pox before. (A) This prompted him to frame the hypothesis that some protection could be obtained against the malady by inoculation with cow-pox matter. (B) He then set about to verify

(III) An inquiry into a preventive of small-pox.

Prevalent opinion based on induction by simple enumeration.

(A) Framing of hypothesis.

(B) Its verification :

* This belief was, no doubt, due to general experience and was thus based on induction by simple enumeration.

(1) Experiment :

Method of
Difference
not satisfied.
Employment
of
(2) the
Method of
Agreement,

(3) the Joint
Method,

(4) the
Method of
Residues,

and (5) the
Method of
Concomitant
Variations.

his hypothesis. (1) And he commenced with experiments. His first case of vaccination was that of a boy of 8 years, whom he inoculated with cow-pox matter taken from a sore on the hand of a dairy maid who had contracted the disease by milking cows suffering from cow-pox. But the conditions of the Method of Difference were not satisfied, as, besides vaccination, there might be many other unknown factors calculated to secure protection from small-pox. (2) Hence he next inoculated other persons, all of whom enjoyed immunity from the disease. This gave him an opportunity for applying the Method of Agreement. (3) And, when to these positive instances the negative instances of non-inoculation with greater liability to the disease were added, there was an opening for the Joint Method (involving Agreement in Presence and in Absence). The success of these experiments induced Dr. Jenner to believe that the protective influence of vaccination was complete and permanent. Subsequent experience proved, however, that this was untrue ; and it thus afforded an opportunity for the application of the remaining Inductive Methods. (4) The residual phenomenon required to secure adequate and durable protection was found in the necessity of re-vaccination after an interval of about ten years. (5) And the Method of Concomitant Variations was also illustrated, as it was found that the degree of safety was proportioned to the degree of success in vaccination. Thus, the Royal Commission, appointed in 1889 to report on the subject, observes

"The beneficial effects of vaccination are most experienced by those in whose case it has been most thorough. We think it may fairly be concluded that where the vaccine matter is inserted in three or four places, it is more effectual than when introduced into one or two places only, and that if the vaccination marks are of an area of half a square inch, they indicate a better state of protection than if their area be at all considerably below this." It may be mentioned in this connection that Princess (afterwards Empress) Victoria was the first member of the royal family who was vaccinated when she was barely 3 months old, which had the effect of greatly diminishing the prejudice against Jenner's discovery among ignorant people.

§ 12. Inductive Methods as Methods of Explanation. The aim of all inference evidently is to remove our perplexities and to satisfy our inquisitiveness. We are ever trying to reduce our detached experiences to system either by tracing facts to principles (induction) or by illustrating principles by facts (deduction). In order to achieve our end we must in the first instance be sure of the character of the data — be they facts or principles—and then we must take due care to employ the appropriate means to connect them with what is calculated to satisfy our understanding. Thus, in the case of deduction we must first determine precisely the meaning and scope of a general truth before we seek to verify it by reference to concrete cases ; and, likewise, in the case of induc-

Inference aims at explanation by either the inductive or the deductive procedure.

We must first be sure of the data before drawing a conclusion.

The Inductive Methods thus involve both Observation and Explanation.

Explanation is relative to materials and attainments.

Inference and explanation

tion, we must previously be sure of the exact nature of the facts to be explained before we try to discover the laws which govern them. We see, then, how the Inductive Methods necessarily involve the two prominent steps of careful observation and of no less cautious analysis and elimination with a view to arrive at a satisfactory explanation of the facts observed. We have already seen that observation and explanation are interconnected processes seeking to strengthen each other. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 10.) We are, therefore, never satisfied with the bare observation of facts, but we push on to find out their explanation : we proceed from the 'how' or the 'what' of things to their 'why'. The employment of the Inductive Methods, accordingly, implies a preliminary observation of facts (including experiment when possible) and a subsequent explanation of them by reference to the laws which the manipulation of the Methods necessarily leads us to infer. We should remember, however, that explanation is always relative to the character of the materials to be explained as well as to the capacity and attainments of the investigator. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 1.) We should thus never lose sight of the features of the objects observed to guide our inquiry and should also try to determine precisely their qualitative and quantitative aspects to render the inquiry definite and exact. And then we must examine carefully the steps and pre-suppositions involved in arriving at an explanation, so that there may not be any flaw in the process. We must also bear in mind that inference and

explanation are necessary only to finite intelligence that tries to render the obscure clear by tracing the unknown to what is known. To the Infinite Intelligence all things are ever present and so nothing requires an explanation. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 4.) As Laplace has said—"An intelligence who for a single instant should be acquainted with all the forces by which nature is animated, and with the several positions of the beings composing it, if further his intellect were vast enough to submit these data to analysis, would be able to include in one and the same formula the movements of the largest bodies in the universe and those of the lightest atom. Nothing would be uncertain for him: the future as well as the past would be present to his eyes."

are necessary only to finite intelligence.

§ 13. **Difficulties in Induction.** It has been urged that the Inductive Principles and Methods are rather of an ideal character scarcely applicable to the actual study of facts, which are often complex and at times even subtle in their composition. The difficulties in the inductive procedure are believed to be (1) partly subjective and (2) partly objective.

It is urged that the Inductive Principles and Methods are not competent to solve practical difficulties.

(1) The subjective difficulty is connected with the nature of our faculties and senses which are regarded as too coarse and obtuse to penetrate the subtleties of Nature. To determine, for example, the true cause of a malady or the proper effect of a remedy is not always an easy task.

The difficulties in the inductive procedure are supposed to be (1) partly subjective and (2) partly objective.

(2) The objective difficulty is connected with the facts themselves which we are called upon to

(1) The subjective difficulty is said to be due to the imperfections of our faculties and senses.
(2) The objective

difficulty is said to be due to the complexity of facts and the intricacy of their relations.

examine for inductive generalizations. The simplicity and isolation of facts and circumstances, required for inductive research, can scarcely be secured in practice. It is difficult, for example, to separate the effects of legislation from those of social opinion in order to determine their respective values. Thus, it is said that in actual experience facts are not so simplified or arranged as antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, as to render the application of the Methods possible. For example, the conditions of the Method of Agreement that 'the instances must have no circumstance in common but one' and of the Method of Difference that 'the two instances should differ in the presence of only one circumstance' can be fulfilled only in an ideal rather than in an actual world. Hence, Dr. Whewell says "The Methods take for granted the very thing which is most difficult to discover, the reduction of the phenomena to formulæ such as are here presented to us." (*Phil. of Discovery*, p. 263.)

It may be mentioned, however, that the imperfections of our faculties and the complexity of phenomena are not so great as to baffle inductive inquiry or generalization.

It may be replied, however, that we must be satisfied with the degree of isolation or simplicity observable by us. Such isolation or simplicity justifies generalizations which are aids to knowledge as well as to practice. And a like remark applies to the so-called defects or imperfections of our senses and faculties. We must be content with such knowledge as we may acquire through them. To emphasize the defects of our constitution as so very great as to exclude all definite knowledge, is merely to advocate a degree of

scepticism which does away with all knowledge and theory alike.

§ 14. Exercises.

1. What do you understand by the Experimental Methods? Why are they so called? Indicate their aim and the uses to which each is appropriate.

2. Show that the Experimental Methods are deductions from the Law of Causation. Point out the particular aspect of Causation on which each of them is based.

3. Give a critical exposition of the special function and conclusiveness of each of the Experimental Methods and reduce them to two fundamental methods of Elimination.

4. Illustrate by examples any two of Mil.'s Experimental Methods.

5. Explain and illustrate the Method of Difference, showing how it is oftener than any other the basis of ordinary inferences. How is it related to the Method of Concomitant Variations?

6. In what does the superiority of the Method of Difference over the Method of Agreement consist? What is the necessity for recourse to a third or Joint Method, and what is the nature of that Method?

7. Explain the Canon of the Double Method of Agreement, and illustrate your answer by a concrete example. When is it necessary to employ this Method?

8. Expound, by a concrete application, the canon of the Method of Concomitant Variations, indicating its different forms. When is it necessary to employ the Method? Is it connected in any way with Elimination?

9. Are the Inductive Methods competent to prove causation? Can they be properly called 'inductive'?

10. Indicate the uses and defects of the Method of Agreement. Explain and examine the remark of Bain, "Agreement for establishing an ultimate law is not the same as the Method of Agreement, in Mill's Canon, for establishing cases of causation." How can the defects of the Method be remedied?

11. Determine the characteristics and respective values of the different Canons of Induction. Are they traceable to a single principle?

12. Discuss the question whether the Inductive Methods may be viewed as mere weapons of Elimination. Examine the attempts of reducing them to one or two fundamental methods.

13. It has been said that it is probably the greatest merit in Mill's logical writings that he points out the entire insufficiency of what is called the Baconian Method to detect the more obscure and difficult laws of Nature. Explain what the Baconian Method is and in what respects Mill departs from it.

14. Illustrate the employment of the Experimental Methods by reference to a concrete case, say, an inquiry into the cause of dew.

15. 'It is in the comprehensive law of causation, itself once established by induction, that we have the instruments for eliminating causes and effects in the detail.' Explain this statement and illustrate it by examples.

16. Explain and illustrate the following terms :—Varying the Circumstances, Inductive Elimination, Plurality of Causes, Intermixture of Effects.

17. Explain and illustrate by a certain example the Method of Agreement. Point out the difficulties connected with the employment of this Method.

18. Explain how Plurality of Causes and Intermixture of Effects affect the application of the Method of Agreement. What advantage has the Method of Difference over the Method of Agreement, and what advantage has the latter over the former?

19. Analyse and examine the following arguments, indicating the methods employed to establish the conclusions :—

(1) As some comets and certain meteoric showers are found to have the same orbits, it is surmised that all meteoric showers are but the debris of disintegrated comets. When Biela's comet was missing, it was, accordingly, pre-

dicted that, when next due, it would be replaced by a meteoric shower ; and this prediction was fulfilled.

(2) Schwabe, after repeated observations, found that the sun-spots always reached their maximum once in about ten years. Lamont similarly noticed that the range of the daily variation of the magnetic needle increased and decreased once in 10 years and 4 months. Sir Edward Sabine likewise observed that magnetic storms reached a maximum of violence and frequency in about 10 years, and marked the remarkable coincidence between such storms and sun-spots in respect of their maximum and minimum variations, whether in phase or duration. Hence it is supposed that the sun-spots are the causes of these magnetic disturbances.

(3) With the help of the microscope infusoria or animalcula were discovered by an observer ; and these were supposed to have been spontaneously generated. A series of experiments were, accordingly, performed to verify its truth. Bottles were filled with the juices of meat extracted by boiling and were carefully corked and sealed with mastic. The closed bottles were then intensely heated and allowed to cool. As subsequently living germs were seen in the enclosed meat-juices, the experiment was believed to support the theory of spontaneous generation, since all such germs must have previously been killed by repeated heating.

Some suspected, however, that the experiments had not been conducted with sufficient care. Further experiments with different kinds of infusions gave, however, the same result. As, in these experiments, the infusions were enclosed in thin flasks and hermetically sealed and kept in boiling water for about an hour, all germs were evidently destroyed. And it was found that no infusoria subsequently appeared in them. But now it was said that such prolonged boiling had destroyed not merely the germs, but the germinative power of the infusions as well. But this objection was easily overthrown when it was found that the infusoria again appeared as soon as the infusions were exposed to air in spite of their previous intense and prolonged boiling.

These and analogous experiments tended to show that there is something in the atmosphere capable of producing life in nutrient fluids ; but it was not known whether this something is solid, fluid, or gaseous. Helmholtz, however, proved afterwards that it must be solid, since it would not pass through a moist animal membrane as fluids and gases would do.

(4) Twenty-seven sterilized flasks containing an infusion of organic matter are opened in pure air on the summit of a mountain. It is found that putrefaction does not set in in any of them. Again, twenty-three similar flasks are opened in a hayloft. Almost all of them show signs of putrefaction after a lapse of three days.* Hence it is inferred that floating particles in the air are the causes of putrefaction.

(5) Sir Humphry Davy found on decomposing water by galvanism, that there were present an acid and an alkali besides oxygen and hydrogen, the two components of water. Suspecting the additional portion of the effect to be due to the partial decomposition of the glass holding the water, he substituted gold vessels for glass, but without any change in the effect. He then used distilled water and found a marked decrease in the quantity of acid and alkali evolved. He next thought that the perspiration from the hands might account for these additional constituents ; and he found that, by avoiding contact, their quantity was still further reduced. Thinking that the traces which were still left might be due to atmospheric impurities, decomposed by contact with the electrical apparatus, he put the machine under an exhausted receiver and found no more any trace of acid or alkali.

(6) It is found in a large majority of cases that high intellectual activity is attended with impaired health ; compare, for example, the lives of doctors, lawyers, and journalists with those of the rustics, army men, and country gentlemen. Numerous instances may be cited in support of this view. Thus, Newton and Leibniz were mostly invalids ; Clerk Maxwell died young after a life of ill-health ; Darwin was scarcely well for three consecutive days in his adult life. The lives of Pope, Chatterton, Keats, Shelley, Byron,

Gibbon, Carlyle, De Quincey illustrate the same truth. It would seem, then, that the mind at its best is never found in a body that is at its best.

(7) It was previously believed that one and the same nerve was employed in sensation and motion, which was apparently supported by the fact that when any nerve was severed both sensation and movement became impossible in the part supplied by it. Sir Charles Bell, however, subsequently pointed out that the apparently single nerves were really bundles of several nerve-fibres and that it was inconsistent to suppose that one and the same nerve-fibre could carry impression *to* the brain and motor energy *from* it at the same time. He, accordingly, suggested that the distinct nerve-fibres performed distinct functions of sensation and motor innervation, which could easily be discovered if they were traced to their separate roots in the brain and the spinal cord. He then experimented on both the cerebral and spinal nerves. Of the cerebral nerves, he selected two—the portio dura (having one root) and the fifth pair (having two roots). On cutting the portio dura in a living animal, he found only motion of the connected limb lost. On cutting those branches of the fifth pair which arise from one root he found only sensibility lost, while, on cutting the branches which arise from both roots, he found both sensibility and mobility destroyed. In the case of the spinal nerves, which have two roots (an anterior and a posterior), he found that the irritation of the anterior root was followed by convulsive movements of the connected muscles, but such was not the case when the posterior root was irritated. It has been discovered also that in the case of partial paralysis either sensation alone or motion alone is lost.

(8) Linnets, when confined and trained with singing larks, abandon their natural song and adhere solely to the songs of the larks. It is thus surmised that birds learn to sing only by imitation, as men learn to use their speech.

(9) Able men have generally very bad handwriting, while good handwriting is frequently found in men doing

comparatively little mental work. Hence it is inferred that mental strain is the cause of poor penmanship.

(10) The great famine in Ireland began in 1845 and reached its climax in 1848. During this time agrarian crime increased very rapidly until in 1848 it was more than three times as great as in 1845. After this time it decreased with the return of better crops, until in 1851 it was only 50 per cent. more than it was in 1845. It is evident from this that a close relation of cause and effect exists between famine and agrarian crime.

(11) The mind must be a function of the brain, since any serious injury to the brain is always followed by the loss of consciousness.

(12) The flood was evidently due to the wrath of the goddess, since it began immediately after she had been slighted, and it subsided after propitiatory sacrifices.

(13) Moisture bedews a cold metal or stone when we breathe on it. The same appears on a glass of ice-water, and on the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail chills the external air. Therefore, when an object contracts dew it is colder than the surrounding air.

(14) With various kinds of polished metals, no dew is deposited; but with various kinds of highly polished glass dew is deposited. Therefore the deposit of dew is affected by the kinds of substances exposed.

(15) Scarlet poppies, scarlet verbénas, the scarlet hawthorn, and honeysuckle are all odourless, therefore we may conclude that all scarlet flowers are destitute of odour.

(16) Dr. Popper, a well-known physician on the continent, has been making some interesting observations regarding the stature of individuals and the relation that exists between height and talent and genius. The doctor finds that not only persons with considerable talent, but the geniuses of the world all have been, and are, of medium size or less. Among statesmen he points out Attila, Cromwell, Frederick II, Napoleon, Gambetta, Thiers—all of whom were of very small stature. He has discovered that while most small

men are small in stature because of the shortness of their legs they are really tall in the length of their bodies. This very fact, he thinks, is perhaps the secret of talent and genius—a good stomach, big heart and lungs in a big body—as they have a direct effect on the intellect. These organs help to feed the brain properly and make big men mentally.

(17) What better proof can we give of the power of the rain-god Mwari to cause rain than that recently at Rhodesia, after a prolonged drought, rain fell in torrents when on the advice of a rain-doctor a native of the place, named Mtegedi, was publicly burnt to death as an offering to the deity?

(18) It is known by direct experiment that for any given degree of temperature, only a limited amount of water can remain suspended as vapour, and this quantity grows less and less as the temperature diminishes. Therefore, if there is already as much vapour suspended as the air will contain at its existing temperature, any lowering of the temperature will cause necessarily a portion of the vapour to be condensed as dew.

(19) It is evident that the green colour of plants holds some necessary relation to light, for the leaves of plants growing in the dark, as potatoes sprouting in a cellar, do not develop this colour. Even when leaves have developed the green colour, they lose it if deprived of light, as is shown by the process of blanching celery and by the effect on the colour if a board has lain upon it for a long time. (Coulter.)

(20) Another indication that the green colour is connected with light may be obtained from the fact that it is found only in the surface region of plants. If one cuts across a living twig or into a cactus body, the green colour will be seen only in the outer part of the section. (Coulter.)

(21) If an active leaf or water plant be submerged in water in a glass vessel and exposed to the light, bubbles may be seen coming from the leaf surface and rising through the water. The water is merely a device by which the bubbles

of gas may be seen. If the leaf is very active, the bubbles are numerous. That this activity holds a definite relation to light may be proved by gradually removing the vessel containing the leaf from the light. As the light diminishes the bubbles diminish in number, and when a certain amount of darkness has been reached the bubbles will cease entirely. If now the vessel be brought back gradually into the light, the bubbles will reappear, more and more numerous as the light increases. (Coulter.)

(22) Vesalius, the founder of modern anatomy, found that the human thigh bone was straight, and not curved, as Galen, the great authority on the subject for over a thousand years, had asserted. Sylvius replied that Galen must be right; that the bone was curved in its natural condition, but that the narrow trousers worn at the time had made it artificially straight.

(23) When electricity was first discovered in the laboratory, the question naturally arose whether this was the same as manifested itself in the clouds. On further investigation, it was found that the effects of thunder and lightning, in the atmosphere, were mostly the same as produced by the electricity prepared in the laboratory. Lightning travels in a zigzag line, so does an electric spark. Electricity sets things on fire, so does lightning. Both melt metals, destroy life, and cause blindness. Pointed bodies attract the electric spark; and lightning also has been known to strike spires and trees and mountain tops. Hence it follows that lightning is but electricity travelling from one cloud to another, as does an electric spark from one substance to another.

(24) Sir Joseph Lister, the father of aseptic surgery, thus indicates the origin of his method:—"When it had been shown by the researches of Pasteur that the septic property of the atmosphere depended, not on oxygen or any gaseous constituent, but on minute organisms suspended in it, which owed their energy to their vitality, it occurred to me that decomposition in the injured part might be avoided without excluding the air, by applying as a dressing some material

capable of destroying the life of the floating particles." He, accordingly, first used carbolic acid for the purpose, and found that his wards in the Glasgow Infirmary, which used to be infected with gangrene, soon became the healthiest in the world, though other wards, separated only by a passage way, continued as unhealthy.

(25) "Koch found that, while guinea-pigs, mice, and other animals were killed by inoculation with anthrax, birds were not affected. This invulnerability had very much struck Pasteur and his two assistants. What was it in the body of a fowl that enabled it thus to resist inoculations of which the most infinitesimal quantity sufficed to kill an ox? They proved by a series of experiments that the microbe of splenic fever does not develop when subjected to a temperature of 44° Centigrade. Now, the temperature of birds being between 41° and 42°, may it not be, said Pasteur, that the fowls are protected from the disease because their blood is too warm? Might not the vital resistance encountered in the living fowl suffice to bridge over the small gap between 41°—42° and 44°—45°?...This idea conducted Pasteur and his assistants to new researches. 'If the blood of a fowl were cooled,' they asked, 'could not the splenic fever parasite live in this blood?' The experiment was made. A hen was taken and after inoculating it with splenic fever blood it was placed with its feet in water at 25°. The temperature of the blood of the hen went down to 37° or 38°. At the end of twenty-four hours the hen was dead, and all its blood was filled with splenic fever bacteria. But if it was possible to render a fowl assailable by splenic fever simply by lowering its temperature, is it not also possible to restore to health a fowl so inoculated by warming it up again? A hen was inoculated, subjected, like the first, to the cold water treatment, and when it became evident that the fever was at its height, it was taken out of the water, wrapped carefully in cotton wool, and placed in an oven at a temperature of 35°. Little by little its strength returned; it shook itself, settled itself again, and in a few hours was fully restored to health. The

microbe has disappeared. Hens, killed after being thus saved no longer showed the slightest trace of splenic organisms. There have been great discussions in Germany and France upon a mode of treatment in typhoid fever, which consists in cooling the body of the patient by frequently repeated baths. The possible good effects of this treatment may be understood when viewed in conjunction with the foregoing experiment on fowls. In typhoid fever the cold arrests the fermentation, which may be regarded as at once the expression and the cause of the disease, just as by an inverse process, the heat of the body arrests the development of the splenic fever microbe in the hen."

Division II.

AIDS TO INDUCTION.

CHAPTER XIX.

HYPOTHESES.

§ 1. **Importance of Hypothesis in Induction.** Induction, as we have tried to show, always rests on hypothesis. We observe a few instances resembling one another in certain important features, which suggest to our mind a law connecting them together. We then put our conjecture or hypothesis to test ; and, if it is borne out by facts, it is accepted as a law or inductive generalization. "The discovery of a universal law," observes Lotze, "is always a guess on the part of the imagination made possible by a knowledge of facts. This knowledge is recalled to our memory by the resemblance of the given case to analogous earlier cases." (*Logic*, § 269.) Induction, as we have seen, is practically limited to the causal problem. When, however, we inquire into the cause of an effect, we cannot make the latter reproduce the former. We, no doubt, first try to find out what *is* the cause in such a case ; but when we fail to do so, we try to conjecture what is the *probable* cause ; and, on our failure even in this respect, we try to imagine what *may be* the *possible* cause.

Hypothesis lies at the bottom of every inductive generalization.

Bacon's
protest
against
hypotheses
was directed
against
extravagant
conjectures.

It should be remembered, however, that rash and unwarrantable conjectures, not based on facts, are not only useless but mischievous in tendency, since they often lead to fruitless inquiries and vain enterprises. It was against such random guesses that Bacon and Newton protested ; and the remark of Newton '*Hypotheses non fingo*' [I do not make hypotheses] was really directed against them. As a matter of fact, we find that Newton himself framed several hypotheses to account for different classes of phenomena. The presence of a centripetal force (gravity) in the sun holding the planets in their places in the solar system, the presence of a similar force keeping the moon in its orbit, and the corpuscular theory of light were all hypotheses advocated by him which were subsequently proved or disproved by facts. Mere empirical compilation of facts is not enough : only relevant facts should be collected, and this is possible by bearing in mind the purpose or end of the collection. Hence the indispensable necessity of hypothesis in Induction. Thus, Dr. Venn rightly observes that, in all inductive generalizations, "There is first a stroke of insight or creative genius demanded in order to detect the property to be generalized, and possibly also to detect the class over which this property is to be generalized. In really original inductions this step may be one of the highest degree of difficulty. Indeed, except in the trite examples of the text books, which mostly deal with such inductions as have either been familiar for ages or at any rate have

had all these difficulties cleared out of their path, this requirement can scarcely ever be entirely evaded." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 351.)

The difference between Hypothesis and Induction, accordingly, lies in the fact that the one is a mere supposition or assumption from an ascertained truth without adequate proof, while the other is a supposition tested and adequately proved by the Experimental Methods. When certain facts suggest to our mind a law or truth, it is a mere guess or hypothesis ; but if it is verified by elimination and variation of circumstances as required by the Inductive Canons, it is an induction. "In proportion," says Bosanquet, "as you merely *presume* a causal connection, it is guesswork or pure discovery. In as far as you can *analyse* a causal connection, it is demonstration or proof ; and for Logic discovery cannot be treated apart from proof, except as skilful guesswork. *In as far as* there is no ground, it gives nothing for Logic to get hold of—is mere caprice." (*Essentials of Logic*, p. 145.) Logic is, thus, directly concerned, not with the framing of hypotheses, but with their examination or verification. It supplies a systematic code of rules in the form of the inductive canons by means of which causal connections previously surmised are carefully examined. Whenever a causal connection is proved in some cases, it is believed to be true in all similar cases, and thus a step is taken towards scientific or inductive generalization. "It is quite true," say Dr. Venn, "that the so-called Methods of Inductive Enquiry

Hypothesis is mere unverified conjecture, while Induction is proved hypothesis.

Logic as a science of proof furnishes canons or rules for testing the correctness of hypotheses.

do not in themselves, and necessarily, involve any reference to induction, but the generalization is nevertheless always held in view while we resort to them." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 352.) When, therefore, a hypothesis stands the test of the Inductive Methods, it is accepted as a law or induction ; otherwise, it is rejected as but an idle speculation. Thus, a hypothesis simply gives a start to an inquiry, but cannot finally settle it ; this is generally done by the employment of the Inductive Methods.

§ 2. Circumstances Favouring Discovery. We have seen that Logic is rather a science of proof than of discovery. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 13.) It supplies tests to determine the validity of our inferences, instead of furnishing hypotheses which help discovery. Hypotheses, as mentioned before, are due to imaginative insight which leads to discovery—when connected with the power of accurate observation and sound abstraction separating the essential from the non-essential. We may, however, mention here some of the circumstances which favour discovery by helping the formation of reasonable hypotheses. The circumstances are :—

Hypotheses are due to imaginative insight, which is the source of discovery.

Circumstances favouring discovery :

(1) Examination of a large number of similar instances.

(1) Examination of a very *large number* of similar cases. Such examination would naturally suggest to the mind the common features present in them all and would thus help it in the framing of hypotheses by reference to these.

(2) Examination of a few instances

(2) Examination of a few cases *with great care and attention*. Close examination may reveal

the points of community and thus suggest a hypothesis which otherwise might be missed.

with care and attention.

(3) Examination of comparatively *simple* or *uncomplicated* cases. Such cases would readily suggest the points of similarity palpably present in them and would thus lead to an appropriate hypothesis.

(3) Examination of a few simple cases.

(4) Deductive reasoning—immediate or mediate—is at times a source of hypotheses, even when such reasoning is invalid. Thus, by simple conversion of 'All material bodies have weight,' we may be led to suppose that, perhaps, 'All bodies having weight are material.' Such a conjecture may subsequently be put to test and then accepted or rejected. Similarly, even wrong syllogistic arguments may suggest hypotheses. Thus, we may be led to think that John may be a murderer, because like murderers he flees from the scene of crime, or that particles of moisture are in the descending smoke, since it is heavier than air, as are the particles of moisture. Likewise, we may argue—John is clever, and John is a merchant, therefore perhaps all merchants are clever. It may be mentioned here that a generalization from a typical case or example (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 6) usually assumes the form of an argument in the third figure. We may, for instance, conclude that 'Man has such and such a structure of the brain or of the heart', because 'Jones has a brain or a heart of such a structure and he is a man.'

(4) Deductive inference, even when invalid.

(5) The Method of Concomitant Variations, as shown above, is often efficacious in suggesting

(5) Employment of the Method of

**Concomitant
Variations.**

causal connections, specially when the connected phenomena can be arranged in a graduated series. "To arrange phenomena in graduated series (if possible) in order to study them," observes Mr. Read, "is, perhaps, the most definite maxim in the Art of Discovery. If their causes are unknown it is likely to suggest hypotheses : and if the causes are partly known, variation of the character of the series is likely to suggest a corresponding variation of the conditions ; as in investigating the development of the forelimbs of vertebrates or the natural history of clothes." (*Logic*, p. 220.)

**Extreme
cases of
concomitant
variations
are often very
efficacious.**

It may be mentioned here that extreme cases of concomitant variations are generally more successful in suggesting hypotheses than the intermediate instances. If, for example, intense heat aggravates a disease very much, while feeble heat is attended with slight aggravation, then the cause of aggravation is very easily detected. Similarly, the effect of weather or climate, of filth or cleanliness, of good or bad rule is clearly brought to light when it operates in a prominent form. And this often leads to the formulation of definite hypotheses to be subsequently tested by a further appeal to facts.

**(6) Use of
Analogy.**

(6) Analogy is often a source of hypotheses. When, for example, we try to explain a special group of phenomena, we observe similar phenomena in other provinces of Nature and try to frame a hypothesis by reference to these. To explain, for instance, the attraction of heavenly bodies we may study with care the attraction of

terrestrial ones ; and, observing the gravitating force of the latter, we may be led to surmise that a similar force governs the former. If, likewise, we observe striking points of similarity between the Lison and the buffalo, we may be led to suspect that they have the same nature and are therefore moved by the same tendencies. Thus, we may be inclined to think that what is true of one is also true of the other. (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 5.)

§ 3. Character and Forms of Hypothesis. From the preceding remarks it is clear that hypotheses are conjectures made without proof or evidence. We never call a proposition which rests upon satisfactory proof, deductive or inductive, a hypothesis. Propositions are in a hypothetical stage so long as they depend only on guess and are not conclusively proved either by the inductive canons or by the rules of deduction. A hypothesis is, accordingly, defined by Mill as "Any supposition which we make (either without actual evidence, or on evidence avowedly insufficient) in order to endeavour to deduce from it conclusions in accordance with facts which are known to be real ; under the idea that if the conclusions to which the hypothesis leads are known truths, the hypothesis itself either must be, or at least is likely to be, true." (*Logic*, II, p. 8.) A hypothesis is said to be verified when facts or known truths are deduced from it, the deduction being an evidence in favour of the correctness of the hypothesis.

Definition of
Hypothesis.
(Mill.)

Hypotheses assume different forms by reference to their objects. Thus, there may be (1) hypotheses

Three
Forms of
Hypotheses :

about agents or causes, or (2) hypotheses about collocations or combinations of circumstances under which such agents act or operate, or (3) hypotheses about the laws or modes of their operation.

(1) Hypotheses about an agent or cause of a phenomenon.

(1) When, for example, we attribute malarious fever to marsh gas, a conflagration to incendiarism, or the loss of an article to theft, we suppose an agent to account for the phenomenon in question. Similarly, in science, ether is assumed to explain the phenomena of light; or Neptune, assumed to account for perturbations in the movements of Uranus.

(2) Hypotheses about a collocation or combination of circumstances under which a cause acts.

(2) When, likewise, we refer the success or failure of an undertaking to a happy or unhappy combination of agencies or circumstances, or we attribute the explosion of gunpowder to the contact of a spark with it, we suppose a collocation to explain the phenomenon under investigation. The Ptolemaic or Copernican system of Astronomy similarly supposes a collocation of heavenly bodies to account for the order of the solar system.

(3) Hypotheses about law or mode of operation of a cause.

(3) Sometimes our supposition refers to the way in which an effect is produced, as when we try to discover how a thief got access to a house or how he effected his escape. The mode of operation of the law of gravitation, of definite proportions, of musical harmony, or of relativity was at first a matter of hypothesis or conjecture, which has subsequently been verified by further investigations.

The three forms of hypotheses usually go together.

The three forms of hypotheses indicated above are seldom found in isolation; hypotheses with regard to one are more or less connected with those

of the rest. When we suppose an agent, we ordinarily suppose also the conditions under which it acts and the mode or law of its operation as well. Thus, in supposing a thief, we suppose also the circumstances under which he committed the theft and the way in which he succeeded in removing the articles stolen. The supposition of ether or of gravitation usually goes with that of the law of its operation as well as with that of the circumstances under which it acts. And if a cause in the abstract has no meaning, if it is always intelligible by reference to the conditions of its exercise and the mode of its operation, then the interconnection of the three forms of hypotheses is seen to be quite natural.

It may be mentioned in this connection that Dr. Whewell, with whom induction is primarily concerned with discovery, lays great stress on hypotheses as essential to inductive inquiry. Whenever by imaginative insight we frame a hypothesis capable of accounting for a group of facts, we discover, according to him, a law, *i.e.*, arrive at an inductive generalization. Mill, however, rightly points out that the Experimental Methods must be carefully employed before an inductive generalization is reached; and Logic, according to him, is, as we have seen, essentially a science of proof. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 13 and Chap. XVI, § 3.) But Mill is disposed to underestimate the importance of hypotheses in inductive investigation, which he regards as resting simply on the Experimental Methods. We should not

While Dr. Whewell over-estimates the importance of hypotheses, Mill under-estimates it.

forget, however, that there is room for the application of the Methods only when hypotheses have already been formed : an inductive inquiry is not an aimless act but a systematic procedure to prove or disprove a suspected connection, *i.e.*, a hypothesis previously started. Even Mill is forced at times to admit this, as when he speaks of the function of hypotheses in "suggesting observations and experiments" as "one which must be reckoned absolutely indispensable in science. Without such assumptions, science could never have attained its present state : they are necessary steps in the progress to something more certain ; and nearly everything which is now theory was once hypothesis." (*Logic*, II, p. 16.)

§ 4. Conditions of a Valid Hypothesis.

Hypotheses, as we have said, are due to imaginative insight ; but imagination may be exercised either within reasonable limits or in an extravagant manner. To account for the disappearance of an article from a particular place we may suppose either that it has been mislaid, or that it has been removed by some person, or that it has been spirited away, or that it has melted in the air. All these hypotheses, however, are not equally reasonable. Certain tests are, accordingly, laid down in Logic by the application of which we may determine the legitimacy of a hypothesis. Some of these tests, however, are applied *when a hypothesis is being formed* to exclude the possibility of extravagant conjectures ; while there are other tests which are employed *after it has been formed*, to see whether

it actually explains what it was previously conceived as capable of doing. The former are known as the *conditions* or *requirements*, while the latter as *proofs* or *evidences* of a true hypothesis. We shall confine our attention to the Conditions in this section and shall dwell on the Proofs in the next. A hypothesis *ought* to satisfy the following conditions before it can be entertained at all as deserving of proof :—

Conditions
and Proofs of
Hypotheses.

*Conditions
of valid
hypotheses*

(1) *A hypothesis must in the first instance be definite and verifiable.* To say, for example, in the above illustration that the object has somehow disappeared or that it has been carried away by spirits is to maintain an indefinite and vague proposition, which can never be put to any test. “To be verifiable,” observes Mr. Read, “an hypothesis must be definite ; if somewhat vague in its first conception (which is reasonably to be expected), it must be made definite in order to be put to the proof.” (*Logic*, p. 248.) This condition evidently implies that every admissible hypothesis must be capable of deductive proof and so of verification : we must be able to deduce conclusions from a hypothesis and compare them with facts in order that it may be deemed as acceptable. “Even if we could imagine,” as Jevons observes, “an object acting according to laws hitherto wholly unknown it would be useless to do so, because we could never decide whether it existed or not. We can only infer what would happen under supposed conditions by applying the knowledge of nature we possess to those conditions. When we attempt

(1) A
hypothesis
should be
definite and
verifiable.

Hence every
Hypothesis
should admit
of deductive
proof and
verification.

to explain the passage of light and heat radiations through space unoccupied by matter, we imagine the existence of the so-called *ether*. But if this ether were wholly different from anything else known to us, we should in vain try to reason about it. We must apply to it at least the laws of motion, that is we must so far liken it to matter. And as, when applying those laws to the elastic medium air, we are able to infer the phenomena of sound, so by arguing in a similar manner concerning ether we are able to infer the existence of light phenomena corresponding to what do occur. All that we do is to take an elastic substance, increase its elasticity immensely, and denude it of gravity and some other properties of matter, but we must retain sufficient likeness to matter to allow of deductive calculations." (*Principles of Science*, pp. 511-512.)

(2) Hypotheses should suppose real agents.

(2) *Hypotheses should generally have reference to real agents, i. e., such as are known to exist in Nature.* Hence some other evidence of their existence must be adduced than simply their relation to the facts to be explained. Newton's maxim that "only *veræ causæ* [true or real causes] are to be admitted in explanation of phenomena" is to be interpreted liberally and not rigidly in scientific investigations. As we are not omniscient beings, we can never expect to have a thorough knowledge of all the departments of Nature. To exclude, therefore, a hypothesis simply because it supposes an agent or cause not hitherto known, is to close the door against all discovery and

investigation. As De Morgan says, "The physical philosopher has frequently to conceive law which never was in his previous thought—to educe the unknown, not to choose among the known."

(*Budget of Paradoxes*, p. 51.) Hence the term *vera causa* should be taken, not in the sense of a cause already known to exist, but in the sense of a cause which may reasonably be believed as existing and whose existence, therefore, does not involve a self-contradiction. *Veræ causæ*, says Herschel, "must be such as we have good inductive grounds to believe do exist in nature and do perform a part in phenomena analogous to those we would render an account of; or such, whose presence in the actual case can be demonstrated by unequivocal signs." (*Natural Philosophy*, p. 209.) Similarly, Dr. Bosanquet observes, "A *vera causa* is a thing, or occurrence in a thing, whose reality we are thoroughly convinced of from the necessity of reconciling observed data, and there is no reason in the nature of things why a single science or a single range of reality should not suffice to produce such conviction." (*Logic*, II, p. 159.)

Meaning of
'*vera causa*.'

It follows from this that some latitude should be allowed to the exercise of imagination that it may be able to penetrate the mysteries of Nature. As the limits to knowledge are not the limits to existence, it is permissible at times to suppose occult and unknown agencies, such as ether or atoms, to account for known phenomena. It should be remembered, however, that the conditions of proof in such a case should be more stringent than

It is permissible at times to suppose new agents; but the conditions of proof should then be more stringent.

we may not land in a region of myths or fairies. "Some Hypotheses," says Bain, "consist of assumptions as to the minute structure and operations of bodies. From the nature of the case, these assumptions can never be proved by direct means. Their only merit is their suitability to express the phenomena. They are *Representative Fictions*." (*Induction*, p. 132.) It is thus that we explain heat to be a form of motion or light to be the vibration of ether, which can never be directly perceived but which enables us to explain satisfactorily the known phenomena of heat or light.

A hypothesis should, therefore, be unconditional.

It is evident from the preceding remarks that a hypothesis should be unconditional, *i. e.*, it should not rest on another hypothesis or conjecture. If this be the case, it would be hard to prove a hypothesis, as there would then be proof behind proof. In fact, a hypothesis in such a case would simply be 'an airy nothing' eluding every attempt to test it by facts.

(3) A hypothesis must be self-consistent and in harmony with the known laws of nature.

(3) *A hypothesis should not be self-contradictory ; nor should it be in conflict with the known laws of Nature.* When, for example, an eclipse is attributed to the agency of a monster (*Rahu*) swallowing the sun or moon and then again ejecting it, or rain is explained by reference to the agency of a huge elephant (*Airavata*) pumping and scattering water by means of its trunk, the mode of operation is altogether inconsistent with the known laws of nature. Nature does not reveal anywhere that such a vast consequence as an eclipse or rain is produced in the way described here by a monster

or an animal that is huge and invisible at the same time. Such a hypothesis, therefore, is *prima facie* absurd.

(4) *A hypothesis must be adequate to account for the phenomena under investigation.* "One of the most familiar instances of an *inadequate hypothesis*," remarks Fowler, "is the theory started by Voltaire, there is little doubt in irony, that the marine shells found on the tops of mountains are Eastern species, dropped from the hats of pilgrims, as they returned from the Holy Land. Such a theory would obviously be inadequate to account (1) for the number of the shells, (2) for the fact that they are found imbedded in the rocks, (3) for their existence far away from the tracks of pilgrims, to say nothing of the fact that many of these shells bear no resemblance to recent Eastern species, while none resemble them exactly." (*Induction*, p. 100.) Likewise, if we explain the disappearance of a box by reference to the agency of a mosquito, the explanation is deemed unsatisfactory, as the hypothesis is quite inadequate to account for the effect.

(5) *We should not unnecessarily multiply the agencies required to explain the phenomena under inquiry.* This is known as the *Law of Parsimony*: it forbids us to assume more than what is necessary to account for a group of facts. If, for example, we can satisfactorily explain the mechanism of the universe by reference to a single Intelligent Principle, there is no necessity of supposing myriads of atoms so adjusted as to be capable of evolving the universe. The first two 'Rules of

(4) A hypothesis should be adequate to render a satisfactory account of the phenomena to be explained.

(5) In framing hypotheses we should not transgress the law of parsimony, i. e., a hypothesis should be necessary and not superfluous.

Philosophising' given by Newton in his *Principia* imply this condition. He writes:—"Rule I. No more causes of natural things are to be admitted than such as are both true, and sufficient to explain the phenomena of those things. Rule II. Natural effects of the same kind are to be referred as far as possible to the same causes." (Book III.) From this condition of a valid hypothesis it follows that it should be necessary and not gratuitous. If a phenomenon can be satisfactorily explained by existing laws, there is no necessity of a hypothesis. If, for example, three faculties can explain mental phenomena, we need not assume more.

Briefly speaking, then, a hypothesis, to be valid, should be definite, verifiable, adequate, unconditional, necessary, and consistent with the entire system of knowledge.

(1) The best test is verification.

§ 5. **Proofs of a Hypothesis.** The proofs or evidences which go to establish a hypothesis as plausible or legitimate are the following:—

(1) *The best test or proof of a hypothesis is its verification * : if the consequences deduced from a hypothesis tally with facts, the presumption is in*

* It has been argued by some logicians that verification by an appeal to facts may be said to involve the fallacy of affirming the consequent in a hypothetical-categorical syllogism. Thus, it may be argued, it is said,—'If a man swallows prussic acid, he will die ; he is dead, and therefore must have swallowed the acid'. That this view is untenable is evident from the fact that the antecedent or hypothesis is not inferred to be true from the mere presence of a consequent or an effect, found apart from it ; on the other hand it is taken to be true only when the consequent or effect is found to follow from it. If we find a man dying or dead after he has swallowed prussic acid, then we may take the hypothesis to be valid, subject always, however, to further confirmation from other instances, involving variation of circumstances—so as to exclude other possible explanations.

favour of its truth. Of course, a hypothesis may temporarily explain facts, which on fuller examination may not support it. In such a case a hypothesis previously accepted is subsequently modified or rejected according to the character of further evidence.

We should remember in this connection that in the attempt to verify a hypothesis we should be actuated by a pure regard for truth, so that we should never try to interpret facts in the light of a hypothesis but should always try to test a hypothesis by reference to facts. The opposite tendency is not infrequently illustrated in the speculations of enthusiastic thinkers disposed to defend their views on any topic or subject. The following illustration of the belief in a supernatural agency causing dreams bears out the truth of this remark. "The ancients were convinced," writes Lecky, "that dreams were usually supernatural. If the dream was verified, this was plainly a prophecy. If the event was the exact opposite of what the dream foreshadowed, the latter was still supernatural, for it was a recognised principle that dreams should sometimes be interpreted by contraries. If the dream bore no relation to subsequent events, unless it were transformed into a fantastic allegory, it was still supernatural, for allegory was one of the most ordinary forms of revelation. If no ingenuity of interpretation could find a prophetic meaning in a dream, its supernatural character was even then not necessarily destroyed, for Homer said there was a special portal through which deceptive visions

In verification there should be an honest and exact estimate of facts.

passed into the mind, and the Fathers declared that it was one of the occupations of the dæmons to perplex and bewilder us with unmeaning dreams." (*History of European Morals*, I, p. 385.) We should not in this way try to reconcile facts with our hypothesis. We should, on the other hand, estimate facts at their proper worth and determine the validity of a hypothesis by reference to them. "A simple absolute conflict between fact and hypothesis," says Jevons, "is fatal to the hypothesis." (*Principles of Science*, p. 516.) He, accordingly, lays down the rule that "*Agreement with fact is the sole and sufficient test of a true hypothesis.*" (*Ibid.*, p. 510.) A very prominent example of verification in science is found in the discovery of Neptune, which was previously supposed to produce perturbations in the movements of Uranus. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 8)

Verification
includes
authentic
testimony
and valid
deduction.

Verification, however, should be construed liberally and not merely in the narrow sense of what is supported by personal observation. If there be recorded trustworthy evidence, it may be taken into account in determining the value of a hypothesis. Thus, the hypothesis, formed from an examination of Mill's treatment of Logic, that his aim in writing the book was to supply a method for social investigations, is settled beyond doubt by a letter written by him to Miss Caroline Fox, in which he distinctly avowed that object. Similarly, if a hypothesis can strictly be deduced from a law already established, such deduction would amount to verification, since the law from which the hypothesis follows is supported by facts.

(2) *Decisive instances should be sought to show that the hypothesis framed in any case is the only acceptable one under known circumstances.* Such instances at once decide which of the several rival hypotheses started in any case is really to be accepted. As Ueberweg says, "One single circumstance, which admits of one explanation *only*, is more decisive than an hundred others which agree in all points with one's own hypothesis, but are equally well explained on an opposite hypothesis, which has originated from our opponent's side of the question." (*Logic*, Eng. trans., p. 513.) What is called a **Crucial Instance** is a case of this sort which at once terminates the conflict between contending hypotheses; and if such a case is obtained by experiment, it is called an **Experimentum Crucis**.* The fact of the aberration of light, for example, is taken as a decisive instance supporting the Copernican, instead of the Ptolemaic, system of Astronomy: if the earth be at rest, why should there be the phenomenon of aberration at all?† Similarly, the free passage of comets through space has disproved the presence

(a) Decisive instances should be observed to decide between conflicting hypotheses.

Meanings of Crucial Instance and

Experimentum Crucis.

Illustrations.

* The expressions have been borrowed from Bacon. Latin *crucis* or *crux* implies a cross which is generally used as a finger-post at the crossings of streets to indicate the right ways. A crucial instance or experiment is thus the fact observed or found by experiment which indicates the correct hypothesis to be chosen. The term, as Bacon says, "is transferred from the crosses (or finger-posts) which are put up in crossways to mark and point out different ways." (*Novum Organum*, Bk. II, Aph. 36.)

† Jevons writes, "Copernicus asserted, in opposition to the ancient Ptolemaic theory, that the earth moved round the sun, and he predicted that if ever the sense of sight could be rendered sufficiently acute and powerful, we should see phases in Mercury and Venus. Galileo with his telescope was able in 1610 to verify the prediction as regards Venus, and subsequent observations of

of the Crystalline Spheres of the ancient astronomers, thereby supporting the Copernican system. The *Principle of Interference* in the case of light likewise decides in favour of the undulatory, as distinguished from the corpuscular, theory of light. If light be due to vibrations of ether, then, when ethereal waves interfere with each other, there ought to be alternate bright and dark bands of colour, as the effects of the waves are heightened by addition or neutralized by counteraction. And Fresnel actually proved by experiment that the phenomena of interference are, as a matter of fact, produced when two streams of light come into collision with each other. "Fresnel's experiment," says Edser, "gives decisive evidence in favour of the wave theory of light. That light when added to light should produce darkness is incomprehensible on any theory of the material nature of light." (*Light for Students*, p. 323.) The following experiment relating to variation in the rate of movement of light with a variation in the density of its media may also be regarded as crucial, deciding in favour of the undulatory theory. "If the undulatory theory be true, light must move more slowly in a dense refracting medium than in a rarer one ;

Mercury led to a like conclusion. The discovery of the aberration of light added a new proof, still further strengthened by the more recent determination of the parallax of fixed stars. Hooke proposed to prove the existence of the earth's diurnal motion by observing the deviation of a falling body, an experiment successfully accomplished by Benzenberg ; and Foucault's pendulum has since furnished an additional indication of the same motion, which is indeed also apparent in the trade winds. All these are crucial facts in favour of the Copernican theory." (*Principles of Science*, p. 522.)

but the Newtonian theory assumed that the attraction of the dense medium caused the particles of light to move more rapidly than in the rare medium. On this point, then, there was complete discrepancy between the theories, and observation was required to show which theory was to be preferred. Now by simply cutting a uniform plate of glass into two pieces, and slightly inclining one piece so as to increase the length of the path of a ray passing through it, experimenters were able to show that light does move more slowly in glass than in air. More recently Fizeau and Foucault independently measured the velocity of light in air and in water, and found that the velocity is greater in air." (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, p. 521.) "A crucial experiment," as Jevons points out, "must not simply confirm one theory, but must negative another; it must decide a mind which is in equilibrium, as Bacon says, between two equally plausible views." (*Ibid.*, p. 519.) Thus, a *crucial instance* or *experiment* is a fact found by observation or experiment, indicating which of two rival hypotheses should be accepted, just as a finger post at a crossing indicates which of the two roads that cross each other is to be taken.

(3) *In the absence of direct verification, the exclusive sufficiency of a hypothesis to account for the appropriate phenomenon and its attendant circumstances may be accepted as a reasonable proof.* We should remember that in such a case there should be no other way of explaining the phenomenon in question. Thus, in circumstantial evidence we

(3) Exclusive sufficiency of a hypothesis to explain facts and concomitant circumstances.

accept such a proof, when direct evidence is wanting. (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 11.) Similarly, the supposed cause of erratic boulders or huge blocks of stone scattered over many parts of Northern Europe is ascertained in this way. The composition of these blocks clearly shows that once they were parts of hills to the northward of their present site. "They must, therefore, have somehow been detached and transported to where we now find them. How? One old explanation is that they were carried by witches, or that they were themselves witches accidentally dropped and turned into stone. Any such explanation by supernatural means can neither be proved nor disproved. Some logicians would exclude such hypotheses altogether on the ground that they cannot be rendered either more or less probable by subsequent examination. The proper scientific limit, however, is not to the making of hypotheses, but to the proof of them. The more hypotheses the merrier : only if such an agency as witchcraft is suggested, we should expect to find other evidence of its existence in other phenomena that could not otherwise be explained. Again, it has been suggested that the erratic boulders may have been transported by water. Water is so far a *vera causa* that currents are known to be capable of washing huge blocks to a great distance. But blocks transported in this way have the edges worn off by the friction of their passage : and, besides, currents strong enough to dislodge and force along for miles blocks as big as cottages must

have left other marks of their presence. The explanation now received is that glaciers and icebergs were the means of transport. But this explanation was not accepted till multitudes of circumstances were examined all tending to show that glaciers had once been present in the regions where the erratic blocks are found. The minute habits of glaciers have been studied where they still exist : how they slowly move down carrying fragments of rock ; how icebergs break off when they reach water, float off with their load, and drop it when they melt ; how they grind and smooth the surfaces of rocks over which they pass or that are frozen into them : how they undercut and mark the faces of precipices past which they move ; how moraines are formed at the melting ends of them, and so forth. When a district exhibits all the circumstances that are now observed to attend the action of glaciers the proof of the hypothesis that glaciers were once there is complete." (Minto's *Logic*, pp. 349—350)

(4) *A hypothesis must be in harmony not only with facts which it undertakes to explain, but also with facts known in other departments of Nature.* The more a hypothesis tends towards unity, harmony, or consistency, the stronger is the evidence in its favour. Thus, a hypothesis should unite all phenomena of a class which it is required to explain, whether present, past, or future. Prediction, as Whewell mentions, is one of the marks of a valid hypothesis. What is described by Whewell "as the consilience of inductions from different and sepa-

(4) Consilience of Inductions.

rate classes of facts" is specially important in this connection. There is a greater likelihood of truth when "the hypotheses which were assumed to account for *one class* of facts are found to explain *another class* of a different nature." (*Novum Organon Renovatum*, p. 95.) Thus, the evidence in favour of Gravity was strengthened when the terrestrial form was supported by the celestial. Such coincidence can scarcely be accidental ; it points rather to truth.

The proofs of a hypothesis, then, are, briefly, verification, exclusion of rival hypotheses, and agreement with known laws.

§ 6. Hypothesis and Abstraction. Dugald Stewart and others sometimes employ the term hypothesis to express an abstraction. Geometrical demonstration, for example, is said to be based on hypotheses relating to a mathematical point, line, *etc.*, which do not correspond to realities. It is true, no doubt, that there are certain points of similarity between a hypothesis and an abstraction. Thus, (1) both are representative in character, and (2) in both the actual is explained by the ideal. But though there are these points of community, yet the two differ in important respects. (1) The essence of hypothesis lies in the guess or conjecture with regard to the unknown ; but in abstraction no such feature is present. In the latter, we merely turn our attention from the concrete peculiarities of a case and direct our attention to one feature alone, conceived in some cases in an ideal form. Thus, in thinking of a mathematical line, we over-

Hypothesis is sometimes used in the sense of abstraction.

Points of similarity between hypothesis and abstraction :

(1) Both are representative and (2) both try to explain the actual by the ideal.

Points of difference :

(1) Unlike abstraction, hypothesis implies a guess about the unknown.

look its breadth, and in thinking of a smooth plane, we withdraw our attention from its asperity. (2) Another important point in which hypothesis and abstraction differ is that the consequences following from the former agree with facts, while the results of abstract reasoning are of an ideal character not tallying with facts. The abstract reasonings employed in the different sciences are applicable to facts only when the conclusions are modified by reference to the concrete peculiarities of a case. Thus, the character and functions of hypothesis and abstraction are not quite the same. Hypothesis, no doubt, involves abstraction; but abstraction does not necessarily involve hypothesis. They are connected, but not identical.

(2) Deductions from a valid hypothesis agree, while those from an abstraction do not, with actual facts.

Related to the Method of Abstraction we have what is called the mathematical Method of Limits. A limit may be defined as an extreme case to which all actual cases approach without ever coming up to it; for example, in mathematics, a curve may be considered as the limit of a polygon with its sides increased beyond number. Likewise, an abstraction may be said to be the limit of concrete objects in the sense that it is related to concrete individuals as a curve to many-sided polygons: what is true of the abstraction is true of concrete cases, the more nearly they approach the abstraction. It is said in this connection, 'what is true up to the limit is true at the limit.' The following remark of Whewell is instructive in this connection. "*The Idea of a Limit* supplies a new mode of establishing mathematical truths. Thus,

Method of Limits.

Limit defined.

Abstraction may be regarded as a limit of individuals.

with regard to the length of any portion of a curve, a problem which we have just mentioned ; a curve is not made up of straight lines, and therefore we cannot by means of any of the doctrines of elementary geometry measure the length of any curve. But we may make up a figure nearly resembling any curve by putting together many short lines, just as a polygonal building of very many sides may nearly resemble a circular room. And in order to approach nearer and nearer to a curve, we may make the sides more and more small, more and more numerous. We may then possibly find some mode of measurement, some relation of these small lines to other lines, which is not disturbed by the multiplication of the sides, however far it be carried. And thus we may do what is equivalent to measuring the curve itself ; for by multiplying the sides we may approach more and more closely to the curve till no appreciable difference remains. The curve line is the *Limit* of the polygon ; and in this process we proceed on the *Axiom* that "What is true up to the Limit is true at the Limit." "*(History of Scientific Ideas, Bk. II, C. 12.)*

All real inference is said ultimately to rest on the hypothesis or assumption of the Uniformity of Nature.

§ 7. Hypothesis and Uniformity of Nature. In a certain sense, hypothesis may be said to be at the basis of all real knowledge and all science. If we exclude formal truth and perfect induction, in which the conclusion is necessarily implicated in the data, we find that all real advance in knowledge or progress in science ultimately rests on the *assumption* of the Uniformity of Nature. The Uniformity of Nature is, no doubt,

regarded by some as an intuitive principle and by others, as due to wide and uncontradicted experience. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 2 and § 11.) In either case, however, it is viewed as an assumption lending support to every generalization. "All inference," says Jevons, "proceeds upon the assumption that new instances will exactly resemble old ones in all material circumstances ; but in natural phenomena this is purely hypothetical, and we may constantly find ourselves in error." (*Elementary Lessons in Logic*, p. 225.) And he writes with regard to our own sphere of existence, "It is a mere assumption that the uniformity of nature involves the unaltered existence of our own globe. There is no kind of catastrophe which is too great or too sudden to be theoretically consistent with the reign of law. For all that our science can tell, human history may be closed in the next instant of time. The world may be dashed to pieces against a wandering star ; it may be involved in a nebulous atmosphere of hydrogen to be exploded a second afterwards ; it may be scorched up or dissipated into vapour by some great explosion in the sun ; there might even be within the globe itself some secret cause of disruption, which only needs time for its manifestation." (*Principles of Science*, p. 748.)

Though it is true, from the human stand-point, that absolute certainty with regard to future events is unattainable by man, yet we should not overlook the fact that there are degrees of certainty or probability. What we call 'certain' has a high degree of probability ; and what we call

The terms 'certain' and 'probable' are relative, there being degrees of certainty and probability.

It is thus undesirable to call our confidence in Nature's uniformity a mere hypothesis.

'probable' has but a very weak degree of certainty. And if hitherto no exception has been noticed to the law of uniformity, then for all practical purposes it may be treated as 'certain.' Moreover, it is highly undesirable to call this law a hypothesis, which is ordinarily applicable to our conjectures lying in a tentative stage. "It seems undesirable," observes Mr. Read, 'to call our confidence in Nature's uniformity an 'hypothesis': it is incongruous to use the same term for our tentative conjectures and for our most indispensable beliefs. 'The universal postulate' is a better term for the principle which, in some form or other, every generalization takes for granted." (*Logic*, pp. 264-265.)

Ambiguous use of the term 'Theory':

(1) It sometimes means a hypothesis proved to be true; and

(2) sometimes it means a system of truths constituting a science.

§ 8. **Hypothesis, Theory, and Fact.** The term Theory has been used by some to indicate a Hypothesis which has been proved to be true in innumerable instances. The line of distinction between Theory, thus understood, and Hypothesis is, however, a delicate one. The proof which the sanguine may consider as adequate to Theory, may be considered by the sceptical as rather insufficient; and thus what would be called a Theory by one would be called a hypothesis by another. But, beyond this doubtful application of Theory, there is a sense which is generally accepted: Theory is understood to imply a system of truths or laws relating to a particular subject-matter, constituting the province of a definite department of knowledge or science (*e. g.*, the atomic theory, theory of dew, theories of light and heat).

The term 'Fact' comes from Latin '*factum*,' implying what has been done. 'Fact' thus signifies what has been done or what has happened. 'Fact,' accordingly, covers all those presentations which are immediately known and whose truth, therefore, can never be questioned. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1 and § 9.) Theory, on the other hand, comes within the province of inferential knowledge—what is legitimately thought out to explain a class of facts. Again, as intuitive knowledge is restricted to the concrete and individual, 'facts' are supposed to be essentially concrete and individual; and, as inference has to do mainly with general truth, we find theory is often used in the sense of a system of such truths. In some cases, however, the term 'Fact' is applied to a law or general truth, when it is proved beyond dispute (*e.g.*, when we speak of the 'fact' of gravitation or of the mortality of man). In such cases the term 'Fact' is extended to cover general truths simply because these approach the certainty of individual instances or concrete cases. 'Fact' in this sense means what is objectively true or certain. Whewell observes in this connection, "At any one of the steps of Induction, the Inductive proposition is a *Theory* with regard to the Facts which it includes, while it is to be looked upon as a *Fact* with respect to the higher generalizations in which it is included. In any other sense, the opposition of *Fact* and *Theory* is untenable and leads to endless perplexity and debate. Is it a 'Fact' or a Theory that the planet Mars revolves in an Ellipse about the Sun? To

Difference between Fact and Theory :

(1) Sometimes 'Fact' means what is immediately present before us, while 'Theory' implies the truths established by inference.

(2) Hence 'Fact' is supposed to refer to the concrete and individual, while 'Theory' to the general and abstract.

(3) Sometimes 'Fact' is used in the sense of what is objectively certain.

In the last sense the terms become relative: a lower generality is regarded as a 'Fact' in relation to a higher, which is viewed as a 'Theory'.
Dr. Whewell.

Kepler, employed in endeavouring to combine the separate observations by the conception of an Ellipse, it is a Theory ; to Newton engaged in inferring the law of force from a knowledge of the elliptical motion, it is a Fact. There are no special attributes of Theory and Fact which distinguish them from one another. Facts are phenomena apprehended by the aid of conceptions and mental acts, as Theories also are. We commonly call our observations *Facts*, when we apply, without effort or consciousness, conceptions perfectly familiar to us : while we speak of Theories, when we have previously contemplated the Facts and the connecting Conception separately, and have made the connection by a conscious mental act. The real difference is a difference of relation ; as the same proposition in a demonstration is the *premise* of one syllogism and the *conclusion* in another ;—as the same person is a father and a son." (*Novum Organon Renovatum*, p. 116.) Thus, there is no fundamental separation between facts and theories. What we call facts are but results of previous investigation and theorizing as well as the starting-point for fresh inquiry and hypotheses. There is, accordingly, a continuity between facts and theories, they being but different stages of the Inductive process : theories when proved and generally accepted coming to be known as facts, and facts when carefully examined revealing their theoretical basis. This relative difference is, therefore, due to the circumstance that a lower generality, in relation to a higher, is viewed as a

datum or fact, whose certainty goes to establish the truth of the latter. This is practically admitted by Whewell himself when he says that "we speak of Theories when we have previously contemplated the facts and the connecting conception separately and have made the connection by a conscious mental act." The conscious effort betrays the inferential process by which we pass from what is relatively certain to what is merely proved by it.

§ 9. **Uses of Hypotheses.** The uses of hypotheses are indeed various and manifold. If the distinctive endowment of man is to think and reason, if his natural tendency is to penetrate the mysteries of nature, to unify facts, and to explain them, then the formation of hypotheses becomes inevitable and their application unlimited. Thus, there is no sphere—whether of theory or practice, of religion, art, or science—where there is no room for hypotheses. In discovering the laws of nature or maturing a scheme of safety, in representing gods or supernatural agencies as the originators of natural processes, or in referring to the ideals of beauty or moral perfection to account for the facts of our æsthetic or moral life, we have to do with hypotheses more or less. The uses of hypotheses in any sphere are found to be threefold :—

(2) A hypothesis systematizes or tends to unify knowledge. We bring together objects or phenomena under general notions or laws only by means of prior abstractions or hypotheses subsequently verified or proved by facts. A hypothesis

Hypotheses are required in every sphere of human thought and activity.

The uses of hypotheses :

(1) A hypothesis tends to unify or systematize knowledge.

'colligates' or binds together facts, which otherwise seem detached and inexplicable. And the more we advance from the concrete to the abstract sciences, the greater the need we feel for hypotheses, until we come to metaphysics (which may be regarded as the highest or final science) in which their range is very great. To form a theory of the universe—whether atomic or dynamic, materialistic or spiritualistic, substantialistic or phenomenalistic, monistic or pluralistic—we must have recourse to a comprehensive hypothesis which may serve as a key to unlock its secrets.

(2) It thus lies at the root of all explanation.

(2) A hypothesis thus ultimately lies at the root of all explanation. To explain a fact is, as we shall see, to assimilate it or discover its cause. (*Vide* Chap. XXIV, § 1 and § 2.) And every form of explanation rests either on known laws (which, as we have seen, are finally due to hypotheses) or on hypothetical agencies or relations believed to render a satisfactory account of the phenomena under investigation. To satisfy our curiosity, we pry into the secrets of Nature; and by a stretch of the imagination we try to discover what is calculated to remove our doubt or perplexity.

(3) It, accordingly, suggests a definite line of investigation and so controls observation and experiment.

(3) A hypothesis, as a tentative conception, guides our inductive inquiry by the selection of instances and regulation of experiments which are likely to put it to the test. Inductive investigation is not a random procedure, but a well regulated course, controlled by the dominant idea of a hypothesis, which determines the line of observation and experiment. No doubt, if facts do not

bear out a hypothesis, we reject it altogether or modify it in the light of fresh experience ; and in that case the new hypothesis in its turn similarly controls our observation and experiment. In this way we proceed until we hit upon the right hypothesis consistent with facts. It has, accordingly, been said that the process of Induction may be likened to a Disjunctive Syllogism, where the conclusion is reached by the successive elimination of all the alternatives but one. This remark, however, is not strictly true, since all the possible hypotheses are not always formed at the outset in the form of disjunctive members. Usually, a new hypothesis is forged as an old one is rejected ; and at times the seemingly new is but a modification of the old, as suggested by wider experience and deeper insight. In this way, the inductive procedure is always controlled by one hypothesis or another which guides our inquiry.

It may be mentioned in this connection that, though extravagant hypotheses, involving more or less uncontrolled exercise of imagination, are to be condemned, yet hypotheses which are of the form of rational conjectures, due to a regulated exercise of imagination, must be allowed. It is better to start somewhere than to be at a standstill through undue care and reflectiveness. Herein lies the importance of what are known as working and descriptive hypotheses. **A working hypothesis** is one which is provisionally adopted with some evidence in its favour to account for a class of phenomena, and it serves as a guide to inquiry in

Reasonable hypotheses, even when subsequently proved to be false, are useful in furthering inquiry and helping discovery.

A 'working hypothesis' is one provisionally adopted to help inquiry.

in a certain
direction.

a certain direction.* It is a plausible starting-point for investigation and we try to see by further observation and experiment how it would work. To discover, for example, the cause of indigestion in any case, we may begin with the supposition of a particular article of food apparently producing it as its cause ; but when it is found on further examination that the same kind of food under similar circumstances does not produce indigestion, we may vary our supposition and imagine the cause as excess in eating or drinking. If this in its turn be found afterwards to be false, we may form some other hypothesis, until we hit upon the right one, adequately supported by facts. A working hypothesis is thus subject to revision, modification, or even rejection in the light of subsequent investigation or experience. "In later years," observes Jevons, "Professor Huxley has strongly insisted upon the value of hypothesis. When he advocates the use of 'working hypotheses', he means no doubt that any hypothesis is better than none and that we cannot avoid being guided in our observations by some hypothesis or other." (*Principles of Science*, p. 509.) Thus, the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy, the Cartesian theory of vortices, and the corpuscular theory of light were working hypotheses which prepared the way for the later Copernican theory of astronomy, the Newtonian theory of gravitation, and the undula-

* A hypothesis is viewed as simply provisional when it is merely started to account for a particular class of facts ; and so long as it is partially or insufficiently proved, it is regarded only as a 'working hypothesis.'

tory theory of light. A working hypothesis, even when disproved, may be retained for more clearly explaining a certain class of facts. In optics, for example, "the so-called corpuscular theory of light is still used with advantage as a convenient means of summarising the laws of reflection and refraction" (Merz, *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, I, p. 422.)

A **descriptive hypothesis** is merely an attempt to group together facts by analogy when their definite character is not precisely known or cannot otherwise be expressed. It is, in the language of Bain, 'a representative fiction' to render intelligible by means of a suitable conception what might otherwise remain obscure. "There are hypotheses," says Jevons, "which we may call *descriptive hypotheses*, and which serve for little else than to furnish convenient names. When a phenomenon is of an unusual kind, we cannot even speak of it without using some analogy. Every word implies some resemblance between the thing to which it is applied, and some other thing, which fixes the meaning of the word. If we are to speak of what constitutes electricity, we must search for the nearest analogy, and, as electricity is characterised by the rapidity and facility of its movements, the notion of a fluid of a very subtle character presents itself as appropriate. There is the single-fluid and the double-fluid theory of electricity, and a great deal of discussion has been uselessly spent upon them. The fact is, that if these theories be understood as more than convenient modes of

A 'descriptive hypothesis' indicates an attempt to express the character of a class of facts by a suitable name when its exact nature is not definitely known-

e.g., 'electric
fluid,'

'vital force.'

Distinction
between
Explanatory

describing the phenomena, they are altogether invalid. The analogy extends only to the rapidity of motion, or rather the fact that a phenomenon occurs successively at different points of the body. The so-called electric fluid adds nothing to the weight of the conductor, and to suppose that it really consists of particles of matter is even more absurd than to reinstate the corpuscular theory of light. A far closer analogy exists between electricity and light undulations, which are about equally rapid in propagation. We shall probably continue for a long time to talk of the *electric fluid*, but there can be no doubt that this expression represents merely a phase of molecular motion, a wave of disturbance. The invalidity of these fluid theories is shown moreover in the fact that they have not led to the invention of a single new experiment." (*Principles of Science*, pp. 522-523.) Of a like character are the expressions 'vital force,' 'resisting medium,' or that 'heat is a form of motion.' "That Heat consists of motions of the atoms can never be directly shown ; but if the supposition is in consistency with all the appearances, and if it helps us to connect the appearances together in a general statement, it serves an important intellectual function." (Bain, *Induction*, p. 132.)

Though hypothesis is essentially explanatory in character, since its aim always is to explain a particular class of phenomena, yet a distinction has at times been drawn between *explanatory* and *descriptive* hypotheses by reference to their predominant feature. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 2.) Thus,

hypotheses about causes or agents are said to be *explanatory*, as they really explain how an event happens or a thing is produced, while hypotheses about laws are viewed as *descriptive*, as they rather indicate (often with mathematical precision) the ways of happening,—though, no doubt, these also ultimately help us to understand how events take place, involving a reference to some agent or cause. “Every *hypothesis of cause*, *i. e.*, every supposition of some definite antecedent (or group of antecedents) as being the real, actual cause of the phenomenon in question,” writes Prof. Coffey, “is necessarily explanatory: it offers—provisionally—an *explanation* of the phenomenon. *Hypotheses of law*, on the other hand, in so far as they merely describe with mathematical exactness the manner in which phenomena occur, are rather *descriptive* than *explanatory*; but nevertheless, inasmuch as a correct quantitative estimate of those changes or activities suggests or reveals to us, at least partially, the nature of their causes and of the laws according to which these causes interact—for “*operari sequitur esse*,”—and inasmuch as hypotheses of law thus inevitably suggest hypotheses of cause, the former as well as the latter have some claim to be called *hypotheses* in the stricter sense, *i. e.*, *explanatory hypotheses*.” (*Science of Logic*, II, pp. 125-126.)

It is clear from the preceding remarks that all laws and theories are but hypotheses verified or established by positive proof. Induction, as we have tried to show, can never proceed without

and
Descriptive
Hypotheses.

All laws and
theories are

but proved hypotheses.

hypothesis ; and the great defect of Mill's System of Logic is that it overlooks this important truth. He imagines that his Canons or Methods are directly applicable to the masses of facts brought before us by circumstances, without being led by any guiding hypothesis. But evidently the Canons can seldom be thus applied, so that facts fortuitously supplied by experience can never be made to disclose uniform laws. "Mill," as Jevons points out, "would have been saved from much confusion of thought had he not failed to observe that the inverse use of deduction constitutes induction." (*Principles of Science*, p. 509.) [*Vide* Chap. XV, § 8.] The very possibility of the employment of the Inductive Methods requires that there should be a preliminary scientific arrangement of facts determined by a prior guess or conjecture. This evidently leads us to prepare materials as we wish to examine them. To reach an inductive generalization, therefore, we must previously frame a *provisional hypothesis* which is believed as capable of explaining the facts engaging our attention and so capable of regulating our research. This hypothetical agent we try to conceive by reference to familiar analogous facts and accordingly give it a *descriptive name*. If it succeeds for the time being in explaining the facts it is required to explain, it is accepted as a *working hypothesis*. If, however, in an attempt at verification we find the hypothesis defective or unsuitable, we improve upon it by suitable modifications or qualifications. In that case the working hypothesis is gradually

Before we get an induction proper, there must be a hypothesis passing through the stages—(1) provisional, (2) working, (3) legitimate, and (4) valid—as it increases in probability.

shaped into perfection or finally rejected by fresh attempts at verification in other instances. When a formulated hypothesis is in this way found to be self-consistent, capable of explaining the appropriate facts as well as analogous cases and also of predicting future events, it is regarded as a *legitimate hypothesis*; and when such a hypothesis stands the test of the Inductive Canons and is thus proved beyond doubt, it may be regarded as an *Induction Proper* or a *Law of Nature*. It should not be forgotten, however, that sometimes such laws or inductive truths may also be established by rigorous deduction from higher laws. We see, then, that a hypothesis must pass through the stages—(1) Provisional, (2) Working, (3) Legitimate, and (4) Valid, before we can get a truly inductive generalization. The successive stages indicate but grades of probability according to the degree of evidence forthcoming.

§ 10 Exercises.

1. Define a Hypothesis, and analyse the conditions on which its value depends. What are the circumstances favourable to Discovery?

Suppose that on returning home you find one of the panes of your window broken: show how you would apply the method of Hypotheses in this case.

2. What different kinds of Hypotheses are there? Give examples. What are Representative Fictions?

3. Discuss the connection between Hypothesis and Induction; and show, by means of an example, what constitutes the complete verification of a Hypothesis.

4. Explain how Hypotheses contribute to scientific discovery, citing instances. How would you reconcile the

remark of Newton—'Hypotheses non fingo'—with the scientific importance of Hypotheses?

5. Explain the function of Hypothesis in Induction. What are the accepted tests for determining the validity of a hypothesis? What exactly has Elimination to do with the proof of a hypothesis?

6. Wherein does a valid Induction differ from a legitimate Hypothesis? What is the relation of Hypothesis to Explanation?

7. Distinguish Hypothesis from Theory. Show, by a concrete example, how far the imagination, and how far the reason, enter into the construction of a workable Hypothesis.

8. "Every hypothesis is an attempt at explanation, every established theory is an explanation of greater or less scope." Explain and illustrate the remark.

9. In what classes of ways are Hypotheses suggested? Are there rules for their formation?

10. Distinguish between a working hypothesis and an established hypothesis. What are descriptive hypotheses?

11. What do you understand by a Crucial I. *factum* and a Crucial Experiment? What is a 'vera causa'? Illustrate your answer by examples.

12. Distinguish between Theory and Fact and indicate their relation to Hypotheses.

13. Explain and illustrate the relation of Hypothesis to Abstraction. Examine the view of Dugald Stewart that the reasonings of geometry are built on hypotheses.

14. Does the Uniformity of Nature rest on Hypothesis? Examine the remark of Jevons, "All certainty of inference is relative and hypothetical."

15. It is a common Hypothesis in Bengal that Railway embankments are causes (proximate or remote) of malarial fever: what logical processes would be required to prove or refute this Hypothesis?

CHAPTER XX.

DEDUCTION IN INDUCTION.

§ 1. **Forms of Deduction.** The application of the Inductive Canons becomes precarious and difficult either (1) when the effects of several causes blend in one homogeneous whole or (2) when one and the same effect is produced by diverse causes. These two difficulties are met by (1) the Deductive Method and (2) the Theory of Probability or the Doctrine of Chance. Both these difficulties are solved to a great extent by the former, while the latter is often successful in the case of a plurality of causes. We shall, accordingly, confine our attention in this Chapter to the exposition of the principles of Deduction as employed in Induction.

The Inductive Methods fail in the case of (1) intermixture of effects and (2) plurality of causes.

The difficulties are met to a great extent by the Deductive Method.

Deduction is illustrated in two principal forms:—
(1) The one form is comparatively simple, in which we merely extend the application of a law or principle to a concrete case. When, for example, we know that 'All men are mortal' or 'All material bodies gravitate', we may apply the law to the particular case of 'John' or 'table' and thus conclude 'John is mortal' or 'Tables are heavy'. This form of Deduction we have already considered in Book II. Induction, as involving the application of a hypothesis to concrete cases with a view to its verification, may also be said to illustrate this form of Deduction. (2) The other form is comparatively

Deduction assumes two forms:

(1) The application of a law or hypothesis to a particular case;

(2) the application of

several laws
to a complex
case to
determine a
compound
result.

complex involving the deduction of a complex result from the co-operation of several agents. For example, writing in any case is determined by several factors, such as, the pen, paper, ink, mind, and hand. Similarly, when a boat goes down a stream, the effect may be due to several causes, such as the current of water, wind, rowing, and towing. We shall consider this complex form of Deduction in this Chapter. In this method we are supposed to be already aware (either by previous inductions or by legitimate hypotheses) of the different agents and their modes of operation, which may possibly bring about the complex effect we are trying to explain. We then suppose a particular combination of these as capable of producing the effect in question and calculate the result accordingly. If this deduction agrees with fact, we believe in our explanation; otherwise we are led to begin afresh with some new agents, laws, or combinations. Thus, this Deductive Method may be said to consist mainly of three stages, *vis.*, (i) *Preliminary Ascertainment of Premises*, *i.e.*, general laws already arrived at by Induction or as a legitimate hypothesis: these are at first assumed; (ii) *Ratiocination*, *i.e.*, deductively deriving consequences from the universal premises or general laws from which the start was made; and (iii) *Verification*, *i.e.*, subsequent verification of these consequences by reference to actual facts with the help of observation and experiment.

The
conditions of
Deduction as
used in
Induction
are:—

§ 2. Conditions of Deduction. The conditions of Deduction as employed in Induction are:—

(1) The presence of several agents or causes which bring about a complex effect.

(2) The laws of operation of these agents or causes.

(3) The circumstances under which the several causes give rise to the complex effect.

(4) Calculation of the result by reference to the agents and the laws of their operation, as in the case of the parallelogram of forces.

(5) Verification, or comparison of the calculated result with the observed effect.

(1) The presence of several agents ;
(2) the laws governing them ;
(3) the circumstances in which they act ;
(4) calculation of the result ;
and (5) verification.

These conditions of the Deductive Method have generally been compressed into three points—(1) the agents and laws of their operation, (2) computation, and (3) verification.

Verification, it should be remembered, is an important factor of the Deductive Method. If the deductive result be not in harmony with actual facts, then we are necessarily led to begin our inquiry anew. In the case of any discrepancy between the calculated and the observed result, we suppose that there is error somewhere in the above steps. And if the calculation as well as the circumstances under which the agents operate, be correctly determined, then we are led to frame fresh hypotheses with regard to the agents or their laws : we suppose that either some causes have been excluded or some factors have been included which do not really operate at the time ; or we are led to think that the laws of the operation of these agents are different, wholly or partly, from what we have taken them to be. We

The correctness of Deduction is proved by verification.

proceed in this tentative way until we find that the calculated result tallies with the observed facts.

The Deductive Method is applicable to homogeneous intermixture of effects, as in mechanical and physical phenomena.

It should be noted in this connection that the Deductive Method is mainly applicable to the cases described by Mill as the homogeneous intermixture of effects, as distinguished from the heteropathic intermixture, to which the Inductive Methods may be applied. (*Vide* Chapter XVII, § 5 and § 7.) The Deductive Method is thus practically confined to mechanical or physical phenomena, as distinguished from the chemical or biological which may, to a great extent, be explained by the Inductive Canons. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 2.)

Three forms of Deduction as employed in Induction:

§ 3. Forms of Deduction in Induction.

Though the Deductive Method, as employed in Inductive inquiry, involves the above steps as a rule, yet we find that these steps are not always involved in the order in which they have been mentioned above; and sometimes the last step, namely, verification, may be wanting altogether. There are thus three forms of Deduction known as—(1) The Direct Deductive Method, (2) the Inverse Deductive Method, and (3) the Geometric Method.

(1) The Direct Deductive Method, in which observation supports computation, as in Physics and Mechanics.

(1) The Direct Deductive Method is illustrated when we arrive at a result by computation, as indicated above, and then test it by verification. This method is generally employed in Physics and Mechanics; and hence the method has sometimes been described as the 'Physical Method.' (a) When, for example, in Astronomy we determine by calculation the path of a planet by reference to the

constituent forces which keep it in its path and then test the result by observation, this form of deduction is illustrated. (*b*) This method explains similarly the rise of water in the common pump. Water can be pumped to the height of 33ft. at the sea-level and to less and less heights as we proceed to higher and higher altitudes above the sea-level. We find that the weight of the column of water raised in a pump is equal to the atmospheric pressure outside the pump in every case. It is this pressure which pushes the water up in the pump owing to vacuum in it. This follows at once from the laws governing the movement of liquids : as a liquid transmits pressure equally in all directions and as the pressure of air outside the pump is not counteracted by a similar pressure inside the pump, owing to vacuum in it, water is necessarily forced upwards in the pump, until the weight of the column of water in it equals the atmospheric pressure outside. (*c* By this method we likewise determine the path of a projectile, when we take into account its initial velocity, the resistance of the air, and the force of gravity, to ascertain their resultant.

(2) The Inverse Deductive Method is illustrated when we first observe a complex effect and then try to account for it by the Deductive Method. This method is frequently employed in History and Sociology. Hence the method is sometimes known as the 'Historical Method'. Here verification does not follow computation ; but computation follows observation and empirical generalization.

(2) The Inverse Deductive Method, in which computation supports observation, as in History and Sociology.

We first generalize by conjecture from the observation of facts and then try to test our generalization by deducing it from general laws. Whenever, by reason of the complexity of a situation, it is difficult for us definitely to ascertain the numerous agencies at work, then we have recourse to this method as the more convenient one : we find it more easy to notice the result as it actually takes place, and then to theorize about the possible causes and draw a conclusion therefrom¹ and see whether the conclusion agrees with the observed fact or not. It is in this way that we try to account for the American War of Independence or the French Revolution by reference to its causes, or we venture to explain the rise or fall of the Roman or the Moghul Empire by reference to its conditions.

(3) The Geometrical Method, in which there is no necessity for verification, as in speculative Mathematics.

(3) The Geometrical Method is illustrated when there is no necessity for verification. When, for example, we have to do with facts relating to space and time, we can safely deduce a conclusion without any necessity for verification. There being no possible counteracting agencies, the calculated result may be accepted as true ; and no need is felt for verification. This method is illustrated when complex results are deduced in Pure Mathematics or when abstract conclusions are drawn in Politics or Economics from the so-called 'Rights of Man' or the 'Laws of Demand and Supply.' To defend Democracy or Oligarchy, for example, merely by reference to the ideal 'Interests of Classes' or to plead for 'Free Trade' or 'Protection' by reference

to the abstract interests of communities in general is to employ this method, as the conclusions are then based, not on an actual estimate of facts in any particular case, but on a theoretic estimate of abstract conditions.

Though generally the above forms of the Deductive Method are restricted in their sphere of inquiry, yet we find that, as a matter of fact, no such restriction is possible. The Direct Method, though generally restricted to the explanation of physical phenomena, may sometimes be applied to the study of historical facts; and the Inverse Method may sometimes be applied to the study of physical phenomena. We find, for example, that the laws of Kepler were first determined empirically before they were deduced from the universal law of gravitation. Here, then, observation and generalization preceded the application of the Deductive Method. We likewise find that the Geometrical Method also is sometimes applied to phenomena other than those relating to space and time. We find, for example, the tendency among some politicians simply to deduce consequences from abstract political principles and not to appeal to experience for verification. The opposite tendency is sometimes found when politicians are content only with observation and empirical generalizations, which are not confirmed by deductive calculation.

Though ordinarily the above forms of the Deductive Method have special spheres of their own, yet they may be extended to the other spheres as well,

§ 4. Induction Aided by Deduction. The full force of scientific method, as Bain observes, is illustrated when Deduction is brought

A fact is conclusively established when Induction is

CHAPTER XXI.

THEORY OF PROBABILITY OR ELIMINATION OF CHANCE.

As a plurality of causes frustrates most of the inductive canons, we require some other procedure which may be an aid to generalization in such a case.

The theory of probability succeeds in such a case.

It enables us to detect a causal connection by the elimination of chance-coincidences.

§ 1. Necessity of Probability in Induction. The second difficulty in applying the Inductive Canons is felt in the case of plurality of causes. Without examining here the validity of the hypothesis of the plurality of causes, we may assume it as it is advocated by Mill and Bain, specially as, owing to our imperfect observation or knowledge, it is not always possible for us to discover exact correspondence between cause and effect. If one and the same effect be apparently produced sometimes by one cause and sometimes by another, then it is hard to determine, by the employment of the Inductive Canons, the causal link in such a case. In such cases, we can, however, determine with a certain degree of exactitude the causal connection by the employment of the Theory of Probability or Chance. If, for example, an effect *X* may be produced by either *A* or *B*, then we try to determine by the doctrine of chance whether the presumption in favour of *A* is greater than that in favour of *B* : we calculate by the doctrine of chance how often *A* and *X* are likely to go together, if due only to accident. If we find the connection to be more frequent, then we naturally suppose that the relation is not merely *casual* but that there is a *causal* link between the two. (*Vide* § 5.) We should, accordingly, confine our attention in this

Chapter to the study of the Theory of Probability, so far as it bears on the inductive determination of causes.

The scientific conception of the universe really leaves very little room for accident or chance. Properly speaking, every phenomenon or occurrence is determined by its cause or conditions, proximate and remote, known and unknown. As, however,*there are limits to human knowledge, we cannot expect to discover or to know the causes of all phenomena or coincidences. Thus, there is room for chance or probability. In fact, Chance is taken by Mill as implying a coincidence which does not afford any ground for establishing uniformity.

Owing to the imperfections of our faculties, events seem to us to be accidental or probable.

Mill's definition of Chance.

Probability has been used in two different senses : (1) popularly it implies a greater likelihood for than against an event ; (2) scientifically, however, it refers to any situation below certainty and above impossibility. Probability has to do with approximate generalizations ; and, when such generalizations are reduced to statistics, the calculation of probability becomes more definite—at least with regard to the average number of cases. No doubt, probability has also been applied to individual instances, but with no greater certainty. (*Vide* § 3.) As Bain remarks, "When a sufficiently extended series of observations shows a fixed proportion in the relative occurrence of events, this proportion is called the probability of the occurrence of any single event : which, however, is a fiction meaning only the certainty of the proportion, or average, on the whole." (*Induction*, p. 91.)

Ambiguous use of the term 'Probability'.

It is sometimes maintained that all inference ultimately rests on probability ;

but this view is not tenable.

Generalizations justified by the laws of thought and the uniformity of nature are to be treated as certain.

§ 2. Inference, Chance, and Probability. "All inference," says Jevons, "is relative and hypothetical." (*Elementary Lessons in Logic*, p. 225.) The remark is, no doubt, true to a certain extent. We have seen that induction proper, involving a reference to the unknown—the distant and the future,—is more or less uncertain or hypothetical. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 6.) If, for example, Nature be not always found to be uniform in all respects, then what is taken to be true here and now may not be true elsewhere and hereafter. Similarly, the material validity of a syllogistic conclusion depends on that of the premises. If the premises be uncertain, the conclusion must be so too. If, therefore, all universal propositions be uncertain, the conclusion must always be probable ; and, in this sense, the dictum of Bishop Butler that 'probability is the very guide of life' is true. From this stand-point we have to do with probability in every case ; the question in any particular instance being to determine its degree. If we adopt this position, then the terms 'sure' and 'certain,' and all analogous expressions, will have to be erased from language. A little reflection shows, however, that when we use these expressions we mean only such certainty as we, with our imperfect faculties, can possibly attain, and not the degree of certainty which an Absolute Being alone can possess. Thus, truths which are based on the laws of thought and countenanced by the unvarying order of things are taken by us as certain, and not as probable. If these justify universal propositions, we ac-

cept them as true. When, on the other hand, facts do not warrant universal propositions, we are in doubt about our inference in any case, and the degree of doubt is determined by the balance of evidence furnished by facts.

It is this doubt which generally lies at the bottom of what are called approximate generalizations or particular propositions and gives rise to probability. As, however, a condition of doubt or uncertainty is one of perplexity, we often try to avoid it by aiming at universal truths yielding certain conclusions. And so we try to render even approximate generalizations precise that they may, within a certain sphere, be treated as universal propositions, yielding definite results. We try to attain our end in two principal ways :—

(1) We may ascertain exactly the exceptions to a rule, which is viewed as indefinite because the exceptions are not known. Thus, instead of being content with the indefinite truth 'Some metals are solid' (which justifies only a probable conclusion in any case), we determine precisely that 'All metals except mercury are solid,' which justifies a certain conclusion on any occasion. It is in this way that the rules of Grammar and the laws of a State are made general by a separate specification of their exceptions.

(2) Generalizations, which seem to be approximate, owing to our ignorance of the exact circumstances in which they are always true, may turn out to be universal when these circumstances are discovered and mentioned as defining the precise

Universal propositions ensure certainty of conclusion, while particular propositions give rise to doubt.

As doubt is painful, we try to render particular propositions definite by discovering the sphere within which they may be treated as universal.

This is sometimes effected in two ways

(1) by enumerating the exceptions,

and (2) by determining precisely the circumstances in which such propositions are always true.

sphere of their application. Thus, instead of being satisfied with the vague proposition 'Some kinds of fever are cured by quinine' (which is often practically useless), we try to be more precise and say 'Chronic ague is cured by quinine,' which is of great practical value. Similarly, instead of holding 'absolute monarchs generally abuse their power,' we maintain that 'An absolute sovereign will abuse his power, *unless* his position makes him dependent on the good opinion of his subjects, or *unless* he is exceptionally good and firm or is guided by ministers who are so.'

When, however, we fail to universalize a proposition, we are content with probability supported by statistics or balance of evidence furnished by facts.

Probability is thus not purely subjective, but supported by evidence.

When, however, we fail to reach a universal proposition in any way, we are content with as much certainty as attainable; and we try by means of statistics to arrive at an objective estimate of probability. Probability, as we have said, is connected with doubt or uncertainty. And, as such uncertainty is due rather to our estimate of facts than to the facts themselves, probability has been regarded by some as purely subjective, without any objective validity. Though, it is urged, all natural events may be the outcome of necessity, yet our ignorance of the conditions of their production gives them an aspect of contingency.* It may be said, however, that contingency or uncertainty rests not merely on the degree of subjective conviction but also on the imperfect estimate of facts: so long as all the circumstances are not taken into account, the few, which are considered,

* The student may consult in this connection *The Elements of Morals*, Chap. XX, § 8.

justify only an approximate generalization.* And the more we have access into the secrets of Nature, the more correctly do we discover the numerous conditions or circumstances yielding a definite result. Herein we find the distinction between Chance and Probability. Chance is simply due to our ignorance; and, so long as we do not know the circumstances which bring about a phenomenon, we attribute it to mere chance or accident.† Thus, we attribute the success of an enterprise to chance when its conditions are not known, as, in olden times, an eclipse of the sun or moon was deemed accidental owing to an imperfect knowledge

Distinction
between
Chance and
Probability.

* Even if the 'few' circumstances, which are taken into account, be the same always, they would yield one uniform result; but, as a matter of fact, they are taken in varying combinations and thus they give rise to variable results, with some preponderance in favour of one owing to the predominant influence of some of the factors present in all the cases. For example, when we try to ascertain the probable effect of education on individuals, education itself involves various factors and diverse forms and individuals likewise have multifarious traits, due to native endowment, heredity, environment, etc. And these factors taken in different combinations would no doubt give rise to different results, though there may be some general agreement in many cases owing to the influence of some common factors affording room for the calculation of probability. It is, therefore, the study of mixed cases which lends support to the doctrine of probability, while an examination of pure cases or exactly the same combination of factors would justify only an inductive generalization.

† Jevons writes—"Chance cannot be the subject of the theory, because there is really no such thing as chance, regarded as producing and governing events. The word chance signifies *falling*, and the notion of falling is continually used as a simile to express uncertainty, because we can seldom predict how a die, a coin, or a leaf will fall, or when a bullet will hit the mark. But everyone sees, after a little reflection, that it is in our knowledge the deficiency lies, not in the certainty of nature's laws. There is no doubt in lightning as to the point it shall strike; in the greatest storm there is nothing capricious; not a grain of sand lies upon the beach, but infinite knowledge would account for its lying there; and the course of every falling leaf is guided by the principles of mechanics which rule the motions of the heavenly bodies". (*Principles of Science*, p. 198.)

and minor details are noticed.

The complex affairs of life often require the use of the principles of probability.

The conclusions of probability are true only of the average number of cases.

name than mere hypothesis elsewhere." (*Logic of Chance*, p. 127.) The computation of probability occupies a very prominent place in the logic of life, as most of its issues are determined by such computation. Whether, for example, a nation or party, engaged in conflict, would be victorious or not, whether an individual should adopt this or that profession, whether a patient suffering from a disease would recover or die, whether an alliance would be advantageous or injurious can be settled only by an estimate of probabilities. "The whole life of man," observes Buckminster, "is a perpetual comparison of evidence and balancing of probabilities."

It should be borne in mind in this connection that a computation of probability is true only with regard to the average number of instances, individual cases being always more or less uncertain. When we study a large number of instances of any phenomenon, say a disease like cholera, we find that a certain proportion of cases is fatal; and the more extended our observation, the less does the proportion fluctuate. This proportion indicates the *average* number of cases true on the whole. Though this proportion is also employed to determine the probability of a single event, yet, as a matter of fact, it is as uncertain as ever. When, for example, knowing the average proportion of fatal to non-fatal cases of cholera to be, say, 4 : 1, we say with regard to a particular patient, suffering from cholera, that the chance of his recovery is 1 : 4, we evidently employ a fiction, for the chance of his recovery is as uncertain as ever, whether we

judge the case by the proportion or not. All that we can say is that, in the long run, the average number of recoveries in the case of cholera is indicated by the proportion 1 : 4. "Unless we act upon the gross or total, we gain nothing by taking into account the numerical probabilities with a view to a single instance." (Bain, *Induction*, p. 91.)

The explanation of the above fact is found in what has been said above about the ultimate grounds of probability. We have mentioned that, in this well-ordered and harmonious world, everything is governed by law; so that what we call accident is merely due to our ignorance. In every individual case, an effect is produced by the convergence or conflict of numerous laws, which it is not easy to determine. Hence we are often perplexed in our estimate of individual instances which seem to baffle inquiry and explanation. When, however, we study a large number of instances of a class, the law governing its characteristics stands out prominently in the midst of individual peculiarities. And the wider our observation, the greater the chance of detection of such a law. Hence the value of average in any sphere. The cholera poison or germ, for example, is governed by a law of its own, which is injurious to the human organism. But, in any particular case, there may be the operation of other laws (such as those connected with habit, diet, surroundings, medicine, inherited constitution) counteracting such influence. When, however, we study a very large number of cases, these counteracting influences are, more or less, excluded by

The reason of this is found in the fact that the central law, governing a class of complex objects or events, stands out prominently when a large number of instances is observed.

The law is illustrated in most of them, though it is frustrated in some owing to counteracting agencies.

Thus, the calculation of probability illustrates also the employment of the Inductive Methods with the connected processes of varying the circumstances and elimination.

Mr. Read's account,

the Method of Agreement, and the central law concerning the cholera poison may approximately be read in what is known as the average. Thus, the calculation of probability illustrates also the application of the Inductive Methods—but only to the examination of very complex cases, rendered difficult by the intricacy of relation subsisting among the several laws governing them. The processes of varying the circumstances and elimination are illustrated in the study of a very large number of cases and the exclusion of peculiarities or (as they are called in this connection) deviations from the central law governing the type.* “The calculation of probabilities,” says Mr. Read, “supposes a class or series of instances or events subject (as far as known) to somewhat similar conditions, though the conditions are not so similar

* Bain writes, “So far as the mere decay of the human system is concerned, deaths would be equally frequent at all periods of the year, and at all hours of the day. In the statistics of Mortality, however, we find that some months are marked by an excessive number of deaths; as December, January, and February. This points to a law of connexion between winter severity and mortality. In the same way, if we had the statistics of the deaths occurring at different hours of the day, we might find a greater number occurring in the depressing hours of the night, namely, between midnight and dawn. There is an element of chance, and an element of law; the chance can be eliminated by statistics, and the law ascertained and estimated.” (*Induction*, p. 89) Statistics in these cases merely reveal the influence of the weather or atmosphere on the human organism, as distinguished from other circumstances. Here is another analogous instance:—“Apoplexy occurs more often in males than in females and frequently between the ages of fifty and seventy than in the other periods of life. With respect to age, the disease is rare before twenty-two years, and increases in frequency with the increase of age from twenty-two years upwards. It occurs most often during the cold season of the year, and according to the observations of Sarmani the hours from three to five o'clock in the afternoon, and two to four in the morning, are those in which the greatest number of cases occur.” (*The Home Hand-book of Domestic Hygiene and Rational Medicine* by Dr. J. H. Kellogg, p. 1080.)

as to result in uniformity. Where the more similar conditions predominate, they produce average instances ; where dissimilar conditions occur, but in such a way as to cancel one another, the average again results ; where unusual conditions occur without cancelling, extraordinary instances appear. Hence, if the average height of a nation is 5 ft. 6 in., most men will be about that size ; men of 5 ft. and 6 ft. will be rare, and those of 4 ft. 6 in. and 6 ft. 6 in. rarer still ; whilst limits to height in both directions seem to be fixed by the nature of things." (*Logic*, p. 293.) These 'deviations' or 'errors' (as they have sometimes been called) are evidently less numerous as we come to extreme cases, since a special combination of circumstances, prominently interfering with the operation of the central law governing a type, is comparatively rare indeed.

The question of 'deviations' or 'errors' brings us to what is known as the *Personal Equation*. Every individual has in him a common nature belonging to the other members of his species, and also certain features, which are peculiar to himself. Among these features, again, we find some which are comparatively constant, such as the influence of personal character or predominant tendency, and some which are highly variable, such as the influence of passing desires, inclinations, and dispositions. Now, in the case of calculations on common data, we naturally expect agreement among different individuals owing to the presence of a common rational nature in all of them. But

Personal Equation indicates the average tendency in an individual to depart from the normal estimate of a class of facts.

It is due to the influence of personal character.

there are sources also of variation owing to personal differences. Among such differences, we find certain fixed tendencies in different individuals which are the expression of personal character. Thus, some may be generally disposed to make mistakes about dates ; some, about places ; and some, about names. This influence of personal character which gives a bias to one's calculations in a certain direction is known as his personal equation. "Each Man," writes Mr. Read, "has a certain cast of mind, character, physique, giving a distinctive turn to all his actions even when he tries to be normal. In every employment this determines his Personal Equation, or average deviation from the normal. The term Personal Equation is used chiefly in connection with scientific observation, as in Astronomy. Each observer is liable to be a little wrong, and this error has to be allowed for and his observations corrected accordingly."* (*Logic*, pp. 294-295).

Statistics often suggest laws.

§ 4. Importance of Statistics. From the above account it is clear that statistics are of material help in settling questions of probability and in determining also the character of average in any case. When we cannot directly discover

* The term 'personal equation' was first used in Astronomy. In 1795 the presence of an error in the observations of transits was detected in the case of a Greenwich observer, who was dismissed in consequence. Its existence as a general feature of the work of all observers was noticed by Bessel and others in the beginning of the last century. Personal equation thus indicates "An error made by a person in a measurement or exact observation of any kind, which is peculiar to himself, and which must therefore be determined and allowed for when the precise result of the observation or measurement is to be derived." (Professor Newcomb.)

the causal link in complex cases, we have to surmise it by weighing evidence gathered from a careful examination of facts. And if all facts of a class do not reveal a uniform relation or law, discoverable by inductive generalization, we are constrained to study a good number of them in a methodical way with the hope of discovering some obscure relation which would otherwise escape our notice. Herein lies the place of statistics* which systematically collect facts relating to a field of inquiry. "In proportion," writes Sigwart, "as we are unable to reduce the particular event to rules and laws, the numeration of particular objects becomes the only means of obtaining comprehensive propositions about that which is, for our knowledge, fortuitous ; as soon as the laws are found, statistical numeration ceases to be of interest. There was some interest in counting how many eclipses of the moon and sun took place year by year, so long as they occurred unexpectedly and inexplicably ; since the rule has been found according to which they occur, and can be calculated for centuries past and to come, that interest has vanished. But we still count how many thunder-storms and hail-storms occur at a given place, or within a given district, how many persons die, and how many bushels of fruit a given area produces, because we are not in a position to calculate these events from their conditions." (*Logic*, Eng. Trans., II, p. 483.)

Statistics methodically collect facts by counting in a field of inquiry.

* Statistics have been defined by Rümelin as "the results obtained in any field of reality by methods of counting."

Statistics are useful in complex cases which do not directly reveal their laws.

Statistical enumeration, to be useful, must be systematic and comparative by reference to the sub-divisions of the class of facts we are studying.

Illustrations.

The employment of the comparative method, tends to the discovery of laws.

Induction

Statistics, then, are employed (1) when the facts we are studying are complex and (2) when these do not directly reveal a general relation or law governing them. But, in order that statistics may be of any use, there should be methodical, and not mere random, enumeration. As in an inductive inquiry our observation and experiment must be regulated by a guiding hypothesis in order that they may help us in the discovery of a causal link, so in statistical enumeration we must sub-divide the field of our inquiry into as many groups as possible quite in a logical or systematic way and then by comparing the statistics of the different groups we should try to gather any causal relation lurking in them. Thus, to determine the longevity of a particular race or nation we may gather the statistics of its members grouped under certain heads—such as age, sex, habits, education, profession, *etc.*—so that by eliminating the peculiarities found in particular sections we may arrive at a fair estimate of the average. Similarly, to determine the havoc wrought by malaria, we gather from various districts the statistics of deaths and sufferings of people varying in constitution, customs, habits, tastes, *etc.* Thus, statistical investigation, to be fruitful, should be well-regulated and not diffused or aimless. Methodical and classified enumeration by reference to sub-divisions affords room for the employment of the comparative method, which is more likely to suggest a causal link than the mere random numerical study of a whole class in its vague and indefinite generality. Both in Induc-

tion and Statistics our observation, analysis and comparison should be guided by a hypothesis in order that these may be means of real discovery.

The advantages of statistical enumeration are briefly the following :—(1) It gives us a comparatively exact and comprehensive grasp of facts, as distinguished from the vague and narrow experiences of ordinary life. (2) It thus enables us to discover a causal connection suggested by quantitative correspondence (*e. g.*, the number of births or deaths and the favourable or unfavourable condition of climate, weather, surroundings, or provisions), ignorance of which would obscure the relation. We should remember here that statistical uniformities afford a basis only for empirical generalizations. [*Vide* Chap. XXIII, § 3 and § 4.] (3) It, accordingly, helps us in forming an idea of the average, which furnishes a ground for probable conclusions in the future, as explained in the last section.

Owing to these advantages, statistics are extensively employed in various departments in modern times,—specially as it is often difficult directly to arrive at inductive generalizations owing to the complexity of materials in many cases. A cue furnished by statistical correspondence usually supplies a ground for subsequent inductive investigations, leading at times to unforeseen discoveries. And here we find an important difference between ancient and modern science : “The extent to which the statistical method prevails, and everything is counted,” ob-

and statistics should be regulated by a hypothesis.

Advantages of statistics

(1) They enable us to have a precise and comprehensive estimate of acts.

(2) They suggest empirical laws.

(3) They help us in forming an idea of the average.

Modern science generally makes an extensive use of statistics.

serves Professor Sigwart, "is another instance of the fundamental difference between ancient and modern science." (*Logic*, I, p. 286.)

Both Induction and Probability rest on observation or experience: but while the former has to do with universal propositions, based on uniform experience, the latter has to do with particular propositions, based on variable experience.

§ 5. Probability and Induction. Probability implies, as we have seen, (1) subjective conviction and (2) experience giving rise to it. That probability may be of any service to Inductive Logic, it must be based on observation or experience. In fact, probable generalizations are also inductively arrived at. The difference between Induction and Probability lies in the fact that, though based on observation or experience, the former has to do with universal propositions or generalizations without any exception, while the latter has to do with particular propositions or approximate generalizations. It has been said by some that Induction itself is based on Probability. When, for example, it is said that there is the succession of day and night it is not an absolute certainty. The conditions of the universe are numerous and inscrutable; and if some of these change, the so-called Inductive generalizations, which are based on the existing order of things, will also be affected. Thus, there may be, under changed circumstances, a perpetual day or a perpetual night.

It is sometimes contended that Induction, being more or less uncertain, is itself based on Probability.

But this view is not tenable. It rests on an ambiguous use of the term 'certainty.'

If we examine this position with a little care, we find that it is based on an ambiguous meaning of 'certainty.' Certainty may mean (1) absolute certainty or (2) rational certainty as justified by a comprehensive view of the existing order of things. (1) If probability means less than absolute certainty,

then, no doubt, everything is probable ; and induction also is so. But (2) if probability means less than rational certainty, then inductive generalizations can never be said to be probable, for they are certain within reasonable limits. In fact, Probability, as we have seen, rests on Induction ; and not Induction, on Probability. (*Vide* § 3.) As Mr. Bosanquet says, "Ultimately the calculus of chances may be said to rest on the same principle as Induction, in so far as the repetition of examples derives its force from the (unspecified) variety of contexts through which this repetition shows a certain result to be persistent. But in such a calculus the presumption from recurrence in such a variety of contexts is only estimated, and not analysed." (*Essentials of Logic*, foot-note, p. 144.)

Probability
rather rests
on Induction.

§ 6. Logical Grounds of Probability.

The Inductive evidence of Probability may rest (1) either on direct statistics, or (2) on computation determining an effect by reference to the laws of the causes operating for and against its production, when they are known, or (3) on a combination of these two methods, implying a verification of calculation by statistics. Of these three methods the third is comparatively the most certain, and the first is the most precarious. Direct statistics can give but an empirical law, the application of which to definite instances yields highly uncertain results. (*Vide* Chap. XXIII, § 5 and Chap. XXX, § 6.) The calculation of Probability leads to the consideration of Average : Average instances, as

The inductive
evidence of
probability
rests either
(1) on
statistics,
or (2) on
computation,
or (3) on
both.

Of these three
methods, the
last is the
most secure.

we have seen, conform more to the rule of Probability, while extremes deviate from it. It should be remembered in this connection that Probability can give rise to subjective assurance, without any corresponding objective certainty, at least so far as individual instances are concerned. (*Vide* § 3.)

The principle
for detecting
a causal
connection by
Probability.

Causal connection is estimated in Probability by the following principle—*Determine the positive frequency of the phenomena themselves, and how great frequency of coincidence must follow from that, on the assumption that there is neither connection nor repugnance. If there be a greater frequency, there is connection ; if a less, repugnance.* If, for example, we imagine a person as able to take his walk by the river-side at any time between 6 A. M. and 6 P. M., and (a) if we observe him taking a walk at any particular hour once in every twelve days, we naturally attribute the connection to chance. (b) If on the other hand, we find him taking a walk at 6 P. M. once in three or six days, instead of once in twelve, we suspect that there is a causal connection between that hour and his walk : in other words, we infer that the person prefers taking a walk at that time. (c) If, again, we find the person taking a walk at 12 (mid-day) once in 30 days, instead of once in 12, we naturally conclude that there is a repugnance : in other words, we suspect that the person is disinclined to take his walk at that time. We suspect a causal link here, but it works in the opposite direction as a deterrent. Let us now consider the rules of probability which justify definite conclusions in

An
illustration.

different cases. Let us consider them in distinct sections.

This Rules of Probability.

§ 7. Rule for Estimating the Concurrence of Two Independent Events. *If two events are quite independent, having neither connection nor repugnance, the probability of their concurrence is measured by the product of the fractions representing their separate probabilities.* If A

Rule for determining the probability of the concurrence of two independent events.

occurs once in 5 times and B once in 4, then the probability of their coincidence is measured by the product of the two fractions $\frac{1}{5}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$, *vis.*, $\frac{1}{20}$. The rule may be explained thus:—If we suppose A and B to be both constant, then they are always found together. If, however, A be constant while B is found only once in two cases, then the probability of their concurrence is reduced to $\frac{1}{2}$. If, again, B happens once in three cases or once in four (A remaining constant), then the probability of their coincidence becomes $\frac{1}{3}$ or $\frac{1}{4}$. If we now suppose A also varying, then the chance of coincidence is further diminished. If, for example, A happens once in three cases, while B once in two, then the probability of their coincidence would be $\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{1}{6}$. Similarly, if A occurs once in 5 times and B once in 4, the probability of their concurrence is measured by $\frac{1}{5} \times \frac{1}{4}$, *i. e.*, $\frac{1}{20}$. The rule may be illustrated by concrete examples. Suppose I am always in my room, and another gentleman is also constantly there. Then, evidently, both of us are always together. But, if the gentleman goes out and comes in every other hour alternately, then we shall be together only half the previous

Illustrations.

number of times. If the previous number (indicating our always being together) be represented by the integer 1, then the subsequent number should be represented by the fraction $\frac{1}{2}$. Suppose, again, that I also, instead of being always in the room, go out and come in every third hour, then the chance of our being together would still more be diminished to the extent of one-third of the preceding number. In other words, the probability in that case would come down to $\frac{1}{3}$ of $\frac{1}{2}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{1}{6}$. If, similarly, it be known that 2 men in every 5 are diligent and 3 men in every 7 are benevolent, then the probability of a man being both diligent and benevolent is $\frac{2}{5} \times \frac{3}{7}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{6}{35}$; *i.e.*, out of 35 men, 6 persons are likely to be both diligent and benevolent. If, likewise, 4 days in 5 are bright and 3 days in 8 are dry, then the probability of their coincidence is $\frac{4}{5} \times \frac{3}{8}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{3}{10}$. In other words, out of ten days, 3 days are likely to be both bright and dry.

Rule for determining the probability of the occurrence of one or other of two events that cannot concur.

Illustrations.

§ 8. Rule for Determining the Occurrence of Either of Two Inconsistent Events. *If two events cannot possibly concur, the probability of the occurrence of either of them is measured by the sum of the separate probabilities.* If, out of every 5 mangoes, 2 are sweet, and out of every 7, 3 are sour, then, out of 35 mangoes, there are altogether 29 which are either sweet or sour. This is clear from the following calculation :—Out of 35 mangoes, the number which is sweet is 14 (*i.e.*, $\frac{2}{5}$ of 35), and the number which is sour is 15 (*i.e.*, $\frac{3}{7}$ of 35).

Thus, altogether there are $14 + 15$, *i.e.*, 29 mangoes which are either sweet or sour; and this is determined by adding together the two fractions representing the separate probabilities (*vis.*, $\frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}$ or $\frac{3}{3}$). Similarly, "If one man in ten is over six feet, and one in twelve under five; then in a large number, say 120,000, there will be about 12,000 over-six-feet men, and about 10,000 under-five-feet men; the sum of the two 22,000, will represent the number of such as are one kind or the other." (Bain, *Induction*, p. 93.) If, likewise, a coin when tossed up presents the head and the tail uppermost equal number of times, then the probability of each is $\frac{1}{2}$. The number of cases, therefore, in which either the head or the tail is presented is the total number of throws. In these cases it is evident that a mango cannot be both sweet and sour, an individual cannot at once be over six feet and under five, nor can a coin simultaneously present both the head and the tail.

§ 9. Rule for Estimating Deterioration of Testimony. *When testimony passes from one person to another, it is weakened; and the value of testimony in such a case is determined by the product of the fractions representing the separate probabilities.* For want of proper comprehension, defects of memory, tendency to exaggeration, or mendacity, incorrect accounts of events are at times given by individuals noticing them. When, however, events are not directly observed, but are learnt at second-hand and then reported, the chances of error are increased; and the more

Rule for determining the deterioration of testimony as it passes from one person to another.

Illustrations.

numerous the persons through whom a testimony passes, the weaker does it become. Hence what is called 'hearsay evidence'—*i.e.*, evidence based not on direct observation, but on indirect testimony or what has been heard—is not admissible in courts of law. When B, for example, reports what he has learnt from A, the value of testimony evidently suffers. If the veracity of A is measured by $\frac{4}{5}$ (*i.e.*, if he speaks truth four times in five) and that of B by $\frac{2}{3}$ (*i.e.*, if he speaks truth twice in three cases), then the value of B's testimony is determined by the product of the two fractions $\frac{4}{5}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$, *i.e.*, by $\frac{8}{15}$. This can easily be explained thus:—Out of 15 instances, A speaks truth 12 times (*vis.*, $\frac{4}{5}$ of 15). Three cases out of 15 are thus misrepresented by A and so necessarily reported amiss by B. Of the 12 instances of truth learnt from A by B, he would be correct only in 8, *i.e.*, two-thirds (which is the measure of his veracity) of 12. Thus, out of 15 instances, B is expected to be correct only in 8, when he reports what he has learnt from A. We see, then, that while the value of A's evidence is four-fifths, that of B's is eight-fifteenths or a little more than half. If, now, another individual C, whose veracity is $\frac{1}{2}$ reports what he has learnt from B (B having got his information from A), then the evidence is weakened to $\frac{8}{15} \times \frac{1}{2}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{4}{15}$. In such a case, there is greater reason to disbelieve C than to believe him, for the chance of his report being true is only 4 against 11. When testimony thus passes from generation to generation, as in the case of tradition,

its value evidently suffers to a great extent ; and this explains, to a certain extent at least, our faith in the good old time or in the golden age.

§ 10. Rule for Determining the Cogency of Cumulative Testimony. *When several independent events conspire to support another, then the probability in its favour is measured by subtracting from unity the product of the improbabilities of these events.* It is evident, when several *independent* circumstances or witnesses support a fact, the probability in its favour is strengthened : and so the rule of multiplying their probabilities will not do in such a case, as the product would then be less than each separate fraction and would thus indicate a decrease, instead of an increase, of probability. With every additional evidence, the *improbability* diminishes ; and hence the decrease of *improbability* is measured by multiplying together the fractions representing the separate *improbabilities*. We can thus determine the degree of *probability* in favour of the event by subtracting from unity (which represents absolute certainty) the product of the different *improbabilities*. If, for example, the reliability of two *independent* witnesses, A and B, be represented by $\frac{5}{8}$ and $\frac{4}{5}$, then their unreliability will be represented by $\frac{1}{8}$ and $\frac{1}{5}$ respectively. The combined unreliability of two such witnesses would, therefore, be $\frac{1}{8} \times \frac{1}{5}$ or $\frac{1}{40}$. The cumulative effect of their separate testimonies would accordingly be $1 - \frac{1}{40}$ or $\frac{39}{40}$, *i.e.*, 29 for and 1 against. It may be further explained thus : out of 30 cases, A will be right 25 times, (*viz.*, $\frac{5}{8}$ of 30),

Rule for determining the value of cumulative evidence.

Illustrations.

and in the remaining 5 times of 30, B will be right 4 times (*i.e.*, $\frac{4}{5}$ of 5). Thus, altogether both A and B will be right 29 times in 30. Similarly, if the probabilities in favour of three independent witnesses or circumstances be represented by $\frac{2}{3}$, $\frac{2}{3}$, and $\frac{1}{2}$, then their separate improbabilities are represented by $\frac{1}{3}$, $\frac{1}{3}$, and $\frac{1}{2}$ respectively. The concurrence of these improbabilities is measured by their product, *vis.*, by $\frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{3} \times \frac{1}{2}$, *i.e.*, $\frac{1}{18}$. The probability, therefore, in favour of the fact supported by such *independent* witnesses or circumstances is $1 - \frac{1}{18}$ or $\frac{17}{18}$. In other words, the odds in favour of it are 17 to 1. It may be mentioned in this connection that the value of analogical evidence as well as of circumstantial evidence is measured by this rule. In the case of analogical evidence, we are to determine the number of the points of community as well as the number of the points of difference and also the relative importance of each of these points (*Vide* Chap. XXII, §4); and then we are to estimate the strength of the analogical inference by subtracting from unity the product of the separate improbabilities. In the case of circumstantial evidence we should proceed in a like manner, giving each circumstance its due weight and then subtracting from unity the product of the different improbabilities. As circumstantial evidence occupies a very prominent place in the practical affairs of life, let us devote a separate section to its exposition and illustration.

The value of analogical and of circumstantial evidence is determined by this rule.

Evidence is a matter of fact tending to prove a

§ 11. Circumstantial Evidence. Evidence may be said to be any matter of fact which goes to support a view or proposition. It is

generally taken to be of two forms—direct and indirect or circumstantial. The difference between the two forms of evidence is well indicated by Wills: "Circumstantial evidence is of a nature identically the same with direct evidence; the distinction is, that by Direct Evidence is intended evidence which applies directly to the fact which forms the subject of inquiry, the *factum probandum* [the fact to be proved]; Circumstantial Evidence is equally direct in its nature, but, as its name imports, it is direct evidence of a minor fact or facts, incidental to or usually connected with some other fact as its accident, and from which such other fact is therefore inferred. A witness deposes that he saw A inflict on B a wound, of which he instantly died; this is a case of direct evidence. B dies of poisoning; A is proved to have had malice and uttered threats against him and to have clandestinely purchased poison, wrapped in a particular paper, and of the same kind as that which has caused death; the paper is found in his secret drawer, and the poison gone. The *evidence* of these facts is *direct*; the facts themselves are *indirect* and *circumstantial*, as applicable to the inquiry whether a murder has been committed, and whether it was committed by A." (*An Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence*, pp. 16-17.)

position.
It is either
direct or
indirect.

Character of
circumstan-
tial evidence.

As direct evidence generally rests on the testimony of the senses, it can scarcely be disputed, unless it is due to misapprehension or misrepresentation. Indirect or circumstantial evidence, however,

Direct
evidence,
resting on
the testimony
of the senses,
cannot be
disputed.

of authority in its favour, this illustration of violent presumption has been made the subject of much and deserved observation. If the authors just quoted mean to say, as their words imply, that there is no possible mode of reconciling the above facts with the innocence of the man seen coming out of the house, the proposition is monstrous! Any of the following hypotheses will reconcile them, and probably others might be suggested. First, the deceased, with the intention of committing suicide, might have plunged the sword into his own body; the accused not being in time to prevent him, drew out the sword, and so ran out, through confusion of mind, for surgical assistance. Second, the deceased and the accused might have both worn swords; the deceased, in a fit of passion, attacked the accused; the accused, being close to the wall, had no retreat, and had just time enough to draw his sword, in the hope of keeping off the deceased, who, not seeing the sword in time, ran upon it, and so was killed. Third, the deceased may in fact have been murdered, and the real murderer may have escaped, leaving a sword sticking in or lying near the body, and the accused coming in might have seized the sword and run out to give the alarm. Fourth, the sword may have been originally a weapon of attack on the accused by the deceased, and wrenched from, and afterwards turned against him by the accused, under danger of attack on his life by pistol or otherwise." (Best, *Principles of the Law of Evidence*, 4th Ed., pp. 427-429.)

The above illustration brings out how circumstantial evidence, which at first sight may seem to be strong, may be weakened on close examination and cool reflection. The following considerations are mentioned by Wills as generally strengthening the force of this form of evidence :—"If it be proved that a party charged with crime has been placed in circumstances which commonly operate as inducements to commit the act in question,—that he has so far yielded to the operation of those inducements as to have manifested the disposition to commit the particular crime,—that he has possessed the requisite means and opportunities of effecting the object of his wishes—that recently after the commission of the act he has become possessed of the fruits or other consequential advantages of the crime,—if he be identified with the *corpus delicti* by any conclusive mechanical circumstances, as by the impressions of his footsteps, or the discovery of any article of his apparel or property at or near the scene of the crime,—if there be relevant appearances of suspicion connected with his conduct, person, or dress, and such as he might reasonably be presumed to be able, if innocent, to account for, but which, nevertheless, he cannot or will not explain,—if, being put upon his defence *recently* after the crime, under strong circumstances of adverse presumption, he cannot show where he was at the time of its commission,—if he attempt to evade the force of those circumstances of presumption by false or incredible pretences, or by endeavours to evade or pervert the course of justice,—the concurrence of

Circumstances determining the force of circumstantial evidence.

all or of many of these cogent circumstances, inconsistent with the supposition of his innocence and unopposed by facts leading to a counter presumption, naturally, reasonably, and satisfactorily establishes the moral certainty of his guilt,—if not with the same kind of assurance as if he had been seen to commit the deed, at least with all the assurance which the nature of the case and the vast majority of human actions admit.” (*Op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.)

Laplace's theorem for the application of the Doctrine of Chances to the inductive determination of causes.

§ 12. **The Application of the Theory of Probabilities to the Inductive Determination of Causes.** It is thus explained and illustrated by Mill who borrows it from Laplace : ‘Given an effect to be accounted for, and there being several causes that might have produced it, but of whose presence in the particular case nothing is known ; the probability that the effect is produced by any one of these causes *is as the antecedent probability of the cause, multiplied by the probability that the cause, if it existed, would have produced the given effect.*’ If, for example, an effect E might be produced by either X or Y, then the likelihood of its being produced by either of them is determined by the product of their relative frequency and relative efficiency. Three cases may be supposed to establish this position :—

Three cases.

(1) Let us imagine first that both X and Y are equally frequent, while X is doubly potent or efficient. Then, on a particular occasion, the chance of E being produced by X is double the chance of its being produced by Y. And

this rule, however uncertain with regard to an individual instance, is generally true in a large number of cases. To take a concrete case. Suppose that on any occasion, deaths are produced by two diseases, plague and small-pox, and that they are equally frequent, though plague is twice as fatal as small-pox. Then, on an average, the number of deaths produced by plague would be twice as large as that produced by small-pox. And, with regard to any particular case, we may say that the chance of its being due to plague, as distinguished from small-pox, is as 2 to 1. (*Vide* § 3.)

(2) If, on the other hand, we imagine that both X and Y are equally potent, but Y is doubly frequent, then on any occasion, the chance of E being produced by Y is double the chance of its being produced by X. This rule is true also in average cases. If, in the concrete example given above, we suppose both plague and small-pox to be equally fatal, but the small-pox cases to be twice as many as those of plague, then, on an average, the number of deaths from small-pox would be twice as large as that from plague; and, with regard to any particular case of death, the chance of its being due to small-pox would be represented by the proportion 2 : 1.

(3) If we suppose X to be doubly frequent as well as efficient, then the chance of its producing E on any occasion will be measured by the product of the two proportions, namely, 2 : 1 and 2 : 1. In other words, the chance of E being produced by

X will be measured by 4 : 1. This is the measure of average cases. If, in the above concrete example, we suppose plague to be doubly fatal while small-pox thrice as frequent, then, on an average, the proportion of deaths from these two causes would be measured by the product of the two proportions 2 : 1 and 1 : 3, *i. e.*, by 2 : 3 ; and in any particular case of death, the chance of its being due to plague as against small-pox would be as 2 : 3.

By this theorem we may distinguish between the operation of law and that of chance in any case.

The above principle may be applied to distinguish *casual* coincidences from *causal* connections or those that result from law. The given fact may have originated either in an accidental conjunction of agencies or in a law of nature. The probabilities, therefore, that the fact originated in these two modes are determined by their relative frequency multiplied by their relative efficiency. But the peculiar combination of accidental circumstances, if it occurred, would be as much potent as a real law of nature. The probabilities, therefore, are determined by their relative frequency, which may be estimated by the Inductive Methods in the case of a law of nature, and by the calculation of Probabilities in the case of an accidental combination of agencies. (*Vide* Mill's *System of Logic*, BK. III, Chap. XVIII, § 5 and § 6.)

Safeguards against an improper use of Probability.

§ 13. Cautions against an Improper Use of Probability. Mr. Read lays down four principal cautions with regard to the use of probabilities :—“(1) Not to make a pedantic parade of numerical probability, where the numbers have

not been ascertained; (2) not to trust to our feeling of what is likely, if statistics can be obtained; (3) not to apply an average probability to special classes or individuals without inquiring whether they correspond to the average type; and (4) not to trust to the empirical probability of events, if their causes can be discovered and made the basis of reasoning which the empirical probability may be used to verify." (*Logic*, pp. 298-299.)

It may be remarked in this connection that probability or approximate generalization is often an instrument of false reasoning in the hands of interested persons, such as advocates, orators, *etc.* By minimizing or excluding one set of circumstances, prominence is given to the other: negative instances may be suppressed and positive ones brought into relief, or *vice versa*. An advocate, for example, in defending his client, may conceal or minimize the circumstances leading to conviction; and thus, the circumstances favouring acquittal are made prominent. His client may thus be proved to be innocent, when really he may be the reverse.

Probability is often misapplied to distort evidence.

§ 14. Exercises.

1. State precisely what is meant by Probability and by Probable Reasoning. How can the degree of the Probability of propositions be expressed?
2. Distinguish between Chance and Probability, and determine the grounds of each.
3. Explain and discuss the doctrine that Induction is based upon the Theory of Probability.
4. Explain the Theory of Probability and discuss its relation to Induction.

5. What do you understand by 'the average', and 'the personal equation'? Indicate their importance in the Theory of Probability.

6. What are the logical grounds for an estimate of Probability? Explain and illustrate the rule for estimating the value of traditional evidence.

7. What do you understand by Evidence? What are its different forms? Are they equally reliable?

8. What is meant by Circumstantial Evidence? State and explain the rule for estimating its value. Mention the circumstances which go to strengthen it.

9. Explain and illustrate the application of the Theory of Probabilities to the inductive determination of causes.

10. "Approximate generalizations give an opening to the bias of the feelings, and to the arts of a sophistical reasoner." How?

11. Mention the cautions to be observed to avoid an improper use of Probability.

12. What is meant by Chance? Give examples. How is it eliminated?

13. Give, with examples, the rules for the calculation of probabilities.

14. What is Probable Reasoning? Discuss the relation of Probability to Induction. State and illustrate the rules for the computation of probabilities.

15. Point out the importance of Statistics and their bearing on the Theory of Probability.

CHAPTER XXII.

PROCESSES ALLIED TO SCIENTIFIC INDUCTION.

§ 1. Induction by Simple Enumeration.

We have read that similarity underlies every form of inference ; and this is pre-eminently illustrated in the case of generalizations, whether hasty or careful. The value of a true inductive generalization rests on the careful examination of materials by the Inductive tests, without which a generalization becomes more or less precarious. In the case of Induction by Simple Enumeration an attempt is made to establish a general proposition on the strength of uncontradicted experience. This, as we have seen, is the popular form of generalization. Common people never take the trouble of carefully examining cases before arriving at general propositions ; they merely observe certain cases, having some peculiarity or feature, and hastily conclude therefrom that all like cases are characterised by the same peculiarity or feature. This tendency to hasty generalization is specially strong in the untutored mind. Persons trained to scientific inquiry or logical examination take the trouble of carefully sifting the materials by the logical methods before establishing a general truth. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 7 and Chap. XVIII, § 2.)

Induction by
Simple
Enumeration
rests on mere
uncontra-
dicted
experience.

Induction by Simple Enumeration is quite in

harmony with the general lethargy and passive attitude of the mind. The employment of the Inductive Canons is more or less laborious and implies an intelligent manipulation of materials. The great merit of Bacon is to have pointed out the superiority of active manipulation of materials to their mere passive contemplation. According to him, the active interrogation of Nature by Experiment is always an essential condition of inductive generalization.

It is usually
precarious ;

but its
strength
increases with
the multi-
plication of
experience.

It is apparent from the preceding remarks that Induction by Simple Enumeration is not so conclusive as Scientific Induction. In the former, the causal connection is not proved by laborious research ; it is merely assumed. When, therefore, a generalization is reached without adequate examination, it is of an uncertain character. But certainty of this form of Induction increases as the chances of exception decrease. In fact, the ultimate laws of Nature are proved finally by Induction by Simple Enumeration, which underlies what Bain calls Universal Agreement through all Nature. According to empiricists, the truth even of the Law of Causation or of the Uniformity of Nature is proved in this way. Such a law, they say, is believed to be certain because no exception has hitherto been noticed in its operation and the chances of exception are few. Had there been any exception, it is urged, it must have been known to some individual or individuals at some time or place ; but the very fact that no exception has hitherto been found creates a presumption in favour.

of the universal truth of the Law. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 2 and Chap. XVII, § 3.) The value of this form of Induction depends, as Fowler points out, on "(1) the number of positive instances which have occurred to us ; (2) the likelihood, if there be any negative instances, of our having met with them." And, as he observes, "The first of these considerations deserves little weight, unless supported by the other." (*Inductive Logic*, p. 207.)

Its value is determined by the positive and negative instances and by the degree and extent of knowledge in any sphere.

§ 2. Mathematical Induction. We considered in Chapter XV, § 5, certain forms of apparent Induction which are really deductive in character. We have seen that the demonstrations of Euclid and the questions of identity to establish a minor have sometimes been regarded as Inductive. But these forms of reasoning are essentially deductive, since they follow from general principles, previously known. Nevertheless, there are some forms of mathematical reasoning which may be regarded as Inductive.

Geometrical reasoning, as we have seen, is deductive ; but

When, for example, we observe that a series of odd numbers, added together from the beginning, gives a sum which is equal to the square of the number of odd numbers in the series, then the result is first established by reference to individual instances. Numerous instances of such observation lead us to generalize the law, that the sum of the odd numbers is equal to the square of the number of terms in the series.

the law of a series in mathematics, when proved in innumerable cases, may be taken to illustrate Induction by Simple Enumeration.

$$\text{Thus, } 1 + 3 = 2^2,$$

$$1 + 3 + 5 = 3^2,$$

$$1 + 3 + 5 + 7 = 4^2,$$

$$1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 = 5^2,$$

$$1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + 9 + 11 = 6^2.$$

If we take n number of odd numbers, the sum would be—

$$1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + \cdots + (2n - 1) = n^2.$$

By adding $2n + 1$ (which represents the next odd number) to each side of the equation, we get

$$1 + 3 + 5 + 7 + \cdots + (2n - 1) + (2n + 1) = n^2 + 2n + 1 \\ = (n + 1)^2.$$

Thus, the law being true for n terms, it is proved to be true also for $n + 1$ terms ; and so on we can proceed. Hence, the law may be extended to cover all similar cases.

This argument cannot be called strictly inductive, in as much as we do not employ the inductive canons to arrive at the result. But though such a form of Induction falls short of Scientific Induction, yet it may be regarded as a form of Induction by Simple Enumeration. The inference evidently is not so certain as what we find in Scientific Induction, where the law of causation is taken as the formal ground. But, still, the inference is to a great extent certain, in as much as no exception to the law has hitherto been noticed ; and had there been any, it would have been known to some persons somewhere. Thus, such mathematical inductions approach to a great extent the certainty of the ultimate laws of nature proved by Universal Agreement. The rule of the Binomial

* The first odd number is $2 - 1$; the second, $2 \times 2 - 1$; the third, $2 \times 3 - 1$; the 4th, $2 \times 4 - 1$; and so the n th is $2n - 1$; and the $(n + 1)$ th is $2(n + 1) - 1$, i. e., $2n + 1$.

Theorem may also be similarly viewed. Geometrical truths reached by an examination of many individual instances illustrate likewise this form of Induction. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 5 and *Elements of Psychology*, Chap. XIII, § 10.)

§ 3. **Analogy.** Analogy may be defined as a kind of probable reasoning in which we infer that things resembling each other in certain respects resemble also in other respects, though no causal connection is known to exist between the points of resemblance and the inferred quality or qualities. In it we rely upon some such vague notion of uniformity as that "things alike in some respects are also alike in others." When, for example, we observe that the planet Mars has a similar atmosphere to that of the earth and that there is a like distribution of land and water, of heat and cold, *etc.*, we conclude by Analogy that Mars also may be inhabited by beings like what we find on earth. Every argument rests on similarity : but in Analogy there is an imperfect or inadequate similarity among the data to justify a result ; perfect similarity, as we have seen, implies identity of essence, justifying conclusive proof. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 4.) Analogy is called by Gotama *Upamanam* (उपमानम्) from *Upama* (उपमा) resemblance.

Analogy defined.

Analogy is based on imperfect similarity.

Points of difference between Induction and Analogy :

(1) The principal difference between Induction and Analogy lies in the fact that in the former a (causal) connection is known to exist between the inferred property or feature and the ground of inference, while in the latter no such connection is

(1) Induction is based on causal connection, while Analogy is not so.

known to exist. If, for example, we observe two objects X and Y and, finding that they resemble in a and b , we conclude that they resemble also in c , which is found in X , the argument is inductive or analogical, according as a causal connection is known or not known to exist between a and b on one side and c on the other. The one is based on the uniformity of causation, while the other on that of mere co-existence. And this explains why induction is comparatively certain, while analogy is only more or less probable. Since in analogical argument no connection is known to exist between the inferred property and the data, we can never state as the principle of reasoning a general proposition, which we virtually do in induction.

(2) In Induction we pass from cases to a law, while in Analogy from instance to instance.

(2) In Induction we proceed from individual instances to a general law,* but in Analogy we proceed from particular to particular, without the help of a general law.*

* Analogy is often used when there are only two things, the one furnishing the ground of inference and the other, its subject. We may thus infer that Venus or Mars is inhabited by comparing it with our own globe; or we may think that a definite line of inquiry which succeeded in one case will succeed in another, owing to its great resemblance with the other. In the case of Induction, on the other hand, we pass from several instances to a general law justified by all of them. In analogy the denotation is small but the connotation is large, for without many points of similarity we are not justified in proceeding from one case to another; while, in Induction, the denotation is wide, but the connotation narrow, since it ordinarily aims at establishing a relation between two qualities or features. "Induction", says Bowen, "proceeds upon the principle, that *what certainly belongs to many Individuals of the same kind, also probably belongs to all the other individuals of that kind*; the principle of Analogy is, that, *if two things agree in many respects, they probably agree also in some other respect*. Because *some one quality exists in many things, therefore it exists in all of the same kind*; that is Induction. Because *many qualities in this are*

(3) In Induction we employ the Experimental Methods to be sure of the causal connection, which we try to generalize. In Analogy, on the other hand, we proceed from one case to another merely on the ground of some points of similarity, without the application of any Inductive Test.

(3) In Induction we employ the Experimental Methods, while in Analogy we do not.

Analogy has sometimes been described as "similarity in relations." A wave of water, for example, has been likened to the undulation of air. This may be expressed thus, 'a wave is to water, as an undulation is to air.' Similarly, it may be said that a sovereign is to his subjects, what the head of a family is to its members. But this account of Analogy is at best a description; it does not explain the essential character of analogical argument. It is too vague to be of any practical value.*

The description of Analogy as 'similarity in relations' is not precise.

§ 4. Strength of Analogical Argument.

Analogical argument being based on imperfect similarity is necessarily of a probable character. As we are not aware of a causal connection be-

Analogical argument is only probable,

the same as in that, therefore *one* other quality in this resembles that; this is Analogy. In other words, induction concludes from *one in many* to *the others*, by way of Extension; Analogy, from *many in one* to *the others*, by way of Intension." (*Logic*, p. 381.)

* Analogy (Gr. *analogia*—*ana*, according to, and *logos*, ratio, proportion) was originally used by Aristotle to express equality of ratios. It thus corresponds to what is known as Proportion in arithmetic. Thus 3 : 6 :: 12 : 24 ; or, as health : the body :: virtue : the soul. Hence, in ordinary discourse, we speak of analogy when we have before us two pairs of things and there is resemblance between their relations. Whately evidently had this meaning in view when he defined Analogy as "resemblance of *ratios* or relations." (*Logic*, p. 123.) The modern sense of the term, though comparatively loose, is connected with its original sense: whenever we draw an inference by analogy, we do so owing to the identity or similarity of relation between the known and unknown properties in the two cases.

the degree of probability being determined by the number and importance of the points of similarity

as well as by the proportion of known to unknown qualities.

tween the inferred quality and the data, we can never be certain that the latter being present, the former must be so also. Though analogical argument is probable in character, yet the degree of probability is not always the same. *The force of analogical argument depends on the number and importance of the points of similarity, as distinguished from the points of difference.* As Dr. Bosanquet puts it, in analogy we must *weigh* the points of resemblance, not simply *count* them. In estimating the strength of analogical argument, we must also take into our consideration the number of properties unknown to us ; for *the relative proportion of the known to the unknown properties would affect the force of Analogy.* If the presumption is that numerous points are unknown, the argument must be weak ; if, on the other hand, a relatively large number of points is known, the argument is comparatively strong, provided the points of community are important or essential. This is sometimes expressed mathematically by the rule that the value of an analogy may be represented by a fraction having as its numerator the resemblances between the two things compared and as its denominator the differences between them *plus* the number of qualities of which we are ignorant regarding them. The rule, however, should not be taken to indicate an exact mathematical ratio, which is often hard to determine in view of the difficulty of balancing the importance of qualities with their number. It suggests only the general relation that the relative proportion of

the points of similarity and known points to the points of difference and unknown points determines the force of analogy in any case.

I have heard of a physician who advised his patients never to have a bath. His theory was that if an object be alternately dry and wet, it wears out sooner than if it be always dry. And he justified his position by analogy. Cut, for example, a rope into two halves and use one portion for drawing water and the other for hanging clothes. Of these two parts, the latter would evidently last longer, it being always dry. It was argued, the human body, when always dry, must continue longer unimpaired than when it is alternately dry and wet, as in the case of the daily bath. The fallacy lies here in the false analogy between a cord and the human organism: the two resemble only in being material; but while the one is inanimate, the other is endowed with life. The points of difference here are too important and numerous to justify an analogical inference. The value of the following argument, used in *The New Science of Healing Without Medicine*, in favour of a cold bath after a hot one can easily be determined by the reader:—"Steel, when brought to white heat in the fire, must be plunged into cold water in order to obtain the requisite temper. Similarly the human body after the steam-bath, on being cooled down, becomes strong and hardy." (Eng. trans. of 1905, p. 104.)

Illustrations.

It is argued likewise that, since individuals pass through the three stages of growth, vigour,

and decay, a community must also do the same. The argument is based on a false analogy between the life of a man and the progress of a community. Sir G. C. Lewis well observes on this point :—"The comparison which is sometimes instituted between the progress of a community and the life of a man fails in essentials, and is therefore misleading. Both a man and a community, indeed, advance from small beginnings to a state of maturity ; but a man has an allotted term of life, and a culminating point from which he descends ; whereas a community has no limited course to run ; it has no necessary period of decline and decay, similar to the old age of a man ; its national existence does not necessarily cease within a certain time. Nations, as compared with other nations, have periods of prosperity and power ; but even these periods often ebb and flow, and when a civilised nation loses its pre-eminence—as Italy in the nineteenth, as compared with Italy in the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries—it does not necessarily lose its civilisation. A political community is renewed by the perpetual succession of its members ; new births, immigrations, and new adoptions of citizens, keep the political body in a state of continuous youth. No such process as this takes place in an individual man. If he loses a limb, it is not replaced by a fresh growth. The effects of disease are but partially repaired ; all the bodily and mental functions are gradually enfeebled, as life is prolonged, till at last decay inevitably ends in death ; whereas a community might, consistently with the laws

of human nature, have a duration co-extensive with that of mankind.

"The supposed analogy between the existence of a political community and the life of a man seems to have contributed to the formation of the belief in a liability to *corruption*, inherent in every society. It was a favourite doctrine among some writers of the last century, that every civilised community is fated to reach a period of corruption, when its healthy and natural action ceases, and it undergoes some great deterioration. The notion of an inevitable stage of corruption in a nation was, indeed, partly suggested by the commonplaces condemnatory of luxury, derived both from the classical and ecclesiastical writers ; and by the more modern eulogies of a savage life. So far, however, as it was founded on the inevitable periods of decay in animal and vegetable life, the comparison was delusive ; for the two relations which are brought together do not correspond. The death of individuals may, indeed, be considered a necessary condition for the progress of the society, into which they enter as temporary elements. It is by the substitution of new intelligences, and of natures not hardened by old customs, for minds whose thoughts and habits have learnt to move uniformly in the same groove, that progressive changes in human affairs are effected. The decay and death of the individual, therefore, tends not only to prevent the deterioration of the society, but to promote its improvement." (*Methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*, II, p. 438.)

Analogy is a fruitful source of hypotheses.

§ 5. Analogy as a Source of Discovery and Means of Proof. We have seen that Analogy is a fruitful source of hypotheses and so of Discovery. (*Vide* Chap. XIX, § 2.) Striking resemblances between things often lead men to imagine that one law weaves them together and thus to start a hypothesis calculated to explain them and all similar cases. And it is here that we find the difference between genius and common intelligence. While men of true imaginative insight and sound judgment patiently arrive at valid hypotheses by a careful and comprehensive estimate of facts, men of weak imagination and of shallow judgment hastily frame extravagant hypotheses only by a narrow and superficial view of things. And at times we find analogy in a ludicrous form illustrated in the far-fetched metaphors or similes of wit, as when one mentions that the strength of an elephant may be found in a mosquito, since both are animals having legs and a proboscis. The importance of Analogy, as an instrument of discovery, depends, therefore, on its cautious use by reference to the characteristics of the facts which are compared together. The truth of these remarks will appear from the following illustrations :—

Illustrations.

(1) Bishop Wilkins quotes the following from Cardinal Nicolo de Cusa :—“We may conjecture the inhabitants of the sun are like to the nature of that planet, more clear and bright, more intellectual than those in the moon where they are nearer to the nature of that duller planet, and those of

the earth being more gross and material than either, so that these intellectual natures in the sun are more form than matter, those in the earth more matter than form, and those in the moon betwixt both. This we may guess from the fiery influence of the sun, the watery and aërous influence of the moon, so also the material heaviness of the earth. In some such manner likewise is it with the regions of the other stars ; for we conjecture that none of them are without inhabitants, but that there are so many particular worlds and parts of this one universe, as there are stars, which are innumerable, unless it be to Him who created all things in number." (*Discovery of a New World in the Moon*, p. 128.)

(2) Dr. Reid writes :—"We may observe a very great similitude between this earth which we inhabit, and the other planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, and Mercury. They all revolve round the sun, as the earth does, although at different distances and in different periods. They borrow all their light from the sun, as the earth does. Several of them are known to revolve round their axis like the earth, and by that means, must have a like succession of day and night. Some of them have moons, that serve to give them light in the absence of the sun, as our moon does to us. They are all, in their motions, subject to the same law of gravitation, as the earth is. From all this similitude, it is not unreasonable to think, that those planets may, like our earth, be the habitation of various orders of living creatures. There is some

probability in this conclusion from analogy." (*Intellectual Powers*, Chap. IV, Hamilton's Ed., I, p. 236.)

(3) Dr. Bain observes :—"Much speculation has been expended on the question—Are the planets inhabited? The argument is at best analogical; and there is not even the force of analogy except with reference to a small number. Bodies, like the moon, possessing no water and no atmosphere, must be dismissed at once. The planets generally appear to possess atmospheres. We seem justified, however, in making a summary exclusion of the near and the remote planets on the ground of temperature. All organized life known to us, is possible only within narrow limits of temperature; no animal or plant can exist either in freezing water or in boiling water. Now, the temperature of Mercury must in all likelihood be above the boiling point, even at the poles, and the temperature of Uranus, and of Saturn, below freezing at the equator. The constituent elements being now shown to be the same throughout the solar system—Carbon, Oxygen, Hydrogen, etc., we are not to presume any such departure from our own type of organized life as would be implied by animals and plants subsisting in these extremes of temperature. On the supposition that the sun's temperature has steadily decreased, and is still decreasing, by radiation, the day of living beings is past for Uranus and Saturn, and perhaps for Jupiter; it is not begun for Mercury.

"Confining ourselves, therefore, to the neigh-

bouring planets, and referring to the others only for the periods, past or future, when the capital circumstance of temperature is suitable, we have an analogical argument as follows. Venus and Mars are gravitating masses like the earth, containing, we may now say with certainty, the same materials as this globe—solid, liquid, and gaseous. But we cannot tell the precise arrangement of the constituent substances ; and, seeing that with ourselves so much depends upon the mere collocation and amount of such elements as oxygen and carbon, we may consider that the unknown properties of the supposed planets are considerable in number, and serious in character. The probability arising out of the points of agreement, if not greatly affected by known differences, is reduced by this large element of the unknown." (*Logic*, II, p. 147.)

The above illustrations show how prone we are to frame hypotheses by analogy, though the ground for such a procedure may not be strong in all cases. In the first example (1), given above, there is only one point of similarity, while there are several and important points of difference ; and dissimilarity is made here the ground of inference. It is arbitrarily assumed that the composition of the sun, the moon, and the earth is unlike and that the degree of intelligence is connected with the 'clearness and brightness' of the sphere in which it is found. In (2), several points of similarity are noted, but the points of difference and the unknown qualities are passed over. In (3),

As a mode
of proof, its
force is very
weak.

the points of difference and unknown possibilities are emphasized to such an extent as to exclude all reasonable hypotheses. These instances bring out that the value of analogical inference, as a mode of proof, is generally very low. And this is evident from the fact that the inference is ordinarily based on superficial points of similarity, since we are ignorant of a causal connection. It never approaches certainty and often gives rise to very weak probability. "The degree of probability," says Minto, "is much nearer zero than certainty." (*Logic*, p. 369.) And the following analogical argument, employed by the advocates of annual Parliaments in the time of the Commonwealth with reference to the serpent's habit of annually casting its skin, is aptly quoted by him :—

"Wisest of beasts the serpent see,
Just emblem of eternity,
And of a State's duration ;
Each year an annual skin he takes,
And with fresh life and vigour wakes

At every renovation.
Britain ! that serpent imitate,
Thy Commons House, that skin of State,
By annual choice restore ;
So choosing thou shalt live secure,
And freedom to thy sons inure,
Till Time shall be no more."

Analogy is thus concerned rather with discovery than with proof : it enables us readily to frame hypotheses, but does not supply definite

tests by which we can verify them. It suggests a line of inquiry, but cannot finally settle it. "In all cases," says Lotze, "when we believe we can prove by analogy, the analogy in fact is distinctly not the ground of the conclusiveness of the proof ; it is only the inventive play of thought by which we arrive at the discovery of a sufficient ground of proof." (*Logic*, § 214.) What are known as happy hits or lucky guesses of natural sagacity or trained intelligence are often due to such analogical inference. Thus, in the practice of medicine or the art of mining happy results have sometimes been achieved by striking similarities. It is said that a general resemblance of the hills near Ballarat in Australia to the Californian hills where gold had been found led to the discovery of gold at Ballarat. When in an analogical reasoning (1) the resemblances are very great, (2) the points of difference very small, and (3) our knowledge of the subject-matter is tolerably wide, then the force of such an inference approaches very near to Induction. And Induction, Explanation, and Analogy are thus very closely related. Newton's discovery of universal gravitation from his assimilating the fall of a stone to the deflection of the moon towards the earth or his inference that the diamond is combustible from his knowledge that combustible bodies (such as camphor, amber, olive oil, linseed oil, spirit of turpentine) have unusual refractive power and that diamond also is a highly refracting body, is sometimes attributed to analogy. But these are rather instances of extended generalization. Had

It often
leads to
discoveries.

Analogy,
Induction,
and
Explanation
are closely
related.

the inference been from a single body, as a stone or an oil to the moon or the diamond, the argument might be construed as analogical. But the inferences were arrived at after comparing several bodies (such as the attraction of the planets to the sun and of the moon to the earth in the one case and the highly refracting power of many unctuous and sulphureous bodies in the other); and so these are rather instances of wider generalization. "The suggestion as to the diamond", as Bain observes, "arose from its position among a number of highly refracting bodies that agreed in being of an inflammable or combustible nature. The concurrence of high refracting power with inflammability was an empirical law; and Newton perceiving the law extended it to the adjacent case of the diamond. The remark is made by Brewster that had Newton known the refractive powers of the minerals *greenockite* and *octohedrite*, he would have extended the inference to them, and would have been mistaken." (*Induction*, pp. 144-145.)

A case is presented which is made the basis of generalization.

§ 6. Value of Examples. We may discuss in this connection the value of Examples or Instances, which we often cite in the course of an inquiry or exposition. When, for example, a chemist finds by analysing a sample of water that it contains eight parts of oxygen and one part of hydrogen, and he concludes therefrom that water everywhere and always is so composed, he evidently takes a step from the known to the unknown, which is the most important mark of Induction. Similarly, in

explaining a particular subject, say Botany, a particular leaf or plant may be examined and its properties discovered. When, on the strength of such observation, generalization is made with regard to all such leaves or plants, the march of reasoning is from a single or a few cases to all like cases. The argument, therefore, in all such cases, is apparently inductive. Whether, however, such an argument is to be regarded as strictly inductive, from the scientific stand-point, depends on the character of the relation existing between the known and the unknown properties. If there is a causal connection between the inferred property and the known features, and the result is arrived at by the application of the inductive tests, then the argument may be regarded as strictly inductive. If, on the other hand, no causal connection is known, then the argument may amount only to analogy or, at best, to induction by simple enumeration, when instances are multiplied.

Such a procedure illustrates either induction or analogy.

§ 7. Exercises.

1. Determine the character of Inference by Simple Enumeration and indicate the circumstances on which its value depends. How is it related to Scientific Induction?

2. What do you understand by Mathematical Induction? Is it strictly inductive? Estimate its cogency.

3. Explain the nature of the argument from Analogy, stating the conditions on which its force depends.

4. What has argument from Analogy in common with, and wherein does it differ from, Deduction and Induction?

5. Analogy has sometimes been defined as 'resemblance in relations.' Is the definition correct?

6. Show, with illustrations, the place of Analogical Reasoning in the process of scientific discovery.

7. How would you distinguish a sound from an unsound Analogy? Give illustrations. Can an analogical argument be ever regarded as conclusive?

8. Explain the use of Examples in inductive reasoning and determine their force as instruments of proof.

9. Why is a single instance sometimes sufficient to warrant a universal conclusion, while in other cases the greatest possible number of concurring instances, without any exception, is not sufficient to warrant such a conclusion?

10. Examine the value of the following arguments :—

(a) England has a democratic franchise, therefore India should have a democratic franchise too.

(b) All the great empires that have ever existed have lost their position of eminence, hence no great empire in the future will maintain its supremacy.

(c) A sovereign : the state :: a pilot : the ship.

(d) A nation must ultimately perish because it is an organism, and all organisms grow old and die.

(e) The metropolis of a country is similar in many respects to the heart of the animal body, therefore the increased size of the metropolis is a disease.

(f) Nobody can be healthy without *exercise*, neither Natural Body, nor Body Politic : and certainly, to a Kingdom or State, a just and honourable war is the true *exercise*. A civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a fever, but a foreign war is like the heat of *exercise*, and serves to keep the Body in health.

(g) A nation, like an individual, must pass through periods of growth, maturity, and decay.

(h) Is not dirt washed away by a current of water? Yes. Then, is it impossible that all the sins of omission and commission may be washed away by the holy water of the Ganges when one dips into it? No. Thus, it matters little how one acts or thinks so long as he periodically bathes in the Ganges.

11. 'A house without tenant, a city without inhabitants, present to our minds the same idea as a planet without life,

a universe without inhabitants.' The conclusion here evidently is that the planets and stars are inhabited. What is the logical form of the inference? State it in its simplest form. What do you consider to be its logical value, and why?

12. Estimate the force of the following argument:—

"When a tree, or a bundle of wheat or barley straw, is burnt, a certain amount of mineral matter remains in the ashes—extremely small in comparison with the bulk of the tree or of the straw, but absolutely essential to its growth. In a soil lacking, or exhausted of, the necessary mineral constituents, the tree cannot live, the crop cannot grow. Now contagia are living things, which demand certain elements of life just as inexorably as trees, or wheat, or barley; and it is not difficult to see that a crop of a given parasite may so far use up a constituent existing in small quantities in the body, but essential to the growth of the parasite, so as to render the body unfit for the production of a second crop. The soil is exhausted, and, until the lost constituent is restored, the body is protected from any further attack of the same disorder. Such an explanation of non-recurrent diseases naturally presents itself to a thorough believer in the germ theory.....To exhaust a soil, however, a parasite less vigorous and destructive than the really virulent one may suffice; and if, after having by means of a feeble organism exhausted the soil, without fatal result, the most highly virulent parasite be introduced into the system, it will prove powerless. This, in the language of the germ theory, is the whole system of vaccination." (Tyndall.)

Division III.

RESULTS OF INDUCTION.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LAWS OF NATURE.

Definition
of 'Law.'

Illustrations.

Laws are
either human
or natural.

Natural Laws
are of various
kinds,
governing
different
departments
of Nature.

§ 1. **Science and Law.** The relation of Science to Law is very close. In order to understand this relation, let us first try to comprehend what is meant by a 'Law' and a 'Law of Nature.' A Law is but the expression in language of some uniform relation existing among the phenomena of a particular class. For example, the Law of Gravitation enunciates a uniform relation existing among material bodies, and the Law of Definite Proportions similarly explains a uniform relation existing among chemical elements. A Law, however, may be either human or natural. In the case of a human law, we find the same aspect of uniformity ; such a law is imposed by a sovereign upon his subjects for the uniform regulation of their conduct. Natural Laws, similarly, imply uniform relations existing among phenomena, but not established by human authority. Natural Laws are necessarily of various kinds as governing different departments of Nature ; there are thus Physical, Chemical, Mathematical, Logical, Mental, and Moral Laws. As Bain puts it, "The course of the world is not a uniformity, but *uni-*

formities. There are departments of uniformity, which are radically distinct." (*Logic*, II, p. 8.) That is, the course of Nature is made up of several uniformities expressed in several laws.

From the above account of the character of laws it is patent that the connection between Law and Science is very intimate. If there be no law, if Nature be capricious in her conduct, then evidently there will be no room for knowledge or expectation, and consequently none for science. If everything be in a chaotic condition, without any order or system, then evidently there would be no fixed rule which science would try to discover. The different sciences are thus but expositions of the different kinds of uniformity prevailing in the different departments of Nature.

Without laws there would be no room for science.

A question may be raised here with regard to the *ultimate ground of these laws*. Reflection shows that laws finally presuppose that Nature is uniform in her operation. The Uniformity of Nature is thus the ultimate postulate on which all Laws rest. But if it be further asked, what is the ground of this Uniformity of Nature itself, then the reply may entangle us in a circle. If, for example, we hold that the Uniformity of Nature is proved by the several laws (for Nature is uniform here, there, and everywhere), then we move in a never-ending circle. Hence, the objection of Mansel against the empirical origin of the Law of Causation applies with no less force to a similar explanation of the Law of Uniformity of Nature. (*Vide* Chap. XVII, § 10.) The Law seems to be the

The laws ultimately rest on the Uniformity of Nature, which we instinctively recognise.

expression of an instinctive tendency to generalize on the model of present experience ; it is due to what Bain calls 'the mere instinct of generalization.' (*Induction*, p. 113.) [*Vide* Chap. II, § 7.]

The world is a systematic whole including several laws harmoniously adjusted to serve some supreme end.

§ 2. The World as a System of Laws.

The world, as conceived by us, is a well-ordered system, the different parts of which are harmoniously related to one another. We, accordingly, find that the laws which are special to a particular subject are not altogether unconnected with the laws which hold good in the other departments of Nature. There is a close connection between, say, Physical and Chemical laws, Chemical and Biological laws, Biological and Psychological laws, Psychological and Sociological laws, and Sociological and Moral laws. The modern doctrine of conservation of energy has established beyond dispute that one form of energy may be transformed into another, indicating a correspondence among the different laws. We not only find that the laws of the different sciences are closely connected with one another, but we also find that, within one and the same department, the different laws are interconnected. The world is thus a unity viewed as a whole as well as in all its parts : it beams with intelligence and beauty in every detail, no less than in its entire mechanism. It is not a chaos, but a cosmos. There are laws within laws—some more general and some less—so that to the Omniscient Mind the cosmos is compressed in a nut-shell of a few wide or comprehensive laws. The world is thus a type of Beauty, Harmony, and Consistency.

§ 3. Classification of Laws. Laws are classified, according to the degree of generality, into higher and lower, though their grades may not be clearly distinguishable.

(1) The most general laws, which are viewed as universal and self-evident, are known as *Axioms*. They rest on their own evidence and are thus viewed as the ultimate principles on which all arguments depend; they are, moreover, considered to be the goal of all generalization. Such principles are the Laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle, the Axioms of Mathematics, and the Law of Causation. Logic assumes them, leaving it to Metaphysics to examine and explain their nature. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 4.)

(2) The laws which are next in order of generality are called *Primary* or *Ultimate*. Their sphere also is extensive, though not so wide as that of the Axioms. They being thus of less wide scope may be proved by the axioms. Such laws are the Law of Relativity in Psychology, Definite Proportions in Chemistry, Gravitation in Astronomy, *etc.*

(3) The laws which are comparatively special in character are known as *Secondary* (called by Bacon the 'Middle Axioms' or 'Intermediate Generalities'), they being but steps for rising to the supreme laws. They are in touch with concrete circumstances, and are thus of greater service in the practical affairs of life than the Axioms or Primary Laws. As Secondary Laws relate to complex situations, they involve combinations of

Laws are classified into three groups according to the degree of their generality :
(1) Axioms, which are ultimate and self-evident principles, constituting the foundation of all inference.

Examples.

(2) Primary or Ultimate Laws, which are the highest generalizations from experience.

Examples.

(3) Secondary Laws, which are applicable to a special group of facts.

They are of great practical value. They are due to the

convergence
or conflict of
Primary
Laws.

Secondary
Laws have
been classified
into different
groups :

(a) Laws are
Derivative or
Empirical,
according as
they follow or
do not follow
from Primary
Laws.
Empirical
Laws rest
mainly on the
Method of
Agreement.

(b) Laws are
invariable or
approximate,
according as
they govern
an entire
class or only
a part of it.

Approximate
generaliza-
tions also are
useful in the
practical
affairs of life.

several Primary Laws governing the constituent factors or elements.

Secondary Laws have been classified into different groups according to different principles of classification :—

(a) Secondary Laws have been divided into *Derivative* and *Empirical*,* according as they are deduced from higher (Primary) laws, or as they rest on mere experience, *i.e.*, on a detailed examination of facts. Empirical laws rest mainly on the Method of Agreement. It is a question whether laws proved by Difference should be considered as Empirical or Derivative. In a certain sense, no doubt, laws thus proved may be considered as Derivative, in as much as they are based on the law of Causation. But, it seems desirable that such laws should be further proved by Primary or Ultimate laws before they can be so considered.

(b) Secondary Laws have also been divided into *Invariable* and *Approximate Generalizations*, according as they express general relations without any exception (within the limits of our experience) or as they stand for partial truths valid in most cases. Approximate generalizations, though short of universal truth, are also useful in the practical affairs of life. Their utility is heightened when they can be reduced to a definite form by reference

* The word 'Law' implies necessary connection, while 'empirical', implying what is begotten of experience, indicates mere association. Thus, what the substantive affirms, the qualifying adjective practically denies. The expression 'Empirical Law,' accordingly, seems to be a misnomer or contradiction in terms. Mere empirical generalizations can never be said to possess the necessity (natural or artificial) which is to be found in 'laws'. As, however, the expression is sanctioned by usage, it is adopted here.

to percentage or proportion. In politics, for example, such approximate generalizations are of great value : all that a legislator can reasonably aim at, must be an approximate result, instead of a strictly general one. And we have also read that Probability ultimately rests on Approximate Generalizations. (*Vide* Chapter XXI, § 5.)

(c) Secondary laws may further be sub-divided into those of either (A) *Succession* or (B) *Co-existence*.

(A) Secondary laws expressing *Succession* may refer to either

- (1) Causation (*e.g.*, fire consumes fuel), or
- (2) the effect of a remote cause (*e.g.*, good rain brings a good harvest), or
- (3) the joint effects of the same cause (*e.g.*, the succession of day and night).

(B) Secondary Laws expressing *Co-existence* may refer to—

- (1) Comparatively general laws based on agreement (*e.g.*, gravitating bodies are inert) ;
- (2) Co-existence of properties in Natural Kinds (*e.g.*, the numerous properties which co-exist in gold) ;
- (3) Co-existence of qualities not essential to a species (*e.g.*, flowers of scarlet colour have no smell) ;
- (4) Constancy of relative position (*e.g.*, the position of planets in the solar system, the sides and angles of a rectilineal figure).

Most of the relations of Co-existence are, on careful examination, reducible to Laws of Causation. When, however, such relations cannot be

(c) Laws express a relation of either (A) Succession or (B) Co-existence. (A) Forms of Laws of Succession.

(B) Forms of Laws of Co-existence.

Many relations of co-existence are reducible to causation.

derived from causation, they can be proved only by collecting numerous examples and relying mainly on the Uniformity of Nature. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 2.)

A subordinate law when deduced from higher laws is called a **Derivative Law**.

A **Empirical law** rests only on experience.

A law is usually first empirical before it becomes derivative.

Forms of Empirical Laws :

(1) An empirical law believed to be deducible from higher laws.

§ 4. Derivative and Empirical Laws, and Forms of the Latter. As explained in the preceding section, when a subordinate law is deduced from higher laws, it is considered as Derivative. When, for example, the law of terrestrial gravitation is deduced from the law of universal gravitation, then the law of terrestrial gravitation is to be considered as Derivative. An Empirical Law, as already remarked, rests only on the evidence of experience. It is known, for example, that 'white tom-cats with blue eyes are deaf,' that 'the fall of the barometer indicates wind or rain.' And almost all laws are in the first instance of an empirical character before they are traced up to higher laws. Thus, that iron rusts, that explosion follows the contact of a spark with gun-powder, that a storm follows the appearance of a circle round the moon are empirical generalizations which may or may not turn out to be derivative according as we succeed or fail to discover higher laws to which they may be traced. Empirical Laws may be of different forms, three of which deserve notice :—

(1) An empirical law applicable to a complex situation and deducible from general laws, though not yet so deduced. The very fact that a law is applicable to a class of complex facts or phenomena creates a presumption that it is deducible from

several higher or elementary laws. The laws of wind and rain, for example, are believed to be deducible from higher uniformities discussed in meteorology.

(2) An empirical law may express a relation between a remote antecedent and a remote consequent, passing over intermediate links. When, for example, it is said that 'a seed is the cause of a tree,' we have to do with an empirical law of such a description; for the seed can never become a tree without the help of intermediate conditions, such as planting, watering, *etc.*

(a) An empirical law expressing a relation between a remote antecedent and a remote consequent.

(3) An empirical law may express a relation among the co-effects of one and the same cause, whether such co-effects are related by way of (a) Succession or (b) Co-existence. (a) Succession is illustrated in the case of day and night and in the flow of the seasons. (b) Co-existence is illustrated in the case of the simultaneous effects produced in the different organs by a drug. Arsenic may produce purging, vomiting, *etc.*, simultaneously. A country engaged in war may similarly have its economy disturbed at once in various departments of its government.

(3) An empirical law expressing a relation among the co-effects of a cause, which may be connected either (a) by succession or (b) by co-existence.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the sciences which rest on empirical laws are generally less certain and progressive than those which employ the derivative ones. Thus, the science of medicine in its present condition is hardly beyond the empirical stage, as a knowledge of the effects of drugs is derived chiefly, if not wholly, from observation and experiment and not from higher laws connecting the properties of

Empirical sciences are more or less precarious.

remedies administered with the conditions of life or health. And hence any extension in the use of medicine to new circumstances (*e.g.*, men or animals of different constitutions, habits or countries) is more or less precarious.

§ 5. Utility of Law and the Relative Usefulness of Its Different Forms. The usefulness of laws is illustrated both (1) objectively and (2) subjectively. (1) Objectively, a law connects diverse facts coming within its province: facts which would otherwise be disconnected and detached are thus reduced to a system by a law connecting them. The law of gravitation, for example, brings together all material bodies attracting each other, which otherwise would remain detached. (2) Subjectively, a law enables us to remember facts more easily than otherwise it would have been possible for us to do. It is not practicable for us to remember the numerous individual instances one by one; but these may be retained by reference to a law connecting them. Moreover, explanation always involves reference to laws: we explain phenomena when we refer them to their causes and indicate the laws by which such phenomena are brought about. (*Vide* Chap. XXIV, § 2.)

Though laws generally are thus useful, yet their utility is not of the same character always. Some laws are more useful theoretically, while others are more useful practically. The Ultimate or Primary Laws are generally of greater theoretical value. Since the end of knowledge is unification, we approach to this end as we arrive at higher and

Laws are useful (1) objectively and (2) subjectively. (1) Objectively, a law unites many facts together ;

and (2) subjectively, it enables the mind to remember and explain facts.

All laws, however, are not of equal value.

The ultimate or primary laws are of theoretical importance,

higher generalities. A very wide ultimate law, which can connect numerous facts, enables us to systematize knowledge pre-eminently. From the practical stand-point, however, the Secondary Laws are of greater importance: as these laws are in touch with facts, they enable us to solve practical problems more successfully than Ultimate Laws, which are of greater theoretical value. It is not of much consequence to a medical practitioner to be aware simply of the most general laws of health or of drugs. To be successful in practice, he must study the laws which govern the special form of the disease which he is ordinarily called upon to treat, and he should similarly study the special properties of the drugs which he ordinarily employs.

while the secondary laws are of greater practical value.

As a Secondary Law is applicable to a complex situation, we should be careful to extend such a law beyond the narrow limits of time, place, and circumstances where it has been found to be true. We should not, for example, extend to other nations the laws which are specially illustrated in our own constitution. If, however, we are disposed to extend the application of a Secondary Law beyond its known province, we must remember that such extension is justifiable more in the case of Derivative Laws than in the case of Empirical Laws. The rise of water in the pump, for example, up to the height of 33 feet can scarcely be confidently extended to other places or other liquids, if the law be viewed as merely Empirical; but when the law is regarded as Derivative (having

Secondary Laws should not be extended beyond their known sphere without great caution.

The extension of Derivative Laws to

unknown cases is more certain than that of

**Empirical
Laws.**

been deduced from atmospheric pressure), then we can confidently extend it to other similar situations, where such pressure remains unaltered.

§ 6. Exercises.

1. What is a Law? Distinguish a Law of the State, a Law of Nature, and a Logical Law, illustrating your meaning with examples. Science must assume that Nature is subject to Law : explain why it must do so.

2. What are the postulates of the Laws of Nature? Determine the character of the Law of the Uniformity of Nature.

3. Distinguish between (1) Axioms and Laws of Nature, (2) Primary and Secondary Laws, and indicate their relative importance in science and practice.

4. Distinguish between (1) Derivative and Empirical, and (2) Invariable and Approximate, Laws, and determine their relative values as conditions of proof.

5. Distinguish between Laws of Succession and Co-existence, and point out their different forms.

6. Distinguish between Laws and Facts, and estimate their relative importance in scientific inquiry.

7. Clearly explain what is implied in the conception of the World as a System of Laws.

8. What do you understand by the Laws of Nature? Do they rest on any primary assumption? How are such laws established? Explain and illustrate their different forms.

CHAPTER XXIV.

SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION.

§ 1. **Character of Explanation.** Explanation (from Lat. *explano*—*ex*, out of, and *plano*, to make plain) implies, as the etymology of the word indicates, the act of making plain or intelligible what otherwise seems to be obscure or mysterious. Explanation thus presupposes a prior state of perplexity, which it tries to remove. A fact or phenomenon is explained when it is made clear to the understanding ; and, the essential nature of our intelligence being assimilation and discrimination, things are made clear when their points of similarity and difference are shown. Thus, we understand what a pen or pencil is, when it is pointed out to us that it is an instrument for writing. Here we detect a similarity between a pen or pencil and what is called an instrument, and we find also that its distinguishing feature lies in being used for writing. When we come to know these points of similarity and difference, our curiosity is satisfied and the object becomes familiar to us.

Often the aspect of similarity is prominently illustrated in explanation, as when we explain a thing by simply referring it to its appropriate class (such as 'this is a pen' or 'that is a goat'). Classification may thus be regarded as a rudimentary form

The end of Explanation is to make clear to the understanding what is otherwise obscure.

As understanding consists in identifying and distinguishing things, the aim of Explanation is to indicate the points of similarity and difference.

Often the aspect of similarity is prominent in Explanation.

Classification
is a form of
explanation.

Hence
similarity
is viewed
as the
ground of
explanation.

Popular
explanation
is concerned
with the
superficial,
while the
scientific
form, with
the deep-
seated, points
of similarity.

Explanation
is relative to
prior
attainments.

of explanation. And the reason is patent. Whenever we classify an object, we know its points of similarity and difference by reference to the characteristics of the class to which it is referred. But classification by itself illustrates the aspect of similarity in a marked degree ; we bring an object under a class when we notice the striking points of similarity. Hence usually similarity or likeness is taken to be the ground of all explanation. "Our only progress from the obscure to the plain, from the mysterious to the intelligible," writes Bain, "is to find out *resemblances* among facts, to make different phenomena, as it were, fraternize" (*Induction*, p. 116.) Common explanation, however, is generally satisfied with the detection of the superficial points of likeness ; it seldom tries to go deep and discover the deep-seated points of community. This is the aim of scientific explanation. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 2.)

§ 2. Popular and Scientific Explanation. To explain, as we have said, is to render a fact or phenomenon clear or intelligible ; and, to render it clear or intelligible, it must be connected with prior knowledge, it must be likened to what is already familiar to us. Thus, explanation is always relative to the prior intellectual attainments of an individual. What serves as an explanation to a child may be of no value to an adult ; what may satisfy a rustic or pagan may fail to convince a savant or Christian. That eclipses are produced by a dragon swallowing the sun or the moon, or that storms are produced by

the wrath of Neptune or Jupiter may not seem strange to the ignorant, who know how rabbits are swallowed by serpents or how things are set in confusion by the wrath of individuals. But such explanations fail to convince one having an insight into the laws of Nature.

We find also that facts or phenomena are explained when the agency or cause producing them is indicated. Thus, we explain a cold by reference to exposure to inclement weather, or we mention that the difficulty of a northern invasion of India lies in the presence of the Himalayas. And this mode of explanation is allied to the generalizing process indicated above. The cause being invariable in character enables us to assimilate all like effects. The single cause establishes a sort of unity among its effects which are thus connected by a common bond. The cause which explains this effect, explains all like effects. The cause is thus regarded as the common source of all such effects. When, therefore, we explain a phenomenon by reference to its cause, we mean to say that all similar phenomena may similarly be explained. Thus, in assigning a cause, we generalize and assimilate facts.

Explanation often consists in assigning the cause of the phenomenon to be explained.

Cause is a means of generalization.

We have read that the difference between ordinary every-day knowledge and science lies in the fact that, in the former, we are interested in individual instances or peculiarities, while, in the latter, in common features or general characteristics. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 7.) And this difference is illustrated also in the case of Explanation. In the

Popular explanation aims at discovering the special cause in any case ; while scientific explanation aims at discovering the general conditions.

ordinary affairs of life, we want to know what throws light on this or that circumstance, what can remove this or that difficulty or obstacle. Science, however, is concerned with the explanation of facts in general, with the discovery of general laws or grounds which elucidate this and all similar cases. "There is," says Bain, "a special and every-day form of explanation that consists in assigning the agency in a particular occurrence ; as when we ask—what stops the way ? Who wrote Junius ? Who discovered gunpowder ? These questions belong to our practical wants and urgencies, but the answer does not involve the process of scientific explanation. If, however, we proceed from the 'who' or 'what' to the '*why*' :—why does A's carriage stop the way ? why did the author of Junius write so bitterly ?—there is an opening for the higher scientific process." (*Induction*, p. 116.)

Explanation is either (1) of a particular event or (2) of a general law.

Scientific explanation traces (1) particular events to their general conditions

and (2) general laws to higher laws, known or supposed.

Explanation is either (1) of a (particular) fact or (2) of a (general) law. Popular explanation is concerned chiefly with the former, while scientific explanation, mostly with the latter. And, (1) even in the *explanation of a fact*, the popular form refers, as mentioned above, to some special circumstance which brings immediate practical gain, while the scientific form refers to general conditions or laws which tend to enlarge our theoretical knowledge and thus to contribute to our future advantage.

(2) The scientific *explanation of a law* ordinarily consists in tracing it to some higher law, real or supposed. Explanation in this case consists in deducing the law to be explained from some other

known law or from some hypothesis which is expected to throw light on it. Thus, magnetism is traced to electric polarity or solution to heterogeneous molecular attraction. Different laws may likewise be connected by similarity and referred to some higher law, as when combustion and metallic corrosion are viewed as but different forms of oxidation. Scientific explanation, accordingly, consists, as Mr. Read points out, in "discovering, deducing, and assimilating the laws of phenomena." (*Logic*, p. 276.) We should remember in this connection that Explanation and Hypothesis are very closely related: the general end of hypotheses is explanation; and explanation, consequently, often involves a reference to hypothesis. "Explanation, in the scientific sense", observes Fowler, "means the reduction of a series of facts which occur uniformly but are not connected by any known law of causation into a series which is so connected, or the reduction of complex laws of causation into simpler laws. If no such laws of causation are known to exist, we may *suppose* or *imagine* a law that would fulfil the requirement; and this *supposed* law would be a hypothesis." (*Induction*, p. 92.)

Mr. Read's definition of Explanation.

Explanation and Hypothesis are closely connected.

§ 3. **Forms of Scientific Explanation.** Mill mentions three forms of scientific explanation:—

Three Forms of Scientific Explanation:

(1) *Analysis*. When a joint or complex effect is referred to the laws of its conditions or causes; for example, when the path of a projectile is explained by reference to the laws of gravitation, initial force, and resistance of the air.

(1) A joint effect is explained by reference to elementary laws.

(2) A remote effect is explained by reference to intermediate agencies.

(2) *Concatenation.* When a remote effect is explained by reference to the intermediate agencies or links; for example, when a good crop is explained by reference to favourable weather and the industry of the husbandman. Likewise, in regarding sea water as the cause of rain, we have to supply the intermediate links (such as evaporation, condensation, electric discharge, etc.) to explain the connection. Proverbs, as pithy sayings, generally pass over intermediate steps (*e.g.*, 'No pains, no gains'). To explain them, therefore, we must unfold these steps.

(3) A lower or less general law is explained by reference to a higher or wider law.

(3) *Subsumption.* The subsumption or inclusion of inferior laws under higher laws; when, for example, terrestrial gravity is explained by reference to the law of universal gravitation. Similarly, the minor laws of antithesis in rhetoric, contrast in works of art, novelty in attention, and variety in agreeable experience are all explained by the fundamental law of relativity.

The essence of scientific explanation lies in discovering a causal connection.

We must bear in mind that the essence of scientific explanation in every case lies in discovering a causal connection, which, as we have seen, is a sure means of generalization. The more we can connect one fact or law with others, the greater the relief to our understanding, and consequently the more satisfactory is our explanation. And in this we are materially aided by causation. "Not any sort of likeness," says Mr. Read, "suffices for scientific explanation: it must be 'fundamental' or (as this is a vague expression) we may say that the only satisfactory explanation of concrete things

or events, is to discover their likeness to others in respect of Causation." (*Logic*, p. 281.)

§ 4. **Limits of Explanation.** It is apparent from the preceding remarks that the limits of explanation are the limits to assimilation. When one thing or phenomenon cannot be referred to a law or other similar phenomena, it remains unexplained. Colour, for example, cannot be likened to anything else; and so any attempt to explain it must prove futile. Once scarlet colour was explained to a blind man as very loud; and he exclaimed, 'yes, it is as loud as the beat of a drum.' It was quite natural, for the blind man could interpret 'loud' only by reference to his experience of sound.

The limits of explanation are the limits to assimilation.

On a careful examination we find that it is not possible for us to explain (1) elementary sensations (*e. g.*, colour, taste, smell), (2) the ultimate forces or properties of matter (*e. g.*, extension, inertia, gravity), and (3) individual peculiarities of concrete objects. These cannot be assimilated: a colour, for example, can never be likened to a sound or smell, nor physical energy to chemical affinity, nor individual peculiarities to specific qualities or properties. It is evident from this that the ultimate laws of nature and the elementary experiences of the mind can never be explained. We should remember in this connection another limit to explanation, which arises from its very nature. Explanation must always be relative: it can never be absolute. To explain one fact we must fall back upon another; and so on we may proceed;

We cannot explain (1) elementary sensations, (2) ultimate forces or properties, (3) individual peculiarities,

and (4)
axioms or
ultimate
principles.

but finally there must be a halting place. (4) Complete explanation is thus unattainable so far as the ultimate principles are concerned: they must be assumed as they are, without any further attempt at tracing them to higher principles still. "The principles of Contradiction, Mediate Equality and Causation", says Mr. Read, "remain incapable of subsumption; nor can any one of them be reduced to another; so that they remain unexplained." (*Logic*, p. 283.)

Illusory
explanations,
are only
apparent
explanations,
the principal
forms of
which are—

(1) To explain
a fact
superficially
by reference
to what is
familiar ;

(2) merely to
vary the
expression ;

(3) to explain
an ultimate
fact.

§ 5. Illusory Explanations. Illusory explanations are those which are of a superficial character,—which pretend to explain facts or phenomena without really doing so. The principal forms of such explanation may be indicated thus—

(1) Often we explain a fact by reference to something with which we are familiar, the points of similarity being but superficial. For example, thunderbolts are explained as shafts of fire hurled by Jove; and solitary boulders, as missiles flung by gaints.

(2) Again, we sometimes state the same thing in a different form of language and this is a fruitful source of erroneous explanations. Moliere's physician, for example, explains the sleep-producing property of opium by reference to its dormitive power; and we similarly explain a slip of the feet by reference to the slippery character of the ground.

(3) Sometimes we are not satisfied with the best explanation offered, and so we push our inquiry farther, until we explain the clear by the obscure. Thus, Newton was not satisfied with

gravity as an ultimate fact explaining the attraction of bodies to one another. He could not imagine how one lump of matter could act on another at a distance ; and he, accordingly, longed to discover some fluid medium through which gravity might be supposed to act. But the law of gravitation may be regarded as the final explanation of falling bodies. Any supposed medium only tends to mystify what is otherwise clear.

It may be mentioned in this connection that at times we fall into the opposite mistake of supposing even complex facts or phenomena as simple because they are familiar. And hence we are disposed to treat them as intelligible in themselves, without any reference to anything else. Thus, combustion or the succession of day and night may seem to be such a familiar fact as to require no explanation. But, surely familiarity is no test of simplicity or intelligibility.

To suppose a familiar fact as clear and simple is also fallacious,


§ 6. Exercises.

1. Determine the character of Explanation. Distinguish between Popular and Scientific Explanation.
2. 'To explain a phenomenon is to assign its cause.' How ?
3. Describe and illustrate the different forms of Scientific Explanation.
4. Point out the limits of Scientific Explanation. Can we be certain that any scientific explanation is complete and final ?
5. How does Hypothesis lead on to Explanation ? How is Explanation related to Induction ?
6. Distinguish between Genuine and Illusory Explanations, indicating the chief forms of the latter.

7. Wherein does Explanation differ from Proof? Does everything admit of explanation? If not, where does explanation cease?

8. Illustrate the several ways in which facts and generalizations from facts may be explained. Are all modes of Scientific Explanation reducible to one principle?

9. Elucidate—'The object of Science is explanation.'



BOOK IV.

ACCESSORIES OF INFERENCE.

CHAPTER XXV.

DEFINITION.

§ 1. **Preliminary.** Having considered the different forms of Inference, let us now proceed to study the logical processes which are its accessories. Logical processes being processes of the human mind are all interconnected : they act and re-act on one another. (*Vide* Chap. XXXI, § 1.) Thus, Inferences, as we have seen, involve Propositions ; and Propositions, Terms. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 1.) Again, Terms or Names, to be of any use, must carry some sense, *i.e.*, must involve a reference to Definition and Classification. To name an object is to refer it to a class and to indicate what is implied by it. It appears, then, that Definition, Classification, and Naming are all more or less pre-supposed in every form of Inference. But, looked at from a different point of view, it would seem that Inference determines all these processes. We gather the meanings of Names through Classification and Inference. If we exclude proper names, which have very little logical value, we find that Names ordinarily involve a general reference—indicating a passage from the known to the unknown. Thus, the meanings of Names grow fuller and fuller by successive inferences. It is in this way that a child comes to

Logical processes are all interconnected.

While Definition, Classification, and Naming ensure the validity of Inference, Inference in its turn secures the correctness of these processes.

know, for example, that cats mew, have whiskers, four legs, a tail, a peculiar form, *etc.** Noticing these features in some cats, a child is led to think that they are present in all cats. The meaning of the term 'cat' is determined by a series of inferences. But a name, in its connotative aspect, implies definition and, in its denotative aspect, implies classification. Inference may, accordingly, be said to underlie the processes of Definition, Classification, and Naming.

We see, then, that Inference, Definition, Classification, and Naming are all closely connected. Valid inference ensures the correctness of Definition, Classification, and Naming; and the correctness of these processes in its turn secures the validity of Inference. Though, however, these processes thus interact, we are not concerned in Logic with this interaction. We have nothing to do here with the mental processes themselves; we are concerned only with the mental products. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 2.) And, since we have considered Inferences above, we shall now turn our attention to the exposition of their accessories. And the reason for considering these after Inference is that, as thought-products, they are often determined by prior inferences.

Definition, Classification, and Naming, as products of thought, are thus often determined by prior Inferences.

§ 2. Character and Limits of Definition. Definition is but a compendious form of

* Naming is really a complex process, involving not merely inference but also the influence of the social intelligence. We are, however, concerned here not with the psychological history of naming or conception, but with the logical product. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3, foot-note.)

explanation. Its aim is to unfold the meaning of a term or class as succinctly as possible. A fact, however, is intelligible to us when it is assimilated and discriminated. (*Vide* Chap. XXIV, § 1.) To know, for example, what a rose is, we must distinguish it from other things and identify it with the members of its own class. It is thus known to be a flower having a peculiar fragrance, shape, and structure. But, as we have read in the last chapter, explanation may be either superficial or genuine. The popular form refers merely to the obvious features, whether they are essential to the thing explained or not. In the case of Definition, likewise, the popular form may be content with the bare delineation of the outward and accidental features, as when man is taken to be a laughing animal. This is what is known as **Description**. Definition proper is allied to scientific explanation and, like it, is concerned with the determination of the essential qualities of the thing defined. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 6 and Chap. XXIV, § 2.) And the general condition of a valid definition is that it must indicate the fundamental points of similarity and difference ; or, as the scholastic formula goes, it must be *per genus et differentiam* (the genus being the point of similarity and the *differentiam*, the point of difference). The accidental and superficial features, however successful in the ordinary affairs of life in indicating a class, generally fail to give an accurate and precise knowledge of it. It is said that Plato defined 'man' as 'a featherless biped.' And Diogenes, to

a compendious form of explanation.

It thus involves assimilation and discrimination.

In Description only the accidental features are mentioned ;

while in Definition, the essential qualities.

Definition should be *per genus et differentia*.

Description
appeals to
imagination,
while
Definition to
reason.

exposé the fallacy of such a definition, plucked a fowl and introduced it into his school as 'Plato's man.' Plato, of course, was driven to modify his definition by adding the further difference 'with broad nails.' But such a procedure is always more or less precarious. Hence, in defining a class, the fundamental features alone should be given. In Description there is rather an appeal to imagination, while in Definition, an appeal to thought. It is clear from these remarks that those terms which have no connotation cannot be defined ; but they can be described. Thus, all definable terms can be described ; but all terms which can be described cannot be defined.

Explanation,
like
Definition,
indicates
a stage in
advance of
Description.

It may be mentioned here that Explanation, like Definition, may be viewed as but a stage in advance of Description. If in Description we colligate or unite facts by reference to the features or characters which lie on the surface, in Explanation, as in Definition, we go deeper and try to discover laws or conditions which throw light on these features or characters. In the one case we are concerned rather with the 'what' of things, while in the other we consider the 'why.' Thus, when Kepler surmised from the observation of a few positions of the planet Mars that its orbit lay in an ellipse and he also found that the orbits of the other planets were of a similar character, he supplied merely a descriptive hypothesis, and this was subsequently converted into an explanatory theory by Newton when he showed that the character of such an orbit in all these cases followed

from the universal law of gravitation binding together all material bodies moving in space. If Description, therefore, may be said to rest on connections which furnish a basis for empirical laws, Definition or Explanation may be said to appeal to characters which afford a ground for derivative laws.

Three important conditions follow from the above account of Definition. (1) Definition must be always of a class and never of an individual. The distinctive character of an individual is found in certain peculiarities not to be found in others. The group of peculiarities constituting, for example, John can never be found in Jones or James. Hence it can never be likened to any other group; and so it cannot be defined. We may, no doubt, compare some of the qualities (*e.g.*, red hair, tall stature, aquiline nose, bald head) with the qualities of other persons; but such comparison would mean that each quality, viewed by itself, is general, being illustrated in several persons. But the entire aggregate constituting what we call 'John,' can never be likened to any other aggregate. In fact, to suppose it as possible is to overlook the individuality of John. (2) Abstract terms are more easily defined than concrete terms, provided the abstract terms do not express elementary qualities, which cannot be likened to others. And its reason is found in the fact that a definition unfolds the connotation of a term. The connotative aspect is more prominently present in the case of abstract terms, while the denotative

*Features of
Definition :*

(1) Definition
is always of a
class and
never of an
individual.

(2) Abstract
terms are
more easily
defined.

aspect, in the case of concrete terms. In defining a concrete term, accordingly, we have to withdraw our attention from the denotative, and concentrate it on the connotative, aspect. No such abstraction is, however, necessary in defining an abstract term. Attributives, however, cannot be defined, since they express qualities only when standing as predicates ; but they may be defined through the corresponding abstract terms. Thus, though we cannot define 'virtuous,' we may define 'virtue' as 'the excellence of character acquired by habitual obedience to moral law.' Similarly, to define 'the virtuous' would be to define a concrete term and not an attributive. [*Vide* Chap. V, § 8.] (3) It is also evident from what has been said above that a definition should include only the fundamental qualities as otherwise it would be contrary to its purpose. As a definition is a condensed form of explanation, it must avoid prolixity and redundancy alike. The qualities mentioned in a definition should be such as would enable us to comprehend the thing defined in the shortest and easiest way possible. These should, accordingly, be the cardinal or fundamental qualities on which the minor qualities hang and from which these can easily be deduced.

Attributives, however, cannot be defined.

(3) Only the fundamental qualities, constituting connotation, should be included in the definition.

Limits of Definition :

(1) Elementary qualities cannot be defined.

From the preceding remarks we can easily determine the limits of Definition. The limits are :—(1) We cannot define elementary qualities, such as pleasure or pain, sweetness or bitterness, redness or greenness, likeness or unlikeness. And the reason is found in the fact that they represent

unique features which cannot be likened to other things : we must either know them directly or not know them at all. If Nature has given us the power to apprehend these features, no definition is necessary ; but if Nature be unkind in this respect, no definition is adequate. (2) From this it follows that the highest or summum genus cannot be defined. 'Thing,' for example, expresses pure being, which can never be viewed as resembling anything else. (3) Individual objects, as explained above, are also incapable of definition. We have read that proper names are devoid of connotation (*Vide* Chap. V, § 11) ; and hence it is not possible to define them.

(2) Summum genus cannot be defined.

(3) Individuals cannot be defined.

§ 3. **Forms of Definition.** Definitions have been distinguished differently from different stand-points. Let us notice here some of the distinctions.

(1) The most prominent distinction is that between Inductive and Deductive Definitions. In **Inductive Definition** we try to determine the meaning of a class by examining its particular instances. Like inductive inference it proceeds by observation and generalization. To arrive at the definition of 'student' or 'book,' for example, we have to observe different individual students or books and thus to gather their essential qualities which go to fix the connotation. In **Deductive Definition**, on the other hand, we explain the meaning of a complex notion by analysing it into its constituent simpler notions, as when we define a triangle to be a figure bounded by three sides. Like deductive inference,

In *Inductive Definition*, the connotation is determined by an examination of facts ;

while in *Deductive Definition*, the accepted connotation is simply unfolded.

it assumes its data as having a fixed connotation and sets before itself the task of merely unfolding it. We shall advert to the conditions of these two forms of Definition in the two following sections ; but we should remember that both of them are characterized by the same feature of noting the important points of similarity and difference.

A Real Definition explains the meaning of an existing class, while a **Nominal Definition** explains only the meaning of a name.

(2) Definitions have also been distinguished into **Real** and **Nominal**. A definition is said to be real when it explains the meaning of an actually existing thing ; while it is viewed as nominal or verbal when it merely unfolds the meaning of a name or term, without any reference to the actual existence of the corresponding objects. And, as in both the cases we have to do with ideas or notions, the one may be viewed as clearing up the relation of ideas to things, while the other, of names to notions. (*Vide* Hamilton's *Reid*, p. 691.) A question is raised at times in this connection—Whether a definition is directly concerned with things or with names ? It is evident that the need of a definition is felt only when we have passed the stage of infancy and are constrained to think only by means of names. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 5.) Thus, “All definitions are of names, and of names only ; but, in some definitions, it is clearly apparent, that nothing is intended except to explain the meaning of the word ; while in others, besides explaining the meaning of the word, it is intended to be implied that there exists a thing, corresponding to the word.” (Mill, *Logic*, I, p. 162.) Mansel contends that, as in every definition we have to do with ideas or notions,

Logic is concerned with "notional definitions only." "Definition," he writes, "is confined to the analysis and separate exposition of the attributes contained in a given concept, and determines not their reality but their conceivability." (*Prolegomena Logica*, pp. 202, 204.) However suitable such a view might have been, when formal truth was regarded as the sole end of logical inquiry, it can scarcely be maintained now-a-days when material truth is so prominently made the end of Inductive Logic. But, it is nevertheless true that Logic is directly concerned with notions or thoughts: "Every definition," says Ueberweg, "defines not the name, nor the thing, but the *notion*, and with it the name and the thing so far as this is possible." (*Logic*, p. 167.) It may be said, however, in defence of the nominalistic position here, that there are three principal reasons which seem to justify the view that definitions are primarily concerned with names: (1) we invariably think by means of names when we are in a position to employ or understand definitions; (2) definitions themselves would be vague and indefinite unless couched in precise forms of expression; and (3) the end of definition in every case seems to be to fix an accurate use of terms. (Cf. the Socratic art of Definition.) Definition, as Whately observes, "is used in Logic to signify an expression which explains any term, so as to *separate* it from everything else, as a boundary separates fields." (*Logic*, p. 94.) And this is quite consonant with the etymological sense of the term, which implies 'laying down a boundary' or marking out

Definitions
are primarily
concerned
with names.

Reasons for
this view.

the limits in any case (Lat. *definio*—*de*, down, and *finio*, to limit, from *finis*, end).

A Substantial Definition explains the essence or connotation of a notion, while a Genetic Definition enables us to arrive at an idea of it by indicating the way in which it is formed.

(3) Definitions have further been distinguished into **Substantial** and **Genetic**. A definition is said to be substantial when it unfolds the connotation or essential qualities of the notion defined; while it is taken as genetic, when it indicates the way by which we can arrive at an idea of it. Thus, the definition of 'triangle' as a three-sided rectilinear figure is a substantial definition; but the definition that it is formed by a perpendicular plane passing through the apex of a cone is a genetic definition. (Similarly, the definition that sensation is an elementary mental phenomenon produced by the stimulation of the peripheral extremity of a sensory nerve, when the current is carried to the brain, may be regarded as a genetic definition of sensation, though there can be no substantial definition of it owing to its elementary character. Substantial or Essential Definitions are thus definitions proper, while Genetic Definitions merely enable us to have an idea of a thing by indicating the mode of its genesis or formation.

Material conditions determine Inductive Definition.

§ 4. **Material Conditions of Definition.**

The material conditions of definition regulate Inductive Definition. To arrive at a correct definition of a term, we must ascertain the essential qualities of the class indicated by it. We indifferently speak of defining things and of defining names, because names stand for things; and any attempt at determining the true meaning of a term must have reference to the things signified.

Definition is

found in the things which

by it. "Definition," says Mr. Stock, "is of things through names." (*Logic*, p. 114.) We have seen that definition must always be of a class and never of an individual. (*Vide* § 2.) It is never possible for us to enumerate exhaustively all the qualities of an individual, which mark him out from the other members of the same species. To attempt to do so would be to exhaust infinity, which evidently can never be done. Hence definition is restricted to general terms alone. And, to gather the true sense of such terms, we must carefully examine the individuals constituting a class with a view to determine their common and essential features. This we can do only by noting, as explained above, the important points of similarity and difference. To arrive at a true definition, we must, therefore, observe the following rules :—

(1) *We should bring together individuals indicated by the term to be defined as well as those indicated by opposite or contrary terms.* It is not meant by this that we are to assemble for comparison all the individuals of a class, which is never possible. It implies merely that we should select for comparison the representative members of the class to be defined as well as those of the opposite classes. This will enable us to discover not only the important points of similarity but also the striking points of difference. This is what is called by Bain the positive and the negative method of definition. They are really parts of one process, which aims at discovering the true import of a class or term. Bain well observes, "As the state-

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A true definition must be based on an examination of facts.

(1) We should examine the individuals of the class to be defined as well as those of the opposite classes to ascertain the essential points of similarity and difference.

Representative instances should be examined in every case.

This implies the employment of the positive and the negative method.

ment of what is common to a number of particular things, Definition is essentially a process of generalization ; while neither particular things, nor their agreements, have any distinct meaning, unless there be assignable a distinct opposite. The act of Defining, therefore, consists of a generalizing operation, rendered precise at every step by explicit or implicit opposition, negation or contrast." (*Induction*, p. 155.) Thus, to define 'Matter,' 'Solid,' 'Metal,' or 'Food' we are to examine representative examples of these classes as well as those of the opposite classes—such as 'Mind,' 'Liquid,' 'Non-metals,' and 'Poison' as well as 'Stimulants'—and thereby to find out the important points of similarity and difference to be included in the definition.

(2) We should include only the fundamental qualities in a definition.

(2) *We should include in the definition only the fundamental qualities from which many other important qualities follow.* The reason of this rule is evident from the very nature of definition, which aims at conveying correct information of a class in the briefest form possible. Thus, though there are several points of similarity and difference in the case of 'Matter' or 'Solid,' we include only the fundamental or essential qualities (such as 'extension' and 'inertia' in the one case, and 'resistance to force applied to change the form' in the other) in the definition.

(3) We should be guided by the knowledge supplied by the sciences.

(3) We should take into account the knowledge supplied by the sciences in framing our definitions. The connotation of a term is determined, as we have seen, not by popular usage but by scientific

investigation. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 4.) A definition resting merely on popular estimate is often variable and precarious. We can render our definitions comparatively stable and accurate only when we include in them the qualities proved to be fundamental by scientific research. The **golden rule of definition**, accordingly, is *to take into account the most important and the most numerous points of community among the objects constituting the class to be defined*. This, as we shall see, is also the golden rule of Classification. (*Vide* Chap. XXVI, § 2.)

Golden rule of definition.

It is contended by some writers that the Inductive Definition is rather an impracticable process, since it is by no means an easy task to determine the qualities which are essential and common to all the members of a class. Difficulties are felt here in two ways :—(1) The number of individuals constituting a class is too large to be viewed together. Even the number of representative instances is at times numerous and various (as in the case of animals or plants), which can never be adequately considered for a correct definition. (2) There are some doubtful instances which may as well be brought under one class as under its opposite. They may be called *marginal instances*, lying in the middle, which may be drawn either to this side or to that. Is, for example, ether material or immaterial? Is jelly solid or liquid? Is dawn or evening day or night? Is arsenic or tellurium a metal or a non-metal? Is sponge a plant or an animal? As it is difficult to decide such cases by hard and fast definitions—which, it

Inductive Definition is pronounced by some writers as impracticable,

Alleged difficulties :

(1) Individuals are too numerous to be adequately examined ; and

(2) there are marginal instances which cannot appropriately be included in a definition.

Hence
Definition
by Type
is suggested
by the
advocates of
this view.

is urged, would be more or less arbitrary—a form of definition, called **Definition by Type**, is suggested by the advocates of this view as more suitable to the practical needs of life. Such a definition consists in referring to a representative member or variety of the class to be defined, as conspicuously exhibiting its prominent features, and thus rendering it intelligible to us. (*Vide* Chap. XXVI, § 3.) “The type-species of every genus, the type-genus of every family,” says Whewell, “is that one which possesses all the characters and properties of the genus in a marked and prominent manner.” (*History of the Inductive Sciences*, II, p. 122.)

But the above
objection to
Inductive
Definition is
untenable
for the
following
reasons :

(1) An
examination
of representa-
tive instances
alone may
enable us to
ascertain the
essential
attributes.
(2) The
marginal
instances
are rather
exceptions.

It may be said, however, in defence of the Inductive Definition that (1) it is not necessary to examine all the members of a class in order to discover its essential attributes which are to be embodied in its definition. An examination of representative instances and at times a careful and exhaustive analysis of even a single instance may enable us to find out such attributes. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 2 and Chap. XXII § 6.) Again, (2) the marginal instances do not invalidate a definition, since they are but exceptions to the rule. No one ever confounds opposite classes because he cannot precisely determine the character of an instance lying between them. “A certain *margin*,” says Bain, “must be allowed as *indetermined*, and as open to difference of opinion ; and such a margin of ambiguity is not to be held as invalidating the radical contrast of qualities on either side. No one would enter into a dispute as to the moment

when day passed into night ; nor would the uncertainty as to this moment be admitted as a reason for confounding day and night. We must agree to differ upon the instants of transition in all such cases. While the great body of the non-metals can be distinctly marked off from the metals, we refrain from positively maintaining arsenic and tellurium to be of either class ; they are transition individuals, the 'frontier' instances of Bacon ; in that position we leave them." [*Induction*, pp. 160-161.] (3) Moreover, the so-called Type is viewed as a type because it illustrates in it the common and essential attributes of a class. The peculiarities of a group considered as a type are not taken into account ; only those qualities are considered which are generally found among the members of the class defined. Thus, the determination of a type involves a reference to definition. If we be disposed to take into account the marginal instances, then, instead of denying the possibility of Inductive Definition and substituting for it Definition by Type, it would be more reasonable to maintain that Inductive Definitions are rather approximate in character, being applicable to *most* members of the class defined. Moreover, there is greater possibility for a variation of Type than for that of Definition. "An Approximate Definition," observes Mr. Read, "is less misleading than the indication of a Type ; for the latter method seems to imply that the group which is now typical has a greater permanence or reality than its co-ordinate groups ; whereas, for aught we know, one of the outside

(3) Type in any case involves Definition.

Even if marginal instances be taken into account, it would be more reasonable to maintain that Inductive Definition is of an approximate character than to deny its possibility altogether.

Moreover
Types
are more
variable
than
Definitions.

varieties or species may even now be superseding and extinguishing it. But the statement of a definition as approximate, is an honest confession that both the definition and classification are (like a provisional hypothesis) merely the best account we can give of the matter according to our present knowledge." (*Logic*, p. 326.)

The
difference
between
Definition
and
Induction
lies in the
fact that the
conjunction
of qualities
is assumed
in the
former,
while it
has to be
proved in
the latter.
Definition
embodies
the results of
Induction.

We may mention in this connection that the difference between Inductive Definition and Induction proper lies in the fact that the connection of qualities characterizing a class is taken for granted in the former, while it has to be proved in the latter. "In definition," writes Bain, "the conjunction is tacitly assumed; in induction, it is laid open to question; it has to be *proved* or *disproved*." (*Induction*, p. 2.) In fact, Definition may be viewed as embodying the important results of Induction. (*Vide* Chap. XV, § 2.)

Formal
conditions
determine
Deductive
Definition.

§ 5. Formal Conditions of Definition. The formal conditions of definition regulate Deductive Definition. As in deductive inference we assume the data to be true, without inquiring into their material validity, so in deductive definition we assume terms as having a fixed connotation which we merely try to explain. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 4.) The formal conditions have thus reference to the way in which we should unfold the central meaning of a notion and the way in which we are to express a definition in language that we may impart a correct information of the term defined. If Inductive Definition aims at determining the true meaning of a term by reference

They secure
consistency
and precision
of thought
and
expression.

to the attributes of the class denoted by it, Deductive Definition aims at properly unfolding the connotation already ascertained and stating it in a clear and accurate form of expression. The formal conditions of definition are:—

(1) *A definition must set forth the entire connotation of the term defined.* In defining the term 'man,' for example, we should state its whole connotation—'animality' and 'rationality.' The scholastic formula of definition—that it should be *per genus et differentiam*—indicates the same necessity, for the genus and differentia constitute the connotation of a term. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 5.) The violation of this rule gives rise to the fallacies of (a) incomplete, (b) redundant, and (c) accidental definitions. (a) When less than the entire connotation is stated, the definition is said to be *partial* or *incomplete*. If, instead of defining 'man' as a 'rational animal,' we simply state that 'man is an animal,' or 'man is rational,' then the definition becomes incomplete or imperfect. Similarly, if 'circle' be defined as 'a figure bounded by one line,' the definition is not adequate or complete, as part of its connotation is left out. (b) When more than the connotation is given in any case, the definition is said to be *overcomplete* or *redundant*, as when we define 'man' to be 'a rational animal capable of drawing inferences,' or we define 'triangle' to be 'a three-sided rectilineal figure, any two sides of which are together greater than the third.' (c) A definition is said to be *accidental* when, instead of stating the

(1) A definition should state the entire connotation of the term defined.

It should be *per genus et differentia*.

Violations of the rule:

(a) If part of the connotation be stated, a definition is incomplete; and

(b) if more, it is redundant.

(c) If accidents be given,

there is
Description.

connotation, it merely enumerates some accidental features, as when 'man' is said to be 'a laughing biped,' or 'love' is said to be 'a medley of endearments, jars, suspicions, reconcilements, wars, *etc.*, then peace again.' *Accidental Definitions* are but *Descriptions*. It is apparent from these remarks that an essential or strictly logical definition should not include in it a proprium or accident of the term defined.

Singular
terms can
only be de-
scribed ; but
designations
may be
defined.

It follows from this rule that singular terms, having no connotation, cannot be defined, though they may be described. Designations, however, as significant singular terms, may be defined through the common terms entering into their composition. (*Vide* Chap. V, § 11.) Thus, the present Viceroy of India may be defined as the person who governs India now with regal authority as the representative of the King-Emperor. The fact is that designations are not essentially singular : they are singular only by accident.

(2) A defini-
tion must be
convertible
in extent
with the
denotation
of the term
defined.

(2) *The extent or denotation of a definition should be co-extensive with the extent or denotation of the term defined.* If this be not the case, then a definition either includes things not covered by the term or excludes those that are covered by it. This rule merely indicates that the connotation stated in the definition must be possessed by every individual denoted by the term. The violation of this rule gives rise to the fallacy of either *too wide* or *too narrow definition*. For example, the definition of 'an acute-angled triangle' as 'a three-sided figure having an acute angle' is too wide, while the definition

Violation of
this rule gives
rise to too
wide or too

of 'a triangle' as 'a rectilineal figure of three equal sides' is too narrow. Similarly, the definition of 'table' as 'a material body' is too wide, while the definition of 'man' as 'a civilized rational animal' is too narrow.

narrow definitions.

(3) *A definition should not include the term defined or any of its synonyms.* To define a term by itself or by a synonymous expression is evidently to frustrate the end of definition as a satisfactory explanation of the term. The violation of this rule gives rise to the fallacy of *circle in definition*. When, for example, we define 'man' as 'a human being', 'mind' as 'a mental entity' or 'liquid' as 'a fluid substance', we commit such a fallacy. Such definitions are evidently quite useless: one, not knowing the meaning of the term defined, can never understand the meaning of such a definition.

(3) A definition should not be synonymous.

Violation of this rule gives rise to circle in definition.

(4) *A definition should be expressed in as clear and definite a form as possible.* The violation of this rule gives rise to the fault of *obscure or figurative definition*. Definitions expressed in obscure and figurative language are unintelligible and even liable to misconstruction. Such definitions should, therefore, be always avoided. Fallacies arising from the transgression of this rule may be illustrated by the following examples:—'Youth is the spring of life'; 'camel is the ship of the desert'; 'love is a sickness full of woes'; or love is

(4) A definition should be clear and not metaphorical.

Violation of this rule gives rise to obscure or figurative definition.

"The silver link, the silken tie,
Which heart to heart, and mind to mind,
In body and in soul can bind."

(5) *Negative definitions should be avoided, when-*

(5) A definition should

not be
negative.

Violation of
this rule
gives rise to
negative
definitions.

The first two
rules refer to
the contents
of a definition;
and the last
three, to its
expression.

Inductive and
Deductive
Definitions
are comple-
mentary
processes,
securing the
correctness
and precision
of notions and
expressions.

*Uses of
definition :*

(1) It renders
the meanings
of terms clear
and definite.

(2) It prevents
tautology and
inconsistency.

ever practicable. A negative definition by merely indicating difference fails to convey an adequate idea of the thing defined. A definition should, therefore, be never negative unless the whole meaning of the term defined is negative. The violation of this rule gives rise to the fault of *negative definition*. We commit a fallacy of this sort when we define 'birds' as 'not insects,' 'compound' as 'not an element,' or 'cold' as 'not hot.' Such definitions do not explain the meanings of the terms defined, and so they are useless.

It may be mentioned here that the first two of the above rules refer specially to the contents or meaning of a definition ; while the last three, rather to its expression.

§6. Value of Definition. The Inductive and Deductive Definitions are really complementary processes, securing the correct sense and proper use of terms. By the material conditions we secure the real truth of our definitions and by the formal conditions we ensure their due apprehension and application. Jointly they enable us to acquire truth and think clearly and consistently. Hence we find that the fundamental notions of every science are generally defined at the outset. Such definitions prevent misconception and confusion afterwards. We derive the following advantages from Definition—

(1) It renders the meaning of the term defined clear and definite, embodying it in language.

(2) It enables us to avoid tautology and contradiction. Repetition or inconsistency is often due

to the want of the proper comprehension of the meanings of the terms employed.

(3) It enables us to distinguish between real and verbal propositions and thus to detect truisms, which not infrequently pass for maxims of wisdom. How frequently do we not hear dicta like these—'It is just to give every man his due,' 'It is but proper that we should not reject reliable testimony,' 'The greater good should be preferred to the less' ! These seem to convey useful information because we overlook the definitions of the terms used in them.

(3) It enables us to discern in any case whether an information is really new or not.

(4) It secures correct inference. Fallacious reasonings may often be traced to ambiguity of expression or to errors connected with the meanings of terms. (*Vide* Chap. XXX, § 5.)

(4) It is an aid to correct reasoning.

§ 7. **Hints for Working out Exercises.** (1) In determining whether a definition is materially correct, we should examine representative instances of the class defined and see whether they possess the qualities included in the definition.

(2) We should always try to define a term by reference to its proximate genus and differentia. We should always take care to see that no part of the differentia is left out, thereby rendering a definition incomplete.

(3) We should not include a proprium or an accident in a definition, which should always be concise, clear, and accurate.

(4) In distinguishing between Definition and Description, we should ascertain whether the fundamental qualities constituting the connotation have been given or only the superficial qualities appealing to imagination have been enumerated.

(5) We should remember that singular terms can only be described, though designations may be defined.

(6) Ambiguous terms should be defined by reference to the different senses in which they are used.

Illustrations.

1. Define Student, Library, Pen, Progress, Eloquence.

Student: A student is a person bent, on the acquisition of knowledge.

Library: A Library is a collection of books belonging to a person or institution for the promotion of learning.

Pen: A pen is an instrument for writing by means of a fluid ink.

Progress: Progress is advance in a definite course or pursuit.

Eloquence: Eloquence is the influencing of men's feelings and conduct by means of speech.

2. Test the following definitions :—

(a) A net is a reticulated fabric decussated at regular intervals.

(b) Porosity is the property which bodies possess of having pores.

(c) A gentleman is a person who moves in good society.

(d) Mercury is not a solid metal.

(e) Humour is thinking in jest, while feeling in earnest.

All these definitions are fallacious for the following reasons :—

(a) The definition is obscure. Moreover, it moves in a circle, since net and reticulated are synonymous terms.

- (b) It is a circle in definition.
- (c) It is an accidental definition or description.
- (d) It is a negative definition.
- (e) It is a description.

§ 8. Exercises.

1. Distinguish between Definition and Description.
Indicate the Formal and Material Conditions of Definition.

2. Define the following terms :—

Animal, Plant, Rock, House, Table, Punishment, Book,
Figure, Food, Society, University, Square, Friend, Child.

3. Test the following definitions :—

- ✓(1) Words are the signs of thought.
- (2) A gentleman is a man living in a decent style.
- ✓(3) A gentleman is a man who wears English clothes.
- (4) Opposed propositions are those which differ in quantity and quality.
- ✓(5) A judge is a lawyer who exercises judicial functions.
- ✓(6) Civilization consists in eating with a knife and a fork.
- ✓(7) Black is the opposite of white.
- ✓(8) A triangle is a figure having three equal sides.
- (9) Life is a mode of activity.
- ✓(10) Pleasure is the absence of pain.
- ✓(11) Oxygen is a gas.
- (12) Logic is the science of thought.
- ✓(13) Gold is a precious metal.
- (14) A disjunctive syllogism is a syllogism whose major premise is a disjunctive proposition.
- (15) A candle is a kind of light used before gas was invented.
- ✓(16) A circle is a plane figure bounded by one line.
- (17) Conversion is the changing of terms in a proposition.
- ✓(18) A citizen is a man who pays taxes.
- ✓(19) Death is the extinction of vital forces.
- (20) A soldier is a man brave and ready to die for his country.
- ✓(21) A dog is an animal of the canine species.

- ✓(22) Life is the opposite of death.
- (23) A dog is a domestic animal that barks.
- (24) Virtue is acting rightly.
- ✓(25) Ignorance is a blind guide.
- (26) Life is the sum of the vital functions.
- (27) Humour is the perception of unexpected incongruities.
- (28) Induction is the colligation of facts by means of an appropriate conception.
- ✓(29) Life is bottled sunshine.
- (30) Logic is the science of proof or evidence.
- (31) Logic is the science of argument, *i.e.*, of inference and proof.
- ✓(32) Man is a rational biped.
- ✓(33) Necessity is the mother of invention.
- (34) A net is a collection of holes strung together.
- (35) Noon is the time when the shadows of bodies are shortest.
- ✓(36) Peace is the absence of war.
- (37) Politeness is the oil that lubricates the wheels of society.
- ✓(38) The sun is the centre of the solar system.
- (39) Gravity is a universal property of matter in virtue of which every body gravitates to every other.
- (40) Man is an animal that makes clothes for himself.
- (41) Rice is an article which is used as food in India.
- (42) A periphrasis is a circumlocutory cycle of oratorical sonorosity circumscribing an atom of ideality lost in verbal profundity.
- (43) Music is an expensive noise.
- (44) Failure is but the want of success.
- (45) A student is a youth attending an educational institution with books.
- (46) The Controller of Examinations controls the University examinations.

CHAPTER XXVI.

DIVISION AND CLASSIFICATION.

§ 1. Definition, Division, and Classification. If Definition is concerned with the connotation, Classification and Division are concerned with the denotation, of a term. In the one case, our aim is to explain the proper meaning of a term by indicating the common and essential attributes of the class denoted by it; while, in the other, our aim is to connect an individual (or class) with a class having affinity with it, so as to bring out in the easiest manner its points of similarity and difference. And, as the connotation and denotation of a term are closely connected with each other, Definition, Division, and Classification are also intimately related logical processes. In defining terms, we are aided by division and classification, as these bring before our mind the members having striking points of similarity and difference, which enter into the definition as genus and differentia. Again, definition in its turn renders a division and classification precise and accurate by laying down the characters on which sound division and classification should always be based. If classification is not a meaningless process, it involves a reference to definition, explicit or implicit, popular or scientific; and, in order that definition may be possible, we must be able to think together the members of the class

Definition unfolds the connotation, while Division and Classification systematize the denotation of a term.

Definition, Division and Classification are closely connected processes, which help one another.

which we want to define. It may be mentioned in this connection that popular classification, like popular definition, is often superficial and vague, while the scientific form in each case is comparatively sound and precise.

Division and Classification indicate the downward and the upward course in arranging things : in the one we proceed from higher to lower classes ; while in the other, from individuals to classes.

Classification and Division embody the results of Definition and Inference.

In generalisation we predicate of a class what is found to be

Division and Classification, as indicated above, have both to do with a systematic arrangement of the denotation of a term. They are essentially the same process, only beginning at opposite ends. In Division we proceed from the higher to the lower class, until we come to *infima species* or the lowest groups ; while in Classification, we proceed from individuals to classes, and from lower classes to higher classes, until we come to the *summum genus* or the highest class. They are both guided by a sense of what is necessary to constitute a class, *i.e.*, by an apprehension of the qualities which may be supposed as forming a sort of implicit, and often inaccurate, definition. Classification and Division may, accordingly, be viewed as representing in a condensed and convenient form the results of Definition. And we have already seen how Definitions may be regarded as embodying the conclusions of Inferences, inductive and deductive. Thus, Classification and Division may be taken as containing in a nutshell the information gathered by prior logical processes. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 1.)

§ 2. Generalisation, Induction, Explanation, Definition, and Classification. Generalisation consists in proceeding from one or more instances to all members of the class, as

when on observing that fire burns or iron rusts in some cases, we conclude that it is equally true in all other cases. Such inferences, therefore, always rest on the detection of a 'common nature' in all these instances, by reason of which we are led to think that what is true of some is true of all. If we hastily suspect the presence of such a common nature, our generalization becomes precarious ; if, on the other hand, we determine such a nature by a careful examination of materials and a cautious employment of the inductive canons, our generalization turns out to be comparatively certain. Again, when the grounds of a generalization are not discovered, it may be accepted simply as an empirical truth not contradicted by experience ; but it cannot then be regarded as an induction proper. Induction requires that a generalization must stand the test of the Inductive Canons and so reveal a uniform causal connection among the factors or qualities constituting the 'common nature.'

Generalization in every form is closely connected with Explanation and Classification, since all of them aim, as we have seen, at the detection of the points of similarity. And, according as these points are fundamental or superficial, we characterise these processes as scientific or popular. Classification regards the points of similarity as fixed qualities, while Explanation treats them as in a process of genesis. In fact, the distinction between *qualities*, on which Classification is based, and *processes* or *activities*, on which Explanation is

true of some of its members.

A generalization rigorously proved by the inductive canons is viewed as Inductive.

Generalization, Explanation, and Classification are interconnected.

Classification contemplates the statical

aspect of things, while Explanation, their dynamical aspect.

based, is entirely relative : qualities refer only to what we attribute to an object by reference to the effects on our senses (*e.g.*, weight, colour), while activities refer to some power or energy by reason of which these effects are believed to be produced (*e.g.*, gravity, light). Now, in the case of Explanation, we refer to the causes which bring about an event or produce an object ; while in the case of Classification, we refer to the features as they are found in it. Thus, if Explanation be described as analysing Nature in its dynamic aspect, Classification may be described as analysing it in its static aspect. Both of them, properly carried out, bring the mind in harmony with Nature and both satisfy our curiosity and rationalise our memory.

Classification, Definition and Explanation influence one another.

We have already seen that Classification and Definition are closely connected. In the one we refer an individual or a group to a class supposed to possess fixed characters or fundamental attributes, while in the other we explicitly state these so as to convey a clear and accurate idea of the class as distinguished from other classes. And both these functions subserve the end of Explanation and are exercised by means of correct generalization and induction. Classification as well as Definition has, accordingly, been described at times as but a compendious form of Explanation. As means of communicating knowledge, Explanation is rather lengthy, Definition comparatively brief, while Classification is condensed to the utmost limit ; what is expressed in the case of an Explanation in several sentences is expressed in a Defi-

Classification and Definition are compendious forms of Explanation.

nition usually in one sentence, while in a Classification the sense is conveyed merely by a term or name.

§ 3. **Character and Forms of Classification.** Classification is the systematic arrangement of objects in groups according to certain points of similarity and difference. Every classification is relative to some end in view. A painter, for example, may classify birds into animals that are beautiful and those that are not ; while a musician may classify them into singing creatures and those that are not so. Man, for example, may be classed under vertebrate animals by the zoologist, while under moral beings by the moralist. Popular classification is mainly determined by the special character of experience and interestingness. Popular classification is thus to a great extent capricious, superficial, and variable.

Classification is systematic arrangement of objects in groups according to certain points of similarity and difference.

Popular classification is superficial and variable.

(1) Classification may be either (*a*) general or (*b*) special. (*a*) **General or scientific classification** aims at knowledge : objects are classified according to their important and prominent qualities. The **golden rule of scientific classification** is that objects should be classified according to their most important and most numerous points of community. (*b*) **Special classification** has reference to some definite or particular end in view, as when horses are classified into animals that are fast and those that are slow.

General or Scientific classification is based on many important points of similarity. Golden rule of classification.

Special classification is relative to some particular end.

(2) Classification has otherwise been distinguished into (*a*) natural and (*b*) artificial. (*a*) **Natural classification** is based on real points of similarity

Natural classification is based on numerous and impor-

tant points of similarity, characterizing a group as fixed by Nature.

Artificial Classification is based on some feature or features relative to a definite purpose.

Natural Classification is supposed to be based on the natural constitution of things : while Artificial, on arbitrary human requirements.

The distinction may be traced to Mill's view of Natural Kinds.

and difference, *i. e.*, on numerous and important points of community among objects which differ from others. The Natural Kinds (Minerals, Plants, and Animals), for example, constitute distinct classes, in as much as they are separated from one another by prominent and numerous features. According to Mill, the qualities of Natural Kinds are really inexhaustible. Natural classification is allied to the scientific form referred to above. (*b*) **Artificial classification**, on the other hand, is based on some feature arbitrarily selected as the principle of classification. As when balls are classified into things that are red and those that are not so. Artificial classification is thus allied to the special form indicated above.

The distinction between Natural and Artificial Classification is based on the assumption that the natural classes are more or less fixed, being characterized by a definite group of qualities as given by Nature, while the artificial classes are formed by pure caprice or the requirements of man. In the one, we adapt our classification to what is settled by Nature ; in the other, we arbitrarily readjust the natural groups to suit our own ends. The origin of this distinction may be traced to Mill's doctrine of *Real or Natural Kinds*, indicating classes (such as Minerals, Plants, and Animals) on which their special features have been permanently stamped by Nature. And the peculiarity of Natural Kinds is that they are characterized by an indefinite number of common attributes, while artificial classes have at most only a few points of simi-

larity. Thus, if the qualities of man, plant, metal, or sulphur are numerous, those of such classes as round things, tables, libraries, or pens are comparatively few.

It may be mentioned, however, in this connection that the distinction between Natural and Artificial Classification is not quite sound. (a) Even if we assume that Nature has unalterably fixed the distinguishing qualities of the Natural Kinds, still in classifying them we have to select only some qualities as the ground of our classification, ignoring the rest. And, in the case of artificial classification, we have also to select from among the possibilities furnished by Nature. In classifying things into, say, large and small, we have to take into account the size in any case, which is supplied by Nature. (b) The view—that in natural classification the points of similarity are numerous, while in artificial classification they are few—is not strictly true. If we closely observe, we find that the points of difference between such artificial classes as rupees and sovereigns, Englishmen and Santals, Colleges and *Pathshalas* are not few, each group being characterized by many qualities. (c) We find, however, as a matter of fact, that the different natural classes which we treat as separate, have often important points of similarity; and the modern Theory of Evolution tries to show that the different grades of being are developments out of one primitive stock.

We find, accordingly, Classification by Series emphasized now-a-days. As the entire animal life, for example, represents one kind of

The distinction, however, is not strictly correct, as all classification is due to human invention or choice.

Classification by Series is the arrangement of classes in a

graduated scale according to the variation of some feature or features.

It is favourable to the discovery of the fundamental qualities of a Class or Order.

being manifested in different degrees or grades, the arrangement of its different forms in a series, according to the more or less perfect manifestation of its fundamental qualities, is more conducive to the discovery of its essential attributes than a mere detached enumeration of the several forms. Thus, the vertebrate animals may be arranged in a serial order beginning with the highest class, mammals, and then proceeding to birds, reptiles, amphibia (*e.g.*, frogs), and fishes. Such an arrangement enables us to discover easily, by the Method of Concomitant Variations, the fundamental qualities which characterize the kind of being manifested in different forms. We discover, for example, in this way that the essential qualities of the vertebrata are the possession of a backbone, a nervous system, jaws as parts of the head, and four limbs disposed in pairs. "The requisites of a classification intended to facilitate the study of a particular phenomenon," says Mill, "are, first, to bring into one class all Kinds of things which exhibit that phenomenon, in whatever variety of forms or degrees; and secondly, to arrange those Kinds in a series according to the degree in which they exhibit it, beginning with those which exhibit most of it, and terminating with those which exhibit least." (*Logic*, II, p. 289.) The Evolutionist carries Classification by Series to its farthest limit when he tries to weave a connected account of the entire universe. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 7.)

Deductive Classification or Division

(3) Classification may again be divided into (a) Deductive and (b) Inductive. (a) **Deductive Classi-**

fication, or what is ordinarily called **Division**, consists in dividing a class into sub-classes, and these sub-classes again into smaller groups, and so on, until we come to the lowest species. (*b*) **Inductive Classification**, or what is sometimes simply called **Classification**, consists in arranging individual objects into groups or classes according to their points of similarity and difference. These groups are again brought together under higher groups, and so on, by reference to the prominent points of similarity. If deductive classification proceeds from the more general to the less general, inductive classification proceeds from the less to the more: if the one be described as a downward process, the other may be described as an upward one.

is the breaking up of a class into sub-classes.

Inductive Classification (or what is simply called Classification) is the arrangement of individuals in groups according to certain points of affinity.

The distinction between Deductive and Inductive Classification, like that between Deduction and Induction, is not an absolute one. Deductive Classification involves the inductive form, and Inductive Classification involves the deductive type. When, for example, we divide animals into rational and irrational, we assume the presence or absence of rationality as the principle of Classification, which must have been gathered by Induction. Inductive Classification, similarly, implies the deductive form. When, for example, we classify tables, chairs, and benches as furniture, we assume that there is a bond of similarity among them, by reason of which the smaller classes follow from the larger one. There is a hypothesis as to the ground of resemblance under which the things

The distinction between Deductive and Inductive Classification is relative and not absolute.

to be classified may be brought, *i.e.*, from which they may, so to speak, be deduced. Though Deductive and Inductive Classification are thus closely connected, yet we may call a classification Deductive or Inductive according as it prominently illustrates this or that method.

Whewell maintains that Classification proceeds by type, which pre-eminently represents the Characteristics of a class.

§ 4. Is Classification by Type or by Definition? It is a matter of controversy among logicians whether we classify by reference to type or definition. Whewell contends that 'Classification proceeds by type. A Type* is an eminent example of a class embodying its characteristics in a conspicuous and complete form. In order to define food, for example, we may take milk, rice or bread as a type, since it embodies the qualities of food as nourishment in a prominent form, and we may then try to bring other objects under the class

* "The type of each genus," says Waterhouse, "should be that species in which the characters of its group are best exhibited and most evenly balanced." Mill also writes, "We must consider as the type of the class, that among the Kinds included in it, which exhibits the properties constitutive of the class, in the highest degree; conceiving the other varieties as instances of degeneracy, as it were, from that type; deviations from it by inferior intensity of the characteristic property or properties. For every phenomenon is best studied (*cæteris paribus*) where it exists in the greatest intensity. It is there that the effects which either depend on it, or depend on the same causes with it, will also exist in the greatest degree. It is there consequently, and only there, that those effects of it, or joint effects with it, can become fully known to us; so that we may learn to recognise their smaller degrees or even their mere rudiments, in cases in which the direct study would have been difficult or even impossible. Not to mention that the phenomenon in its higher degrees may be attended by effects or collateral circumstances which in its smaller degrees do not occur at all, requiring for their production in any sensible amount a greater degree of intensity of the cause than is there met with. In man, for example, (the species in which both the phenomenon of animal and that of organic life exist in the highest degree) many subordinate phenomena develop themselves in the course of his animated existence, which the inferior varieties of animals

(food) by reference to it (*i. e.*, milk, rice or bread). So in classifying flowers, we may take the rose or the lily as the type ; or, in forming the class 'felidæ', we may take the tiger as the type and then bring the lion, the leopard, the cat, the puma under the class as they more or less resemble the type. Likewise, in classifying things into solid, liquid and gaseous, we select their types, such as stone, water and hydrogen respectively ; and things resembling one or other of these types are classified as solid, liquid or gaseous. (A class is thus formed by the type round which individuals resembling it are brought together. "Natural Groups," says Whewell, "are best described, not by any Definition which marks their boundaries but by a Type which marks their centre.") The Type of any natural group is an example which possesses in a marked degree all the leading characters of the class. A Natural Group is steadily fixed, though not precisely limited ; it is given in position, though not circumscribed ; it is determined, not by a boundary without, but by a central point within ;—not by what it strictly excludes, but by what it

do not show. The knowledge of these properties may nevertheless be of great avail towards the discovery of the conditions and laws of the general phenomenon of life, which is common to man with those inferior animals. And they are, even, rightly considered as properties of animated nature itself ; because they may evidently be affiliated to the general laws of animated nature ; because we may fairly presume that some rudiments of feeble degrees of those properties would be recognised in all animals by more perfect organs, or even by more perfect instruments, than ours, and because those may be correctly termed properties of a class, which a thing exhibits exactly in proportion as it belongs to the class, that is, in proportion as it possesses the main attributes constitutive of the class." (*Logic*, II, pp. 291-292.)

eminently includes ;—by a Type, not by a Definition." (*Novum Organon Renovatum*, pp. 21—22.)

Mill holds that Classification is based on definition, indicating the essential qualities by reference to which members are to be grouped together.;

Mill, however, contends that Classification is based on definition. The essential attributes or characteristics of a species must first be definitely laid down, and then objects should be classified by reference to them. Mill's method presents the difficulty of classing individuals which prominently resemble a class but may not possess all the attributes included in the Definition. Should we, for example, regard idiots and lunatics as men? Is sponge a plant or an animal? Mill, no doubt, would question the propriety of including such individuals in the class : scientifically they should be left out. But he admits that classification is often suggested by type, though it is to be corrected by definition.

Whewell's view represents the ordinary, while Mill's the logical, form of classification.

It appears that Whewell refers to the ordinary method of classification. Ordinarily, we never take the trouble of carefully examining the individual objects and gathering their connotation before classifying them. We classify by reference to the average impression or type. The earlier classifications, in the history of the race as well as of the individual, are of this form. Mill's account of classification, on the other hand, refers to the correct or ideal form of classification. Classification should always be by reference to the deep-seated and numerous points of community embodied in a definition. If Whewell's account indicates the actual form of classification, Mill's indicates the logical form. With regard to classification by

types, Jevons writes, "Perplexed by the difficulties arising in natural history from the discovery of intermediate forms, naturalists have resorted to what they call classification by types. Instead of forming one distinct class defined by the invariable possession of certain assigned properties, and rigidly including or excluding objects according as they do or do not possess all these properties, naturalists select a typical specimen, and they group around it all other specimens which resemble this type more than any other selected type...It would be a great mistake to suppose that this classification by types is a logically distinct method. It is either not a real method of classification at all, or it is merely an abbreviated mode of representing a complicated system of arrangement. A class must be defined by the invariable presence of certain common properties. If, then, we include an individual in which one of these properties does not appear, we either fall into logical contradiction, or else we form a new class with a new definition. Even a single exception constitutes a new class by itself, and by calling it an exception we merely imply that this new class closely resembles that from which it diverges in one or two points only." (*Principles of Science*, pp. 722-723.)

Jevons agrees with Mill.

§ 5. Classification Modified by Evolution. The old doctrine of classification should be modified to suit the modern Theory of Evolution. Classes can no longer be viewed as essentially and fundamentally distinct, possessing different or unlike attributes. The different

The older method of classifying the different species as radically distinct, characterized by essentially

different qualities, has been modified by the Theory of Evolution, which classifies them as members of the same family by reference to their 'affinity' or proximity of descent.

Classification thus becomes deductive and derivative, while previously it was inductive and empirical.

Classification and Conception are closely connected since

species are not radically distinct; they are but different developments out of the same stock, under varying conditions. Consistently with the theory of evolution, when we classify, say, plants or animals, by reference to 'affinity,' 'affinity' should be understood as implying nearness of descent from the same stock. The animal kingdom, for example, may be regarded as a family tree illustrating a long line of ancestors; and we should classify the different kinds of animals into higher or lower classes according to the proximity or remoteness of their descent from the primitive stock. Men may thus be brought under apes as their immediate ancestors; and apes may be brought under quadrumana, that may similarly be brought under mammals, and so on. In fact, the character of classification is altered: it is no longer based on empirical laws having reference to the fixed and unalterable characters of the different classes; it rests rather on derivative laws following from causation. If previously classification was essentially inductive and empirical; as modified by evolution, classification becomes rather deductive and derivative.

§ 6. Classification, Conception, Abstraction, and Generalization. Classification and Conception are evidently very closely connected with each other. We classify objects when we bring under general notions or concepts. Without concepts there can never be a classification. In order to form a concept and thus to classify, we have recourse to abstrac-

tion and analysis. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 3, Chap. XVI, § 4, and Chap. XXVIII, § 2.)

involves
abstraction
and analysis.

Abstraction should be distinguished from Analysis by the fact that, in it, we do not exhaustively consider all the constituent qualities, but we consider only some, withdrawing our attention from the rest. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 4.) Analysis thus involves abstraction at every step. There are differences of opinion with regard to the character of abstraction itself :—(a) some hold that abstraction means the *withdrawal of attention from* certain features ; (b) while others contend that abstraction implies the *direction of attention to* certain features. In the midst of this apparent diversity of opinion we find that there is a common point. The concrete exercise of attention in every case involves both a positive and a negative factor. We can, for example, never direct our attention *to* the stature alone of a person without for the time being withdrawing our attention *from* the other features, such as colour, form, &c. But if we still persist in raising the question, Which of these two aspects of attention—negative and positive—is indicated by abstraction ? then we may find a reply in the etymology of the term itself. The etymology of Abstraction (Lat. *abs* from, and *traho*, to draw) suggests that we are to understand by it the negative aspect rather than the positive.

Different
interpreta-
tions of
Abstraction

which has
really a
positive and
a negative
aspect.

A question has been raised as to the relation of Abstraction to Generalization. Without entering into the perplexing psychological aspect of the relative priority of either of these two processes

Abstraction and generalization are inter-connected.

(which is outside the scope of our study), we may simply observe that these two processes are very intimately related to each other. Whenever we withdraw our attention from certain features, we evidently have general ideas of them, without which we can never at all be aware of the features from which to withdraw our attention. Again, it is by withdrawing our attention from the individual peculiarities that we direct our attention to the common features and thus form general ideas of classes. Abstraction and Generalization thus go hand in hand. "What we understand by Generalization," observes Dr. Venn, "is to be interpreted in a wide sense : we must be careful to associate with it all that process of analysis, and of the requisite exclusions, by which alone generalization can be made trustworthy." (*Empirical Logic*, p. 356.)

§ 7. The Rules or Conditions of Classification. The rules of scientific classification are the following :—

(1) The golden rule of classification is to group together things having the most numerous and the most important points of similarity.

(1) *Place together in groups those things that possess in common the most numerous and the most important qualities.* This is the golden rule of definition and classification alike. To classify objects on the ground of some one quality, such as the presence of four legs or warm blood, is not so useful as to bring together things having several important points of community (*e. g.*, Mammalia, Felidae, Rosaceae). And to classify objects merely by reference to their superficial or outward features (such as colour, form, hair), however serviceable it may be for practical purposes, is scientifically useless.

(2) *Connect the groups having close affinity and separate those that are marked by important points of difference.* This rule enables us to distinguish aright the classes which are characterized by prominent differences, though they may have also points of similarity by reason of which they may be viewed as subdivisions of a higher class. Thus, Birds are distinguished from Reptiles, though both of them are brought under the higher class, Sauropsida, 'characterized by the absence of gills, by having the skull joined to the vertebral column by a single occipital condyle, the lower jaw composed of several pieces, and united to the skull by means of a special (quadrate) bone and by possessing uncleated red blood corpuscles.'

(2) Distinguish groups by important points of similarity and difference.


(3) *Graduate the classification upwards, tracing smaller groups to higher or more general classes and continuing the process until a comprehensive class or kingdom is reached which shows the affinity.* Such a plan has the advantage of exhibiting in a comprehensive scheme the mutual relation of the subdivisions according to their fundamental points of similarity and difference.

(3) Graduate the classification upwards.

(4) *The proximity of subdivisions in a general scheme should be determined by the degree of their affinity or similarity ; and their distance, by their difference or variation.* This rule implies that, in arranging the classes, we should place them so in a scheme of classification that their proximity should indicate their similarity, and their distance, their difference ; and the degree of proximity or distance should indicate the degree of similarity or

(4) The proximity or distance of classes in a general scheme of classification should be determined by the degrees of their similarity and difference.

difference. Thus, instead of classifying triangles into equilateral, scalene, and isosceles, it would be better to classify them into equilateral, isosceles and scalene, showing the gradual descent in the equality of sides. A sliding scale is better than abrupt transitions. The truth of these remarks will appear from the following table of the classification of Animals given by Mr. Read in his *Logic* :—



It may be mentioned here that the term 'species' is used in Division or Deductive Classification to express any class which may be viewed as included in another, the terms species and genus being entirely relative. (*Vide* Chap. IV, § 5.) In (Inductive) Classification, 'species' usually stands for the lowest class alone, the highest being called kingdom. If, in any case, the lowest class is still divisible into smaller classes, these are named as sub-species or varieties. The names of the different classes in Inductive classification may be arranged in order of generality thus—(1) Kingdom, (2) Sub-kingdom, (3) Class, (4) Sub-class, (5) Division, (6) Order, (7) Section or Family, (8) Genus, (9) Species, (10) Variety.

The term 'species' is used in Division to indicate any smaller class ; but, in Classification, it represents the lowest class in a series.

§ 8 The Rules or Conditions of Division. Before proceeding to consider the rules of Logical Division, let us distinguish it from the other forms of Division with which it is liable to be confounded. Division is said to be either Logical, Physical, or Metaphysical. **Logical division** is the division of a class ; it is the systematic arrangement of the denotation of a general term into groups or smaller classes according to the presence, absence, or varying degree of some important attribute. We may divide, for example, the class 'man' logically into the sub divisions learned and other than learned, according to the principle—presence or absence of learning. Similarly, we may classify 'man' differently according to some other principle (*e.g.*, height or stature) and get the sub-divisions—tall, short, and of medium

Logical, Physical, and Metaphysical Division distinguished.

Logical Division is the systematic arrangement of the individuals of a class into subordinate groups on some fundamental principle.

Physical Division is the separation of an individual into its component parts.

Metaphysical Division is the analysis of an object into its constituent qualities.

size. While logical division is thus the division of a class, **physical division** or **partition** is the division of an individual into its constituent parts. Thus, physical division is always the division of an object indicated by a singular term. If, for example, we divide 'man' into the head, the trunk, and the limbs, we get an example of physical division. If physical division is the breaking up of an object into its component parts, **metaphysical division** or **analysis** is the enumeration of the constituent qualities of an object. Metaphysical division is illustrated when we divide 'man' into animality and rationality. It is but the enumeration of the attributes or qualities found in man. Similarly, 'chalks' may be logically divided into, say, drawing chalks and other than drawing chalks. The physical division of 'chalk' would be to break it up into its component parts, while its metaphysical division would be its analysis into its constituent qualities, such as whiteness, opacity, brittleness, &c.

As, in Logic, we are not concerned with physical partition or metaphysical analysis, we shall limit our inquiry to the determination of the conditions of logical division. The rules of logical division are :—

Rules of Logical Division :

(1) The term to be divided must be general.

The fallacy due to its violation is one of physical or metaphysical division.

(1) *The term to be divided must be general :* a class can be divided into sub-classes. The violation of this rule gives rise, as shown above, to the fallacy of *physical or metaphysical division*. It is apparent from this that a collective term, as such, cannot be logically divided. If we divide 'a library' into the books of reference, science, history, and fiction, we are guilty of physical division, as we

divide an individual into its parts. The division of 'the British Parliament' into the House of Lords and the House of Commons, or of 'a forest' into, say, the mango trees, pine trees, teak trees, and *sal* trees similarly indicates physical division.

(2) *There should be a single principle of division—a fundamentum divisionis.* Whenever we divide a term, we must accept as the principle of division a single line of thought—the presence, absence, or varying degree of some important attribute. When, for example, we divide 'men' into tall, learned, and virtuous, we transgress this rule, since we adopt more than one principle as the principle of division. The fallacy arising from the violation of this rule is technically called *the fallacy of cross division*. Similarly, the division of 'tables' into circular, wooden, marble, brown, and heavy, or of 'coins' into English, French, gold, round, and valuable illustrates the same fallacy.

(2) There should be a single principle of division.

The fallacy due to its violation is known as cross division

(3) *The name of the class divided must be applicable to each of the sub-divisions.* When, for example, we divide 'men' into learned and other than learned, we can predicate the term 'man' of each of the sub-divisions. The violation of this rule gives rise to the fallacy of *physical or metaphysical division*. When, for example, we divide 'a table' into its top, legs, and framework, or 'gold' into its malleability, weight, and yellow colour, we cannot predicate the name 'table' of the top, legs, or framework, nor 'gold', of malleability, weight, or yellow colour.

(3) The term divided must be predicable of each of the subdivisions.

Violation of this rule implies physical or metaphysical division.

(4) *All the sub-divisions taken together must make up the class divided*; otherwise the division is said to

(4) Division must be exhaustive.

The fallacy due to its violation is known as incomplete division.

be incomplete. If, for example, we divide 'men' into tall and short, the division may be said to be *incomplete*, in as much as men of medium size are left out of account. Similarly, to divide 'triangles' into equilateral and scalene, or 'the articles of food' into sweet and sour would be to commit such a fallacy, as the isosceles triangles, in the one case, and the things having some other taste, in the other, are passed over.

(5) The subdivisions must be mutually exclusive.

(5) *The sub-divisions must exclude one another*; otherwise we get the fallacy of what is called *overlapping division*. If, for example, we divide men into tall, honest, and industrious, we are guilty of this fallacy, in as much as industrious men may be tall or honest, honest men may be tall or industrious, and tall men may likewise be honest or industrious. Thus, the sub-classes overlap, *i.e.*, they are not mutually exclusive. It may be mentioned in this connection that the transgression of this rule involves also the violation of the second rule given above, which may be regarded as the principal rule of Division.

The fallacy due to its violation is known as overlapping division.

(6) A class should be subdivided into proximate groups.

(6) *A class should be divided into its proximate sub-classes*, as otherwise a division is not likely to serve any useful purpose. The transgression of this rule gives rise to the error known as *division by a leap*. If, for example, we divide 'animals' into learned men and those that are not learned, the division is practically useless. We may divide 'animals' into rational and irrational, or 'men' into learned and other than learned; but to divide 'animals' into those that are learned and those that are not so is, to say the least, fanciful and eccentric.

The fallacy due to its violation is known as division by a leap.

Whenever we logically divide a term, it is often difficult to ascertain, without a knowledge of the subject-matter of the term divided, whether the rules given above are satisfied or not. Hence a form of division known as division by dichotomy is suggested which, from its mere form, shows that the logical rules are satisfied. **Division by Dichotomy** (Gr. *dicha*, in two, and *temno*, to cut) is the division of a class into two contradictory sub classes, as when we divide men into tall and not-tall, tables into rectangular and not-rectangular, horses into fast and not-fast, days into bright and not-bright. As contradictory terms are mutually exclusive, and as, taken together, they make up the whole universe, we are sure, in the case of division by Dichotomy, that the several logical rules are observed. It is based on the Principle of Excluded Middle. (*Vide* Chap. II, § 6.)


Division by Dichotomy is the division of a class into contradictory sub-classes.


It ensures formal correctness.

If the table in the preceding section illustrates how the different forms of animal life may be systematically grouped under different classes, the following tables illustrate how a higher class may be systematically subdivided into smaller groups by the process of Dichotomy :—

Illustrations.

Figure





Uses of Classification:

(1) It is a condensed and compendious form of explanation. It thus helps comprehension.

Points of difference between Explanation and Classification:

(a) the one is explicit and fully expressed, while the other is implicit and condensed
(b) the one

§ 9. Uses and Limits of Division and Classification.

The *uses of Classification* are briefly the following.—(1) Classification by indicating the important points of similarity and difference, enables us to understand things aright. Classification, as we have said, furnishes the necessary information in a compendious form: it is but an abbreviated explanation. Whenever we refer an object to its appropriate class, we know at once its important points of similarity and difference and thereby we understand it. The difference between Explanation and Classification lies (a) in the one being an explicit and fully expressed, while the other being an implicit and condensed, mode of accounting for things, and (b) in the one being concerned with phenomena or changes, while the other, with things as they are found or given. As Mr. Read says, "Explanation ana-

lyses Nature in its dynamic, Classification in its static aspect. In both cases we have a feeling of relief." (*Logic*, p. 303.)

(2) Classification is an important aid to memory. Whenever we refer an object to a class, we render its retention and subsequent revival easy. To remember the innumerable objects individually is difficult, if not impossible; but to remember them by reference to their classes or points of similarity is comparatively easy.

(3) Classification gives control over the contents of memory. By marshalling things into classes we can readily find them out when wanted. A poet or a scientist, for example, may thus look in the right direction for a simile or an appropriate example. Classification suggests also hypotheses by analogy. It, accordingly, facilitates communication and explanation. This use is illustrated also in Division.

The *uses of Division* are :—(1) Division gives us a definite knowledge of the denotation of a term and the differences which may exist among its several groups. It thus renders the application of a general term more precise or accurate. (2) Division is an important aid to the specialization of inquiry and thus to the discovery of secondary laws, which, as we have seen, are of great practical value. [*Vide* Chap. XXIII, § 5.] (3) It enables us also to think and reason systematically by reference to the distinct subdivisions of a class. It thus prevents confusion and is an aid to the clearness of thought.

has to do with processes, while the other with existing things.

(2) Classification is an aid to memory.

(3) It facilitates exposition and discovery.

Uses of Division :

(1) It renders the application of a term precise by giving us a definite knowledge of its denotation.

(2) It favours the specialization of inquiry and the discovery of secondary laws.

(3) It enables us to think and reason

clearly and correctly.

Division and Classification are always relative to certain ends.

Index Classification is often an important aid to the other forms of classification.

It should be remembered in this connection that Division and Classification, when based on numerous and important points of similarity among the objects divided or classified, are more or less the work of the mind and are thus relative to definite interests, scientific or otherwise. 'Men,' for example, may be classified under bipeds, mammals, or intelligent beings according to the end in view; and 'men' may likewise be divided into Christians and non-Christians, civilized and uncivilized, or honest and dishonest. At times Division or Classification is scientific, being based on several essential points of similarity; and, at times, it may be practical, designed to serve some desirable end. Thus, birds may be classified by reference to their notes by a musician, their plumage by a painter, and their structure or habits by an ornithologist. We may similarly classify the subject-matter of a book in one way in the 'Contents' and in a different way in the 'Index.' It may be mentioned in this connection that an **Index Classification** has the advantage of limiting the possible classes to the number of the alphabet in a language (26 in English) and of arranging them in regular succession, so that they can be easily found out and their definite characters, promptly known. The Index Classification is ordinarily a secondary form, which is required to help the primary form of Classification based on the golden rule. Thus, the classification of plants or animals is primarily based on deep-seated and fundamental attributes discovered often by patient research involving dissection, micro-

scopical examination, and careful comparison of different specimens. Similarly, the subject-matter of a book may be distributed in different chapters according to some fundamental principle determining the division of topics. But, to a beginner, the essential attributes of the different classes and the plan of division or classification would be a sealed book, if he be not aided by an *analytical key* which serves as an index or guide to the different divisions or classes and their fundamental qualities. We find, accordingly, the Index Classification adopted for the diagnosis of plants, animals, diseases, *etc.*, and hence it is known also as *Diagnostic Classification*. The different signs of structural differences or of morbid processes are recorded in the Index, which enables us to determine the character of a plant, animal, or disease by reference to the concurrence of the signs or symptoms. We thus infer the character of a plant, animal, or disease, by observing, say, the flowers and leaves, the teeth and limbs, the pulse, tongue, and temperature, in any case, and by comparing the characters observed with those recorded in the Index. (*Cf.* The Linnæan System of Botany.)

The Index Classification often enables us to discover the important qualities of a class by reference to their signs or symptoms. It is generally used in Botany, Zoology, Medicine, &c.

Having indicated the uses of Division and Classification, let us now consider their limits. The *limits to classification* are the limits to definite and precise knowledge. "A full classification," says Jevons, "constitutes a complete record of all our knowledge of the objects or events classified, and the limits of exact knowledge are identical with the limits of classification." [*Principles of Science,*

Limits of Classification

(1) Ignorance
of definite
characters.

(2) The
marginal
instances.

(3) Composite
objects whose
constituents
are combined
in varying
proportions.

(4) Varying
phenomena
whose com-
position is
not known.

p. 731.] (1) When we cannot satisfactorily ascertain the characters of an object or phenomenon, we cannot refer it to a particular class. Thus, there are difficulties in determining whether ether is material, or sponge, an animal. (2) The marginal instances also do not admit of easy classification. [*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 2.] (3) Composite objects whose constituents are combined in varying proportions cannot easily be referred to their classes. "Granite," for example, "is a mixture of quartz, felspar, and mica, but there are hardly two specimens in which the proportions of these three constituents are alike, and it would be impossible to lay down definitions of distinct species of granite without finding an infinite variety of intermediate species. The only true classification of granites, then, would be founded on the proportions of the constituents present and a chemical or microscopic analysis would be requisite, in order that we might assign a specimen to its true position in the series." [Jevons, *op. cit.*] (4) Still more difficult is it to classify a varying phenomenon whose composition is not known. "If we attempt to classify tastes, we may rudely group them according as they are sweet, bitter, saline, alkaline, acid, astringent, or fiery; but it is evident that these groups are bounded by no sharp lines of definition. Tastes of mixed or intermediate character may exist almost *ad infinitum*, and what is still more troublesome, the tastes clearly united within one class may differ more or less from each other, without our being able to arrange them in subordinate genera and species. The

same remarks may be made concerning the classification of odours, which may be roughly grouped according to the arrangement of Linnæus as, aromatic, fragrant, ambrosiac, alliaceous, fetid, virulent, nauseous. Within each of these vague classes, however, there would be infinite shades of variety, and each class would graduate into other classes. The odours which can be discriminated by an acute nose are infinite ; every rock, stone, plant, or animal has some slight smell, and it is well known that dogs, or even blind men, can discriminate persons by slight distinctive odour which usually passes unnoticed." [*Ibid.*, p. 732.] (5) An elementary experience or the summum genus cannot be brought under a higher class. (*Vide* Chap. XXIV, § 4.) *The Limits of Division* are evidently (1) the infima species, which cannot be further subdivided into groups, (2) the ultimate experiences, and (3) composite things which are too peculiar to admit of subdivisions.

(5) An elementary experience or the summum genus.
Limits of Division :
(1) Infima species,
(2) ultimate experiences, and
(3) composite things which are unique.

§ 10. **Hints for Working out Exercises.** (1) To determine in any case whether we are concerned with Classification or Division, we should observe whether the procedure is from individuals to classes, from lower classes to higher ones, or from higher classes to lower groups.

(2) To ascertain whether, in any case, there is logical, physical, or metaphysical division, we must examine whether the term divided is singular or general. The division of singular terms—whether concrete, abstract, or collective—implies physical or metaphysical division, while the division of a class indicated by a general term into subordinate groups implies logical division. A

division is physical or metaphysical according as the component parts of an individual or the constituent qualities of an object are enumerated.

(3) As a student cannot be expected to have always an adequate knowledge of the subject-matter of the term to be divided, it is advisable generally to divide terms by Dichotomy.


(4) Division must stop at the smallest groups (*infimæ species*); to proceed further would be enumeration and not division.

(5) We should never overlook the golden rule in the case of Classification and a *fundamentum divisionis* in the case of Division.

Illustrations.


I. (a) Divide and (b) classify (1) 'material bodies,' (2) 'men,' (3) 'syllogisms,' (4) 'tables,' and (5) 'languages'

1. (a) '*Material bodies*' may be divided thus :




(b) '*Material bodies*' may be classed under 'Bodies' or 'Substances.'

2. (a) '*Men*' may be divided thus :




- (b) '*Men*' may be classed under Bimana or two handed mammals.
3. (a) '*Syllogisms*' may be divided into Pure and Mixed. For subdivisions of these see Chap. XI, § 4 and Chap. XII, § 1.
- (b) '*Syllogisms*' may be classed under Deductive Inferences.
4. (a) '*Tables*' may be divided thus :



Those that are made of marble Those that are not made of marble.

- (b) '*Tables*' may be classed under articles of furniture.

5. (a) '*Languages*' may be divided thus :



- (b) '*Languages*' may be classed under a system of signs.

II. Test the following divisions :—

- (a) Plants into root, stem, and branches.
- (b) Europeans into Englishmen, Frenchmen, and Germans.
- (c) Men into Christians, Mahomedans, Hindus, Englishmen, and Dutch.
- (d) Tables into round, marble, heavy, and black.

- (e) Orange into round form, yellow colour, sweet taste, smooth surface, and peculiar smell.
- (a) This is physical partition, breaking rule 1.
- (b) This is incomplete division, violating rule 4.
- (c) This involves the fallacies of cross division and incomplete division, violating rules 2 and 4.
- (d) There are no less than four bases of divisions here—(1) form, (2) material, (3) weight, and (4) colour. It thus involves the fallacy of cross division. It is moreover incomplete.
- (e) It is metaphysical analysis.

§ 11. Exercises.

1. Exhibit the nature and uses of Classification. Point out its relation to Definition.
2. Give a clear account of the principles of Scientific Classification. What is Classification by Series?
3. Give an account of Natural Classification, explaining what is meant by the 'essential' or 'fundamental' characters as the basis of Classification.
4. What is meant by a Natural Kind or Class? To what extent is the distinction between Natural and Artificial Class tenable?
5. Exhibit the procedure in Natural Classification and explain in this connection the distinction between Definition and Type.
6. Distinguish the province and aims of Classification from those of Division. How would you proceed when (a) dividing and (b) classifying the group 'animals'?
7. Determine the relation of Classification to Abstraction and Conception. Point out the bearing of Classification on Generalization.
8. How are Classification and Division related to Induction? Are they connected in any way with Definition?

In writing an essay you apply both Definition and Division : explain for what purposes you apply them.

9. Distinguish Logical, Physical, and Metaphysical Division. Explain the nature and uses of Logical Division.

10. Point out the principal errors incidental to Classification and Division. What is a Cross Division ?

11. What is Division by Dichotomy ? Why is this form of Division considered as specially suitable to Deduction ?

12. 'No such things as classes exist in nature ; every classification depends upon the purpose with which it is made.' Explain and discuss this statement.

13. What in your view is the real distinction between a Natural and an Artificial Classification ? How is Classification related to Explanation ?

14. Has Scientific Classification been modified in any way by the Theory of Evolution ? Illustrate your remarks by an example.

15. Distinguish between Division and Classification. Is Classification based on Type or on Definition ?

16. What do you understand by Index Classification ?

17. Divide and classify the following :—rectilineal figure, horse, book, virtue, house, term, succession, triangle, animal, river, tree, science, chair, pen, substance.

18. Test the following divisions :—

✓(1) India into Bombay, Madras, Bengal, and the United Provinces.

✓(2) Material Bodies into solids, liquids, and gases.

✓(3) Hindus into rich, poor, tall, and learned.

✓(4) Propositions into singular, universal, particular, affirmative, and necessary.

✓(5) Men into Aryans, Mongolians, Asiatics, and Christians.

✓(6) A stone into its colour, solidity, weight, and extension.

✓(7) Men into those who walk and those who crawl.

(8) Indian languages into Sanskrit, Mahratta, Tamil, Pali, Bengali, Uria and Hindi.

- (9) Buildings into buildings of brick, buildings of stone public buildings, religious buildings, churches and law-courts.
- (10) Sciences into physical, moral, and medical.
- (11) Light into artificial light, sunlight, moonlight, gas-light, and electric light.
- ✓(12) The world into Asia, Africa and Europe.
- (13) Books into entertaining and unentertaining.
- ✓(14) Men into those who lend and those who borrow.
- ✓(15) Religion into Christian, Mahomedan, Hindu, and Parsi.
- ✓(16) A person into bones, flesh, stomach, and head.
- ✓(17) Logic into Deduction, Induction, and Fallacies.
- ✓(18) Instruments into knives, scissors, spades, and shovels.
- ✓(19) Fruits into nutritious, sweet, fresh, and succulent.
- ✓(20) Metals into white, heavy, and precious.
- ✓(21) Triangles into equilateral and isosceles.
- ✓(22) Chair into seat, back, legs, and arms.
- ✓(23) Quadrilaterals into squares, rectangles, rhomboids, and parallelograms.
- ✓(24) Quinine into its bitterness, whiteness, and fineness.
- ✓(25) Figures into circles, triangles, quadrilaterals and pentagons.

CHAPTER XXVII.

TERMINOLOGY AND NOMENCLATURE.

§ 1. Importance of Language. We have seen that language is very closely connected with thought. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1 and § 5.) The importance of language is illustrated in several ways :—

(1) It is, as explained in Chapter I, necessary to the formation of thoughts. (2) It is also essential to their communication. We can never have an access into the minds of others but through their expression or speech. Thus, language—either natural or artificial—is always the necessary medium or vehicle for conveying the thoughts of one mind to another. (3) It is essential to the recollection of our previous experience. It is scarcely possible for us to remember things unless they are associated with language. Symbols are thus necessary not merely for the formation, but also for the retention and reproduction, of our ideas. (4) Language secures the precision of our thoughts. Our ideas are objectified, as it were, when they are clothed in language ; and definite expressions tend to render our thoughts definite and precise. (5) Language gives also facility to our thoughts. We can think more easily and quickly when we employ a system of symbols with but a sub-conscious reference to the ideas implied by them. As algebraic expressions facilitate calculation by the substitution of symbols for quantities which may be enormously large, so

Language and Thought are closely connected.

Language helps the
(1) formation,
(2) communication,

(3) recollection,

(4) precision,

and (5) quick succession of thoughts.

Distinction
between
intuitive and
symbolical
knowledge.

words facilitate thinking by the substitution of symbols for ideas which may be of a very complex character. We should remember in this connection the distinction often drawn between **intuitive** and **symbolical thinking**. We think intuitively when we realize in thought what is described in words ; but we think symbolically when we do not form ideas in our mind of what is expressed in language. In referring to a triangle or square, we may think intuitively ; but, in referring to a chiliagon or a million pounds, we think symbolically. And often, in speaking and writing, we use expressions with but a vague reference to the corresponding ideas. The flow of ideas is thus materially aided by language.*

Definition,
Classification,
and Naming
are all inter-
connected.

§ 2. **Definition, Classification, and Naming.** We have already seen that the different logical processes are all inter-connected. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 1.) Thus, Definition underlies Classification, and Classification prepares the way for Definition. And, Definition and Classification are possible only by means of symbols or names, which in their turn acquire a sense through Classification and Definition. When* we classify objects,

* We should remember that precision and facility seldom go together. Precision is secured more by intuitive thinking, while facility by symbolical. As symbolical knowledge gradually takes the place of the intuitive, the facility of thought increases, but more or less at the cost of precision, unless, by prior habitually correct use, the terms employed have acquired a fixed connotation. The validity of symbolical knowledge always depends on its possibility of being transformed into intuitive : if we can never realize in thought an account or description given in words, then it is to be presumed as incorrect. Mansel very appropriately likens symbolical knowledge to bank notes, whose worth always depends on their possibility of conversion into the current coins of a realm.

we attend to their points of similarity and difference, which constitute the meaning of the name applied to the class. Naming involves Classification, for to name is to refer an object or a group to a particular class. Classification again involves Naming. Comparison of individuals, their parts and qualities, is made with the help of general notions, which can be thought of only in connection with general names. Again, the product of classification is associated with a general name.

Connection
between
Naming and
Classification.

The connection between Naming and Definition is also very close. A name always carries some sense in it ; and this sense is clearly apprehended by means of a definition. If the meaning of a term is understood by reference to its definition, the definition too is conveniently retained in the compendious form of a name. Names may thus be viewed as the representative symbols of Definition and Classification. As a linguistic sign, a Name or Term enters into the composition of Propositions and Inferences and so may be regarded as simple or elementary ; but, as representing a thought-product, embodying the results of prior logical processes, it is really very complex, suggesting all that we have already learnt.

Connection
between
Naming and
Definition.

As a
linguistic
sign, a Term
or Name
seems to be
simple ; but,
as standing
for a product
of thought, it
is very
complex.

§ 3. Terminology and Nomenclature.

The difference between Terminology and Nomenclature lies in the fact that the former refers to the terms used in describing the qualities or parts of things ; while the latter, to the names of classes or individuals characterized by such qualities or possessing these parts. Plants or animals are

Terminology
is a system
of names for
describing
the qualities
or parts of
things, while
Nomencla-
ture is a
system of
names for the

classes or individuals themselves.

As popular names are generally vague, appropriate terms are coined in the different sciences for descriptive purposes.

Examples of scientific terms or names.

'Nomenclature' and 'Terminology' are at times used indiscriminately for the entire system of technical terms used in a science or art.

definitely known only by reference to their qualities (such as colour, form, size) or the composition or arrangement of their parts (such as the head, trunk, and limbs ; the stalks, leaves, flowers, and fruits), a description of which falls within what is called Terminology. And, as popular names are often vague and indefinite, appropriate words are coined in many cases in the several sciences to express the qualities and parts aright, so that there may not be any difficulty in the due recognition of classes or individuals. We have thus such terms as *calyx*, *corolla*, *stamens*, *pistils*, *petals*, *sepals*, *perianth*, *pericarp* in Botany; *radius*, *ulna*, *sacrum*, *femur*, *fibula*, *tibia* in Human Anatomy ; *vacuole*, *hydrosome*, *nectocalyx*, *polypites*, *ectoderm*, *endoderm*, *mesoderm* in Zoology. And there are also the special names of the different classes or groups, such as *Dicotyledons*, *Monocotyledons*, *Ranunculaceæ*, *Anonaceæ*, *Malvaceæ* in Botany ; *Vertebrata*, *Mollusca*, *Annulosa*, *Infusoria*, *Protozoa* in Zoology ; *Talc*, *Gypsum*, *Mica*, *Quartz*, *Topaz* in Mineralogy. Though Nomenclature (from Latin *nomen*, name, and *calo*, to call) thus properly implies a system of names of individuals or classes, and Terminology (from Latin *terminus*, (here) term or appellation, and Gr. *logos*, discourse), a system of descriptive terms, indicating their qualities or parts, yet the two terms are at times used indefinitely to express the whole vocabulary of technical terms appropriated to any particular branch of art or science (*e.g.*, the nomenclature or terminology of painting or dyeing, of botany or chemistry).

§ 4. Popular and Scientific Use of Names. The popular use of terms is generally vague and uncertain, owing to the exigencies of ordinary life. This vagueness is due to two causes, one subjective and the other objective.

Popular use of terms is vague for two reasons :

(1) The subjective ground is to avoid the trouble of careful discrimination and also the trouble of increasing the stock of one's vocabulary. People are rather content with the use of such vague expressions as 'good,' 'nice,' 'awful' than to overburden their memory with precise expressions.

(1) Subjective which is to save proximate trouble ;

(2) Again, new and altered circumstances are often presented which require the use of common terms in slightly different or modified senses. Thus, 'pagan,' originally implying a villager, has gradually come to mean individuals not enlightened by the Christian faith (as villages are generally beyond the reach of such enlightenment) ; and 'salt,' though primarily referring to the familiar sea-salt, has gradually come to express the class of saline bodies in general.

and (2) objective, which is to meet the requirements of new circumstances.

We find, accordingly, that the signification of terms is altered either (1) by generalization or (2) by specialization. (1) In the case of *generalization*, part of the connotation of a term is gradually dropped, sometimes through ignorance and sometimes through thoughtlessness. An existing name, hitherto applicable to one class of objects, may thus be extended to another class partly resembling it. It is in this way that 'oil' has come to mean oils generally, instead of simply olive oil ; and 'parson,' clergymen at large, instead of merely the

Signification of Terms is altered or modified either (1) by generalization or (2) by specialization.

Examples of generalization.

rector of a parish. Similarly, 'Sybaritism,' 'Sandwich,' 'Drawcansir,' 'Silhouette,' 'Mausoleum' have acquired a general signification, though originally they were connected with a particular group or individual. "The verb *transpire*," says Mill, "formerly conveyed very expressively its correct meaning, *viz.*, to *become known* through unnoticed channels—to exhale, as it were, into publicity through invisible pores, like a vapour or gas disengaging itself. But of late a practice has commenced of employing this word, for the sake of finery, as a mere synonym of *to happen*: "The events which have *transpired* in the Crimea," meaning the incidents of the war. This vile specimen of bad English is already seen in the despatches of noblemen and viceroys: and the time is apparently not far distant when nobody will understand the word if used in its proper sense." (*Logic*, II, p. 233.) (2) In the case of *specialization*, a fresh connotation is added to the general sense in which a term is primarily or ordinarily used. Thus, the word 'story' has come to mean a fictitious narrative from a mere narrative or account of an incident or event; and 'wit' has similarly come to signify 'facetiousness' from intellectual power in general. Cf. 'Pope'. We have seen that words generally are specialized when interpreted with reference to their context or the universe of discourse (*Vide* Chap. VII, § 1); and they acquire at times special senses with certain classes of men. "Thus, by cattle, a stage coachman will understand horses; beasts, in the language of agriculturists, stands for oxen; and birds, with some sportsmen,

Examples of
specialization.

for partridges only."* (Mill, *Logic*, II, p. 237.) Sometimes purely accidental circumstances invest terms with a peculiar connotation, as is illustrated in the case of 'cabal'. The reproach now associated with the term is due wholly to accident. Macaulay observes, "It so happened by a whimsical coincidence, that in 1671 the cabinet consisted of five persons, the initial letters of whose names made up the word *cabal*; Clifford, Arlington, Buckingham, Ashley, and Lauderdale. These ministers were, therefore, emphatically called the *cabal*; and it has never since their time been used except as a term of reproach." Thus, though the term (Fr. *cabale*) originally meant intrigue or an intriguing body, it has acquired a specially bad sense through mere accident.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the generalization and specialization of terms are effected by the laws of association, supplemented at times by constructive imagination. The laws of association include similarity and contiguity; and constructive imagination involves either separation or combination of elements. (a) Thus, 'light' as dispelling darkness is likened to knowledge as removing ignorance; and hence light is used to signify knowledge itself. Similarly, 'fire' may stand for zeal or irascibility, and 'backdoor' for

Generalization and specialization are effected by Association aided by Imagination.

Thus, the meanings of words are modified by (a) similarity,

* A distinction is sometimes drawn between the *first-intention* and the *second-intention* of a term. The first-intention is the common or popular use, which is generally vague and indefinite, while the second-intention is the special or scientific use, which is generally definite and precise. Thus, 'beasts' in the sense of oxen, 'birds' in the sense of partridges indicate the second-intention of the terms, as distinguished from their first-intention or general use.

any door meant for servants, even though it be in front of a house. (b) Suggestion by contiguity illustrates the figure known as Metonymy, as when we use 'sceptre' for royal authority, 'cradle' for infancy, 'grey hair' for old age, or 'grave' for death. (c) Separation of elements, found conjoined in experience, is illustrated in the figure called Synecdoche, as when Swift writes—

"I do the most that friendship can,
I hate the Viceroy, love the man."

and (d)
combination.

We similarly use 'His Majesty' for king, 'His Excellency' for a governor or viceroy, 'His Holiness' for Pope. In all these cases we separate a quality or feature from an object, which is thus viewed in an ideal form by reference to it. (d) Combination of elements is illustrated in the union of words which separately indicate different things. Thus, 'coach-man,' 'red-hot,' 'far-sighted,' 'hailstones,' 'impossible,' 'unwise,' 'endless,' indicate composition—either of different words or of a prefix or suffix with a main word.

Contiguity
sometimes
effects great
changes in
the meanings
of words.

Examples.

The change effected by contiguity is sometimes so great that a word originally signifying one thing may subsequently come to imply quite a different thing through some links of association into which contiguity enters very prominently. The word 'rival,' for example, illustrates how a word originally applied to a thing by reason of one quality may gradually acquire the additional meaning of some associated quality, and thence be extended to things possessing the second quality alone. "*Rivals*, in the primary sense of the word," says Trench,

"are those who dwell on the banks of the same stream. But since, as all experience shows, there is no such fruitful source of contention as a water-right, it would continually happen that these occupants of the opposite banks would be at strife with one another in regard of the periods during which they severally had a right to the use of the stream, turning it off into their own fields before the time, or leaving open the sluices beyond time, or in other ways interfering or being counted to interfere, with the rights of their opposite neighbours. And thus *rivals* came to be used of any who were on any grounds in more or less unfriendly competition with one another." Cf., 'Pandoor'. Similarly the word 'pectoral' (from Lat. *pectus* the breast) implies, as an adjective, 'of, or pertaining to the breast'; but, as a substantive, it indicates 'an armour, ornament, or dress worn on the breast,' or even 'a medicine for diseases of the chest.' The word 'alphabet' has likewise come to mean the letters of any language arranged in the customary order from signifying at the outset the first two Greek letters, *alpha* and *beta*. Cf. 'Sandwich.' Such a usage is called the **transitive application of words**. "Suppose", says Dugald Stewart, "that the letters A, B, C, D, E, denote a series of objects; that A possesses some one quality in common with B; B a quality in common with C; C a quality in common with D; D a quality in common with E; while at the same time, no quality can be found which belongs in common to any *three* objects in the series. Is it not conceivable, that the affinity be-

Transitive application of words implies extension in their application through contiguity.

Examples.

tween A and B may produce a transference of the name of the first to the second ; and that, in consequence of the other affinities which connect the remaining objects together, the same name may pass in succession from B to C ; from C to D ; and from D to E ? In this manner, a common appellation will arise between A and E, although the two objects may, in their nature and properties, be so widely distant from each other, that no stretch of imagination can conceive how the thoughts were led from the former to the latter." (*Philosophical Essays*, p. 217) Thus, the word 'impertinent' originally signified irrelevant, not pertaining to the matter in hand, but, by gradual and easy transitions, it has come to mean intrusive, meddlesome, unmannerly, insolent. The word 'letter' has likewise undergone a series of transitions from its primary sense of alphabet to written communication, literature, and even any article carried by post. "The word *gentleman* originally meant simply a man born in a certain rank. From this it came by degrees to connote all such qualities or adventitious circumstances as were usually found to belong to persons of that rank. This consideration at once explains why in one of its vulgar acceptations it means any one who lives without labour, in another without manual labour, and in its more elevated signification it has in every age signified the conduct, character, habits, and outward appearance, in whomsoever found, which, according to the ideas of that age, belonged or were expected to belong to persons born and educated

in a high social position." (Mill, *Logic*, II, p. 229)

Having considered the popular use of terms, let us now turn our attention to their scientific use. The aim of science, as we have seen, is to reduce to system what may otherwise seem to be an indefinite multiplicity. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 7.) And, as Whewell points out, "System and Nomenclature are each essential to the other. Without Nomenclature, the system is not permanently incorporated into the general body of knowledge and made an instrument of future progress. Without System the names cannot express general truths, and contain no reason why they should be employed in preference to any other names." (*Novum Organon Renovatum*, p. 288.) The popular names of the different qualities, features, or classes are too numerous and ill-defined to be of any practical value. Science tries to reduce the number by rendering the classes exact and connected and their names definite and significant. In Botany alone, the known species of plants were about 10,000 in the time of Linnæus; and they are nearly ten times that number now. By the *Binary Method of Nomenclature* (Names by Genus and Species) Linnæus reduced the number considerably. Thus, about 1,700 Generic Names, with a moderate number of Specific Names, were found by him sufficient to designate the different species of plants then known. His method has, therefore, been generally followed by scientists concerned with classification. The method consists in using single

The scientific use of terms is precise and based on system.

System and Nomenclature are interconnected.

Science economizes energy by reducing the number of terms.

The Binary Method or the Method of Double Naming consists in using a limited number of generic names and qualifying adjectives

for the
species.

Examples.

names for the higher classes (which are necessarily fewer in number) and in describing the numerous lower groups by the generic names and qualifying adjectives.* "The scientific name of every plant consists of two words, a substantive and an adjective. The substantive is the name of the *genus*, as Brown or Jones may be the name of a family. The adjective indicates the *species*, as John, Thomas, or William indicates the individual member of a family" (Oliver, *Text-Book of Indian Botany*, p. 125.) The generic name precedes. Thus, the different species of Fig are referred to the genus *Ficus* and are described by qualifying epithets as *Ficus religiosa* (the Peepul), *Ficus elastica* (the India-rubber tree), *Ficus benghalensis* (the Banyan). Similarly, in Chemistry, the compounds are named by reference to their elements. The compounds of the Metals, for example, are named thus :—(a) compounds with chlorine, bromine, and iodine are called the *chlorides*, *bromides*, and *iodides*; (b) compounds with oxygen and with oxygen and hydrogen, the *oxides* and *hydroxides*; (c) compounds with sulphur and with sulphur and hydrogen, the *sulphides* and *hydrosulphides*; (d) compounds with sulphuric and sulphurous acids, the *sulphates* and *sulphites*; (e) compounds with phosphoric acid, the *phosphates*; and (f) compounds with carbonic acid, the *carbonates*. We find likewise in Zoology the same method followed. The

*One of the Linnæan maxims is that the generic name must be fixed before an attempt is made to form a specific name; "the latter without the former is," as he observes, "like the clapper without the bell." (Art. 219.)

genus *Felidæ*, for example, is divided into different species called *Felis leo* (lion), *Felis tigris* (tiger), *Felis leopardus* (leopard), *Felis concolor* (puma), *Felis lynx* (European lynx), *Felis catus* (wild cat). This method of double naming (or the binary method, as it has sometimes been called) has the advantage of not only relieving the memory by considerably diminishing the number of independent names, but also of helping the understanding by indicating the relation in which a group or species stands to its appropriate higher class or genus. Sometimes the exact composition of a compound is conveniently indicated by the name itself : the compounds of chlorine and oxygen, for example, are represented as *chlorine monoxide* (Cl_2O), *chlorine trioxide* (Cl_2O_3), and *chlorine tetroxide* (Cl_2O_4). Scientific names, accordingly, tend to relieve the memory, enlighten the understanding, and render knowledge precise and systematic.

Scientific names relieve the memory, enlighten the understanding, and render knowledge accurate.

§ 5. Requisites of Scientific Language.

Scientific names should be as definite, precise, and systematic as possible. To avoid the unnecessary multiplication of terms, appropriate words, already current in a language, may be adopted in science with suitable qualifications. The conditions of accurate expression, essential to every science, may briefly be said to be the following :—

Scientific terms should be definite, precise, and systematic.

Conditions of the Scientific Use of Terms :

(1) *Every important meaning must have an appropriate name for it.* It implies that there should be (1) an adequate *nomenclature* for the different classes or groups of objects, (2) a comprehensive *terminology* for describing their various qualities or

(1) No important meaning should be without an appropriate name. There should,

therefore,
be—

parts, and (3) appropriate *names for indicating the relations* of connected groups included in a classification.

(1) an
adequate
nomencla-
ture ;

(1) Nomenclature implies, as indicated in the last section, that there should be distinct names (generally short) for the different higher classes or orders ; and that the names of the lower groups or species should generally be formed of these names and qualifying expressions. Thus, in Geology, there are names for classes of rocks and strata ; in Mineralogy, names for the species and varieties of minerals ; in Chemistry, names for the elements and their compounds ; and in Botany and Zoology, names for the several species, genera, families, and orders.

(2) a com-
prehensive
terminology
with suitable
names for

(2) Terminology implies that there should be suitable names for the (a) physical, (b) metaphysical, and (c) dynamical elements of things. (a) The names of the physical parts are the names of members or organs, such as nerve, muscle, head ; stalk, petal, sepal ; plinth, frieze, cornice. (b) The names of the metaphysical constituents are the names of qualities or features, with their various degrees and forms, such as size, figure, weight ; hard, soft, elastic ; red, yellow, green ; sweet, bitter, sour ; *etc.* (c) The names of the dynamic elements of objects are the names of processes and activities which enter into the conception of force or energy, such as causation, origination, decay, birth, growth, death, tendency, resistance, refraction, *etc.*

(a) the
physical,

(b) meta-
physical,

and (c)
dynamic
elements
of things ;

and (3)
appropriate
names of

(3) Appropriate names of the different groups related as members of a supreme class or kind are

also essential to indicate their mutual relations or connections. Thus, the terms 'kingdom,' 'class,' 'order,' 'genus,' 'co-ordinate species' point out the relations in which certain groups stand to others. "According to the laws of Botanical Nomenclature adopted by the International Botanical Congress, held at Paris in August 1867, no less than twenty-one names of classes are recognised—namely, Kingdom, Division, Sub-division, Class, Sub-class, Cohort, Sub-cohort, Order, Sub-order, Tribe, Sub-tribe, Genus, Sub-genus, Section, Sub-section, Species, Sub-species, Variety, Sub-variety, Variation, Sub-variation." (Jevons, *Principles of Science*, p. 727.)

(II) The other great condition of accuracy and precision is that *Every name must have a definite meaning attached to it.* The necessity of this rule is obvious. The use of terms in vague and ambiguous senses is a fruitful source of confusion and fallacy. Hence, in every science, the utmost care should be bestowed at the outset on clear and accurate definitions of the terms subsequently employed, so as to preclude the possibility of future error and misunderstanding. We find this procedure now generally adopted in many sciences, such as Geometry, Dynamics, Physics, and Chemistry.

To avoid the unnecessary multiplication of words, popular names may be adopted in science when they are found to suit our purpose. And, as popular names are divisible into the same classes into which scientific terms are divisible—*viz.*, names of things, classes, parts, qualities, and activities—

(II) No name should be without a definite meaning.

When suitable popular names are available, they may be adopted in science ;

but their meanings should be rendered exact by qualifying epithets and explanations.

But settled meanings should not be rudely disturbed.

Popular language may be improved when we (1) fix the meanings of terms by reference to their derivation, (2) resist the tendencies towards generalization and specialization, and (3) divert the use of superfluous terms to allied meanings

popular names may often be of service in science. As, however, ordinary language is generally loose and vague, we should definitely settle the meanings of popular terms when they are adopted in a science. We may do so either (*a*) by reference to their etymological or central signification or (*b*) by qualifying epithets and interpretative clauses. When, however, the scientific meaning cannot thus be grafted on a common term without violence to language, it is better to coin new words for special purposes than to use current words in unheard-of-senses, which lead only to confusion and obscurity. "The precautions to be observed in re-adjusting the signification of terms," says Bain, "are these:—First, important meanings in current use, or meanings at the base of important predications, should not be disturbed; secondly, the associations of powerful sentiment should not be reversed." (*Logic*, II, p. 175.)

It may be mentioned in this connection that we may also try to improve popular language by rendering the meanings and uses of current terms precise and definite. We may do so in three principal ways:—(1) The meanings of terms should, as a rule, be settled by reference to their derivation. (2) We should resist the tendency towards excessive generalization or specialization: we should not make terms unduly wide or narrow by unwarrantably using them in an indefinite or restricted sense. (3) When two or more terms are exactly synonymous, it would be conducive to precision and perspicuity to divert some of them

to neighbouring or allied meanings which have no appropriate expression

having no appropriate names.

§ 6. Exercises.

1. Point out the importance of Language in general and of Scientific Names in particular.

2. Distinguish between intuitive and symbolical knowledge, indicating their relative importance.

3. Determine the relation of Definition, Classification, and Naming. Is a Term or Name an elementary or a complex logical product?

4. Distinguish between Scientific Terminology and Nomenclature, and indicate their relative uses.

5. 'The popular use of terms is generally vague and uncertain.' Why? How can the defects be remedied?

6. What do you understand by the Generalization and Specialization of Terms? How are they caused? Give illustrations.

7. Explain and illustrate what is meant by the Transitive Application of Words.

8. What do you understand by Double Naming? Point out its scientific importance.

9. What are the requisites of Scientific Knowledge? Is it advisable to use popular names for scientific purposes? If so, when and to what extent?

BOOK V.

METHOD.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

EXAMINATION OF MATERIALS.

As rational beings, we employ the different logical processes for the attainment of a definite end.

§ 1. Importance of Method. Having examined the several forms of the logical processes let us now turn our attention to the way in which they may be best adapted to some end—either theoretical or practical. Being rational creatures, we generally employ definition or division, classification or naming, deduction or induction not as isolated operations but as different steps towards the attainment of an object, which may be the acquisition or communication of knowledge, the gratification of feeling, or the control over some circumstance or agency. To be accurate, we define ; to be systematic, we classify ; and to widen our knowledge, we have recourse to observation and inference. As, however, accuracy, system, and increase of knowledge are all interconnected, we are disposed to employ all these processes in regular succession to arrive at the desired result. And it is on this systematic employment of the different steps that the success or failure of an undertaking generally depends. Thus, the mere isolated correctness of the logical processes explained in the preceding Books is not of much

Mere isolated correctness of these processes is not of much

consequence ; to be of real value, they must converge on a definite purpose and contribute to its realization. Hence, Method or systematic procedure may be described as the crown of all logical operations, which, without it, can at most have a momentary or fragmentary value. And the difference between good and bad intelligence often lies more in the proper or improper use of Method than in the bare detached uses of the several logical operations. Descartes very well observes, " The power of judging aright and of distinguishing Truth from Error, which is properly what is called Good Sense or Reason, is by nature equal in all men ; and the diversity of our opinions, consequently, does not arise from some being endowed with a larger share of Reason than others, but solely from this, that we conduct our thoughts along different ways and do not fix our attention on the same objects. For to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough ; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it. The greatest minds, as they are capable of the highest excellencies, are open likewise to the greatest aberrations ; and those who travel very slowly may yet make far greater progress, provided they keep always to the straight road, than those who, while they run, forsake it." (*Discourse on Method*, Veitch's translation, pp. 3—4.)

§ 2. Preliminary Conditions of Method.

Method, as Kant says, is " procedure according to principles." (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Meiklejohn's translation, p. 516.) We keep steadily before our

importance without their systematic arrangement.

Thus, Method may be viewed as the crown of logical operations.

The differences observable among men are due more to the proper or improper use of Method than to natural endowments.

Method is 'procedure according to principles.'

mind some end to be attained and regulate our steps by such principles as are conducive to its realization. We have thus to observe with care certain facts and circumstances and to find out the laws which govern them, in order that we may systematically use the appropriate means for arriving at the desired result. "Although in every question," observe the authors of *The Port-Royal Logic*, "there is something unknown, otherwise there would be nothing to seek, it is, nevertheless, necessary that even that which is unknown should be marked out and designated by certain conditions which may determine us to seek one thing rather than another, and, which may enable us to judge, when we have found it, that it is the thing of which we were in search." (Baynes' translation, pp. 310-311.) As the ultimate end of knowledge is the correspondence of ideas with facts, every sound method must estimate these aright that it may not terminate in fiction; in order that a superstructure may be stable, its foundation must be secure. Whether we proceed from facts to principles or from principles to facts, a correct estimate of facts is always essential to the validity of the result. But, though careful observation plays a prominent part in all sound method, yet other conditions are also necessary to render it efficacious. The chief preliminary conditions of sound method may briefly be indicated thus:—

It involves a careful examination of facts.

The preliminary conditions of sound method are:—

(1) Correct observation,

(1) *Correct Observation.* We should carefully and accurately study the facts connected with the

inquiry in hand. In such study we should be guided by the following considerations :—

which requires

(a) Direct apprehension or testimony should always be preferred to indirect. The great danger of observation is the confusion of perception with inference : in many cases we mistake a conclusion for a percept. We imagine, for example, that we directly know by sight the distance, solidity, or weight of an object, when really it is inferred from certain signs. And we have already seen that the value of testimony diminishes as it passes from one person to another. (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 9.) Once D said to E (so the story goes) that X had vomited three black crows. E asked D whether he had seen it. D replied, he had learnt it from C, who in his turn said that he had not seen it himself but had learnt from B that X had vomited two (and not three) black crows : and in this way the report was finally traced to an eye-witness, who simply said that X had vomited something black—as black as a crow. Such is often the value of indirect testimony ; and hence it is generally inadmissible in courts of law. We should, therefore, always try to derive our knowledge from direct observation or testimony, whenever possible.*

(a) direct apprehension or testimony,

(b) We should study with an unprejudiced mind, for bias often colours an object observed. We are often disposed to construe objects accord-

(b) absence of bias,

* When we are constrained to depend on indirect testimony (as in the case of historical or biographical incidents or astronomical observation), we should determine its value by reference to the authenticity of the record, the character of the reporter, and the consistency of the report with other facts proved independently to be true.

ing to our views. Men think that their experiences determine their ideas ; but their ideas have often a reflex effect on their experience. Thus, friends are led by affection to under-estimate, while opponents are led by ill-will to over-estimate the fault of a person. Faddists are similarly disposed to construe facts in the light of their fads.

and (c)
examination
of relevant
facts alone.

(c) Observation should be duly regulated, so as to include within its compass only the relevant facts, or facts bearing on the subject in hand, and not to cover indiscriminately any and all facts. In fact, the difference between observation and perception is that, while the one is regulated, the other is casual : observation is but well-regulated perception. As observation is thus under the control or guidance of a leading idea or principle, the facts observed must always be determined by it. Thus, while the zoologist may bring apes and men within the compass of his study, by reason of their similarity in respect of organic structure, the moralist is led to exclude the former from his province as devoid of any moral significance. The relevancy or irrelevancy of a topic in every case must, therefore, be determined by our end in view and the sphere of our inquiry. It may be mentioned in this connection that observation may assume either of two forms, according as its objects constitute the facts of the internal world of Mind or of the external world of Nature and Society. Introspection in the one case and Sense-perception in the other are the means employed to gather facts by direct observation. And, if Introspection prevails

Observation
assumes two
forms :

Introspection
and Sense-
perception.

in the mental and moral sciences, Sense-perception preponderates in the sciences of Nature.

(2) *Analysis and Synthesis.* Mere observation of facts, presented to the mind, is not adequate, however, for the purposes of a science. Most of the facts known in adult life are of a complex character. Adequately to explain them, therefore, we must break them up into their constituent elements and discover the laws of their combination. It is thus necessary to have recourse to the two methods of Analysis and Synthesis. Analysis implies the separation of elements which are found together in a concrete object or experience, while Synthesis means the combination of elements for the reconstruction of such a product. Synthesis is not "the unabstracted concrete" : it is "combining *after* analysing ; it is using the results of analysis with a view to construction." (Bain, *Logic*, Part II, p 397.)

Analysis and synthesis assume two distinct forms owing to a difference in the materials on which they are employed. *Physical* or *chemical analysis* implies the actual separation of elements which go to constitute a compound, while *logical* or *psychological analysis* implies the ideal separation of elements entering into a complex fact or notion. Similarly, physical or chemical synthesis is the actual composition of elements for the production of a desired compound, while logical or psychological synthesis is the ideal reconstruction of a complex notion out of the elements discovered by prior analysis. Synthesis in either case supple-

(2) Analysis and Synthesis.

Analysis implies separation of elements ; while synthesis, their combination.

While physical analysis is actual separation, logical analysis is ideal separation.

Similarly, physical synthesis is actual composition, while logical synthesis is

ideal reconstruction.

Synthesis proves the correctness and adequacy of prior analysis.

(3) Definition and Classification of facts.

(4) Employment of the rules of Inductive and Deductive Inference.

(5) Thoroughness.

ments analysis to verify its results : the correctness and adequacy of analysis are proved by the subsequent synthetic reconstruction of the complex fact out of the elements and according to the laws already discovered by analysis.

(3) *Definition and Classification.* As the result of a careful estimate of facts and their due analysis, we must correctly define and classify them, to avoid future mistake or confusion. We have already indicated in the preceding Book, the importance of these processes in every scientific investigation.

(4) *Use of Inductive and Deductive Inference.* To understand things aright, it is not sufficient that we should merely observe, analyse, classify, and define them ; it is further necessary that we should discover the laws which govern them. To understand a fact is to assimilate it and to discover causal links which bring all similar facts together. (*Vide* Chap. XXIV, § 2.) Thus, the principles of induction and deduction must be employed on appropriate materials to arrive at correct generalizations and deductions from them. All the experimental methods, with the connected processes of elimination, hypothesis, and verification should, therefore, be used to elucidate physical and psychological facts.

(5) *Comprehensiveness.* Our treatment of a subject should be comprehensive and full and not incomplete and imperfect. Every science must take an exhaustive survey of *all* the facts coming within its province or their representative instances and try to explain them, not merely in isolation, but in their mutual connection and bearing. As

Descartes says, "We should divide each of the difficulties under examination into as many parts as possible and as might be necessary for its adequate solution ; and in every case we should make examinations so complete, and reviews so general that we might be assured that nothing was omitted." (*Discourse on Method.*)

The above conditions indicate merely the steps we should take to ensure the correctness and adequacy of the materials which constitute the subject-matter of an inquiry. How to arrange these materials, either for discovery or for instruction, falls within Method proper, which we shall consider in the next chapter.

§ 3. Knowledge Fit for Methodical Treatment. Knowledge is fit for methodical treatment when it is clear, distinct, and exact. If our ideas be vague and inaccurate, then they generally overlap, thereby preventing system and begetting confusion. Methodical treatment is aided when the following marks are found in knowledge :—

Knowledge, to be fit for methodical treatment, must be

(1) *Clearness.* Knowledge is said to be clear when its object as a whole can be distinguished from other wholes. Thus, we may be said to have a clear knowledge of the horse when we can distinguish it from other animals, such as the ass, cow, and buffalo. Absence of clearness means obscurity and vagueness.

(1) clear,

(2) *Distinctness.* Knowledge is called distinct when the several parts or qualities of its object are definitely known. Thus, a good painter or sculp-

(2) distinct,

tor may be said to have not merely a clear but also a distinct knowledge of the objects with which he deals. Common knowledge, for example, of the horse may be clear, though not distinct. Indistinctness, no doubt, often leads to obscurity as well.

and (3)
accurate,

(3) *Accuracy*. Knowledge is accurate when it exactly corresponds to facts. Clearness and distinctness generally secure accuracy; but we may have vivid ideas of the parts as well as of the whole, though they may not quite agree with facts. We may have a rough idea of the whole and an inadequate idea of the parts; and thus our knowledge may not be accurate. To be accurate, it must be adequate and consistent. When our knowledge exceeds its proper limits, then also it becomes inaccurate, as when foreign elements are incorporated into an idea. It may be mentioned in this connection that the accuracy of knowledge is preserved only so long as symbolical knowledge can be converted into intuitive. When such a possibility ceases, knowledge is again likely to become inaccurate and vague. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 3 and Chap. XXVII, § 1.)

Accuracy
involves
adequacy
and
consistency.

Symbolical
knowledge,
when not
convertible
into intuitive,
becomes a
source of
error.

§ 4. Exercises.

1. Point out the importance of Method in ordinary and scientific inquiries.

2. What are the preliminary conditions of sound Method? Are they essential to every inquiry?

3. Distinguish between Perception and Observation. Indicate the forms and conditions of correct Observation.

4. Distinguish between Physical and Logical Analysis. How is Synthesis related to Analysis?

5. Determine the features which render knowledge fit for methodical treatment.

CHAPTER XXIX.

DISPOSITION OF PARTS.

§ 1. **Definition of Method.** Method proper consists in so adjusting the parts of an inquiry or discourse as to render the whole easily intelligible. Method, accordingly, implies a multiplicity of parts systematically arranged for a definite purpose, which may be either the acquisition or the communication of knowledge. It involves reference to an end (which is either discovery or instruction) and a guiding sense of what is needed to promote that end. This guiding sense is determined by previous experience, indicating approximately the way in which we should proceed as well as the scope of investigation or treatment in any case. Having, thus, before our mind the end to be achieved and the sphere of inquiry, we have to adapt the different parts to one another in such a manner as to render our treatment at once clear and comprehensive. Method has, accordingly, been defined by the Port-Royalists as "The art of disposing well a series of many thoughts, either for discovering truth when we are ignorant of it, or for proving it to others when it is already known." (Baynes' translation, pp. 308—309.) The essence of Method lies in so arranging our reasonings on any subject as to produce their combined effect on the mind eager for knowledge.

Method is the due arrangement of the parts of an inquiry or discourse so as to render it clear.

Method involves (1) reference to an end and (2) a guiding sense of fitness.

Definition of Method by the authors of Port-Royal Logic.

The essence of Method lies in its cumulative effect.

§ 2 Natural Order of Arrangement.

As the peculiarity of Method is the proper arrangement of parts for the production of a desired effect, the chief question connected with its use is, How to arrange the parts in order to attain the end? It is generally said that we should treat of things in their "natural order" to make them easily intelligible. But the natural order may be (1) physical, (2) psychological, or (3) logical order. (1) We may, for example, explain the character of crystals by indicating the mode of their formation, or (2) we may commence our inquiry with the crystals as formed and then try to discover by analysis and abstraction the general conditions which determine their structure. And (3) in either case we are to arrange our thoughts in such a way that the comparatively simple and independent may precede what is relatively complex and dependent. On a closer examination we find that the first or physical order is possible only when we have a prior knowledge of the elements and laws which combine to produce the phenomenon under investigation. This may be called the *synthetical method*, proceeding from principles to facts. The second or psychological order is the method of analysis in which we proceed from facts to principles. In one, we try to trace the way in which Nature works from elements to a complex product; while in the other, we try to discover the mode of her operation by starting with the product as supplied to the mind. Analysis and

The natural order of arrangement is either physical, psychological, or logical.

All these

Synthesis, then, are the two principal methods employed to explain the constitution and genesis of things. The third or logical order also resolves itself into either of these two methods, according as our reasonings proceed from facts to principles or from principles to facts, *i.e.*, as they are essentially inductive or deductive. The two fundamental methods, therefore, which regulate every inquiry and exposition are Analysis and Synthesis. Let us consider them a little fully in a separate section.

procedures
are finally
resolvable
into two
methods,
Analysis and
Synthesis.

§ 3. Analytical and Synthetical Procedure. The general principle of method to be observed in all inquiry is that we should proceed from the simple to the complex, from the familiar to the obscure. As, however, simplicity or familiarity varies with individuals, the methods employed by them necessarily vary. To a child or beginner, the individual is more familiar than the general, the concrete more familiar than the abstract. And, in a certain sense, the individual or concrete is also simple to him—simple psychologically, though not logically. In the history of mental development we find that concrete things are known earlier than their abstract qualities or relations, individuals before the classes to which they belong. Thus, generally, the method of discovery is the method of analysis. But, with the increase of knowledge, we become familiar with the elements and laws which enter into the composition of concrete and individual things. We thus learn to retrace our

The general
rule of
method is to
proceed from
the simple to
the complex,
from the
familiar to
the unfamiliar.

Simplicity
and familiarity,
however,
are relative
to individuals.

Generally,
Analysis is
the method
of discovery;
and Synthesis,
the method of
exposition.

The Synthetical method ordinarily presupposes the Analytical, though as social beings, we may pursue the two methods independently.

steps backwards, from the elements and laws to their complex products. This is the synthetical method. To discover, therefore, the way in which Nature works, we must previously pass through the way which reveals her procedure. The synthetical method, therefore, properly presupposes the analytical. But, situated as we are in society, we are often saved the trouble of personal investigation owing to the instruction we receive from others. Hence, a learner may acquire knowledge synthetically without prior analysis. He has then only to accept the general principles enunciated by his instructor and to follow his exposition synthetically. Thus, though primarily synthesis presupposes analysis, yet, situated as we are, we can often pursue the two methods independently of each other.

Uses of the two Methods :

(1) Analysis regulates induction ; while synthesis, deduction.

(2) Analysis favours discovery and synthesis, exposition.

The following points in this connection deserve special notice :—

(1) The Analytical Method regulates, as we have seen, our inductive investigations ; while the Synthetical Method, our deductive inferences. In the one case we start with concrete cases and then try to discover the conditions and principles by analysis ; while in the other, we synthetically connect principles with cases to see the conclusion justified by both of them.

(2) The Analytical Method, as explained above, is generally the Method of Discovery, while the Synthetical Method is the Method of Exposition. Thus, we come to know principles and characteristics governing classes, by Inductive Inferences,

Definitions, and Classifications, which involve the Analytical Method, while we explain and illustrate such principles and characteristics by Deductive Inferences, Definitions, and Divisions, involving the Synthetical Method.

(3) The Analytical Method is suitable for children, who are familiar with concrete things ; while the Synthetical Method is adapted to the requirements of adults, who are more or less familiar with general truths. The object-lessons of infancy, which constitute so prominent a part in the kindergarten system of education, involve an appeal to observation, abstraction, and analysis, which more effectively secure accuracy, distinctness, and clearness of knowledge than can possibly be attained by a mere synthetic exposition from principles. It should, however, be borne in mind here that the analytic method employed for instruction is not exactly the same as is employed for original research. Though, in both the cases, the procedure is from facts to principles, yet in the case of instruction, the course is more straight, regular, and easy than in the other case. In original investigations, the materials are not so systematically arranged, nor is the analytic procedure so direct and short as in exposition, in which only the appropriate materials and lines are chosen by the instructor as furnished by his previous knowledge.

(3) Analysis suits children better than adults.

Difference between the analytic method as employed for instruction and that as employed for discovery.

(4) The analytical and synthetical methods, though distinct, are at times employed together to establish a position beyond dispute : one of these methods is then used to verify the results

(4) The full force of logical method is illustrated when both

the methods
are employed
together.

arrived at by the other. As the best conclusive evidence is reached when a point is proved both deductively and inductively, so the full force of logical method is illustrated when analysis and synthesis supplement each other.

The general
conditions of
methodic
procedure or
treatment.

§ 4. The Rules of Method. The general conditions of all methods are that we should proceed systematically and by easy transitions from the simple to the complex, and that the connection between any two steps should, as a rule, be furnished by causal connection or logical sequence. In the absence of causal or logical succession, we should have recourse to the psychological order as determined by the laws of association. When steps are arranged in this way, there will be an easy flow of ideas, readily grasped and combined in a system. But, besides these general conditions, we may mention some special rules applicable to the two Methods separately.

The special
rules of the
Analytical
Method.

(1) *Rules for the Analytical Method.*

(1) We should observe carefully the facts to be explained with an unprejudiced mind.

(2) We should distinguish the facts from other analogous facts and thus demarcate the exact sphere of our inquiry.

(3) We should exhaustively consider the different parts, elements, or aspects of the facts to be explained.

(4) We should ascertain the laws governing these parts, elements, or aspects as well as the laws governing their relations.

(5) We should try to trace these laws to higher laws, so that the laws governing the features, elements, and relations may be considered as derivative and certain. (*Vide* Chap. XXIII, § 3 and § 4.)

(6) We should consider the facts and their parts or elements in their natural order proceeding from the less to the more general.

(7) We should take a comprehensive survey of the sphere of our inquiry in order to be sure that nothing is left out which is calculated to throw light on it.

(II) *Rules for the Synthetical Method.* These rules are thus laid down by the authors of *The Port-Royal Logic* :—

The special rules of the Synthetical Method.

“Two Rules touching Definitions.

1. Not to leave any terms at all obscure or equivocal, without defining them.

2. To employ in definitions only terms perfectly well known, or already explained.

“Two Rules for Axioms.

3 To demand as axioms only things perfectly evident.

4. To receive as evident that which requires only a slight attention to the recognition of its truth.

“Two Rules for Demonstrations.

5. To prove all propositions which are at all obscure by employing in their proof only the definitions which have preceded, or axioms which have been granted, or propositions which have been already demonstrated.

6. Always to avoid the equivocation of terms by substituting mentally the definitions which restrict and explain their meaning.

"Two Rules for Method.

7. To treat of things, as far as possible, in their natural order, by commencing with the most general and simple, and explaining every thing which belongs to the nature of the genus before passing to its particular species.

8. To divide, as far as possible, every genus into all its species, every whole into all its parts, and every difficulty into all its cases." (Baynes' translation, pp. 346—347.)

§ 5 Exercises.

1. Define Method and explain its precise character and scope.

2. What is the natural order of inquiry or exposition? Is it the same always?

3. What are the general rules of Method? How does the Method of Discovery differ from that of Exposition?

4. State and explain the rules of the Analytical and the Synthetical Method respectively.

5. Point out the proper uses of the Analytical and the Synthetical Method. Is there any difference between the Analytic Method as employed for instruction and that employed for discovery?

6. Indicate any difference in the uses of Inductive and Deductive Definitions and Classifications.

BOOK VI.

FALLACIES.

CHAPTER XXX.

CLASSIFICATION OF FALLACIES.

§ 1. **Fallacy Defined.** The term Fallacy (Latin *fallacia*, deceit, from *fallax*, deceitful, deceptive) etymologically implies what is calculated to deceive or mislead us by a show of truth or correctness. And as, strictly speaking, errors are always connected with inferences (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1 and § 9), Fallacy properly implies an unsound mode of argument which professes to be decisive of the question in hand, without really being so. But, like many other terms, it is often used in a vague and wide sense to cover other errors as well. We find, accordingly, that the term is used in at least three different senses :—

(1) In the proper sense, a Fallacy implies, as mentioned just now, an incorrect inference which appears satisfactorily to establish a conclusion, without really doing so. Fallacies, in this sense, indicate all errors which arise from the improper use of the rules of inference, deductive, inductive, or analogical.

(2) In a wider sense, a Fallacy is an error arising from the violation of any logical rule, whether pertaining to inference or not. It thus stands for an error of Definition, Division, Classification, Naming, or Inference.

Fallacy properly implies an incorrect inference which seems to be correct.

Three uses of the term 'Fallacy' :

(1) In the proper sense, it is an invalid argument which wears the semblance of validity.

(2) In a wider sense, it is an error due to the transgression of a logical rule.

(3) In the widest sense, it implies any error.

(3) In the widest sense, a Fallacy signifies any error whatever, whether due to faulty perception, memory, imagination, conception, or the improper use of the logical principles. In this sense, we commit a fallacy when we mistake a post for a man, refer an event to a wrong date, define or divide terms incorrectly or draw unjustifiable inferences.

Paralogisms are self-deceptive fallacies due to the violation of the formal rules of inference.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the terms 'Paralogism' and 'Sophism,' though implying fallacious reasoning, have special connotations of their own. **Paralogism** (Gr. *para*, beyond, and *logismos*, reasoning) indicates a reasoning which transgresses a formal rule of inference and often deceives the reasoner himself. It is usually illustrated when we overlook the rules of deduction or demonstration and are guilty of glaring mistakes by losing sight of evident principles of consistency. Thus, in simply converting an **A** proposition, committing a fallacy of illicit process in syllogistic reasoning, or in supposing that the law of causation, which is the ground of all induction, is itself an inductive generalization, we are guilty of paralogisms or evident self-contradictions.

Sophism is a specious argument meant for the deception of others.

Sophism (from Gr. *sophisma*, a clever or cunning contrivance) is taken to be a specious argument which is calculated to mislead or entrap others. As an intentionally deceptive syllogism, it is opposed to paralogism which, as we have said, deceives the reasoner himself. "Sophism", says Taylor, "is not usually applied to *mere errors* in reasoning; but only to those erroneous reasonings of the fallacy of

which the person who maintains them is, in some degree, conscious; and which he endeavours to conceal from examination by subtlety, and by some ambiguity or other unfairness in the use of words." (*Elements of Thought*.) As, however, Logic is not concerned with the intention or subjective factor in any case, which comes within the province of Ethics and Psychology, we shall speak only of Fallacies, instead of Paralogisms and Sophisms. (*Vide* Chap. III, § 2.)

In Logic we are concerned with Fallacies, without any reference to the intention or mental condition.

§ 2. Treatment of Fallacies. A separate treatment of Fallacies is considered objectionable by certain writers on two principal grounds:—(1) It is urged that, when we have read the logical rules and principles, we are expected to know also the errors which arise from their violation. In Grammar, for example, we never separately study the rules and their violations. No separate chapter is devoted to the enumeration or exposition of the different grammatical errors. Hence, it is said that a separate treatment of Fallacies is itself fallacious. (2) It is not possible for us to divine or collect all the possible errors which arise from the transgression of the different rules of inference, and far less the numerous errors which arise from the violation of all the logical rules. It is, therefore, deemed more reasonable simply to explain and illustrate the different logical processes and their violations, instead of attempting to systematize the inexhaustible number of logical errors.

Objections to a separate treatment of Fallacies:

(1) Such treatment is illogical, as fallacies are but violations of logical rules already discussed.

(2) Errors being inexhaustible can never be systematized.

It is urged also that practice can never justify an unreasonable procedure. To Aristotle and his

Practice can be no excuse for such

treatment, specially when a comprehensive treatment of Logic is undertaken in modern times.

followers, a separate treatment of fallacies might have been necessary, for their Logic was only formal and so could not possibly explain and illustrate, under appropriate rules, all the different kinds of fallacies revealed in concrete experience. Their alternatives were either to be incomplete or inconsistent ; and they preferred inconsistency to incompleteness. A separate discussion of fallacies was thus necessary to them to explain the character of material fallacies. But, now, that we have an adequate treatment of all the logical principles—deductive and inductive—it is altogether unscientific, if not useless, to consider in a distinct chapter the different kinds of fallacies.

Though, it must be admitted, there is some truth in the above remarks, yet the following reasons may be advanced in favour of the traditional practice of giving fallacies a separate place in the treatment of logical doctrine :—

Reasons in favour of a separate treatment :

(1) A collective estimate of Fallacies places before our mind the snares to be avoided in reasoning.

(1) By considering the prominent fallacies together, we may have before our mind's eye the snares to be avoided for the attainment of truth. The different fallacies when systematically arranged and labelled or named become convenient heads of reference and serve as warning-posts to guide the unwary disputant.

(2) Such estimate awakens in us a sense of our intellectual frailty and so impresses on us the necessity

(2) Even when we have read the logical rules and their violations in their proper places, a separate consideration of the errors to which we are liable has the effect of impressing on our minds the necessity of caution to be exercised in the pursuit of truth. A collective study of fallacies

awakens in us more forcibly the necessity of a scrupulous examination of materials and steps which go to prove a position.

of greater caution to be observed in reasoning.

(3) Above all, a systematic treatment of fallacies has a scientific value as helping the discovery of the general sources of error. When the main-springs of the fallacies are thus discovered, we may try to choke them up or diminish their force, thereby securing the correctness of thought more effectually than can possibly be done by mere piecemeal attention to the several fallacies.

(3) It prepares the way for the scientific treatment of Fallacies and the discovery of their sources, which are conducive to the end of truth.

§ 3. **Classification of Fallacies.** There are two main reasons which render a satisfactory classification of fallacies difficult. (1) There is scarcely any limit to the aberrations of our intelligence ; and so the number and form of fallacies seem to be inexhaustible : "There *is*," says De Morgan, "no such thing as a classification of the ways in which we may arrive at an error ; it is much to be doubted whether there ever *can be*." (*Formal Logic*, p. 237.)

Difficulties of a classification :

(1) Fallacies are innumerable and various.

(2) As fallacies are generally covert violations of logical rules, it is often doubtful whether a particular fallacy comes under this or that head. As Whately observes, "From the elliptical form in which all reasoning is usually expressed, and the peculiarly involved and oblique form in which Fallacy is for the most part conveyed, it must of course be often a matter of doubt, or rather, of arbitrary choice, not only to which genus each *kind* of fallacy should be referred, but even to which kind to refer any *one individual* Fallacy. For, since,

(2) They are often subtle and obscure.

in any argument one premiss is usually suppressed, it frequently happens, in the case of a Fallacy, that the hearers are left to the alternative of supplying *either* a premiss which is *not true*, or *else*, one which *does not prove* the conclusion. *E.g.* If a man expatiates on the distress of the country, and thence argues that the government is tyrannical, we must suppose him to assume *either* that "every distressed country is under a tyranny," which is a manifest falsehood, *or*, merely that "every country under a tyranny is distressed" which, however true, proves nothing, the middle-term being undistributed." (*Logic*, pp. 104-105.) Let us, however, try to give a systematic account of Fallacies by reference to their prevailing forms and appropriate names as generally recognised by logicians. The following general scheme indicates the prominent Fallacies :—

Table of
Classification.

(A) Logical	(I) Inferential	(1) Deductive... (2) Inductive. (a) Formal. (b) Semi-logical.
	(II) Non-Inferential.	(1) Deductive. (2) Inductive.
(B) Non-Logical or Material	(I) Premise unduly assumed	(1) Premise depending on the conclusion (<i>Petitio Principii</i>). (2) Premise false or unsupported.
	(II) Irrelevant Conclusion (<i>Ignoratio Elenchi</i>).	

Let us now proceed to examine the various classes of Fallacies indicating their different forms or varieties.

§ 4. Formal Inferential Fallacies. These fallacies are such as can be easily detected from the mere form of an argument, without any necessary reference to the import of the terms employed. When we are familiar with the rules of the distribution of terms and the conditions of deductive reasoning (mediate and immediate), we can easily detect such fallacies. As we have already considered these fallacies in detail in Division III of Book II, we shall refer here to some prominent forms alone.

These fallacies are evident violations of logical rules, which can be readily detected without a reference to the matter of thought.

Illustrations.

1. Immediate Inference.

(a) *Simple conversion of A or conversion of O.*
For example :—(1) All horses are quadrupeds ;
∴ All quadrupeds are horses.
(2) Some men are not graduates ;
∴ Some graduates are not men.

(*Vide* Chap. X, § 2.)

(b) In *Obversion* or *Contraposition*, when the contrary is substituted for the contradictory, the contradictory of the subject is taken instead of that of the predicate, the quality is not changed, or the rule for the distribution of terms is violated. For example :—

- (1) All wise men are cautious ;
∴ All foolish men are careless.
- (2) All discontented men are unhappy ;
∴ No contented men are unhappy.
- (3) No men are perfect ;
∴ All imperfect beings are men.

(4) Some mangoes are not sweet ;
 ∴ Some not-sweet things are not mangoes.

(5) Some animals are bipeds ;
 ∴ Some non-bipeds are animals.

(*Vide* Chap. X, § 3 and § 4.)

(c) In *Inversion*, when any universal conclusion is drawn or **I** and **O** are inverted.

For example :—

(1) All intemperate men are weak ;

∴ No temperate men are weak.

(2) No imperfect beings are happy ;

∴ All perfect beings are happy.

(3) Some agreeable things are desirable ;

∴ Some disagreeable things are not desirable.

(*Vide* Chap. X, § 5.)

(d) In *Opposition*, when from the falsity of a universal proposition the truth of its contrary is inferred, or from the truth of a particular proposition the falsity of its sub-contrary is inferred.

For example :—

(1) All diligent men are prosperous (*false*) ;

∴ No diligent men are prosperous (*true*).

(2) Some days are clear (*true*) ;

∴ Some days are not clear (*false*).

(*Vide* Chap. X, § 6.)

(e) In *Subalternation*, when from the falsity of a universal proposition, the falsity of its sub-alternate is inferred ; or from the truth of a particular proposition the truth of its subalternant is inferred.

(*d*) No men are perfect ;

All men are animals :

∴ No animals are perfect. (*Illicit Minor.*)

(*e*) No men are quadrupeds, and

No quadrupeds are wise. (*Two Negatives.*)

But we should not hastily pronounce such an argument fallacious, without carefully examining whether a formal modification of the premises justifies any conclusion. The following premises, for example, justify a conclusion, when they are suitably modified :—No perfect beings are finite, and
No imperfect beings are happy.

The first premise when converted becomes—

No finite beings are perfect...(1)

The obverse of (1) is—

All finite beings are imperfect...(2)

By making (2) as the minor and the other given premise as the major, we get the following syllogism in *Celarent*—No imperfect beings are happy ;

All finite beings are imperfect :

∴ No finite beings are happy.

Or the given argument may be reduced to the following form :—

By converting the second original premise we get

No happy beings are imperfect...(1)

By obverting (1) we obtain

All happy beings are perfect.....(2)

By combining this with the other given premise we get the following syllogism in *Celarent* :—No perfect beings are finite ; All happy beings are perfect :
∴ No happy beings are finite.

(*Vide* Chap. XIII, § 7.)

(f) All created beings are not rational, and
Some rational beings are wise.

When reduced to the logical form, the argument stands thus :—

Some created beings are not rational, and
Some rational beings are wise.

(*Fallacy of Two Particular Premises.*)

§ 5. Semi-logical Fallacies. The Semi-logical Fallacies are the errors of inference which arise from the ambiguity of language. They are not quite formal fallacies, as the errors cannot be detected from the mere form of an argument. An examination of the meanings of the terms reveals the different senses in which they are used ; and this enables us to detect that the first and fundamental rule of syllogism is violated. (*Vide* Chap. XI, § 9.) Thus, Semi-logical Fallacies are ultimately fallacies of four terms. And, though we find that the middle term in such cases is often used ambiguously, yet fallacies of ambiguous extreme are not rare. Jests and puns owe their existence chiefly to this class of fallacies. We shall consider under this head six principal types which illustrate the chief forms of ambiguity. They are the Fallacies of (I) Equivocation, (II) Division and Composition, (III) Accident, (IV) Figure of Speech, (V) Amphibology, and (VI) Accent. Let us consider these one by one.

Semi-logical Fallacies are errors due to the ambiguity of language.

They are ultimately fallacies of four terms.

Their principal forms :

(I) **Fallacy of Equivocation.** Equivocation (Lat., *æquus*, equal, and *vox*, *vocis*, the voice) implies that the same term (voice or sound) is used in different senses, giving rise to a fallacy of ambi-

(I) *Fallacy of Equivocation*, in which the same word or expression is used in different senses.

Its two forms
are (1) ambiguous
middle
and (2)
ambiguous
extreme.
Illustrations.

guity. It assumes two forms according as the middle term or an extreme is used ambiguously. Thus, we have either (1) the fallacy of ambiguous middle or (2) the fallacy of ambiguous extreme (major or minor). The following may be taken as examples :—

(1) *Ambiguous Middle.*

(a) Sound travels 1,100 ft. per second ;
His knowledge of mathematics is sound :
∴ His knowledge of mathematics travels
1,100 ft. per second.

(b) All Masters of Arts are learned men ;
My cunning critic is, indeed, a master
of art :
∴ My cunning critic is a learned man.

(2) *Ambiguous Extreme.*

(a) "No courageous creature flies ;
The eagle is a courageous creature :
∴ The eagle does not fly." (*Ambiguous Major.*

Or

Light is essential to guide our steps ;
Lead is not essential to guide our steps :
∴ Lead is not light, *i.e.*, it is heavy.
(*Ambiguous Major.*)

(b) "No human being is made of paper ;
All pages are human beings :
∴ No pages are made of paper."
(*Ambiguous Minor.*)

Or

Infantry is not a part of our body ;
Foot is infantry :
∴ Foot is not a part of our body.
(*Ambiguous Minor.*)

(II) **Fallacies of Division and Composition.** These fallacies are closely connected with the preceding. They consist in using a term ambiguously with regard to its denotation. We know that every term occurs twice in a syllogism. [*Vide* Chap. XI, § 2.] (1) If we proceed from the collective to the distributive use of a term, we find the *Fallacy of Division* illustrated; (2) while the converse case of proceeding from the distributive to the collective use of a term illustrates the *Fallacy of Composition*. In the former, we divide (Lat. *di* for *dis*, asunder, and *vid*, to cut or separate) or separate what was previously taken collectively; while in the latter, we compose (Lat. *com*, with, and *pono*, to place), combine, or put together what were taken distributively before. The following may be taken as illustrations:—

(II) *Fallacies of Division and Composition*, in which there is ambiguity in the denotative use of a term:

(1) in *Division* we proceed from the collective to the distributive use;
(2) while in *Composition*, from the distributive to the collective use.

Illustrations.

(1) *Fallacy of Division* :

(a) All the trees in the park make a thick shade ;

This is a tree in the park :

∴ This tree makes a thick shade.

(b) All the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles ;

ABC is an angle of a triangle :

∴ ABC is equal to two right angles.

(2) *Fallacy of Composition* :

(a) Three and four are odd and even ;

Seven is three and four :

∴ Seven is odd and even.

(b) This box, this chair, this table, this shelf, this bed-stead can be carried on the head ;
The furniture of the room consists of this box, this chair, this table, this shelf, and this bed-stead :

∴ The furniture of this room can be carried on the head.

(c) "Is it possible for a man who is walking not to walk ?" "Yes."

"Then it is possible for a man to walk without walking."

In the above illustrations, we pass, in the one case [*vis.* (1)], from the collective to the distributive use of the middle term, while in the other [*vis.*, (2)], from its distributive to its collective use. Sometimes a fallacy of this kind is illustrated in connection with the extremes. Take the following example :

Seven is one number :

Three and four are seven :

∴ Three and four are one number.

Here we pass from the collective to the distributive use of the minor term ; and so it illustrates the fallacy of Division.

We should remember in this connection that, simple as these fallacies seem, they are often illustrated in the concrete affairs of life. A spend-thrift, for example, may think that because he can afford to buy this, that, *or* the other thing, therefore, he can as well afford to buy *all* these things ; while a miserly man may deny himself the ordinary pleasures, thinking that his money is not adequate to meet the necessities of his life. A good illustra-

tion of the fallacy of composition is found in the following argument of Mill, in which he tries to show that, because every man seeks his own happiness, therefore, he is disposed to seek also the happiness of the community : "No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness : each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 53.) We commit these fallacies also when, from the general character of a person, we infer that a particular act of his must necessarily bear that stamp ; or, conversely, when from a few acts we hastily conclude that they are a sure index to a particular type of character. Because a man is generally correct in his speech, we cannot conclude that he is necessarily correct in a particular case ; much less can we conclude that because a person is correct in a few cases, he must necessarily be so always. The following example illustrates how a combination of these two fallacies may sometimes lead to extravagant forms of reasoning :—'Epimenides the Cretan says that "All the Cretans are liars" ; but Epimenides is himself a Cretan : therefore he is himself a liar. But if he be a liar, what he says is untrue, and consequently the Cretans are veracious ; but Epimenides, is a Cretan, and therefore what he says is true ; hence the Cretans are liars, Epimenides is himself a liar, and what he says is untrue.' Thus, we may go on alternately proving

that Epimenides and the Cretans are truthful and untruthful.

(III) *Fallacy of Accident* in which the middle term is used without any qualification in one premise, but subject to a qualification in the other, or the middle term is used with different limitations in the two premises.

An example.

(III) **Fallacy of Accident.** The fallacy of Accident illustrates that form of ambiguity in which we confound the essential with the accidental use of a term. Thus, in this fallacy, we confound the general application of a term with its special use, or one special use with another. "The Middle Term," as Whately observes, "is used, in one Premiss to signify some thing considered ' simply, in itself, and as to its essence ; and in the other Premiss, so as to imply that its Accidents are taken into account with it." (*Logic*, p. 131.) An interesting example of this fallacy is given by Boccaccio :—
 "A servant who was roasting a crane for his master was prevailed upon by his sweet-heart to cut off a leg for her to eat. When the bird came upon table at supper, the master desired to know what was become of the other leg. The man answered that cranes had never more than one leg. The master, very angry, but determined to strike his servant dumb before he punished him, took him next morning into the fields where they saw cranes standing each on one leg as cranes do when they are sleeping. The servant turned triumphantly to his master, on which the latter shouted, and the birds put down their other legs and flew away. "Ah, sir," said the servant, "you did not shout to the crane at supper yesterday ; if you had done so, he would then have set down his other leg, as these here did ; but if, as they, he had flown away too, by that means you might have lost your supper."

(*Decameron*, the Sixth Day, Novel IV.) The argument of the servant evidently assumes that what a living crane can do, a dead crane can do as well.

The Fallacy of Accident occurs in three different forms :—

(1) When we argue *from a general rule to a special case*. For example,

Water is liquid ;
Ice is water ;
∴ Ice is liquid.

Here the middle term, 'water,' is used generally or without any condition in the major premise, but subject to a condition (*vis*, congealed or frozen) in the minor. This is known as the *fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid*, i.e., the fallacy of arguing from a simple statement to a statement under a certain condition. This is often illustrated when we apply a proverb or common saying to a particular case, as when we suggest a conclusion by saying 'what man has done man may do,' or 'a rolling stone gathers no moss.' Here are other examples of this form of fallacy : (a) "Every man has a right to inculcate his own opinions ; therefore a magistrate is justified in using his power to enforce his own political views." (b) Books are a source of knowledge and instruction ; a table of logarithms is a book : therefore, a table of logarithms is a source of knowledge and instruction.

(2) The converse of the above case, i.e., when we reason *from a special case to a general rule*. For example,

Three Forms of this Fallacy :

(1) When we reason from a simple to a qualified case.

(2) When we reason from a qualified case to a simple one.

What is bought in the market is eaten ;
 Raw meat is bought in the market :
 ∴ Raw meat is eaten.

Here the middle term, 'what is bought in the market,' is used subject to a condition (such as, 'when cooked at home') in the major premise, while without that condition in the minor. This is known as the *fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*, i.e., the fallacy of arguing from a statement under a certain condition to a simple statement. Here is another instance of this type :

Nuisances are punishable by law ;
 To have mosquitoes in a house is a nuisance :
 ∴ To have mosquitoes in a house is punishable
 by law.

(3) When we reason from a qualified case to a case differently qualified.

(3) When we reason *from one special case to another*. For example,

To inflict pain on another is wrong :
 The surgeon in performing an operation
 inflicts pain on another :
 ∴ The surgeon does something wrong.

Here the middle term, 'to inflict pain on another,' is used subject to one condition (*viz.*, maliciously) in the major premise, but subject to a different condition (*viz.*, with the intention of doing good to another) in the minor. This form of the fallacy is often illustrated when we confound an unessential with an essential (*a*) resemblance or (*b*) difference. For example—

(*a*) To call you an animal is to speak truth ;
 To call you a donkey is to call you an animal :
 ∴ To call you a donkey is to speak truth.

(b) "Is Brutus different from Cæsar?" "Yes."

"Is Cæsar a man?" "Yes."

"Then Brutus is different from man."

(IV) **Fallacy of Figure of Speech** This fallacy is illustrated when words derived from the same root, but having different meanings in the different part of speech or in their different forms, are confounded with one another, or words similarly formed are supposed to have similar meanings. Thus, art, artist, artisan, and artful; project, projection, and projector; presume, presumption, and presumptuous; image, imaginary, and imagination; desire, desirous, and desirable; apprehend, apprehension, and apprehensive do not always imply the same thing. As such conjugate words are called paronyms (Gr. *para*, beside, near, and *onoma*, a name), the Fallacy of Figure of Speech is sometimes described as the **Fallacy of Paronymous Terms**. Terms which are similar in form are supposed to be similar also in meaning. This fallacy, as Whately observes, is "built on the grammatical structure of language, from man's usually taking for granted that *paronymous* [or *conjugate*] words—*i. e.*, those belonging to each other, as the substantive, adjective, verb, *etc.*, of the same root, have a precisely correspondent meaning; which is by no means universally the case." (*Logic*, p. 117.) As examples of this fallacy we may take the following:—

(a) "Projectors are unfit to be trusted;

This man has formed a project:

∴ He is unfit to be trusted."

(IV) *Fallacy of Figure of Speech*, in which conjugate words or words similarly formed are erroneously supposed to have similar meanings.

This is sometimes known as the *Fallacy of Paronymous Terms*.

Illustrations.

Here the bad sense associated with 'projectors' is not present in 'forming a project.'

(b) Whatever a man walks he tramples on ;

This man walks the whole day :

∴ He tramples on the whole day.

Here an adverbial phrase is taken as equivalent to a noun object.

(c) Mill in his *Utilitarianism* argues thus :—
 "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it : and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it." (Pp. 52-53.) Surely, 'visible', 'audible,' and 'desirable,' though similar in their formation, do not bear similar meanings. 'Visible' or 'audible' implies *capable* of being seen or heard ; but 'desirable' means what *ought* to be desired. A robber, for example, desires another's property ; but this can never be called 'desirable.'

(V) *Fallacy of Amphibology*, in which the error lies in the ambiguous construction of a sentence.

(V) **Fallacy of Amphibology.** Here the ambiguity lies, not in a word, but in the interpretation of a sentence, owing to its ambiguous *construction*. An amphibolous (Gr. *amphi*, in two ways, and *ballo* to strike) sentence is one which admits of double construction and so of two meanings. Of such a character is the witch's prophecy in *Henry VI* :

"The duke yet lives that Henry shall depose"

(Second Part. Act. i, Sc. 4.)

This may mean either that the duke shall

depose Henry or that Henry shall depose the duke. Prophecies are generally of this character, so that, whatever may be the issue in any case, they may be justified by a suitable construction. We may remember in this connection the well-known oracular sayings—‘Alexander Darius will conquer,’ ‘Pyrrhus the Romans shall, I say, subdue.’ Sometimes a careless use of adjectives or pronouns or thoughtless arrangement of words may give rise to such a fallacy. “The double-meaning which may be given to ‘twice two and three,’” writes Jevons, “arises from amphibology ; it may be 7 or 10, according as we add the 3 after or before multiplying. In the careless construction of sentences it is often impossible to tell to what part any adverb or qualifying clause refers. Thus, if a person says ‘I accomplished my business and returned the day after’, it may be that the business was accomplished on the day after as well as the return ; but it may equally have been finished on the previous day. Any ambiguity of this kind may generally be avoided by a simple change in the order of the words ; as for instance, ‘I accomplished my business, and, on the day after, returned.’ Amphibology may sometimes arise from confusing the subjects and predicates in a compound sentence, as if in ‘platinum and iron are very rare and useful metals’ I were to apply the predicate useful to platinum and rare to iron, which is not intended. The word ‘respectively’ is often used to shew that the reader is not at liberty to apply each predicate to each subject.” (*Elementary Lessons in Logic*, pp. 172-173.)

Prophecies,
riddles, and
witticisms
generally
involve this
fallacy.

Illustrations.

The following examples may also be mentioned here :—‘Wanted a chestnut horse by a gentleman with a long mane and tail’ ; ‘A piano for sale by a lady about to cross the channel in an oak case with carved legs’ ; ‘Lost, a dog by the chief medical officer of Hongkong with a tufted tail that answers to the name of ‘Tom’’ ; ‘He blew out his brains after bidding his wife good-bye with a gun’ ; ‘Erected to the memory of John Browning accidentally shot as a mark of affection by his brother.’ Riddles and witticisms are often based on this fallacy.

(VI) *Fallacy of Accent*, in which the error is due to misplaced accent.

(VI) **Fallacy of Accent.** This is illustrated when any ambiguity arises from misplaced accent or emphasis on any expression in a sentence. A ludicrous example may occur to one reading 1 Kings, XIII, 27, where it is said—“And he spake to his sons, saying, saddle me the ass. And they saddled *him*.” Similarly, the sacred texts—‘Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour,’ ‘The fool hath said in his heart that there is no God’—may be perverted by ‘wrong emphasis. One, by laying emphasis on ‘against’ in the one case and on ‘in his heart’ in the other, may be led to imagine that it is not wrong to bear false witness *in favour of* his neighbour or to proclaim *aloud* that there is no God. The different ways in which this fallacy may be committed are well indicated by De Morgan. He writes, “A statement of what was said with the suppression of such tone as was meant to accompany it, is the *fallacia accentus*. Gesture and manner often make the difference between irony and sarcasm, and ordinary assertion.

A person who quotes another, omitting anything which serves to show the *animus* of the meaning ; or one who without notice puts any word of the author he cites in italics, so as to alter its emphasis ; or one who attempts to heighten his own assertions, so as to make them imply more than he would openly say, by italics, or notes of exclamation, or otherwise, is guilty of the *fallacia accentus*... I may here observe that irony...is generally accompanied by the *fallacia accentus* ; perhaps cannot be assumed without it. A writer disclaims attempting a certain task as above his powers, or doubts about deciding a proposition as beyond his knowledge. A self-sufficient opponent is very effective in assuring him that his diffidence is highly commendable, and fully justified by the circumstances." (*Formal Logic*, pp. 249-50.) How emphasis alters meaning is well illustrated by the sentence, 'I never sold you that horse', where stress on any one of the six words implies a different sense.

Irony generally involves this fallacy.

§ 6. Inductive Inferential Fallacies.

Having considered the principal forms of the Fallacies of Deductive Inference, let us now turn our attention to the examination of the fallacies which arise from the transgression of the Rules of Inductive Inference. These fallacies arise from the improper use of the Inductive Canons and of the connected processes of Probability and Analogy. As we have already illustrated these fallacies in detail in explaining the Inductive Methods, let us briefly refer to a few prominent cases here.

These Fallacies are due to the improper use of the Inductive Canons and of the connected processes of Probability and Analogy.

The chief inductive fallacy is the fallacy of *Non causa pro causa* or the erroneous supposition of an accidental circumstance as a cause.

Illustrations.

The chief fallacy connected with inductive inquiry is the error of mistaking as a cause what is not really so. This is known as the fallacy of **Non causa pro causa** [assuming as a cause what is not the cause]. The superstitious are thus disposed at times to attribute their successes or failures to good or bad omens, which at most may be but favourable or unfavourable signs. Purely accidental circumstances are thus at times viewed as causes, as when the Norwegians attributed the disappearance of the fish from their coast to the introduction of inoculation. "Many are the cases," observes Whately, "in which a *Sign* from which one might fairly infer a certain phenomenon, is mistaken for the *Cause* of it: (as if one should suppose the falling of the mercury to be a cause of rain; of which it certainly is an indication) whereas the fact will often be the very reverse. *E.G.* A great deal of *money* in a country is a pretty sure proof of its wealth; and thence has been often regarded as the cause of it; whereas in truth it is an effect. The same, with a numerous and increasing *population*. Again, the *labour* bestowed on any commodity has often been represented as the cause of its value; though every one would call a fine pearl an article of value, even though he should meet with it accidentally in eating an oyster. Pearls are indeed generally obtained by laborious diving: but they do not fetch a high price from that cause; but on the contrary men dive for them *because* they fetch a high price. So also exposure to want and hardship in youth

has been regarded as a cause of the hardy constitution of those men and brutes which have been brought up in barren countries of uncongenial climate. Yet the most experienced cattle breeders know that animals are, *cæteris paribus*, the more hardy for having been well fed and sheltered in youth ; but early hardships, by destroying all the tender, ensure the hardiness of the survivors ; which is the cause, not the effect, of their having lived through such a training. So, loading a gun-barrel to the muzzle, and firing it, does not *give* it strength ; though it *proves*, if it escape, that it *was* strong." (*Logic*, pp. 134-135.)

The most common form of the fallacy of *Non causa pro causa* is to mistake an antecedent as the cause : not infrequently we regard one phenomenon as the cause of another, because the one precedes the other. This form of the fallacy is known as *Post hoc ergo propter hoc* [after this, therefore caused by this]. Thus, a comet or an eclipse may be regarded as the cause of some disaster or calamity ; the wearing of an amulet may be regarded as the cause of prosperity or good fortune. "All superstition," says Father Clarke, "is fond of employing it. I walk under a ladder and lose the train just afterwards. Foolishly I attribute my misfortune, not to my unpunctuality, but to the ill-luck resulting from going under a ladder. A ship sails on a Friday and is shipwrecked, and one of the passengers blames his folly in starting on an unlucky day. An habitual drunkard accounts for his shattered nerves to the fact that he studied hard for the army in his

The most common form of *Non causa pro causa* is to imagine an antecedent as the cause. It is known as *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*.

Illustrations.

youth. A preacher obtains a great success, and attributes the number of conversions to the eloquence wherewith he has preached the word of God, whereas all the while what obtained from God the grace that moved the hearts of men was the prayers and sufferings of some good old dame saying her beads in a corner of the church." (*Logic*, p. 454.)

The fallacy of *Non causa pro causa* is often due to Non-observation or Mal-observation.

It may be mentioned here that the fallacy of *Non causa pro causa* is often due to oversight or imperfect analysis, the fallacies of which we shall consider under Non-observation and Mal-observation in section 8.

Causation may be wrongly inferred from Agreement

We have already considered the errors which arise from the wrong use of the Inductive Canons. (*Vide* Chap. XVIII.) The most fruitful source of error here is to prove causation by the *Method of Agreement*, which, as we have seen, is not competent to prove it. The illustrations given above show how even accidental coincidences may be misconstrued as implying causation. And the *Method of Difference*—the most *cogent* Inductive Method—may at times fail when some other cause than the supposed one is allowed to operate. If our analysis or elimination be incomplete, then even this method proves ineffectual. It is found, for example, that royal touch cures certain patients, while without it others are not cured. From this it may be inferred by Difference that such a touch is a potent cause of cure; but such an inference may be wrong. Dr. Paris well observes on this point:—"Amongst the numerous instances which have

and even from Difference when elimination is imperfect.

Illustrations.

been cited to show the power of faith over disease, or of the mind over the bodily organs, *the cures performed by royal touch* have been considered the most extraordinary : but it would appear, upon the authority of Wiseman, that the cures which were thus effected were in reality produced by a very different cause ; for he states that part of the duty of the royal physicians and serjeant surgeons was to select such patients afflicted with scrofula as evinced a tendency towards recovery, and that they took especial care to choose those who approached the age of puberty. In short, those only were produced whom Nature had shown a disposition to cure ; and as the touch of the king, like the sympathetic powder of Digby, secured the patient from the mischievous importunities of art, so were the efforts of Nature left free and uncontrolled, and the cure of the disease was not retarded or opposed by the administration of adverse remedies." (*Pharmacologia*, p. 30.) Similarly, when we find that with certain incantations some result is achieved, while without them it is not accomplished, we may be disposed to believe in the efficacy of the incantations, without caring to examine whether some other secret cause operates at the time. "It is unquestionable," says Voltaire, referring to sorceries, "that certain words and ceremonies will effectually destroy a flock of sheep, if administered with a sufficient portion of arsenic." (*Vide* Chap. XVIII, § 6.)

We have seen that the *Theory of Probability* involves, more or less clearly, the employment of the inductive methods. (*Vide* Chap. XXI, § 3 and

The Fallacies of Probability are generally due to a

wrong
estimate of
the average
or its undue
extension
to dissimilar
cases.

An
illustration.

§ 4.) The correctness of our conclusions by a computation of probabilities depends, therefore, on the accuracy and precision of our prior inductive analysis, elimination, and modification of circumstances. Thus, the averages in any sphere are reliable only when the supposed causes remain constant; any variation in them would mean variation in the result. But how often do we not unwarrantably assume that the averages which are true now will be true always, that the averages which are true here, are true everywhere! The following passage from Dr. Venn is instructive in this connection :—"Let us take, for example, the average duration of life. This, provided our data are sufficiently extensive, is known to be tolerably regular and uniform. But a very little consideration will show that there may be a superior as well as an inferior limit to the extent within which this uniformity can be observed. At the present time the average duration of life in England may be, say, forty years; but a century ago it was decidedly less; several centuries ago it was very much less; whilst if we possessed statistics referring to our early British ancestors we should probably find that there has been since that time a still more marked improvement. What may be the future tendency no man can say for certain. It may be and we hope that it will be the case, that owing to sanitary and other improvements, the duration of life will go on increasing steadily; it is quite conceivable that it should do so without limit. On the other hand, this duration might gradually tend towards some

fixed length. Or, again it is perfectly possible that future generations might prefer a short and a merry life, and therefore reduce their average. All that I am concerned to indicate is, that this uniformity (as we have hitherto called it) has varied, and, under the influence of future eddies in opinion and practice, may vary still ; and this to any extent, and with any degree of irregularity. To borrow a term from Astronomy, we find our uniformity subject to what might be called an irregular *secular* variation." (*Logic of Chance*, Chap. I.)

Analogy, as we have seen, is likewise often a source of false inference. (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 4 and § 5.) We often incorrectly extend to new cases what we have already noticed in like instances. We may mention the following additional example here as illustrating false analogy. The Arabian physicians imagined "that gold was the metallic element in a state of perfect purity, and that all the other metals differed from it in proportion only to the extent of their individual contamination ; and hence the origin of the epithet *base*, as applied to such metals. This hypothesis explains the origin of alchemy ; but in every history we are informed that the earlier alchemists expected, by the same means that they hoped to convert the *baser* metals into gold, to produce an universal remedy, calculated to prolong indefinitely the span of human existence. It is difficult to imagine what connexion could exist in their ideas between the '*Philosopher's Stone*', which was to transmute metals, and a remedy which could arrest the progress of bodily

Fallacies of Analogy are due to imperfect similarity.

An illustration.

infirmity : upon searching, however, into the writings of these times, it appears probable that this conceit may have originated with the alchemists from the application of false analogies, and that the error was subsequently diffused and exaggerated by a misconstruction of alchemical metaphors." (Dr. Paris, *Op. cit.*, p. 64.)

These include the inconsistencies in the use of Terms and Propositions and the errors from the violation of the rules of Definition and Division.

Illustrations.

§ 7. Deductive Non-Inferential Fallacies. These fallacies include the formal errors in the use of Terms and Propositions as well as those which arise from the violation of the rules of Division and Deductive Definition. The following may be taken as illustrations :—

1. *Inconsistent Terms.* Fallacies under this head are illustrated when the composition of terms involves self-contradiction, *e. g.*, a sweet weight, an indivisible atom, a round anger, a straight circle, or a figure bounded by two straight lines.

2. *Inconsistent Propositions.* Fallacies under this head indicate incompatible combinations of terms in propositions, *e. g.*, John is living and dead, sleep is wakefulness, every rule has exceptions, truth is consistent falsehood, light is darkness, Logic is the Laws of Thought, he exclaims he is dumb, consciousness is unreliable, Jean Paul's dwarf reached only up to his own knees.

3. *Fallacies Connected with Division.* These fallacies imply a confusion of physical, metaphysical, and logical division, or an error arising from the transgression of the rules of Division. (*Vide* Chap. XXVI, § 7.) We may take the following as additional examples. The sun divided into

its light and heat ; a watch into its dial, hands, wheels, springs, plates, screws, and case ; a crowd into adults and children ; books into octavo, quarto, English and scientific ; houses into one-storied, two-storied, and three-storied.

4. *Fallacies Connected with Definition.* These fallacies include the errors which arise from the violation of the rules of Deductive Definition. (*Vide* Chap. XXV, § 5.) The following may be taken as examples :—A scribe is a writer ; cows are domestic animals ; light is not darkness ; Logic is the art of reasoning ; the moon is the queen of night ; mind is a home where everything is made or unmade.

§ 8. Inductive Non-Inferential Fallacies. These fallacies include the errors connected with the preliminary processes of Inductive Inquiry (such as Observation, Analysis, Elimination, the framing of Hypotheses) as well as the errors due to the transgression of the rules of Classification, Naming and Inductive Definition. (*Vide* Chap. XVI, § 4, Chap. XVII, § 9, Chap. XIX, § 4, Chap. XXV, § 4, Chap. XXVI, § 7, and Chap. XXVII, § 4 and § 5.)

The most fruitful source of error here is wrong Observation. Taking Observation in a wide sense (so as to cover Experiment), we may say with Mill that the Fallacies of Observation are divisible into two principal forms, *viz.*, Non-observation and Mal-observation. Non-observation indicates an error of a negative kind, as in it we merely overlook what is present before our mind ; while

These include the errors of Observation, Analysis, Elimination, Hypothesis, Classification, Naming, and Inductive Definition.

Wrong Observation may be due to either Non-observation or Mal-observation. Non-observation implies a mere oversight ;

while
Mal-
observation,
a positive
mistake.

Mal-observation implies a positive mistake, as in it we suppose some wrong feature or quality present in an object before us. "The one," as Bain says, "leaves out pertinent instances, the other distorts or misrepresents what is observed. Non-observation explains the credit given to fortune-tellers, to quacks, and to false maxims; the cases favourable being noted, and the other forgotten. The motive in this class of fallacies is a strong pre-conceived opinion or wish to find the dictum true. Further, the Non-observation may be, not of instances, but of *material circumstances*, as when it is stated that lavish expenditure alone encourages industry, the circumstances being overlooked that savings are capital for the employment of labour. Under Mal-observation may be placed the chief mistake connected with the proper act of observing, namely, the confounding of a perception with a rapid inference, or the mingling up of inferences with facts. This is the common infirmity of uneducated witnesses and narrators of events." (*Induction*, p. 371.) If, for example, in non-observation we merely overlook that a particular person has a pair of blue or black eyes, in mal-observation we suppose him as possessing a pair of blue eyes when really his eyes are black. In thinking that nothing else happened when a magician converted a ball into a sparrow, I am guilty of non-observation; but in supposing that the ball developed into a sparrow in the hands of the magician, I am guilty of mal-observation.

Thus, the one is illustrated when we *fail* to observe by omitting a feature ; while the other, when we *badly* observe by importing a feature which is not present. When, for instance, we say that there are no stars in the sky during the day, we commit the fallacy of non-observation ; but when a traveller in a desert pursues a mirage to drink water, he is guilty of mal-observation.

It may be mentioned, however, that non-observation and mal-observation, though thus theoretically distinct, often run into each other : non-observation leads to mal-observation ; and mal-observation involves non-observation in many cases. When I miss an essential feature, I import another to complete my idea of the object observed ; and when I import a wrong feature, I generally do it by displacing or overlooking a right one. Such a confusion in inductive inquiry is often due to imperfect analysis or elimination. When, for example, I miss an article and do not adequately analyse the circumstances under which it was lost, my suspicion may wrongly be fastened on my servant, whose conduct, thenceforth, may seem to me suspicious because I read it with suspicious eyes. The following example given by Minto clearly illustrates this point :—“The believers in Kenelm Digby’s ‘Ointment of Honour’ appealed to experience in support of its efficacy. The treatment was to apply the ointment, not to the wound but to the sword that had inflicted it, to dress this carefully at regular intervals, and, meantime, having bound up the wound, to leave it alone for

Non-observation and Mal-observation are closely connected.

They are often due to imperfect analysis and elimination.

Illustrations.

seven days. It was observed that many cures followed upon this treatment. But those who inferred that the cure was due to the bandaging of the sword, failed to observe that there was another circumstance that might have been instrumental, namely, the exclusion of the air and the leaving of the wound undisturbed while the natural healing processes went on. And it was found upon further observation that binding up the wound alone answered the purpose equally well whether the sword was dressed or not." (*Logic*, p. 296.) Here is another example reported in the *Indian Daily News* of January 31, 1922 :—

"So many seeming miracles are accomplished by rays, visible and invisible, now known to science, that there is little wonder the public will believe any marvel attributed to "rays". An Italian created a tremendous sensation a few years ago, with his "mysterious, ultra-red rays." These were, apparently, capable of anything, but their especial function was the igniting of explosives at a distance. A demonstration was given, in which an old ship well charged with explosives, was allowed to drift some distance from the shore where Signor Ulivi was stationed with his apparatus. The inventor adjusted his generator and directed the rays towards the ship, which obediently blew up. That was enough. No one stayed to investigate, and each account grew more wonderful. The distance at which the rays would operate also grew until the whole affair fizzled out, and it transpired that all the demonstrations had

been accomplished with the aid of confederates, who had fired the charge by ordinary methods."

As the Fallacies of Classification, Definition, and Naming have already been explained and illustrated in the chapters treating of these logical processes, let us conclude this section with examples of erroneous hypothesis and explanation, which are often due to prior bias or misconception. "It has been maintained," says Fowler, "by theologians more ardent than discreet, that all fossils were the creations of the Devil, whose object was either to mimic the Almighty or to tempt mankind to disbelieve the Mosaic account of the creation. Such theories admit of no refutation ; every argument, grounded on the resemblance of fossil remains to living organisms, shows only more distinctly, to those who have once embraced the idea, the success of the alleged agent as a mimic or as an impostor." (*Induction*, p. 98.) Similarly, when Galileo discovered with his telescope that the surface of the moon was full of hollows, his opponents charged him with taking a fiendish delight in distorting the fairest works of nature. For, the Aristotelian doctrine, it was urged, was that the moon was a perfect body. Now, Lodovico delle Colombe tried to reconcile these extreme views by suggesting that the 'apparently hollow parts were filled with a pure transparent crystal'!

Illustrations
of wrong
Hypothesis
and
Explanation.

§ 9. Fallacies of Undue Assumption. Having explained above the different forms of the Logical Fallacies, let us now examine the varieties of the Non-Logical or Material Fallacies. These

Material
Fallacies
include (I)
Undue
Assumption
of Premise

and (II)
Irrelevant
Conclusion.

fallacies arise, not from a direct violation of the logical rules, but from the incorrectness of the data or the misapprehension of the relation of premises to conclusion. We shall accordingly discuss, under Material Fallacies, these two principal forms, *viz.*, (I) Undue Assumption of Premise and (II) Irrelevant Conclusion. In the present section we shall confine our attention to the former, while, in the next, we shall examine the latter.

(I) The
Fallacy of
Undue
Assumption
of Premise
assumes two
forms
according as
the premise
assumed (1)
unfairly
includes the
conclusion or
(2) is not
justified by
facts.

(I) The Fallacy of Undue Assumption of Premise may imply either (1) that what we intend to prove we already assume in the premise, or (2) that the premise with which we start is quite false, being inconsistent with facts. In the one, we unfairly assume what we want to establish, while in the other we incorrectly suppose a premise which lends support to the desired result. Let us consider these two forms one by one.

(1) The
Fallacy of
Petitio
Principii or
Begging the
Question
implies that
the conclu-
sion is
assumed in
a premise.

(1) *Petitio Principii*. The Fallacy of *Petitio Principii* or Begging the Question implies that what we want to prove we assume in a premise. Surely, to take for granted what has to be established by inference offends against the postulate of all reasoning : whenever we begin to argue, we mean that the premises with which we start are different from the conclusion, which is their combined effect according to the principles of reasoning. Hence, some are disposed to hold that *Petitio Principii* is rather a formal Fallacy, as it transgresses the fundamental principle of all reasoning that we should not beg the question at issue. But, when we examine the character of this fallacy

a little closely, we find that it can never be detected unless we are aware of the true import of the terms employed and of the real order of things. The Fallacy lies not in *mere* assumption, which is essential to every reasoning, but in *undue* assumption, so that the conclusion is implied in a premise. As Mansel observes, "The *petitio principii* is a *material*, not a *formal* Fallacy, and consists in assuming in demonstration, a non-axiomatic principle as axiomatic, or in dialectic disputation, a non-probable principle as probable." *Petitio principii* is illustrated either (a) in a single step of inference or (b) in a train of reasoning. Let us consider these two forms separately.

It is illustrated either (a) in a single syllogism or (b) in a train of reasoning.

(a) *Simple Form*. The Simple Form of *Petitio Principii* is illustrated when the argument is confined to a single syllogism, a premise and the conclusion being really the same. Thus,

(a) Simple Form in which the fallacy is confined to a single syllogism. Illustrations.

All men are fallible ;

Those who are fallible are not infallible :

∴ No men are infallible.

Here apparently the conclusion is proved by both the premises ; but really it is assumed in the first or minor premise which, when obverted, directly gives the conclusion. Similarly, when it is said that 'glass is transparent because we can see through it,' or 'the volume of a body diminishes when it is cooled, since the molecules then become closer,' we are guilty of this form of begging the question. Once a member of Parliament argued—"The bill before the House is well calculated to elevate the character of education in the country,

Sometimes the fallacy is involved in single epithets.

for the general standard of instruction in all the schools will be raised by it." Sometimes the fallacy may be involved in single epithets or, what Bentham calls, "question-begging appellatives." When, for example, an individual is unwarrantably branded as a rebel or a traitor, or a measure is described as mischievous or revolutionary, the expressions smoothly prepare the way for any subsequent condemnation which is implied in them.

(b) Complex Form, known as Argument in a Circle, in which the fallacy is illustrated in a train of reasoning.

(b) *Complex Form.* The Complex Form of *Petitio Principii* is known as **Argument in a Circle**. It is illustrated when by a chain of reasoning we try to establish a conclusion which is really assumed at the outset. It is committed not in a single syllogism but in a train of syllogistic inference. In such a case we finally return to the point whence we started, as we do when we traverse the successive points in the circumference of a circle. It may be illustrated symbolically thus :—

- | | |
|------------------------|------------------------|
| (1) <i>All A is B,</i> | (3) <i>All A is D,</i> |
| <i>All B is C,</i> | <i>All D is E,</i> |
| ∴ <i>All A is C ;</i> | ∴ <i>All A is E ;</i> |
| (2) <i>All A is C,</i> | (4) <i>All A is E,</i> |
| <i>All C is D,</i> | <i>All E is B,</i> |
| ∴ <i>All A is D ;</i> | ∴ <i>All A is B.</i> |

Here the conclusion of the 4th syllogism is the same as the minor premise of the first ; and thus practically 'A is B' is proved by 'A is B'—the same by the same, *idem per idem*. The difficulty of detecting such a fallacy increases with the length of the chain, the omission of certain steps,

The difficulty of detecting such a fallacy increases.

and the use of synonymous expressions. As Whately observes, "Obliquity and disguise being of course most important to the success of the *petitio principii* as well as of other Fallacies, the Sophist will, in general, either have recourse to the 'Circle,' or else not venture to *state* distinctly his assumption of the point in question, but will rather assert some other proposition which *implies* it ; thus keeping out of sight (as a dexterous thief does stolen goods) the point in question, at the very moment when he is taking it for granted. Hence the frequent union of this fallacy with '*ignoratio elenchi*'". (*Logic*, p. 133.) The following concrete example is given by Whately as illustrating Argument in a Circle :—"Some Mechanicians attempt to prove, (what they ought to have laid down as a probable but doubtful hypothesis,) that every particle of matter gravitates equally ; 'why' ? because those bodies which contain more particles ever gravitate more strongly, *i. e.*, are heavier : 'but (it may be urged) those which are heaviest are not always more bulky' ; 'no, but still they contain more particles, though more closely condensed' ; 'how do you know that ?' 'because they are heavier' ; 'how does that prove it ?' 'because all particles of matter gravitating equally, that mass which is specifically the heavier must needs have the more' of them in the same space'." (*Ibid.*, *Vide* Chapter XXXI, § 2.)

with the length of the train and the use of synonymous expressions.

A concrete example.

(2) **Falsity of Premise.** Having considered *Petitio Principii*, let us now turn our attention to the other form of the Fallacy of Undue Assumption, *vis.*,

(2) Falsity of Premise implies that a premise is

unjustifiably
assumed.

It is usually
associated
with
*ignoratio
elenchi*,
*post hoc ergo
propter hoc*,
or *petitio
principii*.

Wrong
Dilemmas, in
which there
is imperfect
disjunction,
often involve
this fallacy.

Illustrations.

the Fallacy of the Falsity of Premise. It is illustrated when we unwarrantably start with a premise to prove a conclusion, as when we argue that 'locomotion is not an attribute of all animals, since sponges cannot change their place.' Here we unjustly assume that 'sponges are animals,' which is a doubtful fact. This fallacy is usually associated with other fallacies. (a) If the premise wrongly assumed bears no connection with the conclusion, the fallacy is associated with *ignoratio elenchi*. [Vide next section.] (b) If, as is ordinarily the case, the premise is connected with the conclusion the fallacy is associated with either *post hoc ergo propter hoc* or *petitio principii*. As the last form is often illustrated in practice, let us explain it in a separate paragraph.

As the selection of premises is not an aimless act, they are generally chosen by reference to the conclusion to be established. Hence, we not infrequently find that a false premise is so selected as unfairly to imply the conclusion. It is often illustrated in wrong dilemmas in which there is imperfect disjunction. For example, the impossibility of motion is proved thus :—

If motion is possible, a body must move either in the place where it is, or in the place where it is not ;

But a body cannot move in the place where it is, and, of course, it cannot move where it is not :

Therefore, a body cannot move at all, *i. e.*, motion is impossible.

Here the character of motion is so defined in

the major premise as to preclude its possibility altogether. Hence what is deduced in the conclusion is already unwarrantably assumed in the premise. Motion is *neither* movement *in* the place where a body is, *nor* movement *in* the place where it is not: motion is *change of place*, i. e., the passage of a body *from* the place where it is *to* a place where it is not. We find a similar example in the dilemma in which the custodians of the Alexandrian Library were put by Caliph Omar when he conquered Egypt in 640 A.D. :—"If your books," he said, "are in conformity with the Koran, they are superfluous; if they are at variance with it, they are pernicious. But they must either be in conformity with the Koran or at variance with it. Therefore, they are either superfluous or pernicious." The conqueror assumes here, without good grounds, that the teachings of the Koran are not merely sound but contain all that is worth knowing, so that any book in conformity with it might be regarded as superfluous. Thus, he assumes what he subsequently deduces. We should remember that a materially invalid dilemma is often a nest of *petitio principii*. (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 4.)

A materially invalid dilemma often involves a *petitio principii*.

§ 10. **Ignoratio Elenchi.** Let us now bring our account of Fallacies to a close by a brief reference to the remaining class of Material Fallacies, *viz.*, (II) *Ignoratio Elenchi*. *Ignoratio Elenchi* literally means Ignorance of the Refutation or arguing beside the point. By an *elenchus* (Gr. *elenchos*, a refutation) Aristotle meant a syllogism suited to refute an opponent; and such a

(II) *Ignoratio Elenchi* or Irrelevant Conclusion implies that there is no legitimate connection

on the
conclusion
and its
premises.

syllogism was naturally thought to be one which aimed at proving the contradictory of the conclusion to be refuted. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 6.) If, however, instead of the contradictory, some other proposition was proved which did not necessarily exclude the truth of the conclusion to be refuted, then such an argument was described as *ignoratio elenchi*, i. e., ignorance of the syllogism necessary to refute the argument of an adversary. "In the strictest sense of the words," observes Fowler, "ignoratio elenchi is committed by a person who in disputation does not confine himself to proving the contradictory or contrary of his adversary's assertion, or who proves a proposition other than the contradictory or contrary. But, like many other terms borrowed from the dialectical disputations of the ancients, this has now received a wider meaning. Whenever an argument is irrelevant to the object which a speaker or writer professes to have in view, it is called an *ignoratio elenchi*. Thus, if I am endeavouring to convince a person that some particular measure is for his personal interest, and I adduce arguments to prove that it contributes to the general utility, or that it is the necessary consequence of other acts of legislation, I am guilty of an *ignoratio elenchi*, as I should also be if, when it was my object to establish either of the other two conclusions, I were to appeal to his personal interest. When the question at issue is the truth of an opinion, it is an *ignoratio elenchi* to attack it for its novelty, or for its coming from a foreign source, or for any sup-

posed consequences which may result from it, or to try to throw discredit on its author by saying that it has often been started before, and so is no discovery of his." (*Deductive Logic*, p. 149.)

The term *ignoratio elenchi* thus implies now any argument which is not to the point ; and it may be employed either for refuting an adversary or for establishing one's own position. "It is evident," says Whately, "that *ignoratio elenchi* may be employed as well for the apparent *refutation* of your opponent's position as for the apparent establishment of your own ; or it is substantially the same thing, to *prove* what was not denied, or to *disprove* what was not asserted. The latter practice is not less common ; and it is more offensive, because it frequently amounts to a personal affront in attributing to a person opinions, *etc.*, which he perhaps holds in abhorrence. Thus, when in a discussion one party vindicates, on the ground of general expediency, a particular instance of resistance to Government in a case of intolerable oppression, the opponent may gravely maintain, that 'we ought not to do evil that good may come' : a proposition which of course had never been denied ; the point in dispute being 'whether resistance in this particular case *were* doing evil or not' ; Or again by way of disproving the assertion of the 'right of private-judgment in religion,' one may hear a grave argument to prove that 'it is impossible every one can be *right in his judgment*.' In these examples, it is to be remarked, that the Fallacy of *petitio principii* is combined

This fallacy may be committed either in refuting the position of an opponent or in defending one's own.

Illustrations.

Ignoratio elenchi is often

associated
with *petitio
principii*
in sophistical
reasonings.

Illustrations.

with that of *ignoratio elenchi* ; which is a very common and often successful practice ; *viz.*, the Sophist proves or disproves, not the proposition which is really in question, but one which is so dependent on it as to proceed on the supposition that it is already decided, and can admit of no doubt ; by this means his 'assumption of the point in question' is so indirect and oblique, that it may easily escape notice ; and he thus establishes, practically, his conclusion, at the very 'moment he is withdrawing your attention from it to another question. *E. G.* An advocate will prove, and dwell on the high *criminality* of a certain act, and the propriety of severely punishing it ; assuming (instead of proving) the *commission*." (*Logic*, pp. 141-142.)

Similarly, to procure from the jury a verdict of 'not guilty,' a barrister may dwell on the havoc that will be wrought in the home of the prisoner if he be convicted ; to heighten the efficacy of a drug, a doctor may refer to the difficulties in its preparation ; to enhance the appreciation of an article, its high price may be mentioned by a dealer ; or to discredit a society or sect, the infamy of some of its members may be the theme of condemnation. How often do we not hear it said that Logic and Geometry are of no practical value, since few students remember the rules and theorems when entering life. We find a like argument directed against classical education when it is said that "throughout his after career a boy, in nine cases out of ten, applies his Latin and

Greek to no practical purposes." (Spencer, *Education*, Chap. I.) We forget in such cases that the end of education is not merely to store the mind with facts, but to train the faculties aright that they may be of use in solving the practical problems of life.

The fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi* is illustrated in various forms, of which we shall notice the following :—(1) *Argumentum ad hominem*, (2) *Argumentum ad populum*, (3) *Argumentum ad verecundiam*, (4) *Argumentum ad ignorantiam*, (5) *Non sequitur*, (6) *Hysteron proteron*, (7) *Shifting ground*, and (8) *Many questions* (*plurium interrogationum*). All of them are beside the mark, as contra-distinguished from *argumentum ad rem* or *ad iudicium* (*i. e.*, argument to the real matter in question or to correct judgment). Let us briefly consider them one by one.

(1) *Argumentum ad hominem* (*i. e.*, an argument to the individual man). This is a personal argument "addressed to the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a reference to him only, and does not bear directly and absolutely on the real question, as the '*argumentum ad rem*' does." This sophistical argument is intended to silence the opponent instead of convincing him. It does not touch the truth of the question, but merely refers to his character or conduct, such as his inconsistency or bad faith. "A man accuses me of superstition because I believe in modern miracles, and instead of attempting to argue in

*Different
Forms of
Ignoratio
Elenchi :*

(1) *Argumentum ad hominem*, in which reference is made to the character or past conduct of the opponent to prove his inconsistency, instead of to the real matter in dispute.

Illustrations.

favour of my convictions I turn round to him and say : 'you talk of superstition ! Why you refused only yesterday to sit down to table because there were thirteen in company !' This may turn the laugh against him, but it is no real argument ; it is at most a refusal to discuss the question with him. A story is told of O' Connell that on one occasion when he had to defend a man who was clearly in the wrong, the counsel for the prosecution was a certain Mr. Keefe, who had come in for some money in rather a questionable way, and had taken the name of O' Keefe. O' Connell commenced his defence by addressing his opponent

Mr. Keefe O' Keefe

I see by your brief o' brief

That you are a thief o' thief,

which so disconcerted Mr. O' Keefe and so tickled the jury that a verdict was returned for the defendant." (Clarke, *Logic*, p. 450.) This fallacy is not infrequently illustrated in the arguments of the advocates who have to defend a weak case. We may remember in this connection the well-known instructions to a barrister—"No case : abuse the plaintiff's attorney." Similarly, when we laugh at a late-riser or a drunkard who speaks in glowing terms of the benefits of early rising or of temperance, we are guilty of this fallacy.

(2) *Argumentum ad populum*, in which an appeal is made to the passions or

(2) *Argumentum ad populum* (*i. e.*, an argument to the people). This implies an appeal to the passions or prejudices of the multitude, who are thus carried away by oratorical flourishes. It is a powerful instrument in the hands of demagogues

whose harangues are so effective because they know how to rouse the feelings and passions of the people with whom they have to deal. A Wilkes, for example, may thus address the mob—"Are you, freeborn citizens, going to allow your liberties to be trampled upon by the minions of the oppressor? Are you going to permit those who have robbed you of the land that is your own, to go on to rob you of the very bread that is to feed you? poor hungry children? Are you going to put up with the selfish exactions of the rich, who, not content with all their own unjustly-gotten gains, want to rob you of the little that still remains to you?"

prejudices of the people.

An illustration.

(3) *Argumentum ad verecundiam* (*i. e.*, an argument to reverence for authority). This implies an appeal to reverence for high authority or venerable institution with a view to silence an opponent. It thus involves "an appeal" to a man's sense of shame or natural modesty in estimating his own powers. A man ventures to differ from the Theory of Evolution, and he is accused of impertinence and presumption in setting up his own opinion against that of a man of genius like Darwin, who had devoted his life to the study of it. In the Convocation of Oxford it was once proposed to set aside the recommendation of a committee of the Hebdomadal Council on some University question. One of the members of the committee indignantly protested against the rejection of a measure to which he and other learned seniors had devoted a considerable portion

(3) *Argumentum ad verecundiam*, in which an appeal is made to reverence or respect for authority.

Illustrations.

of time, and seemed to think this a decisive argument for accepting it. A man intends to become a Catholic. Before doing so, he has an interview with a Protestant clergyman. "In your presumptuous ignorance, you are proposing to forsake the Church of your Baptism, you find fault with the teaching that satisfied the saintly Keble and the learned Pusey, and thousands of holy men besides. Who are you, that in your pride you should think you know better than they?" (Clarke, *ibid.*) Dr. Paris, referring to the baneful influence of authority in the sphere of medicine, writes, "It is an instinct in our nature to follow the track pointed out by a few leaders; we are gregarious animals, in a moral as well as a physical sense, and we are addicted to routine because it is always easier to follow the opinions of others than to reason and judge for ourselves; and thus do one half of the world live as alms-folks on the opinions of the other half. What but such a temper could have upheld the preposterous system of Galen for more than thirteen centuries, and have enabled it to give universal laws in medicine to Europe, Africa, and part of Asia? What, but the spell of authority, could have inspired a general belief that the sooty washings of resin could act as a universal remedy? What, but a blind devotion to authority, or an insuperable attachment to established custom and routine, could have so long preserved from oblivion the absurd medicines which abound in our earlier dispensatories?" (*Pharmacologia*, p. 76.)

(4) **Argumentum ad ignorantiam** (*i. e.*, an argument to ignorance). This implies an appeal to ignorance, which often has the effect of silencing an opponent. This fallacy is generally committed by one who tries to defend his position by trading on the ignorance of the person addressed. Persons with scientific training may thus defend even an untenable position by calling upon their opponents to disprove it. The evolutionists, for example, maintain that in the course of several ages the different grades of being have developed out of the primitive nebular mass ; and some geologists similarly contend that natural causes operating in the ordinary way (without the supposition of any cataclysm or violent disruption of the usual course of nature) are able to account for the enormous differences in altitude, distribution of land and water, which we notice on the surface of the globe. Allow only sufficient time for such changes ; and, it is urged, they are found to be possible. The fallacy of such a position lies in the oversight of the transition from bare possibility to rational probability ; and the position is strengthened by an appeal to the ignorance of the people. No one can have an access into the remote past ; and thus such theories are allowed to stand because they cannot be refuted. Of a like character is the denial of a familiar fact because we do not know *how* it is produced. We persist in our denial until the mode of operation is explained by our opponents. But, since the mode of operation is obscure, it is not ex-

(4) *Argumentum ad ignorantiam* in which an appeal is made to ignorance to defend a position.

Illustrations.

plained ; and hence we build our theory on their ignorance. A little reflection shows that we are never justified in denying a fact, because it cannot be explained or its mode of operation cannot be indicated. In fact, on such an assumption, few things can lay claim to existence, as in most cases we are ignorant of the origination of things. "The Fallacy," observes Bowen, "consists in denying that the thing is so, merely because we do not know *how* it is so. But if this reasoning were correct, we ought to deny that the human will has any control over a single movement of our animal organism, or even that the grass grows ; for, certainly, no one can tell *how* a mere volition moves the arm, or *how* the green herb in the spring-time absorbs inorganic matter and assimilates it to itself. But our ignorance of one thing, the *modus operandi* [mode of operation], is no disproof of a very different thing, the *opus operatum* [outward operation]. The king of Siam was illogical in denying that water could become ice, merely because, within his experience, a liquid had never become solid. The inconceivable is no sure indication of the impossible." (*Logic*, p. 300.)

(5) *Non sequitur* or the Fallacy of the Consequent, in which the antecedent and the consequent, the cause and the effect, are wrongly transposed.

(5) **Non sequitur** (*i. e.*, it does not follow). This is otherwise known as the Fallacy of the Consequent. It is based on the confusion of the antecedent and the consequent of a hypothetical proposition, which leads to the affirmation of the antecedent on the affirmation of the consequent (*Vide* Chap. XII, § 2.) We overlook here the difference between the condition and what follows

from it and are thus led to imagine that the condition may be inferred from the consequent. Knowing, for example, that exposure causes cold, I may be led to think, when suffering from cold, that it is due to exposure. Similarly, if we infer from the proposition 'If John is well, he will come,' that 'if he comes, he must be well,' we commit such a fallacy : we think that because A produces B, therefore B also produces A, which is evidently unwarrantable. This fallacy is connected formally with the simple conversion of an A proposition and materially with the oversight of the plurality of causes. Aristotle's example of this fallacy is—

If it has rained, the ground is wet :

∴ If the ground is wet, it has rained.

(6) **Hysteron proteron** (Gr. *hysteron*, last, and *proteron*, first). It is illustrated when there is an inversion of the natural or logical order, as when a cause is deduced from its effect, or a premise is inferred from its conclusion. It is, so to speak, to put the cart before the horse : instead of saying that the horse draws the cart, we say the cart draws the horse. When we say, for example, that the whole of India and Bengal were in glee at the Emperor's visit, we commit such a fallacy, as Bengal is included in India. This fallacy is illustrated when Mill tries to account for Duty by reference to the pain attendant on its violation. "The internal sanction of duty," he writes, "is a pain, more or less intense, attendant on a violation of duty." (*Utilitarianism*, p. 44.) Mill overlooks the fact that first there is the conscious-

Illustrations.

(6) *Hysteron proteron*, in which the natural order of treatment is reversed.

Illustrations.

ness of duty and then there is the pain attendant on its violation, and not the reverse. It may be mentioned here that this fallacy is a sin more against method than against any rule of inference.

(7) *Shifting ground*, in which an individual, finding it hard to defend his original position, quietly changes it for another which seems to him to be more strong.

Illustrations.

(7) **Shifting ground.** This fallacy is illustrated when a person, finding his original position weak, quietly changes it for another which, though apparently tending to support it, really does not help him in any way. "The fallacy of 'irrelevant conclusion' (*ignoratio elenchi*)," says Whately, "is nowhere more common than in protracted controversy, when one of the parties, after having attempted in vain to maintain his position, *shifts his ground* as covertly as possible to another, instead of honestly giving up the point. An instance occurs in an attack made on the system pursued at one of our Universities. The objectors, finding themselves unable to maintain their charge of the *present* neglect (*vis.*, in the year 1810) of Mathematics in that place, (to which neglect they attributed the 'late *general decline*' in those studies) shifted their ground, and contended that that University 'was never famous for mathematicians': which not only does not establish, but absolutely overthrows their own original assertion; for if it *never* succeeded in those pursuits, it could not have caused their late *decline*. A practice of this nature is common in oral controversy especially; *vis.*, that of combating *both* your opponent's premises *alternately*, and shifting the attack from the one to the other, without waiting to have either of them decided upon before

you quit it. 'And besides' is an expression one may often hear from a disputant who is proceeding to a fresh argument, when he cannot establish, and yet will not abandon, his first." (*Logic*, pp. 143-144.)

(8) **Many questions.** This is, as Whately observes, the 'Fallacy of Interrogation,' in which several questions are so combined together that no single answer can fairly be given to the query. It ordinarily consists either in connecting several subjects or predicates with a predicate or subject respectively, or in framing a question in such a way as to make it dependent on prior assumptions which may or may not be true. Thus, when it is asked, 'Are gall and honey sweet?' or 'Is James industrious and honest?' no single answer in the form of 'yes' or 'no' can be given which is not liable to misconstruction. Similarly, the questions, 'Have you cast your horns?' 'Have you left off drinking?' 'When were you set at liberty?' 'In what subjects did you fail?' 'Have you given up beating your mother?' cannot be satisfactorily answered by a simple 'yes' or 'no'. This is a common artifice of barristers who try to make out a case in favour of their clients from the answers given to such questions by thoughtless witnesses. The following example from Fries further illustrates how such answers may be misconstrued:—'Is it not true that you must have lost that which you once had, but which you have no longer? Yes. Did you ~~not~~ have ten counters when you commenced the game? Yes. Have you ten counters now? No.

(8) *Many questions*, in which certain assumptions are unwarrantably made when putting a question.

Illustrations.

Then you have lost ten counters." As a matter of fact, the individual had lost only two counters, and so he still possessed eight. But his answer, 'No,' to the last question was open to the misconception that he had not any of the ten which he previously possessed. And such a risk cannot be avoided so long as a person is required to answer simply 'yes' or 'no' to such sophistical questions. Aristotle well observes, "Several questions put as one should be at once decomposed into their several parts. Only a single question admits of a single answer : so that neither several predicates of one subject, nor one predicate of several subjects, but only one predicate of one subject, ought to be affirmed or denied in a single answer."

*Argumentum
ad baculum*
or an appeal
to brute
force is
properly no
argument
at all.

It may be mentioned in this connection that the *argumentum ad baculum* (*i. e.*, the argument of the cudgel) is generally included in *Ignoratio Elenchi*. But, though the cudgel or brute force may silence another by over-awing him, it can scarcely be called an 'argument' or a 'fallacy.' As well might we call the hurricane an effective or convincing argument for dispersing a fleet. The following example given by Mr. Stock may be cited in this connection :—"A sub-variety of this form of irrelevancy was exhibited lately at a socialist lecture in Oxford, at which an under-graduate, unable or unwilling to meet the arguments of the speaker, uncorked a bottle, which had the effect of instantaneously dispersing the audience. This might be set down as the '*argumentum ad-nasum*.'" (*Logic*, pp. 379-380.) And we may add

that reasons advanced for including such attempts in arguments or fallacies really amount to 'argumentum ad nauseam.'

From the above account of fallacies it is clear that they are ultimately due either to faulty observation or to incorrect inference ; and, in the latter case, they may arise either from a mere violation of a logical rule or canon or from a careless use of language or from confusion or prepossession. And these different forms may finally be traced to the wrong use of our faculties, which properly exercised are meant for the attainment of truth. We shall dwell on this topic in the next chapter.

Fallacies are thus ultimately due either to faulty observation or to incorrect inference ; and the latter may be the outcome of confusion, prepossession, or violation of logical rules.

§ 11. Hints for Solving Problems. (1) Before trying to discover the character of fallacy in any argument, it should be reduced to the strictly logical form, with its premises and conclusion distinctly shown.

(2) If the inference is found to be formally valid, we should test its material validity ; *i. e.*, if the conclusion is formally justified by the premises, we should examine the truth of the premises themselves.

(3) To determine whether a fallacy falls under deduction or induction, we should ascertain the drift of the argument—whether it proceeds from 'all' to 'some' or from 'some' to 'all'. We should remember in this connection that an analogical argument does not come under either of these two forms, as it proceeds from one case to another.

(4) To decide whether a fallacy is one of division or of composition, the minor and major premises must first be determined. When the usual order of premises is inverted, a fallacy may have the appearance of a

fallacy of division or of composition, when really it is the reverse. [See example (*h*) in question 3 below.]

(5) In every case, reasons must be assigned for classifying a fallacious argument. It should be remembered that the value of an answer depends always on the cogency of the reasons advanced and not simply on the classification of a fallacy. In fact, as we have seen, one and the same example may be brought under different heads from different points of view. (*Vide* § 3.)

(6) The exact error in each case should be definitely indicated. The specification of a fallacy illustrates a better answer than a mere reference to a wide class. For example, in the case of an inductive fallacy, it should be mentioned whether this or that Canon has been violated, and not simply that there has been an improper use of the Inductive Methods. Similarly, in the case of a deductive fallacy, it is better to mention the specific, instead of the generic, name, *e.g.*, the fallacy of ambiguous middle, instead of the fallacy of four terms. So in the case of material and other fallacies, *e.g.*, the fallacy of accident instead of the semi-logical fallacy, the fallacy of argumentum ad hominem instead of ignoratio elenchi.

(7) Technical names should be used in describing a fallacy. Such names, as carrying a definite and precise sense, should always be preferred to common speech which is often vague and indefinite.

Illustrations.

1. Show that, to refute a universal proposition, its contradictory is of greater service than its contrary.

For the refutation of a universal proposition its contrary is not convenient, as it requires the proof of

a universal proposition, which is always difficult to accomplish. If my opponent maintains, for example, that 'No men are mortal' and I maintain that 'All men are mortal,' both the positions are equally hard to establish, for they can be proved to be true only by a thorough examination of particulars. If, however, I maintain that some men are mortal and point out a single instance of the death of a human being, the position of my opponent is easily overthrown. (*Vide* Chap. X, § 6.)

2. A remarkable concomitance is observed between spots on the sun, displays of Aurora Borealis, and magnetic storms. Does it justify any inference?

This is an example of Concomitant Variations, which suggests a causal connection. Whether the phenomena are related as cause and effect or are the co-effects of some other cause can be determined only by extended observation and any variation in the combination which may be noticed. Experiment evidently is not possible in such a case, as the phenomena are beyond our control.

3. Test the following arguments :—

(a) Since lightning invariably precedes thunder, it must be the cause of thunder.

(b) Animal is a genus ;
This cow is an animal :

∴ This cow is a genus.

(c) The greater the fall of the mercury in the barometer, the greater the disturbance of weather. Hence we may fairly conclude that the mercury in the barometer is the cause of changes of weather.

(d) Large colonies are as detrimental to the power of a state as overgrown limbs to the vigour of the human body.

(e) Men in small authority are dangerous ; but

this constable is a man in small authority : therefore, he is dangerous.

(*f*) It is absurd for you, for many years the consistent advocate of the liberties of the people, to turn round now and profess this extraordinary affection for despotic government. Your ancestors, if they were alive, would blush for such a degenerate descendant.

(*g*) To help a man in distress is right ; but to rescue this prisoner from lawful custody is to help a man in distress : therefore, to rescue this prisoner is right.

(*h*) Nine is four and five ; but four and five are two numbers : therefore, nine is two numbers.

(*i*) All criminal actions ought to be punished by law ; but prosecutions for murder are criminal actions : therefore, prosecutions for murder ought to be punished by law.

(*j*) My client is charged with murder. The evidence against him consists of a number of circumstances so trivial that, if you examine each separately, you must reject it as furnishing no conclusive evidence of guilt. I call upon you, therefore, to acquit the prisoner.

(*a*) It involves the fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, based on a wrong use of the Method of Agreement which cannot prove causal connection.

(*b*) It involves the fallacy of accident, as the term 'animal' is taken with a qualification (*viz.*, in relation to its species) in the major, but without that qualification in the minor.

(*c*) This is an example of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*, based on an incorrect use of the Method of Concomitant Variations, which can suggest but cannot establish a causal link.

(*d*) This is an example of false analogy between a living organism and a political body.

(*e*) It involves the fallacy of division, as the middle term is used collectively in the major but distributively in the minor premise.

(*f*) This is an instance of the *argumentum ad hominem*, with an admixture of the *argumentum ad verecundiam*.

(*g*) This is an example of the fallacy of accident ; for 'a man in distress' is understood as innocent in the one case, while as guilty in the other.

(*h*) The first premise here is the minor premise, as the minor term is found in it. This is an instance of the fallacy of composition, for the middle term is used distributively in the major, but collectively in the minor premise.

(*i*) This is an example of the fallacy of equivocation, as the middle term is used in different senses in the two premises.

(*j*) This is an example of the fallacy of composition ; the several circumstances taken separately may be trivial ; but they are not so when taken together.

§ 12. Miscellaneous Exercises.

1. Define Fallacy, and give a classification of Fallacies, with examples.
2. Distinguish Fallacy, Paralogism, and Sophism.
3. Discuss the propriety of a separate logical treatment of Fallacies.
4. Indicate the difficulties of achieving a complete classification of Fallacies.
5. Explain and exemplify the following fallacies and refer each to its own proper class : *Non causa pro causa*, *Post hoc ergo propter hoc*, *Petitio Principii*, *Ignoratio Elenchi*.
6. Distinguish between the Fallacies of Division and

Composition. Indicate the different forms of the Fallacy of Accident. Illustrate your answer by examples.

7. Distinguish between the fallacies of Non-observation and Mal-observation. Are these fallacies connected in any way?

8. What do you understand by a Semi-logical Fallacy? Explain and illustrate its different forms.

9. Indicate the character of the fallacy of *Non sequitur*. Distinguish between Argument in a Circle and Begging the Question.

10. Explain and illustrate the fallacies of Many Questions, Shifting Ground, and *Hysteron Proteron*.

11. Test the following :—

(a) The division of charm into 'sweetness of manner' and 'an incantation.'

(b) The definition of the soul as the first form of an organized body which has potential life.

(c) The classification of horses under created beings.

12. State in logical form, and draw all possible inferences (naming each) from, the following :—

(i) Every mistake is not blameworthy.

(ii) None but the uneducated believe in such things.

(iii) Honesty is not always rewarded in this world.

13. Explain the form of the reasoning, deductive or inductive or both, implied in the following propositions, indicating the premises or conclusions left unexpressed, and estimating the value of the reasoning :—

(a) The sun will rise to-morrow morning.

(b) The lower animals feel pain just as we do.

(c) He will die within a few hours ; he has been bitten by a cobra.

(d) Intermittent fever is found only in places where there are marshes, even though they differ in every other respect.

(e) The inner world of mind attains the light of knowledge through seven organs of sense ; therefore, some mediæval astronomers said, there must be

- seven planetary bodies to illuminate the outer world of nature.

(f) The factory Commissioners say in their report : 'The past and present conditions of work in factories are undoubtedly calculated to cause physical deterioration ; and we were struck with the marked absence of elderly men among the operatives.'

14. Find premises to prove the following propositions ; state the mood and figure of the syllogism you construct, and state whether the same conclusion could be arrived at in any other syllogistic mood :—

- (a) Not all the unhappy are evil-doers.
- (b) Lazy people never prosper.
- (c) Buildings are made to live in.

15. Point out the fallacies embodied in, or indicated by, the following passages :—

- (a) A boy looking at a white powder says : surely, this is sugar.
- (b) Master speaking to servant : your old master was too lenient with you, but I am not your old master ; so, don't think I am going to spare you in any way.
- (c) Pious men only are fit to be ministers of religion ; some ignorant men are pious : therefore, ministers of religion may be ignorant men.
- (d) I will not do this act, because it is unjust ; I know that it is unjust, because my conscience tells me so ; and my conscience tells me so, because the act is wrong.
- (e) Riding is agreeable ; he is riding : therefore, he is agreeable.
- (f) The Terror ceased immediately on the death of Robespierre : therefore, Robespierre was the cause of the Terror.

16. (a) 'An eclipse of the sun will occur when the moon intervenes between the earth and the sun' ; 'an eclipse of the sun will occur when some great calamity is impending

over mankind.' Examine the logical grounds and comparative validity of these two propositions.

(b) All arsenic is poisonous ; the substance before me is arsenic : it is therefore poisonous. Explain the logical process underlying (i) your belief in the major premise, (ii) your belief in the minor premise, and (iii) the conclusion drawn.

(c) 'Napoleon's Russian expedition was the cause of his downfall.' Explain the fallacy here.

17. Show by instances how names tend to become more general or more special in their application.

18. "Calculations of probability in general do not express what will actually occur in the future, but only the degree of subjective confidence which we repose in their occurrence." Discuss the statement.

19. Point out the misinterpretations to which the following sentences might be liable :—

(a) Were you absent from the station for a long time ?

(b) He went to Bombay and then to Madras by special train.

(c) How much is twice four and nine ?

20. In what figures are the following syllogisms ? Reduce them :

(a) The nerve fluid will not travel along a tied nerve ;
Electricity will travel along a tied nerve :
Therefore, nervous fluid is not electricity.

(b) No men are birds ;
All birds are animals :
Therefore, some animals are not men.

21. (a) Suppose that wherever there are anopheles mosquitoes there is malaria, but that malaria is found also where there are no mosquitoes : what conclusion can you draw from this ?

(b) When Crusoe saw the print of a bare foot on the sandy shore, he thought at once that savages had landed on his island : give a logical analysis of Crusoe's thought.

22. (a) Water freezes to-day at 32° Fahrenheit ; therefore

it will freeze at 32° at this time next year : explain the logical character and value of this.

(b) Yesterday the smoke of the chimneys tended to sink downwards, and it rained in the afternoon : can any connexion be inferred from this ?

23. What do you understand by Secondary Laws and Derivative Laws ? Mention the different kinds of Secondary Laws and give a concrete illustration of each.

24. What is a Hypothesis ? Under what circumstances can a verifiable Hypothesis be said to be proved or disproved.

25. State and illustrate (by concrete examples) the Methods of Agreement and Difference. Compare the Methods with regard to their respective advantages and disadvantages.

26. What are the grounds of our belief in Uniformity of Nature ? Can Uniformity of Nature be proved ? Fully discuss this question.

27. How would you represent the process of Inductive Classification ? Give a concrete example of this process.

28. Explain and illustrate *tendency*, *heteropathic intermixture of effects*, and *fact*.

29. What is the Method to be followed when direct observation or experiment is insufficient to resolve an effect into the laws of its conditions ? Fully exhibit and explain this Method.

30. What is the full scientific conception of an Effect ? Show the importance of this conception.

31. Reduce the following arguments to their logical form and examine their validity :—

(1) Epicureans are not true philosophers ; for Epicureans do not hold that virtue is the chief good, as all true philosophers do.

(2) The wise are good ; therefore, some ignorant people are wise, because some ignorant people are good.

(3) Being born in Africa, he is naturally black.

(4) All vices are reprehensible ; emulation is not a vice : therefore, emulation is not reprehensible.

(5) Silence and speech must be the same thing, for sometimes one is not seemly, sometimes the other.

(6) Treason doth never prosper : what's the reason ? for if it prosper, none dare call it treason.

(7) No beast so fierce but knows some touch of pity ; but I know none and, therefore, am no beast.

(8) Every man should be moderate, for excess will cause disease.

(9) The evolution theory must be true, for it has the support of able thinkers.

(10) Mathematical study undoubtedly improves the reasoning powers ; but, as the study of Logic is not mathematical study, we may infer that it does not improve the reasoning powers.

(11) Evil is good ; for what is necessary is good ; and evil is necessary.

(12) If it rains, the ground will be wet ; but the ground is wet ; we may, therefore, infer that rain has fallen.

(13) Every law is either useless or it occasions hurt to some person ; now a law that is useless ought to be abolished ; and so ought every law that occasions hurt : therefore, every law ought to be abolished.

(14) Seven and eight as well as nine and six make fifteen : hence they are equal.

(15) I am afraid that the greatest part of Dryden's life was passed in exigencies. For such outcries against poverty were surely never uttered but in great pain.

(16) The French are a polished people ; M. Blanc is a Frenchman ; therefore, M. Blanc is a polished person.

(17) I remember what I have read ; I have read every line of Homer : therefore, I remember every line of Homer.

(18) All fixed stars twinkle ; yonder star twinkles : therefore, it is a fixed star.

(19) If ye were the children of Abraham, ye would do the works of Abraham.

(20) The sun is too bright to be looked at.

(21) If any objection that can be urged would justify a change of established laws, no laws could be reasonably maintained ; but some laws can be reasonably maintained ; therefore, no objection that can be urged will justify a change of established laws.

(22) Books are a source both of instruction and amusement. A table of logarithms is a book : therefore, it is a source both of instruction and amusement.

(23) The object of war is durable peace ; therefore, soldiers are the best peace-makers.

(24) The plea of *alibi* is always the refuge of the guilty ; and therefore the fact that the prisoner pleads an *alibi* is a strong argument against him.

(25) Heavy dews fell last night, so it could not have been cloudy.

(26) Happiness is the end of man's existence ; but all men desire to be happy : therefore, all men desire to end their existence.

(27) Sisters of Charity are liable to punishment, because they beg money from people, and beggars are punishable according to law.

(28) If you eat too much, you suffer from indigestion ; you do suffer from indigestion : therefore, you eat too much.

(29) Food is a necessity of life ; venison is food : therefore, venison is a necessity of life.

(30) A vacuum is impossible ; for, if there is nothing between two bodies, they must touch.

(31) If truthfulness is never found save with scrupulousness and if truthfulness is incompatible with stupidity, it follows that stupidity and scrupulousness can never be associated.

(32) Some who are truly wise are not learned ; but the virtuous alone are truly wise : the learned, therefore, are not always virtuous.

(33) That many persons who commit errors are blameworthy is proved by numerous instances in which the commission of errors arises from gross carelessness.

(34) Plato lived after Socrates, and Aristotle after Plato ; and so Aristotle lived after Socrates.

(35) All responsible beings are rational ; responsibility increases with the increase of rationality ; some dogs are more rational than some men : therefore, some dogs are more responsible than some men.

(36) Suicide cannot be condemned ; for it is but voluntary death, and voluntary death has been gladly embraced by heroes.

(37) A good temper is a sign either of a good conscience or of a good digestion ; therefore, the conscientious and the healthy will always possess a good temper.

(38) Bodies subject to gravity descend ; but smoke ascends, therefore, smoke is not subject to gravity.

(39) No trifling business will enrich those engaged in it ; speculation in cotton is no trifling business : therefore, speculation in cotton will enrich those engaged in it.

(40) He that mindeth his own business cannot find much matter for envy ; for envy is an inquisitive passion.

(41) Ancient historians cannot be believed, for they describe impossible prodigies.

(42) Wisdom dwells with age : we should, therefore, in all matters abide by the customs of our ancestors.

(43) This poem cannot be the work of Tennyson, for it differs both in style and subject-matter from such poems of his as I have so far read.

(44) Six manuscripts have this reading, while two only have that found in your copy of the book. There is no doubt, therefore, that the former reading is to be preferred.

(45) The writer is a historian of great learning, and if he denies the existence of God, what wise man will dissent from his opinion ?

(46) The percentage of success in the Matriculation is higher than that in the Intermediate Examination : it is obvious from this that teaching in schools is superior to that in colleges.

(47) You say that there is no rule without an exception.

I answer that, in that case, what you have just said must have an exception, and so prove that you have contradicted yourself.

(48) Cork is lighter than water ; the third city in Ireland is Cork : therefore, the third city in Ireland is lighter than water.

(49) Since the end of poetry is pleasure, that cannot be unpoetical with which all are pleased.

(50) All intelligible propositions must be either true or false ; the two propositions 'Cæsar is living still' and 'Cæsar is dead' are both intelligible propositions : therefore, they are both true or both false.

(51) All novels are false : therefore, no novel-reader is a lover of truth.

(52) The people of the country are suffering from famine ; and, as you are one of the people of the country, you must be suffering from famine.

(53) None of the evils of this life are to be feared, for they are all transitory.

(54) Meat and drink are the necessaries of life ; the revenues of Vitellius were spent in meat and drink : therefore, the revenues of Vitellius were spent on the necessaries of life.

(55) I must be successful or unsuccessful in this examination ; in the one case it is useless for me to work and in the other superfluous : so I may take my ease.

(56) I cannot accept your opinion as true, for it seems to me that its general recognition would be attended with the most injurious consequences to society.

(57) You are inconsistent with yourself, for you told me yesterday that there was a presumption of this man's guilt, and now, when I say that I may presume his guilt, you contradict me.

(58) It is affirmed that such a man has left off playing the fool. If it is granted, it is implied that he did play the fool formerly. If it be denied, it seems to imply that he plays the fool still.

(59) "Perchance some form was unobserved ;
Perchance in prayer or faith he swerved ;
Else how could guiltless champion quell ;
Or how could blessed ordeal fail ?"

(60) Half a loaf is better than nothing ; but nothing is better than wisdom : therefore, half a loaf is better than wisdom.

(61) Morality is either superfluous or unavailing, according as the universe is righteous or not.

(62) The learned are pedants ; A is a learned man : therefore, A is a pedant. •

(63) No one can deny Faraday was a true man of science, for he spent his life in searching for truth, which is the object of search with all true men of science.

(64) This problem is too difficult, and therefore no one will attempt its solution.

(65) His imbecility may be inferred from his proneness to favourites ; for all weak princes have their failings.

(66) The probability of an infant living to the age of 20 years is $\frac{1}{2}$; and if it lives to that age, the probability of its being well-educated is $\frac{1}{3}$; and if it is well-educated, the probability of its being a distinguished person is $\frac{1}{5}$. Hence the probability of the infant being a distinguished person is $\frac{1}{30}$.

(67) No education is complete without a study of Logic, which teaches men to reason correctly.

(68) All criminal actions should be legally punished ; prosecutions for theft are criminal actions ; therefore, prosecutions for theft should be punished by law.

(69) None should be punished if he is innocent ; this man should not be punished : therefore, he is innocent.

(70) Avarice is innocent, since it is allowed by the law of the land.

(71) Logic is useless, because men who know Logic fail in examinations.

(72) This measure would be destructive of the national prosperity, and I cannot adduce a more cogent argument

than that, five years ago, you were yourself of the same opinion.

(73) My opinions must be true, for none but a prejudiced person, like yourself, would wish to gainsay them.

(74) There exist many differences of opinion and much uncertainty with regard to many questions connected with geology ; consequently geology is not a science, and any arguments which assume the truth of geological theories must invariably be regarded with considerable suspicion.

(75) No punishment should be allowed for the sake of the good that may come of it ; for all punishment is an evil, and we are not justified in doing evil that good may come of it.

(76) This man is a scoundrel, for he is very much afraid ; and "ill-doers are ill-dreaders."

(77) We know that God exists because the Bible tells us so ; and we know that whatever the Bible affirms must be true, because it is of Divine origin.

(78) It is not right for you to devote all your time to philosophical inquiry, for if all men did so, the business of the world could not go on.

(79) If justice consists in keeping property safe, the just man must be a kind of thief, for the same kind of skill which enables a man to defend property will also enable him to steal it.

(80) To allow every man unbounded freedom of speech is advantageous to the state, for it is highly conducive to the interests of the community that each individual should enjoy an unlimited liberty of expressing his sentiments.

(81) What is Protestantism ? It is only loyalty to the sovereign ; for, were not the Protestants loyal to Elizabeth in her struggle with Spain ?

(82) If a man is educated, he does not want to work with his hands ; consequently, if education is universal, industry will cease.

(83) Women as a class have not been hitherto equal in intellect to men ; therefore, they are necessarily inferior.

(84) The human soul must be diffused over the whole body, because it animates every part.

(85) Education is clearly the source of all discontent, since the educated not getting suitable employment are dissatisfied with their condition in life.

(86) So far as my experience goes, A has been invariably preceded by B. I therefore conclude that B is the cause of A.

(87) It is strange that in a country like India, where millions of men die every year of plague, malaria, and other diseases, people are loath to join the army, seeing that the casualties of warfare cannot possibly be higher.

(88) What John Smith advocates must be a wise course, since he is a Senator, and the Senate is undoubtedly a wise body.

(89) Is a man infallible? No. Then every Senator is liable to make mistakes. Yes. Ergo, the judgment of the Senate in this important matter is unreliable.

(90) Every man has the right of private judgment. Therefore every examiner is quite at liberty to examine answer papers as he likes.

(91) Beggars who have no property cannot claim the protection of law, for all laws are made for the protection of property.

(92) *Swarājya* or self-government can be attained only by doing away with servitude. As, however, the University in training young men renders them fit for public service, the first step towards the attainment of *swarājya* must be the destruction of the University.

(93) Surely what a man has done a man may do. Was not Hercules a man? Yes. Then, why shall I not be able to do what he did?

(94) If a little economy would save half of our expenses, a still greater economy would certainly save all.

(95) 'Steel, when brought to white heat in the fire, must be plunged into cold water in order to obtain the requisite temper. Similarly the human body after the steam-bath, on being cooled down, becomes strong and hardy.'

(96) We should think it a sin and a shame if a great steamer, dashing across the ocean, were not brought to a stop at a signal of distress from a mere smack.....And yet a miner is entombed alive, a painter falls from a scaffold, a brakeman is crushed in coupling cars, a merchant falls, falls ill and dies, and organized society leaves widow and child to bitter want and degrading alms.

(97) "What would our ancestors say to this, Sir? How does this measure tally with their institutions? How does it agree with their experience? Are we to put the wisdom of yesterday in competition with the wisdom of centuries? (*Hear! hear!*) Is beardless youth to show no respect for the decisions of mature age? (*Loud cries of hear! hear!*) If this measure be right, would it have been reserved for these modern and degenerate times?

(98) Punishment must have some other and higher justification than the prevention of crime, for if punishment were only for the sake of example, it would be indifferent whether we punished the innocent or the guilty, since the punishment, considered as an example, is equally efficacious in either case.

(99) We observe very frequently that very poor handwriting characterizes the manuscripts of able men; while the best handwriting is as frequent with those who do little mental work when compared with those whose penmanship is poor. We may, therefore, infer that poor penmanship is caused by the influence of severe mental labour.

(100) Suppose Achilles to move ten times as fast as the Tortoise, but the Tortoise to have the start of Achilles, say, by one-tenth of the distance to be traversed: when Achilles has arrived at the point from which the Tortoise started, the Tortoise will still be one-hundredth part of the whole distance in advance of him; when Achilles has reached this point, the Tortoise will still be one-thousandth part of the whole distance in advance of him; and so on. Thus, Achilles will never be able to pass the Tortoise.

CHAPTER XXXI.

SOURCES OF FALLACIES.

§ 1. Fallacious Tendencies of the Mind.

The justification for the transition from the logical to the psychological treatment of Fallacies lies in its practical utility.

The account of Fallacies given in the last chapter has prepared the way for an inquiry into their sources. We shall, accordingly, try to discover in this chapter these sources or main-springs, which when duly controlled more effectually prevent the commission of fallacies than their mere piece-meal detection or exposition. Such an inquiry involves, no doubt, a transition from the logical to the psychological treatment of the topic ; but we should remember that there is no natural barrier between the different sciences, which explain merely the different aspects of existence. If a psychological study of the different sources of error be of great practical utility, there may be some excuse for departing, at the close of our logical inquiry, from the rigid conventional course with a view to discover the main and easier road to truth. When cut off from the source, the fallacies seem to be detached and disconnected ; but when traced to their source, they are seen to be but branches of a main stream.

The sources of the Fallacies are to be found in the improper use of Intelligence,

As fallacies are due to wrong thinking, their sources can be discovered by an examination of the circumstances which pervert thought. But thought as a mental process is intimately connected with the other exercises of the mind. The

mind is an organic unity in which the different faculties are implicated in one another. The faculties of the mind are ultimately resolvable into three, *viz.*, Intellect, Feeling, and Will. They represent but diverse exercises of one and the same psychical energy. Thus, an exercise of Intelligence involves elements of Feeling and Will in the shape of interest and concentration ; an exercise of Feeling (yielding pleasure or pain) involves elements of Intellect and Will in the form of knowledge and direction of attention ; and an exercise of Will likewise involves elements of Feeling and Intellect in the shape of an agreeable or painful experience and the recognition of a connection between the means to be adopted and the end to be achieved. When, therefore, thought is led astray, it may be due to either confusion or the perverting influence of the feelings and of the active tendencies. The ultimate sources of Fallacies are to be found, accordingly, in the wrong use of (I) Intelligence, (II) Feeling, and (III) Conation (*i.e.*, Impulses and Will) frustrating the end of truth.* Let us then dwell on these different sources in three successive sections.

Feeling, and Conation, which, as psychical processes, are all interconnected.

* The sources of fallacies are traced by Bacon to certain erroneous notions, called by him *Idola* or Idols (*Gr. eidolon*, from *eidos*, form or shape), *i.e.*, the misconceptions or prejudices which flow not from the nature of the objects to be known, but from man's own nature. The fallacies that thus beset mankind are divided by Bacon into four principal classes. These are :—

I. The first class of *Idola* is the *Idola Tribus* (*i.e.*, Idols of the tribe or race of men). These tendencies are common to all and inherent in the individual, arising from the nature of man. They are prominently illustrated in the following forms :—(1) Man supposes that there is greater simplicity and uniformity in things than is

(f) The Intellectual Sources are
 (1) incorrect observation,
 (2) inveterate association,
 (3) wild imagination,
 and (4) hasty generalization,
 (1) Non-observation
 and Mal-observation

§ 2. (I) Intellectual Tendencies to Error. The fallacies which are due to the wrong use of Intelligence may be considered under four principal heads, *viz.*, (1) Observation, (2) Association, (3) Imagination, and (4) Hasty Generalization. Let us consider these one by one.

(1) *Fallacies due to Observation.* We have already considered in section 8 of the last chapter the fallacies of Non-observation and Mal-observation. The commonest form of error here is to con-

really the case : this is a tendency to unity. For example, for a time, the medical virtues of bodies were regarded as four—moisture dryness, heat, and cold ; and chemists thought that all the elements of bodies were reducible to salt, sulphur, and mercury. (2) There is a tendency to neglect negative or contradictory instances ; in this we find the origin of superstition. We hail a fulfilment of dreams, omens, and prophecies, but do not look at the many times they fail. The whole race of prophets and quacks live on the overwhelming effect of one success compared with hundreds of failures, which are unmentioned and forgotten. As Bacon says, "men mark when they hit and never mark when they miss." And we should do well to remember in this connection the ancient story quoted by Bacon of one who in pagan times was shown a temple with a picture of all the persons who had been saved from shipwreck after paying their vows. When asked, whether he did not now acknowledge the power of the gods,—“Aye,” he answered, “but where are they painted that were drowned after the vows ?” (3) The narrowness of the mind which, when once impressed by a few striking objects, supposes all else to be similar to the impressions which influence it. (4) The restlessness of the mind which leads it to inquiries beyond the boundaries of human thought. (5) The influence of the wishes and passions, which leads us to believe what we wish to be true. (6) Sources of error connected with the senses : we have a tendency to be moved and guided by objects striking our senses.

II. The second class of *Idola* is the *Idola Specus* (*i.e.*, Idols of the den or cave). While the Idols of the tribe are common to all men, those of the cave or den are peculiar to the individual and arise from the peculiar character of the individual man, bodily and mental, from education, habit, and action. These include—(1) An undue attachment to a particular science or train of thought from the belief that we originated it or are best acquainted with it or have bestowed most attention on it. (2) The tendency to extremes in our investigations illustrated in the comprehensive and acute or discriminative intellect. This refers to a radical distinction in the constitution of the human mind—acuteness and

found perception with inference, to suppose an absent feature as present in a thing before us. Thus, we mistake a sign for the thing signified, as when we take the haziness of a visual impression to be equivalent to its distance, or the conduct of a suspect as bespeaking his guilt. "It commonly happens," says Mr. Kinglake, "that incidents occurring in a battle are told by the most truthful by-standers with differences more or less wide." (*The Invasion of the Crimea*, iii, 124.) Non-observation often leads to erroneous inference by leaving

often lead to confusion and wrong inference. We are apt to confound perception with inference. Illustrations.

comprehensiveness. Some minds are fitted for noting the differences in things, while others are suited for observing the resemblances in objects. The first class of persons is called acute or analytical; the second, comprehensive or synthetical: the one analyses, while the other classifies and brings together.

III. The third class of Idola is the *Idola Fori* (i.e., Idols of the market-place). They are so called because they arise from language; and language is principally used by men when they assemble together. These creep into the understanding through the association of words or names. The *Idola Fori* are of two kinds: (1) the first kind arising from the use of words which indicate no reality (e.g., 'chance' which, as Bacon observes, indicates nothing whatever); (2) the second kind arising from the use of words whose meaning is confined, ill-defined, or inapplicable to the things which we apply them to (e.g., 'heavy', 'light', 'moist', 'attraction', 'repulsion', 'element', 'corruption', used to explain the physical properties of objects).

IV. The fourth class of Idola is the *Idola Theatri* (i.e., Idols of the theatre). These arise from the occupation of men's minds in particular theories of science and are, like the plays of the stage, generally more elegant than the solid facts of reality. These are very powerful hindrances to the investigation of truth; and Bacon divides them into three classes:—(1) The sophistical appealing to Reason instead of to Experience. It is often illustrated in a deductive or anticipative form: assuming certain principles without adequate examination, thinkers reason downwards and interpret the facts by reference to the theories which they start from. (2) The vague and superficial appeal to experience but from too narrow and imperfect observation. (3) The influence of superstition which leads people to measure science by the standard of their religious beliefs. Thus, the Ptolemaic system of astronomy was supported and the Copernican system was discountenanced by the Church on theological grounds.

out material circumstances. Thus, Pope Clement VIII was believed to have been killed by the fumes of a poisoned candle placed in his bed-room, when no notice was taken of a brazier of burning charcoal which was in the room and for the fumes of which there was no adequate outlet.

(2) We often mistake subjective association for objective connection.

Illustrations.

(2) *Fallacies due to Association.* When we have invariably associated one quality or thing with another, we think that they always go together and can never possibly be reversed. Thus, the king of Siam, living in a tropical climate, associated liquidity with water and could only treat an account of water being frozen into ice as untrue. The difficulties in the acceptance of the Copernican system lay partly in the old associations connected with the Ptolemaic system of astronomy. It is said that no physician above forty believed in Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood. We are thus disposed to treat with suspicion any departure from current opinion or practice.

This error is prominently illustrated in the case of the association of language with thought. Association of words induces belief in the corresponding connection of things.

The most powerful association in the human mind is the *association of language with thought*. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 1 and § 5 and Chap. XXVII, § 1.) Bacon rightly observes, "Men believe that their reason rules over words; but it is also the case that words re-act, and in their turn use their influence on the intellect." (*Novum Organum*, I, 59.) Thus, association of words tends to induce belief in the corresponding connection of things, such as we find in one,

"Who having into truth, by telling of it,
Made such a sinner of his memory,
To credit his own lie." (Shakespeare, *Tempest*.)

In this way people come to think that 'talk of the devil and he will appear' or that there are different things because there are different words, though these imply the same object. This accounts for the fallacy of the Identical Proposition, such as we find in *Hamlet*—

So, different words tend to suggest different things.

"There's ne'er a villain dwelling in all Denmark,
But he's an arrant knave."

We have already read in the last chapter the wide range of the semi-logical fallacies, which are due to the ambiguous use of language. Thus, we not infrequently commit the *fallacy of accident* when we overlook differences between cases which seem to be alike, though they are really not so. One is, in this way, led to think that what suits another suits him as well, what another can do he may achieve likewise. A poor man may thus be led to imitate the ways of the rich in the matter of the articles of luxury, and a rich man may similarly be disposed to think that what the poor man can endure he also can put up with; the invalid or the weak may in the same manner be inclined to think that they can digest a food or do a work, which is easily assimilated or accomplished by the healthy and the strong. The perverting influence of language is no less patent even in the case of the material fallacies. "The English language," says Whately, "is perhaps the more suitable for the fallacy of *petitio principii*, from its being formed from two distinct languages, and thus abounding in synonymous expressions, which have no resemblance in sound, and no

Semi-logical fallacies and at times *petitio principii* illustrate the error.

connexion in etymology ; so that a Sophist may bring forward a proposition expressed in words of Saxon origin, and give as a reason for it, the very same proposition stated in words of Norman origin ; *e. g.*, 'to allow every man an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State ; for it is highly conducive to the interests of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments.' * (*Logic*, pp. 133-134.)

(3) Errors of imagination are illustrated in extravagant hypotheses and false analogies.

(3) *Fallacies due to Imagination.* The errors arising from an improper exercise of imagination are illustrated in extravagant hypotheses and fanciful analogies, already explained in chapters XIX and XXII. What is noticed in some cases is at times unwarrantably extended to other cases having but slender points of similarity. Referring to the early growth of Law, Sir Henry Maine observes, "Analogy, the most valuable of instruments in the maturity of jurisprudence, is the most dangerous of snares in its infancy. Prohibitions and ordinances, originally confined, for good reasons, to a single description of acts, are made to apply to all acts of the same class, because a man menaced with the anger of the gods for doing one thing, feels a natural terror in doing any other thing remotely like it. After one kind of food has been interdicted for sanitary reasons, the prohibition is extended to all food resembling it, though the resemblance occasionally depends on analogies the most fanciful. So, again, a wise

provision for insuring general cleanliness dictates in time long routines of ceremonial ablution ; and that division into classes which at a particular crisis of social history is necessary for the maintenance of the national existence degenerates into the most disastrous and blighting of all human institutions—Caste." (*Ancient Law*, pp. 19-20.) We have seen that Analogy is rather a source of Discovery than a means of Proof. (*Vide* Chap. XXII, § 5.) To confound one function with the other is a common fallacy of this form of inference.

(4) *Fallacies due to Hasty Generalisation.* To hastily arrive at a general notion or universal truth often implies incorrect generalization. Thus, we are led to think that if swans are white here, they are white everywhere ; that what we like or dislike others also do the same ; that as we feel now, we shall feel always. This also explains our fallacious estimates of national character from our imperfect acquaintance with a few individuals. We are likewise disposed to infer a causal connection on imperfect observation or analysis, as when we suppose the appearance of a comet as foreboding disaster to mankind. The fallacy of mistaking any prior phenomenon for the cause of what follows is well exposed by Shakespeare in Hotspur's retort to Glendower when he boasts of his natural power as prognosticated by omens :

"*Glendower.*

At my nativity

The front of heaven was full of fiery shapes,

Of burning cressets ; and at my birth

(4) Errors of generalization are illustrated in incorrect notions and general truths, formed without adequate examination of data.

Illustrations.

The frame and huge foundation of the earth
Shaked like a coward.

"Hotspur. Why, so it would have done at the same season, if your mother's cat had but kittened, though yourself had never been born."
(1 Henry IV, III, i, 13-20.)

The fallacy of over-hasty generalization is not infrequently illustrated in the sphere of Politics. It consists in attributing to an individual what may be found in some other members of the same class, and thus assuming as universal what may only be partially true. For instance, a pamphlet entitled 'The Crimes of Kings' was published in France in 1792 to suggest the execution of Louis XVI, and a book named 'The Cruelties of Catholics' was published in England to prove the undesirability of Catholic Emancipation. "To identify, to assimilate, to generalize," says Bain, "constitute one of the two great functions of science. Yet there is often a necessity for restraining the too great ardour for these processes. We identify and assimilate, without real likeness, thus giving birth to bad analogies, and irrelevant comparisons; we over-assimilate and over-generalize. We rush blindly on the search after Unity, Simplicity, Fraternity." (*Induction*, p. 378.)

(II) The Emotional Sources of error are the partialities of love and sympathy as well as the prejudices and

§ 3. (II) **Emotional Tendencies to Error.** We have already mentioned that the different faculties of the mind are very closely connected with one another. Hence Feelings often influence our Thoughts directing them in a particular channel. The law of the Feeling is that only

the ideas consistent with its character are brought and kept before the mind, while all ideas which do not tend to support it are generally excluded. Thus, a condition of pleasure leads us to entertain hopeful ideas, while pain or suffering generally inclines us to take a gloomy view of things. The feelings thus give a bias to our judgments. We are disposed to overlook the faults of the objects of love or affection, while we are led to underestimate the merits of persons whom we hate or dislike. This is often turned to account by skilful reasoners who are interested in supporting or condemning a cause ; and even an *ignoratio elenchi* may be associated with such a rhetorical artifice. Thus, as Whately observes, "When the occasion or object in question is not such as calls for, or as is likely to excite in those particular readers or hearers, the emotions required, it is a common Rhetorical artifice to turn their attention to some object which *will* call forth these feelings : and when they are too much excited to be capable of judging calmly, it will not be difficult to turn their passions, once roused, in the direction required, and to make them view the case before them in a very different light. When the metal is heated, it may easily be moulded into the desired form. Thus, vehement indignation against some *crime* may be directed against a *person* who has not been proved guilty of it ; and vague declamations against corruption, oppression, *etc.*, or against the mischiefs of anarchy ; with highflown panegyrics on liberty, rights of

superstitions.
Feelings
sustain ideas
consistent
with their
character.

Illustrations.

man, *etc.*, or on social order, justice, the constitution, law, religion, *etc.*, will gradually lead the hearers to take for granted, without proof, that the measure proposed will lead to these evils or these advantages; and it will in consequence become the object of groundless abhorrence or admiration. For the very utterance of such words as have a multitude of what may be called *stimulating* ideas associated with them, will operate like a charm on the minds, especially of the ignorant and unthinking, and raise such a tumult of feeling, as will effectually blind their judgment; so that a string of vague abuse or panegyric will often have the effect of a train of sound Argument." (*Rhetoric*, Part II, Chap. II, § 6, p. 130.)

The Feelings which distort our judgments are chiefly (1) self-interest, (2) sympathy, (3) the special emotions, and (4) temperament. (1) Self-interest leads us to justify even the grossest practices.

The principal forms of feeling which bias our judgments may be mentioned as (1) self-regarding, (2) other-regarding, (3) the special emotions, such as anger, fear, wonder, reverence, and (4) the individual temperament.

(1) The *self-regarding feelings* have generally been condemned as the parent of all evil, distorting our judgments and vitiating our will. The grossest practices have been justified when they tend to promote the interests of the self and the most absurd doctrines have been defended simply because they emanate from one's self. We are likewise prone to believe in what feeds our vanity or heightens our importance in the eyes of others, though there may not be even the semblance of justification in its favour. A soldier, for example, can scarcely fail to be influenced by an eulogy like

the following :—"Citizen soldier, you are the greatest thing this old earth has yet bred ; you, in your khaki are the biggest thing on this old planet. God bless your gallant heart, you 've set all the world wondering ;...The whole Empire is proud of you. Our hearts are thrilling with the splendour and glory of your wonderful achievements." (*Great Thoughts of Haratio Bottomley.*)

(2) The *other-regarding feelings*, whether in the form of love or in that of hate, are also, as mentioned above, a fruitful source of error. The partiality of love is well symbolized in the blindness of Cupid.

(2) Undue sympathy begets prejudices.

(3) The confusion produced by *anger*, the superstition fed by *fear*, the excitement caused by *wonder*, and the monopoly of attention secured by *reverence* are not at all consistent with impartial estimate and cool judgment. The fallacy of the *argumentum ad verecundiam* illustrates how errors are caused by undue reverence ; and the prejudices and superstitions bring out what can be wrought by fear when wedded to custom. Thus, it is believed by the people as unlucky to mention such an unlucky word as 'death,' or to dine together in a group of thirteen, or to start an enterprise on a Friday. The night that Alexander was born, the noted temple of Diana at Ephesus was burnt to the ground ; and the night that Oliver Cromwell died, a violent storm devastated London. Such coincidences may be construed by superstition as ominous.

(3) Anger, fear, wonder, reverence often pervert our judgments and lie at the root of superstition.

(4) The influence of temperament on our (4) Personal

temperament
leads to
optimism or
pessimism.

thoughts is also very great. Those who are gay and cheerful are generally disposed to take a hopeful view of things, while those who are sad and gloomy are inclined to be despondent and depressed. The difference in the estimates of things by such natures is well illustrated in the *L' Allegro* and *Il Penseroso*. If one is optimistic in his estimates, the other is pessimistic.

(III) The
Conative
Sources of
error are (1)
the Impulses
and (2) the
Will.

§ 4. (III) Conative Tendencies to Error.

Conation covers (1) the Impulses which urge us to action and (2) the Will which determines a course of action in any case. Both of these factors may pervert our judgment.

(1) What we
are strongly
inclined to do
we are prone
to justify.

Illustrations.

(1) The *Impulses*, when strong, suggest to our mind grounds which seem to justify the course we are inclined to adopt. Thus, the strong and lively are led to be rash and hasty, while the weak and indolent are disposed to be negligent and dilatory. An athlete, for example, thinks that because he can successfully combat this, that, or the other adversary, he can as well successfully meet all of them together (thus committing the fallacy of composition); and an idler may similarly be of opinion that it is not of much consequence if he whiles away this, that, or the other hour, though thereby he may spend the whole day in doing nothing. The fallacy of *ignoratio elenchi* is not infrequently illustrated when one argues under the sway of the passions and inclinations. "We dispute with warmth, and often without understanding one another. Passion, or bad faith, leads us to attribute to our adversary that which is very far from his

meaning, in order to carry on the contest with greater advantage ; or to impute to him consequences which we imagine may be derived from his doctrine, although he disavows and denies them. All this may be reduced to this kind of sophism, which an honest and good man ought to avoid above all things." (*Port-Royal Logic*, p. 247.)

(2) Will also exercises at times a perverting influence on judgments. Sophisms or wilful perversions of judgments play a prominent part in the daily affairs of life. What we decide to do, we are disposed to defend. How often do we not try to deceive others as well as ourselves to hide our guilt and shame ! (*Vide the Elements of Morals*, Chaps. VI and VIII.) Malice, envy, ill-will no less than love, sympathy, and affection often employ Will in their service to hatch reasons for condemning what is noble and good and justifying what is ignoble and bad. History shows how false accusations and charges are glossed over with specious reasons to injure the weak and the innocent and how attempts are made to shield an unworthy object of love or affection by sophistical pleadings. In such cases

(2) What we decide to do we are inclined to defend.

Illustrations.

"Truth and fiction are so aptly mix'd
That all seems uniform, and of a piece."

(*Roscommon Horace, A. P.*)

§ 5. Truth Lies in Consistency. The end of Logic, as we have seen, is Truth. The rules and principles of Logic explained in the preceding pages aim at the avoidance of error and the

The end of Logic is Truth.

attainment of Truth ; and the importance of Truth can hardly be over-estimated.

“Truth informs the judgment, rectifies the mind,
Pleases the understanding, makes the will
Submit ; the mem’ry too, it doth fill
With what do our imaginations please ;
Likewise it tends our troubles to appease.”

(*Bunyan.*)

Consistency
is the
foundation
of Truth.

The above account of the Logical processes and the fallacious tendencies of the mind tends to show that consistency lies at the root of all truth. If we be consistent with the real order of the world as it is revealed to us and consistent also in our views and judgments, then we may expect to attain truth. The rules of Definition and Division, Classification and Naming, Syllogism and Induction, Hypothesis and Analogy all aim at consistency—formal and material. To harmonize our views with the actual order of things and to free us from inconsistency and contradiction constitute the great end of ‘the science of sciences.’ Hence Logic may best be conceived as the science and art of consistency. (*Vide* Chap. I, § 2.)

Logic is thus
the science
and art of
consistency.

The source
of consistency
lies in the
right
adjustment
of our
faculties.

The chief practical question which lies behind Logic is, then, How to regulate our faculties so as to secure consistency ? The soul of consistency lies evidently in harmony or due adjustment. We find that our mental constitution is an organic whole—a multiplicity of parts closely united for some end which may be conceived as truth, perfection, happiness, or enjoyment. (*Vide The Elements of Morals*, Chaps. IX—XII.) A close examina-

tion reveals that the place of reason or intelligence in this constitution is supreme. The difference between the man and the brute, the sane and the insane lies in this ascendancy of reason. So long as feeling and conation are exercised according to the dictates of reason, we may expect to keep clear of the risks of fallacy and confusion. An impartial estimate of facts and a valid inference always require that we should not be led astray by the pleadings of hostile affections and inclinations, but should be disposed to give each circumstance its due value and weight. We have tried to explain in this chapter how the several fallacies which we commit arise from the wrong use of the different faculties. And, it may be mentioned here that the wrong use of intelligence, when not due to ambiguity of expression or inveterate association, is often the result of the baneful influence of the feelings and impulses. Thus, to be consistent, we should be cool and impartial in our estimates and be scrupulous enough to preserve the supremacy of reason. The sway of reason keeps our mental constitution intact and leads us at once to truth and virtue and happiness. Consistency, then, is not merely the foundation of truth ; it is the basis of virtue as well. Nay, we may go further and say that consistency is the true life and consistency is the real world. By slightly varying an expression of Shakespeare we may say with him—

‘O heaven ! were man

But consistent, he were perfect. That one error

Reason being supreme in the human constitution its harmony is preserved so long as this supremacy is maintained.

Fallacies are thus always due to the wrong use of the different faculties.

The wrong use of Intelligence, when not due to confusion, is the result of the hostile influence of the Feelings and Impulses.

The sway of reason secures consistency and thus leads to truth, virtue, and happiness alike.

Fills him with faults, makes him run through
all the sins."

§ 6. **Miscellaneous Exercises.**

1. Trace the fallacies to their sources in the human mind.

2. To what extent are Intellect and Feeling responsible for the fallacies which are illustrated in daily life?

3. It is said that "Truth lies in consistency." Explain and illustrate the remark.

4. Mill and Bain think that three 'operations' are implied in the full 'scope of the Deductive Method,' *viz.*, Induction, Deduction proper, and Verification. Explain the exact meaning of each, and exhibit their relation to one another, making your meaning clear by means of examples. Do you consider that Mill and Bain are right in thus holding that all Deduction depends on previous Induction? Give your reason.

5. 'Logic must admit either negative terms or negative propositions, but has no need of both.' Discuss this.

6. 'Induction is the process of establishing general propositions, and deduction is the interpreting of them'. Explain and illustrate this. Is the theory of reasoning here implied admitted by all logicians? If not, what other theory has been held?

7. Explain the process called Reduction, and discuss the following: 'If the other figures are inferior in cogency to the first, they ought to be excluded; if they are not inferior, their reduction is a superfluity.'

8. State the Method of Residues fully, with examples, symbolical and concrete, indicating its two chief applications. Does it involve any element of Deduction? Show how it may lead to the discovery of new antecedents. Give some example of this.

9. What is meant by a *Deductive* and what by an *Inductive* Science? State the principal Deductive and Inductive Sciences, explaining in the case of each of these sciences why it is called Deductive or Inductive.

10. What is meant by Demonstration? What is meant

by Probability ? What kinds of inference are of demonstrative character, and what kinds are merely probable ? Explain the reason in each case and give examples.

11. Explain the sense of the terms *family*, *kingdom*, *species*, *variety*, *order* and *genus* as used in Classification, and show their respective places in a scale of Natural Classification, giving examples of each.

12. If it be true that the same cause always produces the same effect, does it follow that the same effect is always produced by the same cause ? Give your reason for your answer and support it by illustrations. Show how the principle involved there gives rise to difficulty in the drawing of inferences, giving examples. How may the difficulty be overcome ? Give examples.

13. What do you consider to be the difference between *cause* and *condition* ? Give examples. If a workman, carrying a burden, falls from a ladder and is killed, what do you consider to be the cause and the conditions of his death, and why ? A distinction may be made between *cause* from the *scientific* and *cause* from the merely *practical* point of view : in the above case what may be regarded as cause from the merely *practical* point of view ?

14. State fully and clearly, in your own words, the Method of Concomitant Variations, with examples. On what canon or principle is it based ? Of what other Method is it a modification ? Is it a Method of Observation or of Experiment, or of both ? In what class of cases is it the only possible inductive method, and why ?

15. If for both the premises of a valid syllogism their contradictories are substituted, will the contradictory of the original conclusion be thereby established ?

16. Explain what you consider to be the true relation of Deduction and Induction, illustrating your meaning by examples ; discuss the claim of Induction to be a separate department of Logic.

17. What is meant by a *Natural Kind* or *Class* ? Give an account of Natural Classification, explaining what is meant

by 'essential' or 'fundamental' characters as bases of classification. 'A class is nothing but the objects contained under it': examine this statement of Mill, showing whether it is correct or not.

18. What is meant by Hypothesis in science? What different kinds of Hypotheses are there? Give examples. Explain how Hypotheses contribute to scientific discovery, citing instances. Explain the relation of Hypothesis to Induction.

19. What is meant by Composition of Causes? By what form of Reasoning is it possible to ascertain beforehand the effects of Composite Causes? In what sciences, and in what professions, is reasoning of this kind most essential?

20. Mathematics and its applications are called 'the exact sciences', and their conclusions are 'characterized as systems of necessary truth': show what is implied in these designations and whether they are justifiable or not.

21. Explain the meaning of Energy and Conservation of Energy; and show the bearing of the theory on the nature of Causality.

22. Prove the following:—Given a valid syllogism, then in no case will the combination of either premise with the conclusion establish the other premise.

23. What kind of Logic is applied by (i) the engineer when he is designing a new bridge, (ii) the physician when he is prescribing a particular medicine to a patient, and (iii) the legislator when he is introducing a new law? Give reasons for your answers.

24. "I have noticed," says Meng Tsien, "that in years of plenty many good actions are done, and in years of scarcity many bad actions are done." What is the inference evidently implied here? Express it in its simplest form, showing under which of the logical methods it falls, and indicate its logical value as inference.

25. 'We think that, as civilization advances, poetry almost necessarily declines. Therefore, though we fervently admire those great works of imagination which have appeared

in dark ages, we do not admire them the more because they have appeared in dark ages.' State in full logical form the reasoning involved, and test it fully.

26. The more the number of pools of stagnant water in a district is reduced, the rarer does the occurrence of malarial fever become.

What conclusion can be drawn from the above statement? State the reasoning implied, in its full logical form, exhibiting the logical method employed in it; and estimate the logical value of the inference.

27. Explain and illustrate fully the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature. What are the fundamental kinds, classes, or branches of uniformity found in Nature? What do you consider to be the ground or evidence underlying the belief in Uniformity? What is meant by saying that Uniformity is the ground of Induction? Do you consider cyclones and earthquakes to be consistent with Uniformity?

28. What are *Laws of Nature*? Define and exemplify Ultimate, Secondary, Derivative, and Empirical Laws, showing their relation to one another. To which class will those laws belong which are founded on the Method of Agreement? Give your reason, with examples.

29. 'Great part of the knowledge of every individual is derived not directly from Inference, nor even from Perception, but from Authority': explain and illustrate this, exhibiting clearly the meaning of Authority. What parts of your own knowledge have you derived from Authority? On what conditions mainly does the value of Authority depend?

30. What is meant by Necessary Truths? Do you think that there are any truths which can be known to be necessary? If so, how can they be known to be such and what will be the use of such truths in logical thought?

31. 'All cases of reasoning in which the premise or premises are particular facts are cases of Induction': accepting this as a definition of Induction, show from it what the chief kinds or forms of Induction will be; and indicate the logical value of each, giving examples.

32. Fully explain and illustrate the uses of Nomenclature and Terminology. Exhibit the relation of Nomenclature to Definition and Classification

33. Galileo saw with his telescope that the planet Jupiter is a centre about which several satellites revolve, receiving light and warmth from him ; and appealed to this fact as an argument to prove that the sun is a centre about which the Earth and other planets revolve as satellites. What was the logical character of Galileo's reasoning here, and what, in your opinion, was its logical value ?

34. You believe that Siraj-ud-daulah took Calcutta from the English in 1756 : state on what grounds you believe this proposition, and exhibit their logical character.

35. A bell struck in a vacuum gives no sound ; therefore sound must be a movement of the atmosphere. Exhibit the logical character of the reasoning here.

36. It is a popular belief that there will be a change of weather at new moon : what logical process would be required to establish the validity of this belief ?

37. "When beggars die, there are no comets seen ;
The heavens themselves blaze forth the death
of princes." *Julius Cæsar*, II, 2.

Characterize logically the grounds of this belief.

38. 'Every man who has seen the world knows that nothing is so useless as a general maxim ' Estimate this logically, pointing out what would be necessary for logically establishing this proposition.

39. Discuss the following :—Any syllogism involving directly an illicit process of major or minor involves indirectly a fallacy of undistributed middle.

40. Carefully consider the fundamental assumptions which must be made in order to rationalize experience.

41. What is Perception ? What is Inference ? How are they related to each other logically ? Give examples. 'That tree there is a mango tree ; it will be loaded with fruits in the month of June.' Explain the elements of Perception and Inference involved in the statement.

42. Given two premises of the form most B's are C, most A's are B, can any inference be drawn? If so, of what kind, and on what conditions will its value depend? Give examples.

43. What is Experiment? Why is it thought necessary to deal with the methods of Experiment in Logic? State the Method of Agreement, giving symbolical and concrete examples. What is its characteristic defect, and how may it be overcome?

44. Explain and exemplify the process which Bacon called 'Inference from Simple Enumeration.' Explain in what its inferiority consists, and how it differs from scientific induction.

45. Given that the major term is distributed in the premises and undistributed in the conclusion of a valid syllogism, determine the syllogism.

46. Distinguish between *deduction* and *induction*, their scope and functions

47. Explain what sort of logic is used in order to make the following statements :—

(a) The heat of June is followed by the refreshing showers of July.

(b) Homer is the common property of all later poets.

(c) Plants must breathe in order to live.

48. What is meant by the *cause* of an event? How does a cause differ from *conditions*?

49. What are the various canons of elimination? Show, by concrete examples, how each of them furnishes a method of inquiry into causation.

50. What is meant by *varying the circumstances* in scientific investigation? Discuss, giving illustrations, the use and necessity of this process.

51. Explain the nature, modes, and limits of *logical explanation*. What is its relation to hypothesis and induction? Contrast the scientific conception of explanation with the popular.

52. Discuss the nature, value, and uses of *analogical*

reasoning. How does analogy differ from induction and generalization?

53. Distinguish between *observation* and *experiment*, and explain their importance in Inductive Logic. Discuss the comparative advantages and disadvantages of these two processes.

54. Explain and illustrate the following :—

Plurality of Causes, Intermixture of Effects, Law of Nature, Empirical Law, Working Hypothesis, Necessary Truths.

55. Distinguish between *non-observation* and *mal-observation*, giving concrete examples of their various forms. State your opinion as to which is more common in actual life.

56. Prove that when the major term of a syllogism is predicate in the major premise, the minor premise must be affirmative.

57. Distinguish between Immediate and Mediate knowledge. Do these two forms of knowledge come equally within the province of Logic? Give reasons for your answer.

58. Distinguish between Formal and Material Logic. Does this distinction coincide with that between Deductive and Inductive Logic? Discuss this question.

59. Can Induction be reduced to syllogistic reasoning? Mention some attempts made in this direction and give your own view on this subject with reasons to support it.

60. Mention some forms of reasoning which appear to be inductive, but are really deductive. Give a concrete example of each.

61. Reduce the following arguments to their logical form and examine their correctness :—

(1) He has no appreciation of beauty, for he has no taste for pictures

(2) The value of a thing depends on its utility ; but iron is the most useful metal : therefore, of all metals, iron is the most precious.

(3) Warm countries alone produce wine ; but Abyssinia is a warm country : therefore, Abyssinia produces wine.

(4) If a conclusion is more certain to be wrong where the reasoning is correct from premises that are false, will not the best logician be the least safeguard in subjects where perfect certainty is unattainable ?

(5) Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, *etc*, have been countenanced by public opinion in several countries ; all the crimes we know of are Revenge, Robbery, Adultery, Infanticide, *etc* : therefore, all the crimes we know of have been countenanced by public opinion in several countries.

(6) What we eat grew in the fields ; loaves of bread are what we eat : therefore, loaves of bread grew in the fields.

(7) An indifferent act is not right ;

An indifferent act is not wrong :

∴ Not wrong is not right :

∴ (By contraposition) Right is wrong.

(8) If Cæsar was a tyrant, he deserved to die :

Cæsar was not a tyrant :

∴ He did not deserve to die.

(9) Good always triumphs, and vice always fails : therefore, the victor cannot be wrong, nor the vanquished right.

(10) All who have passed the Matriculation Examination have a knowledge of Mathematics ; hence this person cannot have passed that Examination, for he has no knowledge of Mathematics.

(11) Irresponsible men are self-sufficient ; and only careful men are responsible

(12) What will people think of your consistency, if after these many years you change your views ?

(13) The phenomena of spirit-rapping are not more wonderful than those of electricity, and as we know that the electric telegraph is no fable, we are justified in accepting the accounts we receive of spirit-rapping as true.

(14) Books should not be lent from public libraries ;

for, if the books are common, it is unnecessary to lend them ; and wrong to lend them, if they are rare.

(15) A is never found without B ; B is never found without C ; therefore, C is never found without A.

(16) Avarice is innocent : for it is allowed by the laws, and whatever these allow is innocent.

(17) Are honours and rewards, public or private, to be considered useless, because men of genius rise above them and stupid men are not influenced by them ?

(18) No unwise men can be trusted ; hence some speculative men are unworthy of trust, for they are unwise.

(19) No soldiers should be brought into the field who are not well-qualified to perform their part. Only veterans are well-qualified to perform their part. Therefore, only veterans should be brought into the field.

(20) Why have you not carried out my orders ? If your excuse is, that you forgot, you have been grossly careless ; if you wilfully neglected them, you are guilty of a breach of trust. In either case, I can no longer retain you in my service.

(21) Blood is a colour ; for it is red, and red is a colour.

(22) Animal-food may be entirely dispensed with ; and vegetable-food may be entirely dispensed with ; therefore, as all food consists of animal-food and vegetable-food, all food may be entirely dispensed with.

(23) No wise man is unhappy ; for no dishonest man is wise and no honest man is unhappy.

(24) A government has the right to enact laws, for it could not exist without them ; therefore a government must have the right to prescribe what the religion of the people shall be.

(25) Few men are patriots, because few men possess the quality which is essential to patriotism, namely disinterestedness. *

(26) Some kings are tyrants ; for Nero was a king, and he was a tyrant.

(27) Men alone are rational creatures ; and therefore angels, not being men, are irrational beings.

(28) Opium is a poison ; but physicians advise some of their patients to take opium : therefore, physicians advise some of their patients to take poison.

(29) The story of the formation of the human race by Prometheus must be true ; for the clay from which he formed it was shown in Greece within historical times.

(30) If education is popular, compulsion is unnecessary ; if unpopular, compulsion will not be tolerated.

(31) A truth should not be neglected, because it seems impractical ; for many truths that seem impractical prove upon trial to be applicable to practice.

(32) Any man, who sincerely lays down his life in the service of his country without any ulterior motives whatever, is really worthy of respect ; but as such men are few, it is evident that few men are really worthy of respect.

(33) How valueless the syllogism as a test of truth ! For are there not many arguments recognized as valid which it is impossible to express in a syllogistic form ?

(34) How can you deny the justice of persecution when you admit that it is sometimes ineffective ?

(35) It cannot be true that all infliction of pain is evil, if punishment is painful and yet is frequently beneficial.

(36) Silk is dearer than wool, and wool than cotton ; therefore silk is dearer than cotton.

(37) No one who is without a sense of honour can be influenced by public opinion. Diogenes is not endowed with a sense of honour, and therefore he cannot be influenced by public opinion.

(38) During the retreat of the Ten Thousand a cutting north wind blew in the faces of the soldiers ; sacrifices were offered to Boreas, and the severity of the wind immediately ceased, which seemed a proof of the god's causation.

(39) In several instances states that have grown outrageously luxurious have declined in power ; and we are led to believe that luxury caused this downfall.

(40) The modern nations will be extinct, for the great ancient empires are perished.

(41) We know that there are arctic regions in Mars ; if there are also arctic animals, they must be white for arctic animals on the Earth are white.

(42) To be wealthy is not to be healthy ; not to be healthy is to be miserable ; therefore to be wealthy is to be miserable.

(43) I shall not pass this examination, for although I should have done so if I had read Mill's *Logic*, I have not read that book.

(44) We ought not to go to war, because it is wrong to shed blood.

(45) He was too impulsive a man not to have committed many errors.

(46) This patent medicine must be very efficacious : for all the testimonials speak of the marvellous cures effected by it.

(47) As soon as I sat down to study this morning, the man in the adjoining room began to play on the harmonium. He must therefore be a very malicious person.

(48) Everything must have a cause ; for if anything wanted a cause it would produce itself, that is, exist before it existed, which is impossible.

(49) Art is not fostered by money ; for a true artist would practise his art for its own sake, and a bad artist should not be encouraged.

(50) It is injustice to the intellect of women to refuse them the suffrage ; for the reigns of many queens have been famous for literary productions.

(51) Either the proposition (S is P) is true, or it is not true ; and since you must either accept it as true or deny it as false, you cannot, logically, in any way suspend your judgment in the matter.

(52) What is the use of all this teaching ? Every day you hear of a fraud or forgery, by some one who might have led an innocent life, if he had never learnt to read and write.

(53) I will have no more doctors ; I see that all of those who have died this winter have had doctors.

(54) We need not mind pain ; for if it is long continued, it is not severe ; and if it is severe, it does not last long.

(55) "Our ideas reach no further than our experience. We have no experience of divine attributes and operations. I need not conclude my syllogism. You can draw the inference yourself." (Hume.)

(56) Freedom means power to do or forbear from doing any particular act, upon preference : and since the will is merely the power of preference, the question whether the will is free is an unmeaning one : therefore the only proper question is whether a man (not his will) is free.

(57) In "Is Shakespeare Dead ?" Mark Twain argues that Shakespeare was either a lawyer or not the author of the works which go under his name, since a technical knowledge of law is found in lawyers. May we not equally argue that Shakespeare must have been a doctor, a warrior, a priest, a king, a fool, a woman, or any other of the many types of beings he so marvellously created, or else incapable of producing such works.

(58) Whatever any man desires is desirable ; every man desires happiness : therefore, the happiness of every man is desirable.

(59) Giving advice is useless. For either you advise a man what he means to do, in which case the advice is superfluous : or you advise him what he does not mean to do, and the advice is ineffective.

(60) Theft cannot be a crime, for it was encouraged by the laws of Lycurgus.

(61) Since it is just to take interest, it is right to exact it from one's own father.

(62) We *see* the sun rise and set every day, therefore the sun does actually rise and set.

(63) Unhealthiness in the parents is not the cause of unhealthiness in the children, because many unhealthy persons have perfectly healthy children.

(64) A habitual drunkard who studied hard for the army

in his youth has got shattered nerves, therefore the cause of his shattered nerves is his hard study in youth.

(65) The University of Calcutta is above criticism, as it has produced eminent lawyers, doctors, engineers, scholars and public men.

(66) The Great War was followed by an outbreak of epidemic diseases, therefore the war may be taken to be the cause of these diseases.

(67) The number of deaths in Calcutta per annum is greater than in Nagpur. Therefore Calcutta is more unhealthy than Nagpur.

(68) The eating of mangoes is the cause of boils.

(69) One of the sailors rescued wore an amulet, and this was, no doubt, the cause of his escape.

(70) This man must be the thief, for he was in the room whence the article has been stolen and he came out as soon as I entered the room.

(71) How glad am I at your success, which I really anticipated ! Is it not meet, therefore, that you should give me some reward ?

(72) What better explanation can we give of the fact that we can see through glass than that it is transparent ?

(73) Induction supported by Deduction affords the most conclusive proof. Now we see men around us more or less given to evil ways. And we also read in our sacred books (the *Shastras*) that in the present age (*Kali Yuga*) there would be degeneration of mankind. Can, then, there be a more conclusive proof of the degeneration of modern times ?

(74) He must be an excellent man in all respects, for I have been favourably impressed by his actions.

(75) It is indeed very strange that the sky during the day is without any stars, while at night the sky is full of stars !

(76) How can you deny that the flash of lightning is the cause of the peal of thunder when you find the former invariably preceding the latter ?

(77) Good laws are for good people. It is useless to offer good laws to bad people.

(78) Gold is heavier than silver because the weight of the former is greater than that of the latter.

(79) Comets were seen either before or during the Wars of the Roses, the Civil Wars in England, France, and the United States as well as the Peninsular and Crimean Wars. Thus, Comets always portend disaster.

(80) Candour as a virtue ought to be cultivated; therefore secrecy in war should be strongly condemned.

(81) The Vice-Chancellor of This University must be an ease loving person, since in no day of the year does he grant an interview, even for five minutes, to all the graduates of the University.

(82) The whole family has been vaccinated, yet some have had small-pox. It is clear, therefore, that vaccination is no safeguard.

(83) Roman Catholicism is but another name for disloyalty to the sovereign, for were there not many Roman Catholic plots in England to depose Queen Elizabeth?

(84) The non-co-operators should not boycott the University, for their leaders are all educated men?

(85) The Reforms have given a death-blow to Bolshevism in India, for the people are now looking forward to a better state of things.

(86) Life is but light, and no wonder that a man should be cut off in the prime of life; a light burning brightly is very often put out by a puff of wind.

(87) The University is the Temple of Learning, and therefore politics has no place in it.

(88) We should not mourn the death of eminent men, for by the law of the survival of the fittest, those that are still alive must be fitter and better than those that are gone.

(89) Oh! I would give the whole world for peace of mind, for that is really invaluable.

(90) I do not consult physicians, for those that do so also die.

(91) The University evidently looks only to sectarian interests, since it does not fix the dates of its examinations by reference to the convenience of all communities.

(92) I can conclusively prove that you are a beast. How? Are you the same as I am? No. Can you deny that I am a man? No. Thus, you are, by your own admission, not a man. You must, therefore, be a beast.

(93) Four and five are nine; but nine is one number; four and five, therefore, must be one number.

(94) The conclusion of this syllogism cannot but be universal, as both of its premises are universal.

(95) The planet Mars resembles the Earth in possessing atmosphere, water, and moderate temperature, and we may therefore suppose it to be inhabited.

(96) Moisture bedews a cold metal or stone when we breathe on it. The same appears on a glass of ice-water, and on the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail chills the external air. Therefore when an object contracts dew it is colder than the surrounding air.

(97) There is no use trying for anything, for what is fated must happen.

(98) England has a gold coinage, and is a very wealthy country, therefore it may be inferred that other countries having a gold coinage will be wealthy.

(99) A man wearing an amulet escapes shipwreck, therefore the amulet is the cause of his escape.

(100) "The scarcity of a dear year, by diminishing the demand for labour, tends to lower its price, as the high price of provisions tends to raise it. The plenty of a cheap year, on the contrary, by increasing the demand, tends to raise the price of labour, as the cheapness of provisions tends to lower it. In the ordinary variations of the price of provisions, those two opposite causes seem to counterbalance one another; which is probably in part the reason why the wages of labour are everywhere so much more steady and permanent than the price of provisions."

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
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